I* 


(U/ 


////J  K^<r 


STUDIES  IN  THE  LEADING  OF  TROOPS 


BY 


General  J.  von  yERDY  du  Vernois, 

Commander  of  Count  Schwerin's  14th  Infantry 
Regiment  (3d  Pomeranian). 


VOLUME  I. 

Tlie  Infantry  Division  as  a  Part  of  an 
Army  Corps. 


REVISED  BY 

Colonel  von  Gossler, 

Commander  of  the  4th  Infantry  Regiment,  Guard  Corps. 


TRANSLATED  FROM  THE  GERMAN  BY 

Lieutenant-Colonel  William  Gerlach, 

U.  S.  Army,  Retired. 


ARMY  WAR 
COLLEGE, 

LIBRARY, 


6 


OCT  16  1906 


ar 

v  + 


\m^'^''''^ 


I 


PREFACE. 


In  order  to  develop  and  direct  the  war  strength  of  a 
nation,  we  must  have  commanders,  and  we  must  educate  them. 
While  their  education  should  in  the  main  be  of  a  practical 
nature,  yet  there  is  no  question  but  that  it  must  go  hand  in 
hand  with  a  theoretical  course  of  study. 

Nor  can  we  lose  sight,  at  the  outset,  of  how  little  time 
for  theoretical  preparation  is  available  to  one  of  the  military 
profession. 

He  who  lays  claim  to  culture  cannot  dispense  with  a 
general  scientific  foundation,  to  be  followed  by  a  professional 
education.  While  the  former  almost  wholly  occupies  the 
school-year  period  of  a  young  man,  his  practical  education 
should  nevertheless  begin  as  soon  as  possible.  It  is  for  tWs 
reason  that  with  cadets  in  military  schools,  public  or  private, 
professional  instruction  can  strive  only  for  limited  results,  a 
condition  detrimental  to  the  most  important  subject  of  their 
study — Tactics.  Furthermore,  the  field  of  Tactics  is  too  large 
and  too  intricate  to  allow  the  beginner  to  go  over  it  thoroughly 
during  this  period.  As  a  consequence,  we  find  it  practicable 
to  treat  in  detail  only  minor  situations  in  which  he  may  have 
to  act  at  the  outset  of  his  army  career,  outside  of  which  we 
must  be  content  with  a  general  illustration  and  superficial 
knowledge. 

Although  education  continues  after  officer's  rank  has  been 
attained,  yet  an  officer's  career  admits  generally  of  only  an 
imperfect  filling  of  the  existing  void.  Although  military  edu- 
cation is  at  present  chiefly  promoted  by  the  performance  of 
actual  duties,  this  alone  is  not  sufficient.  In  addition,  we  need 
intelligent  guidance,  and  no  one  will  deny  that  practical  train- 
ing will  bear  better  fruit  if  it  proceeds  simultaneously  with  a 
progressive  theoretical  education.     Charged  with  this  duty  in 

iii 

ivi2i0?65 


iv  Preface. 

the  must  coniprclicnsivc  manner  is  our  highest  military  edu- 
cational institution,  the  Royal  War  Academy,  which  was  in- 
deed established  especially  for  this  purpose.  It  would  be  well 
if  all  young  officers  could  attend  it,  but  under  existing  condi- 
tions this  ^is  impracticable,  and  only  a  small  number  enjoy 
its  benefits.  If,  upon  completion  of  their  academic  course,  its 
students  should  imagine  that  their  education  was  completed, 
it  would  utterly  fail  in  its  mission.  One  of  the  most  precious 
fruits  that  mature  there  is  the  knowledge  that  is  gained  by 
the  combination  of  incessant  practical  work  and  progressive 
theoretical  education,  and  this  enlarged  knowledge  ought  to 
enable  the  student  thereafter  to  continue  his  progressive  train- 
ing by  his  own  efforts,  as  it  furnishes  him  a  guide  for  the 
accomplishment  of  this  end  in  the  most  efficient  manner. 

With   officers   who,   on   the   other   hand,    remain   perma- 
nently in  active  service  with  troops,  opportunities  for  further 
theoretical    education    are    incomparaljly    more    unfavorable. 
Their  demands  allow  them  but  a  few  free  hours,  and  these 
are  needed   for  recreation,   leaving   little   time    for   strenuous 
mental   labor.     Nevertheless   much  encouragement   is   offered 
even  here — scientific  lectures,  theoretical  service  compositions 
in  winter,   the   war-game,   and   practice   rides   are   some   of 
the  expedients,  all  of  which  will   be  more  useful  in  propor- 
tion to  the  zeal  displayed  in  their  pursuit  and  the  skill  with 
which  they  are  conducted.     Yet  a  thorough,  coherent  course 
of  study  by  these  means  is  hardly  practicable,  and  we  must 
depend  princi]ially  on  the  pcrso)ial  diliiioicc  of  the  individual 
officer.     Here  the  young  officer  especially  needs  guidance  and 
help,  so  that  he  may  use  his  time  to  the  best  advantage  and 
avoid  getting  on  the  wrong  road  in  this  difficult  field.     Mili- 
tary history,  doubtless  the  best  preceptress  for  every  one  who 
is  duly  prei)ared  to  enter  her  school,  is  dangerous  company 
for  one  not  yet  so  prepared.     Tactical  text-books,  whose  lit- 
erature  is   indeed  extensive,  are  therefore   all   that   is  at  the 
command  of  the   young  officer   for  his  progressive   trainings 
We  do  not  at  all  mean  to  belittle  the  value  of  tactics  in 
its  past   forms.     It  has  been  of  the   greatest  importance   for 
all  who  devote  themselves  to  the  study  of  the  art  of  war,  and 
we  owe  it  much.     Notwithstanding  this,  the  number  of  stu- 
dents who  have  been  led  astrav,  or  never  would  have  reached 


PkE^ACIv.  V 

their  goal  without  the  tried  teachers  who  assisted  them  or 
the  helping  hand  of  experience,  is  legion.  Tlic  novice  in  the 
field  of  martial  knowledge  cannot,  at  this  day,  dispense  with 
the  study  of  elementary  or  applied  tactics,  and  it  is  therefore 
insisted  that  text-books  should  adapt  themselves  to  the  needs 
of  our  times.  I  rebel  against  the  absolute  authority  with  which 
tactical  text-books  have  for  centuries  ruled  our  entire  scien- 
tific education,  and  I  maintain  that  the  progressive  training 
of  the  officer  may  be  accomplished  in  more  thorough  and  prac- 
tical ways  than  those  we  have  so  far  pursued. 

In  sirpport  of  this  assertion  note  the  following:  Many 
sciences  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  employment  of  troops  in  war, 
while  troop-leading  is  an  art  in  itself.  Although  the  material 
required  in  its  service  is  subject  to  relatively  minor  changes, 
the  problems  it  is  called  upon  to  solve  are  of  such  a  varied 
nature  that  it  becomes  impossible  to  compress  them  within  fixed 
boundaries.  So-called  applied  tactics  certainly  attempts  this, 
yet  both  it  and  strategy  appear  on  the  field  of  military  science: 
as  the  parts  which,  in  view  of  their  aim,  should  least  assume 
a  purely  scientific  character. 

We  may  ^certainly  strive  to  gain  our  object  in  different 
ways,  and  if  we  would  derive  real  benefit  from  applied  tactics, 
we  will  be  successful  if  it  prepares  us,  as  far  as  possible,  out- 
side of  real  practice,  for  troop-leading  in  zvar,  or  to  become 
its  useful  organs   (general  stafi'  officers,  adjutants,  or  aids). 

It  is  in  reality  not  so  important  that  one  should  be  com- 
petent to  prepare  a  good  treatise  on  a  given  theme,  as  that  he 
should  be  able  to  act  intelligently  in  a  case  before  him.  Above 
all,  the  first  result  is  produced  by  the  scientific  treatment  of  ap- 
plied tactics,  while  to  perform  the  latter,  if  he  would  play  his 
part  well,  the  student  must  be  trained.  In  the  same  manner, 
scientific  treatment  must  wrestle  with  the  disadvantage  already 
pointed  out,  that  the  nature  of  war  cannot  be  restricted  to  dis- 
tinct subdivisions;  should  we  attempt  this,  the  great  mass  of 
conditions  under  v/hich  we  give  battle  could  only  be  roughty 
disposed  of.  But  certainly  in  most  cases  these  conditions  do 
govern,  and  exert  a  powerful  influence.  Instead,  however,  of 
taking  them  into  account,  applied  tactics  gives  a  preponder- 
ant value  to  terrane;  their  entire  arrangement  is  often  based 
on  the  latter  alone.     It  describes  wood,  village,  and  defile  com- 


VI 


Preface. 


bat,  the  passage  and  defense  of  rivers,  the  struggle  for  a 
height,  actions  in  the  mountains  or  on  the  plain.  By  these 
means  scientific  treatises  are  built  up,  which,  like  all  similar 
compositions,  culminate  in  abstract  propositions,  and  create  a 
desire  to  give  a  rule  for  everything,  going  absolutely  too  far 
in  that  direction. 

C!onsidering  applied  tactics  from  the  standpoint  of  its  re- 
lation to  icrrane  and  rules,  so  characteristic  of  it,  v^e  observe 
the  following  points,  both  from  its  historical  development  and 
its  substance : 

The  combat  theory  of  the  eighteenth  century,  which  still 
prevailed  to  some  extent  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth, 
placed  a  preponderant  value  on  elementary  forms  and  an  ex- 
tremely limited  value  on  terrane.     Thus,  we  find  in  Tempel- 
hoff's  "History  of  the    Seven   Years'   War"   such   words   as 
these :     "The  village  itself  must  be  cleared  in  order  that  two 
battalions  may  march  through  it  in  line ;  otherwise  it  cannot 
be  defended."     The  wars  of  the  French  Revolution  caused  a 
violent  upheaval  in  this  field  ;  any  terrane,  if  at  all  practicable, 
was  entered,  and  in  course  of  time  formations  necessary  for  thi^ 
were  gradually  develo])ed.     Thus  the  terrane  acquired  greater 
importance  than  ever  before,  which  again  illustrates  the  fact 
that  every  innovation,  as  soon  as  it  proves  of  actual  value, 
gains  at  the  start  at  least  an  importance  far  above  its  intrinsic 
worth.     There  was  a  time  when  disputes  arose  as  to  whether 
a  battalion  should  defend  a  mountain  or  the  mountain  defend 
the   battalion.     These   aberrations   were   certainly   soon   over- 
come, but  the  echoes  remained,  although  j-jcrhaps  in  an  altered 
manner,  and  in  njost  military  dogmas  the  nature  of  terrane 
still  ])lays  the  most  prominent  ]>art.     Although,  however,  we 
certainly  cannot  question,  its  high  value,  yet,  as  a  rule,  terrane 
is  only  .secondary;  far  more  important  than  any  consideration 
ui  f^rand  tactics  arc  nearly  always  the  conditions  under  which 
7ve  give  battle — we  fight  for  a  village,  a  height,  a  wood — in 
fact,  for  any  locality,  as  we  find  it,  though  often  in  a  differ- 
ent maimer,  yet  ai:cays  according  to  tJic  means  at  Jiand  or  the 
object  of  the  combat. 

The  object  for  7i'hich  -n'C  fight  must  never  be  regarded  as 
of  secondary  importance :  it  cannot  be  dismissed  with  the  re- 
mark that  it  belongs  to  the  realm  of  strategy.     Scientific  treat- 


PrKe-^ace:.  vii 

ment  has  forced  a  division  into  tactics  and  strategy,  and  has 
thus  set  up  two  distinct  ideas  inseparable  from  the  independ- 
ent action  of  a  commander.  We  can  never  consider  separately 
the  questions,  Under  what  conditions  must  zve  ßghtf  and,  // 
we  must  fight;  how  shall  we  proceed?  The  former  determines 
the  latter,  and  he  who  is  taught  only  the  latter  will  be  robbed 
of  an  element  in  his  instruction  without  which  no  commander, 
from  lieutenant  to  commander  in  chief,  can  independently  act 
to  best  advantage. 

As  to  rules,  we  can  accord  them  only  limited  importance, 
for  we  are  able  to  apply  them  only  so  far  as  we  can  overlook 
and  absolutely  control  existing  conditions.  There  may  be 
rules  (or  rather,  principles)  for  the.  arrangement  of  marches, 
in  so  far  as  these,  dispositions  are  applicable  to  our  own  troops ; 
rules  for  the  establishment  of  outposts;  or  rules  determining 
upon  what  visible  objects  a  battery  should  fire  under  various 
circumstances ;  but  for  conducting  an  engagement  on  a  large 
scale  no  rules  can  be  given  —  there  they  become^  simply 
phrases,  for  we  can  then  neither  overlook  all  conditions  nor 
absolutely  control  them. 

In  war,  rules  that  shall  govern  under  all  conditions,  must 
necessarily  shrink  to  axioms,  as  in  mathematics,  where  we  say 
that  things  equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to  each  other. 
If  they  are  to  signify  any  more  than  this,  then  every  new  con- 
dition must  involve  a  new  exception.  The  rule  may  enjoin 
us  to  occupy  the  strong  line,  while  the  particular  situation 
compels  us  to  go  beyond  it;  the  rule  may  direct  us,  because 
we  are  stronger,  to  fight,  but  we  retreat,  for  we  are  needed 
more  in  another  place.  The  decision  must  be  deduced  from 
the  concrete  case;  the  rule  may  apply  in  one  instance,  but  in 
another  it  is  faulty.  Exact  science  rests  upon  a  case  already 
demonstrated,  out  of  which  we  deduce  a  second,  and  so  on, 
building  up  a  system ;  but  practical  life,  and  war  above  every- 
thing else,  must  reckon  with  ever-varying,  even  incalculable, 
quantities ;  indeed,  all  it  can  foresee  is  the  next  immediate 
occurrence,  and  even  this  but  incompletely,  and  can  infer 
no  second  beyond  it. 

In  spite  of  this,  we  often  find  in  texts  on  strategy  and 
applied  tactics  sentences  like  these :  ''Concentrate  your  forces 
on  the  enemy's  weak  point" ;  or,  "If  the  enemy  does  this,  you 


Mil 


PrKi-aciC 


must  do  that."  W'liat  becomes  of  the  nature  of  war  then? 
The  enemy  will  hardly  be  obliging  enough  to  tell  us  his 
strength,  his  intentions,  or  how  he  i)roposes  to  accomplish  his 
intentions.  IMuch  of  this  we  only  find  out  in  the  course  of 
action,  often  in  a  very  surprising  manner;  more  we  learn  when 
the  figiit  is  over;  but  most  turns  up  in  military  history,  years 
afterwards.  At  Skalitz,  even  after  the  battle  was  over,  the 
Eighth  Austrian  army  corps  placed  too  high  an  estimate  on 
the  strength  of  its  op]:>onent,  believing  it  had  encountered  two 
Prussian^orps.  Even  after  the  campaign  was  over,  similar 
mistakes  were  made  by  tlie  Sixth  Austrian  corps,  and  by 
Wnuck's  cavalry  brigade  at  Nachod.  A  hundred  examples 
miojit  indeed  be  cited  from  the  engagements  in  1866,  where 
portions  of  both  sides  erred  in  judging  the  strength  and  in- 
tentions of  their  opponents,  untii  the  official  narrative  cleared 
up  the  situation. 

The  cause  of  all  this  is  simple — each  side  endeavors  to 
conceal  from  its  opponent  whatever  it  does.  The  leaders  and 
the  cavalry  patrols  in  war  cannot  ride  into  the  enemy's  skir- 
mish line 'in  order  to  obtain  information. 

When  the  nature  of  war  is  therefore  such  that  everything 
on  the  enemy's  side  appears  uncertain  and  often  unknown, 
and  on  our  own  side  a  wide  range  of  misunderstandings  and 
errors  (all  that  we  call  friction)  develop,  where  shall  we  apply 
a  rule  ?  In  war  twice  two  is  not  always  four.  We  can  nc\'er 
tell  whether  we  should  apply  a  rule,  or  make  an  exception. 
Consequently,  in  this  fluctuating  field,  all  that  is  left  for  us 
is  an  apj)eal  to  our  own  resources.  Dcfinitcncss  as  to  zvhat  we 
propose  to  do  and  resolute  execution  of  our  intentions — these 
are  the  pilots  that  carry  us  over  dangerous  obstacles.  And 
for  this  reason  it  is  that  military  virtue  is  rooted  infinitely 
deeper  in  character  than  in  scientific  attainments.^ 

iThis  thought  always  reminds  me  of  the  engagement  at  Nachod. 
It  was  my  first  time  in  action.  Things  looked  duhious  for  a  time 
on  the  plateau  of  Wenzel  Hill.  Companies  of  the  advance  guard, 
and  a  battery,  were  falling  back,  while  the  columns  of  the  main 
body  wero  hurriedly  moving  up  (he  mountain  pass  below.  The  sit- 
uation liad  become  critical;  If  the  Auptrians  should  succeed  in  get- 
ling  a  firm  foothold  on  the  hill,  the  debouchment  of  the  corps  would 
in  all  probability  be  frustrated.  During  a  pause,  which  permitted 
calm  refle<tion,  I  pondered  all  the  theories  concerning  debouching 


PrK-tace;.  ix 

We  will  hope  that  military  sciences  may  ever  retain  their 
high  importance,  and  that  applied  tactics,  scientifically  treated, 
may  also  yield  great  profit,  despite  the  fact  that  they  will  not 
be  sufficient  in  this  form  for  a  practical  education  in  troop- 
leadin,^.  For  here  we  have  a  real  void,  the  filling  of  which 
is  doubtless  necessary.  This  can  be  accomplished  only  by  a 
System  of  l^roop-leading.  As  a  consequence  Tactics  and 
Strategy  will  most  certainly  lose  the  importance  which,  in  the 
theoretical  field,  has  up  to  this  been  accorded  them  in  an  un- 
limited degree — they  will  only  retain  their  place  as  an  intro- 
duction to  the  education  of  commanders. 

A  system  of  troop-leading,  framed  in  such  a  comprehen- 
sive manner  that  it  may  serve  as  a  guide  for  every  commander, 
has  become  a  necessity.     We  do  not  yet  possess  it. 

If  we  approach  the  problem  more  closely,  we  must  answer 
two  questions  at  the  outset;  What  is  to  he  taught  here?  and 
lioiv  shall  it  he  taught? 

We  cannot  ignore  the  fact  that  entirely  difi^erent  problems 
fall  to  the  lot  of  different  commanders,  in  peace  as  well  as  in 
war.  During  peace,  for  example,  the  company  commander 
must  instruct  his  non-commissioned  officers;  the  regimental 
commander  is  responsible  for  the  instruction  of  the  commis- 
sioned officers,  Tn  the  company  the  training  consists  princi- 
pally iü  preparing  the  individual  for  the  combat;  in  the  bat- 
talion we  have  the  co-operative  action  of  the  lowest  tactical 
units.  Subordinate  commanders  are  charged  with  detailed 
training  and  immediate  execution ;  as  we  go  higher  more  lead- 
ing is  demanded. 

In  like  manner  material  distinctions  are  seen  in  war-time. 
The  care  for  the  subsistence  of  a  company  requires  measures 
differing  from  those  necessary  in  the  case  of  a  division.  Prob- 
lems given  to  a  platoon  are  very  dift'erent  from  those  given 
to  a  regiment  or  army  corps.     The  lieutenant  posts  his  picket, 

out  of  a  defile  that  I  could  recall  from  text-books.  Not  one  fitted 
the  case  before  me.  I  cast  them  aside,  and  asked  jnyself,  "What  is 
the  real  issue  here?"  The  answer  came  spontaneously:  "The  ad- 
vance guard  on  the  height  must  do  its  best  to  hold  it,  while  the  col- 
umns of  the  main  body  coming  up  the  valley  must  try  to  reach  it 
as  soon  as  possible  and  take  part  in  the  action  where  the  fight  is 
retrograding."     Prom  that  hour  dates  my  aversion  to  tactical  rules. 


X  Preface. 

the  battalion  occupies  an  outpost  line,  the  platoon  can  prepare 
itself  for  defense  in  a  farm-house,  while  the  defense  of  a  vil- 
lage devolves  upon  a  battalion. 

Much  of  what  it  is  necessary  to  learn  is  common  to  the 
entire  gradation  of  commanders,  but  the  view  differs  from 
every  round  of  the  ladder.  What  use  is  there  in  a  subaltern's 
studying  only  the  operations  of  armies  or  the  conduct  of  bat- 
tles?" He  should  be  interested  rather  in  speculating  on  what 
situation  he  might  find  himself  in  when  in  the  field  with  his 
platoon,  or  at  the  head  of  a  company  if  his  captain  should  fall, 
or  even  in  charge  of  a  battalion.  It  is  therefore  essential  that 
he  should  at  first  limit  his  studies,  and  above  all  that  he  should 
make  clear  to  himself  the  conditions  he  must  meet  in  such 
cases,  before  he  approaches  the  study  of  grand  tactics  in  a 
comprehensive  manner. 

A  theory  of  troop-leading  should  therefore  start  with 
the  lowest  divisions,  commencing  with  the  platoon  or  the 
company ;  it  ought  to  include  the  entire  gradation  of  the  mili- 
tary hierarchy,  up  to  the  command  of  an  army.  An  auxiliary 
scheme  might  cover  the  education  for  special  functions,  of 
the  aides-de-camj),  of  the  general  staA'  officers  in  their  various 
positions,  of  the  supply  departments,  and  of  the  hospital 
corps,  in  an  analogous  manner.  In  some  of  these  branches 
we  already  have  excellent  text-books.  On  company  duties, 
too,  we  have  some  for  non-commissioned  officers.  The  value 
of  these  is  universally  acknowledged.  Why  should  we  not 
build  higher?  The  more  the  demands  of  the  various  positions 
are  in  time  increased,  the  greater  will  be  the  necessity  for  thor- 
ough instruction.  It  is  no  longer  possible  for  a  single  person 
to  master  the  entire  range  of  military  knowledge  and  skill, 
and  consequently  all  the  more  necessary  is  it  that  we  should 
take  up,  on  a  general  foundation,  those  problems  the  solu- 
tion of  which  practical  life  may  demand  of  the  individual  ac- 
cording to  his  station.  A  work  covering  the  whole  range  of 
trooi)-lcading  with  regard  only  to  special  requirements  of 
war  cannot  bc'compiled  by  one  man;  besides  the  time  re- 
quired, it  would  call  for  such  a  mass  of  practical  experience 
and  knowledge  as  we  could  never  expect  to  find  combined  in 
a  single  person.  Such  a  system  may.  however,  be  produced 
])v  tlu"  la!)or  of  many,  working  even  c]uito  independently.     It 


Pri-j^ace;.  xi 

is  therefore  greatly  desired  that  the  efforts  of  many  comrades 
be  brought  to  bear  in  this  direction. 

It  is  not  only  necessary  in  life  that  we  should  choose  to 
do  what  is  right,  but  that  we  should  go  to  work  in  a  practical 
manner  and  do  it. 

The  matter  in  point,  when  answering  the  second  question, 
is,  How  shall  troop-leading  be  taught?  What  method  should 
serve  as  our  basis? 

Here,  above  all,  we  must  remember  that,  as  in  every  art, 
a  knowledge  of  war  is  not  acquired  in  a  rationalistic,  but  in 
an  empirical  manner.  To  accomplish  something  creditable  in 
this  field,  routine  is  necessary  above  all  else.  But  how  shall 
this  routine  be  acquired?    What  should  be  its  special  aim? 

In  view  of  the  nature  of  war  as  we  have  described  it, 
the  following  characteristics  must  be  developed  in  a  com- 
mander of  troops : 

To   quickly   form   definite   and   intelligent  decisions; 

To  clearly  and  intelligently  communicate  these  de- 
cisions to  others ; 

To  lead  troops  so  they  will  accomplish  ends  sought; 

To  quickly  determine  upon  bold  enterprises  and 
promptly  execute  them. 

Although  the  formation  of  character  must  be  left  to  the 
conditions  of  practical  and  personal  life,  the  development  of 
the  military  judgment  may  be  promoted  in  a  theoretical  man- 
ner. /^Different  roads  lead  in  this  direction;  but  after  some 
experience  has  been  gained  by  the  student,  the  following 
method,  in  my  judgment,  is  the  best:  Illustrating  the  divers- 
ity of  situations  by  continual  practice  on  concrete  cases  and 
teaching  the  nature  of  zvar  through  these  illustrations,  there- 
by developing  the  faculties  above  mentioned  by  causing  the 
student  to  form  a  multitude  of  decisions  and  make  his  dispo- 
sitions accordingly. 

This  end  can  best  be  achieved  by  the  so-c^led  applicatory 
method,  which  indeed  for  some  time  past  has  been  in  use  in 
our  military  schools.  It  is  true  this  method  cannot  be  equally 
applicable  to  all  branches  of  learning,  nor  can  be  employed  in 


Ml 


Prkface. 


cvcrv  ])art  of  an  institulioii.  for  llic  reason  that,  making  the 
greatest  ilemands  on  intlependent  study,  it  takes  up  too  much 
time.  It  nevertheless  appears  to  be  the  most  advantageous 
method  for  the  study  of  tactics  and  military  history,  promis- 
ing withal  the  quickest  returns. 

This  method  is  eminently  applicable  to  independent  study. 
We  either  create  a  situation,  or  take  one  already  given;  we 
practice  the  framing  of  orders  and  instructions;  we  elaborate 
the  special  dispositions  for  the  march, |the  length  of  the  col- 
umn, and  time  required  for  deployment;  we  next  suppose  the 
receipt  of  reports  or  orders  and  the  appearance  of  hostile  bod- 
ies;  and  we  then  sketch  out  a  plan  of  action;  and  finally  such 
measures  may  lead  us  into  an  engagement  and  force  us  to 
consider  dispositions  for  its  conduct  or  what  we  may  have  to 
do  upon  its  close.  Such  exercises  are  particularly  instruct- 
ive in  connection  with  military  history.  Tlicy  can  never  he 
broHi^ht  to  an  end,  for  they  arc  practice  work;hyQ  continually 
create  new  situations,  which,  though  apparently  ahvays  sim- 
ilar, are  never  completely  alike.  The  task  which  a  commander 
sets  himself  or  has  assigned  him  cannot  be  confined  to  a  fixed 
form.  The  means  at  his  disposal,  according  to  strength,  com- 
position, and  quality  of  troops;  the  intentions  of  the  enemy; 
the  terrane  in  ail  its  variations ;  and  many  other  elements  are 
a  marvelous  kaleidoscope  in  which  .accident  may  construct  the 
oddest  situations. 

The  studies  now  l)eforc  us  are  ofifered  as  a  contribution 
to  the  theory  of  troop-leading  herein  advocated  and  as  an  ex- 
])lication  of  the  method  suggested.  They  are  studies  for  him 
who  WTites  them ;  for  younger  comrades  they  may  serve  as 
text -books. 

The  conditions  shown  are  based  on  actual  occurrences, 
but  their  elaboration  is  the  product  of  fancy.  This  course  has 
been  ])ursued  because  it  appeared  the  best  in  a  text-book,  for 
thus  the  critique  which  is  contained  in  the  reflections  that  fol- 
low can  move  along  with  perfect  freedom,  unhampered  by 
considerations  tliat  would  bind  it  as  soon  as  the  actions  in  late 
wars  were  the  real  subjects  of  contemplation.  Furthermore, 
an  imagined  situation  has  the  advantage  of  bringing  out  all 
we   intend   to  teach,   by  permitting  events  to  take   a  certain 


i're:i^aci5.  Xlll 

course.    This  is  not  practicable  in  describing  a  real  action,  as 
it  fails  to  present  the  variety  of  situations  demanded. 

Once  more  let  me  emphasize  the  fact  that  these  studies 
simply  form  a  text-book. /l^he  diligent  student  who  by  practice 
and  theoretical  studies  has  first  acquired  a  sufficient  under- 
standing of  war  and  its  demands  is  referred  to  the  independent 
study  of  military  history.  The  whole  end  of  our  effort  should 
culminate  in  this,  that  each  should  be  finally  competent  to  form 
his  own  opinions,  and  for  this  military  history  is  our  best 
guide.  All  that  is  therefore  necessary  at  present  is  to  point 
out  to  the  beginner  the  direction  in  which  he  may  pursue  his 
studies  to  the  best  advantage. 

It  is  also  intended  in  this  w^ork  to  direct  attention  espe- 
cially to  the  training  for  troop-leading  under  the  conditions  of 
grand  tactics.  Our  entire  peace  training,  inclusive  of  autumn 
maneuvers,  consists  principally  of  detachment  exercises ;  a  few 
hours  only  are  devoted  to  combat  movements  of  the  real  bat- 
tle unit,  the  division.  Even  our  largest  exercises,  the  maneu- 
vers of  one  corps  against  another,  still  pertain  in  a  certain  de- 
gree to  detachment  war,  as  they  are  necessarily  constructed 
on  a  general  situation  covering  several  days,  and  these  corps 
we  can  imagine  only  loosel}?-  connected  with  an  army.  In 
grand  tactics  stich  a  performance  is  rarely  the  zuork  of  an 
army  corps;  the  leading  of  a  corps  and  its  subdivisions  is 
regulated  differently,  if  it  is  isolated  during  several  days,  than 
if  the  movements  of  another  corps  of  the  same  army  must  also 
be  taken  into  consideration. 

Each  question  influences  the  conduct  of  an  independent 
leader  in  quite  a  different  manner  than  if  his  command  is 
directly  dependent  upon  another  command.  The  officer  who 
suddenly  encounters  the  enemy  when  patrolling  with  his  pla- 
toon must  conduct  his  actions  from  a  different  point  of  view 
than  if  he  commanded  his  platoon  deployed  as  skirmishers  in 
advance  of  his  company.  A  division  in  an  army  corps  will 
generally  be  so  situated  that  it  must  carry  out  an  action  even 
though  it  be  completely  annihilated  in  doing  so,  and  then  it 
w^ould  still  be  promoting  the  general  purpose ;  on  the  other 
hand,  a  division  widely  separated  from  an  army  would,  as  a 
rule,  utterly  fail  to  accomplish  its  mission  if  it  allowed  itself 
to  be  annihilated.     At  Königgrätz,  Fransecky's  division  could 


XIV 


Prki-aci:. 


render  the  army  no  greater  service  than  to  draw  upon  itself  as 
much  of  the  hostile  "force  as  possible,  unconcerned  whether  it 
might  thereby  be  wiped  out.  While  a  division  under  the  con- 
ditions that  led  to  the  detachment  of  the  forces  of  Generals 
Stolberg  and  Von  Knobelsdorf  for  the  protection  of  Upper 
Silesia,  would  never  have  been  justified  in  accepting  and  carry- 
uig  on  an  action  such  as  Lieutenant-General  von  Fransecky 
ventured  for  the  good  of  the  whole. 

In  this  way  material  differences  manifest  themselves  be- 
tween the  actions  of  completely  independent  bodies  and  bodies 
in  larger  commands.  While  our  peace  exercises  continually 
furnish  instruction  in  the  first  direction,  they  cannot  do  so  in 
the  latter.  Therefore  a  theoretical  education  which  goes  be- 
yond the  elementary  conditions  should  be  concerned  princi- 
pally with  grand  tactics  and  the  dependent  conditions  that 
exist  in  them. 

The  following  studies  in  troop-leading  deal  especially  with 
situations  in  grand  tactics,  and  in  order  to  draw  more  advan- 
tage from  this  it  covers  not  only  the  sphere  of  action  of 
the  division  commander,  but  also  the  actions  of  commanders 
under  him,  in  so  far  as  conditions  before  the  enemy  are  in- 
volved. Such  a  dilatation  will  indeed  become  superfluous  when- 
ever a  perfect  theory  of  troop-leading  shall  be  available;  but 
for  the  present  it  seems  to  be  quite  necessary. 

It  is  evident  that  in  this  form  the  work  can  be  of  some 
benefit  to  the  independent  student.  Where  dispositions  and 
rellections  are  elaborated  in  the  text,  the  student  should  never- 
theless not  shirk  the  labor  of  working  them  out  anew  for  him- 
self. How  to  do  this  will  be  shown  in  detail  in  the  Appendix 
to  Part  I.'  Let  the  student  also  remember  that  these  studies 
are  not  merely  reading-matter,  but  that  they  must  be  worked 
over  with  dividers.  pai)er,  and  pencil. 

The  dispositions  described  on  the  following  pages  as 
having  been  made  on  various  occasions  lay  no  claim  to  perfec- 
tion ;  in  such  a  difficult  field  as  troop-leading  we  can  hardly 
expect  that  a  theory  be  jK'rfect  thrcnighout.  when  so  much  is 
yet  open  f<»r  discussion.     I'ut  even  so  it  can  be  useful  if  the 

»The  student  is  advised  to  read  tlie  first  pages  of  the  Appen- 
dix before  proceeding  witli  the  problems. 


t-REifACi:.  XV 

reader  himself  fornis  an  independent  opinion  on  every  situa- 
tion. This  will  give  him  an  opportunity  for  comparison  with 
possibly  divergent  opinions  in  the  text,  and  for  testing  his  own 
judgment.  In  this  connection  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the 
fact  that  judgment  is  primarily  determined  by  one's  own  indi- 
viduality, and  that  we  may  attain  success  in  a  variety  of  ways. 

As  regards  the  general  situation  on  which  these  studies 
are  based,  the  work  is  connected  with  the  familiar  conditions 
that  existed  in  t866,  but  as  changes  are  made  at  the  outset 
(in  number  of  troops,  dispositions,  and  reports  of  what  actually 
took  place),  the  development  naturally  had  to  take  a  different 
course ;  facts  as  they  are  given  are  therefore  largely  the  prod- 
uct of  the  imagination.^  Hence  nothing  herein  can  properly 
he  said  to  be  a  critique  of  actual  events  in  the  campaign  of 
1866. 

Von  Ve:rdy. 

Berlin,  June,  1870. 

With  the  author's  approval,  the  studies  have  been  revised, 
giving  due  consideration  to  Firing,  Drill,  and  Field  Service 
Regulations.  It  is  therefore  here  assumed  that  formations, 
regulations,  and  armament  were  the  same  in  1.866  as  they  are 
in  1898. 

Vo?^  GOSSLER, 

Colonel,  Commanding  4th  Infantry,  Guards  Corps. 
Berlin,  August,  i\ 


iFor  example,  only  the  general  situation  in  this  work  is  based 
on  real  conditions,  and  from  the  moment  the  commander  of  the  Sec- 
ond infantry  division  initiates  his  own  dispositions,  these,  their  exe- 
cution, and  the  incoming  reports  are  inventions. 


CONTENTS. 


BOOK  L 

The  Infantry  Division  as  a  Part  of  an  Army  Corps. 

Part  I. 

Page. 

General  situation,  June,.  1866 i 

vSpecial  situation  of  the  Second  infantry  division  on  June  26,     2 

Its  order  issued  for  June  27 22 

Comments .   28 

Information  received  concerning  the  Guard  corps,  and  dis- 
positions made  consequent  thereon 36 

Advance  on  Parschnitz 39 

Comments 4^ 

Rendezvous  at  Parschnitz 49 

Comments 5^ 

Problems 64 


Part  2. 

Expulsion  of  the  cneniy  from  Trautenau 71 

Time  consumed  in  deploying 87 

Resolutions  of  the  division  con.imander 89 

His  manngement  of  the  engagement 98 

His  choice  of  position loi 

His  mode  of  issuing  orders  and  seeing  to  their  execution.  .  106 

His  reports t^o^ 

The  general  staff  officer no 

The  Third  infantry  brigade  from  8  140  to  t  t  130 it6 

The  Fourth  infantry  brigade  from  8 140  to  i  J  130 I37 

The  division  cavalry  regiment  from  8:40  to  11:30 I43 

xvii 


xviii  Cox  ri-: NTS. 

Page. 

The  division  arlilkry  rciiiiiR-nt  from  X:4()  to  i  i  :3c) 14^ 

Problems 14S 

Part  s. 

I  >isi)Ositions  of  the  corps  rommandcr  from    i  1  130  a.  m.  to 

12:45  P    '11 kS^ 

Comments 152 

Second  infantiy  dixision  from  1  !  130  to  12:45 ^^3 

Comments 170 

The  several  i)arts  of  the  division  from  1 1  130  to  12:45.  •    •  •  ^7^* 

Attack  of  tlR'  division  (  \2  :45  to  i  :45) 187 

The  artillery  from  12  145  to  1  :45 190 

The  Third  infantry  brigade  from  12:45  l-<^  i  ^45 19^ 

The  Fourth  mfantry  brig^ade  from  12:45  tc>  1:45 -19^ 

Termination  of  the  preparations  for  attack 205 

Comments — conduct  of  the  division  commander 206 

Comments — the  Third  infantry  brigade 210 

Comments — the  P'onrth  infantry  brigade 222 

Comments — the  cavalry 226 

Comments — the  division  artillery  regiment 228 

Attack  of  the  Second  infantry  division  until  the  capture  of 
the  thickets  north  of  Neu-Rognitz.  and  entry  into  the 

village  ( r  :45  to  2  :25  p.  m.) 230 

Comments  on  the  conduct  of  the  division  commander.  .    .  .233 

The  Third  infnnlry  brigade  from  t  145  to  2:25 235 

Comments 239 

The  Fourth  infantry  brigade  from  i  :45  \.o  2\2^ 244 

Comments 247 

Oencral  retrospect 25T 

Invents  until  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  (2  :20  to  4  p.  m.)  .  .    .  .253 

Comments 258 

'J*he  .several  parts  of  the  division   from  j  :20  to  4 265 

(Vtnments 271 

l'rf»bl('nis 272 

/'(//■/     /. 


Va\(\  of  llie  r.allle  14  to  5  p    m.  ) IJ^ 

Comnunts 278 

The  Third  infanlr\  bri.<;ad<'  from  4  to  5  p.  ni I'f^^.^ 


LONTKNTS.  Xl> 

Page. 

The  Fourtli  infantry  brigade  from  4  to  5  p.  ni 293 

Comments 295 

Dispositions  from  the  end  of  the  battle  until  nightfall ....  300 

Conmients 308 

The  outposts  of  the  division  from  5  p.  m.  until  nightfall.  .  .319 

Comments 326 

The  main  body  of  the  division  from  5  p.  m.  until  nightfall.  .331 

Comments 332 

The  hospital  service 339 

The  general  staff  officer 349 

The  division's  report  on  the  engagement 350 

Comments 354 

Course  of  events  with  the  enemy 356 


Plan    J.  Organization  of  the   Second  infantry  division  and 
First  cavalry  brigade. 

II.  Order  of  march  during  advance  to  Parschnitz. 

Ala)^    I.  Camp  of  the  division  on  June  26. 

II.  Rendezvous  at  Parschnitz. 

''    111.  Position  at  9:50  a.  m. 

"     IV.  Position  at  1 1  :30  a.  m. 

V.  State  of  the  fight  at  12:45  P-  "i- 

"     VI.  State  of  the  fight  at  i  -45  p.  m. 

'■  Vn.  Bivouac  and  outposts  evening  of  Tune  2^. 


studies  in  tlie  Leading  of  Troops 


Volume  I. 

The  Infantry  Division  as  a  Part  of  an  Army  Corps. 


PART  I. 

GENERAL  Situation. 

'About  the  middle  of  June,  1866,  the  Second  Prussian 
Army,  composed  of  the  Guard  corps  and  the  First,  Fifth,  and 
Sixth  army  corps,  together  with  a  cavalry  division,  were  as- 
sembled on  the  Neisse.  On  the  20th,  the  First  corps  was 
thence  put  in  march  in  the  direction  of  the  I  Bohemian  frontier ; 
corps  headquarters,  the  First  infantry  division,  and  corps 
artillery  arrived  at  Liebau  June  25.  On  the  same  day  the 
Second  infantry  division  and  the  First  cavalry  brigade  ar- 
rived at  Schömberg. 

War  had  already  been  declared. 

The  country  was  familiar  to  the  troops  of  the  First  corps, 
who  had  been  stationed  there  early  in  June,  before  hostilities 
commenced.  At  that  time  the  frontier  on  the  enemy's  side 
was  being  watched  by  the  Windischgrätz  dragoons,  whose 
headquarters  were  at  Trautenau.  No  other  hostile  trops  are 
supposed  to  have  been  in  the  country  between  the  frontier  and 
the  Elbe,  and,  according  to  statements  of  inhabitants,  no 
changes-  had  since  then  been  made  in  the  occupation  of  the 
frontier. 


V  Studies  in  tiif:  LeadiiNG  of  Troops. 

SrJXiAE  SnuATJox  of  the  Second  Infantry  Division. 
(^lap  I.) 

As  long-  as  the  corps  should  remain  divided,  the  First 
cavalry  brigade  was  to  be  under  the  orders  of  the  commander 

of  the  Second  infantry  division,  Lieutenant-General  A / 

The  strength  of  the  Second  infantry  division  was  as 
follows  r 

12  battalions  of  infantry; 
4  squadrons ; 
.56  guns ; 
I   company  of  engineers,  with  division  bridge  train; 
1   signal  corps  detachment ; 
I   ambulance  company. 
The  First  cavalry  brigade  consisted  of  8  squadrons  and 
6  guns. 

A  field  hospital  was  attached  to  the  division. 

(The  organization  of  these  troops  is  given  in  Plan  I.) 

'In  the  German  Army  a  brigade  is  commanded  by  a  major- 
general  and  a  division  by  a  lieutenant-general;  there  is  no  title 
"brigadier-general." — Translator. 

-The  formation  and  war  strength  of  various  units  in  the  Ger- 
man  Army  is  as  follows: 

Infantry. — Regiment  is  divided  into  3  battalions;  battalion  into 
4  companies;  company  into  3  platoons.  Company  has  5  officers,  255 
non-commissioned  officers  and  men,  8  horses,  and  is  formed   up  in 

2  ranks. 

Cavalry. — Regiment  is  divided  into  4  squadrons;  squadron  into 
4  troops.  Squadron  is  tactical  unit;  it  has  5  officers  and  161  non- 
commissioned officers  and  men,  and  is  formed  up  in  2  ranks. 

Artillery. — Regiment  is  divided  into  4  battalions;  battalion  into 

3  batteries;  battery  into  3  platoons.  Each  battery  has  G  guns.  Gen- 
erally only  2  battalions  of  a  regiment  are  attached  to  an  infantry 
division,  a  third  battalion  going  to  furnish  the  horse  artillery  for 
the  cavalry  divisions,  and  a  fourth  battalion  being  retained  at  home 
as  reserve. 

KiUjincer  company  has  5  officers,  213  non-commissioned  officers 
and  men,  19  horses.  Division  luMdge  train  has  2  officers,  52  non- 
commissioned officers  and  men,  S7  horses,   14  vehicles. 

Hiffnal  corps  dctadimcnt  (in  this  instance  a  telegraph  section) 
2  non-commissioned   olficoj-s  and  10  men. 

Amhulancc  company  has  3  officers,  S  nioilical  oiruers.  249  non- 
commissioned  officers,  men.  .md  allcndants,  with  U\  horses  and  13 
vehicles. —  Translator 


Studies  in  the:  Lkading  of  Troops.  3 

The  division  commander  had  been  informed  of  the  sta- 
rions  assigned  the  other  parts  of  the  corps,  also  that  the  cav- 
alry division  had  gone  into  bivouac  behind  Liebau.  He  did 
not  know,  however,  whether  the  other  corps  of  the  Second 
Army  had  also  left  the  line  of  the  Neisse,  nor  did  he  know  the 
special  task  set  for  the  First  corps.  The  last  orders  received 
were:  To  go  into  bivouac  near  Schömberg,  secure  against 
Trautenau  and  Braunau,  not  to  cross  the  frontier  with  larger 
bodies  until  further  orders,  and  to  make  a  stand  near  Schöm- 
berg should  the  enemy  advance.  • 

In  pursuance  of  this,  the  various  parts  of  the  division 
were  in  bivouac  or  cantonment  on  the  morning  of  June  26  as 
follows : 

Advance    Guard    (Major-General    B )    at    Bertels- 

dorf  (cantonment)  : 

1st  infantry  regiment; 
ist  horse  battery; 
4th  squadron,  ist  hussar  regiment. 
Main  Body,  in  and  around  Schömberg: 
Quartered  in  the  city — 

Division  headquarters ; 

Headquarters,  4th  infantry  brigade  and  ist 

cavalry  brigade; 
]  st  and  2(1  battalions,  4th  infantry  regiment ; 
Signal  corps  detachment. 
In  bivouac — 

North  of  Schömberg-Trautenau  road : 
2d  infantry  regiment ; 

1st  field  artillery  regiment,  less  ist  battery; 
Engineer    company    with     division    bridge 

train ; 
Ambulance  company. 
South  of  vSchomberg-Trautenau  road : 
^d  infantry  regiment ; 

ist  and  2d  squadrons,  ist  hussar  regiment. 
I  mile  northeast  of  the  city : 

ist  cavalry  brigade. 
North  of  vSchömberg: 
Field  hospital. 
The  trains  were  with  the  respective  troops. 


4  Studie:s  in  the  Leading  oe  Troops. 

Left  Flank  Dctaclimcnt  (Major  \' )  pushed  for- 
ward west  of  and  close  to  Alerkclsdorf : 

3d  battalion,  4th  infantry  regiment ; 
3  troops,  3d  squadron,  ist  hussar  regiment. 
Thj  Fourth  troop  of  the  Third  squadron  was  at  division 
hcad(|uarters. 

Mounted  orderlies  were  distributed  as  follows:  at  divis- 
ion headquarters,  i  non-commissioned  officer  and  6  men;  at 
each  infantry  brigade  headquarters,  2  men  ;  for  each  infantry 
regiment,  i  non-commissioned  officer  and  8  men.  With  each 
battalion  were  4  to  6  cyclists. 

Disposition  of  the  Advance  Guard. — The  Third  battalion, 
First  infantry  regiment,  had  sent  out  the  following  outposts: 
the  Twelfth 'company,  into  the  southern  portion  of  Bertels- 
dorf,  one  platoon  occupying  the  exits  toward  Albendorf ;  the 
Ninth  company,  to  the  north  of  the  highway,  bivouacked  on  a 
line  with  the  Twelfth;  the  Tenth  company,  to  the  south  of  the 
highway,  protected  by  pickets  during  the  night ;  the  Eleventh 
company,  as  main  body  of  the  advance  guard,  occupying  a 
large  farm-house  in  the  center  of  the  village.  The  com- 
mander of  the  Third  battalion  had  disposed  of  two  troops 
of  the  Fourth  s(|uadron,  F'irst  hussars,  in  such  manner  that 
one  troop,  as  picket,  occupied  the  heights  northwest  of  Al- 
bendorf; the  other  troop  bivouacked  near  the  main  body. 
Two  mounted  men  were  with  each  outpost  company.  At 
nightfall  the  pickets  would  be  drawn  in,  and  in  their  stead 
continuous  mounted  patrols  would  be  instituted  on  the  road 
beyond  Petersdorf.  During  the  day  the  cavalry  picket  had 
set  out  one  non-commissioned  officers'  post  on  the  Albendorf- 
Bernsdorf  road,  and  another  on  the  Albendorf-Oualisch  road. 
Patrols  would  be  substituted  for  these  during  the  night,  go- 
ing beyond  C,olden-Oels.  The  First  and  Second  battalions  of 
the  regiment,  the  remainder  of  the  Fourth  scjuadron,  and  the 
battery  were  in  village  bivouacs  around  the  farm-houses  in  the 
direction  of  Schömberg.  Tn  case  of  attack,  the  advance  guard 
commander  had  ordered  the  holding  of  the  line  (xxupied  by 
the  f(;remost  companies. 

Upon  issuing  from  the  mountain  defile,  the  officers'  pa- 
trols previously  sent  out  toward  Trautenau  on  June  25  had 
encountered  hostile  dragoons  northeast  of  Parschnitz. 


Studies  in  the:  Lkading  of  Troops.  5 

The  left  flanking  detachment  of  the  division  had  moved 
the  Twelfth  company  toward  Merkelsdorf,  and  sent  the  Ninth 
company  to  the  heights  in  the  direction  of  Adersbach.  Pick- 
ets of  these  ontpost  companies  closely  watched  the  communi- 
cations near  them.  A  non-commissioned  officer  and  6  hussars 
had  been  assigned  to  the  Ninth  company  for  patrol  duty,  and 
a  non-commissioned  officer  and  10  hussars  to  the  Twelfth. 
The  latter  first  established  a  cavalry  non-commissioned  offi- 
cer's post  on  the  height  northwest  of  Merkelsdorf,  opposite 
Friedland,  and  sent  the  remainder  of  the  troopers  to  patrol 
through  Merkelsdorf.  The  balance  of  the  detachment,  as  main 
body  of  the  outposts,  bivouacked  on  the  Schomberg-Merkels- 
dorf  road,  about  1%  miles  from  the  latter  village.  The 
hussar  patrols  sent  forward  6  miles  from  the  outpost  of  the 
main  body  had  learned  nothing  of  the  enemy. 

By  direction  of  the  division  commander,  defensive  posi- 
tions had  been  reconnoitered,  in  which  he  intended  to  deploy 
the  division  in  case  considerable  hostile  forces  should  advance 
to  attack  from  Trautenau  or  the  south. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  June  26  the  division  was  in 
receipt  of  the   following  message    from   corps  headquarters: 

2d  Army, 

1st  Army  Corps. 

Headquarters.  Headquarters  at  Liebau, 

Page  No. .  25  June, .  1 1  45  p.  m. 

The  Guard  corps  will  cross  the  frontier  to-rnorrow,  June 
26,  east  of  Braunau. 

The  division  v/ill  reconnoiter  the  roads  to  Braunau  via 
Weckelsdorf  and  Friedland,  and  will  immediately  advance  to 
the  assistance  of  the  Guard  should  the  latter  become  engaged. 
In  such  case,  however,  the  advance  guard  of  the  division  will 
remain  in  its  position  toward  Trautenau. 

The  Commanding  General:  N . 

To  the 

2d  Infantry  Division, 
Schomberg. 

In  pursuance  of  this,  the  following  message  was  imme- 
diately dispatched  to  the  left  flanking  detachment: 


o  Studies  in  tiii<:  Li-adixc  ok  Troops. 

2d  Infantry  Division.  Headquarters  at  Schümberg, 

26  June,  I  :io  a.  ni. 

The  Guard  corps  will  cross  the  frontier  early  to-day  near 
Braunau.  If  it  should  thereby  become  involved  in  an  engage- 
ment, the  division  is  directed  to  assist  it.  It  is  therefore  neces- 
sary to  obtain  early  information  relative  to  conditions  near 
Braunau.  Vou  will  reconnoiter  the  country  to  Braunau  by  the 
cavalry  assigned  to  you,  and  establish  communication  with  the 
Guard. 

Prompt    report   of   the   results   of   the    reconnaissance    is 
expected. 
To  A-^ , 

Major  V ,  Lieiitenant-Gcncral. 

Commanding  3d  Bn.,  4th  Regt., 
In  bivouac  before  Merkelsdorf. 

The  general  staff  otlicer  personally  instructed  the  cyclist 
entrusted  with  the  transmission  of  this  order  about  the  route 
to  be  taken,  especially  the  street  leading  out  of  Schomberg, 
and  particularly  enjoined  him  to  bring  back  receipt  showing 
delivery  of  the  order.    He  left  the  city  at  1 130  a.  m.     Fifteen 

minutes  later  Major  V had  been  found,  and  the  order 

delivered  to  him.  To  insure  delivery,  the  general  staff  officer 
had  also  des])atchcd  a  copy  of  the  order  by  a  mounted  mes- 
senger, who,  having  first  to  saddle,  arrived  at  his  destination 
TO  minutes  after  the  cyclist.     Having  read  the  order,  Majoi 

V handed  the  cyclist  the  following  written   report   to 

division  headquarters : 

Left  Flank  Detachment.     Fiivouac  west  of  Merkelsdorf, 

26  June.  2  a.  m. 
Order  of  this  day  received.   Two  troops  of  hussars  will  go 
forward  toward  Braunau  on  roads  via  Friedland  and  Weckels- 
dorf.     To  support  them  I  will  hold  the  exits  of  Merkelsdorf. 

To  the  V , 

2(1   Infantry   Division,  Major. 

Schomberg. 

Major   \' made  his  dispositions  accordingly,   and   at 

2:30  2  troops  of  the  Tliird  squadron  started  out  in  the  direc- 
tion of  l^>raunau. 


Studiks  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  7 

At  4:30  a.  m.  the  division  commander  issued  the  follow- 
ing order  to  the  connnanders  of  the  various  bivouacs: 

ist  Army  Corps, 

2d  Infantry  Division.  Headquarters  at  Schömberg, 

Page  No. .  26,  6,  '66,  4:30  a.  m. 

Troops  must  hasten  preparation  of  breakfast  and  then 
hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  march. 

A , 

Lieu tenan t-General,   Commanding. 

Reports  received  during  the  day  from  the  hussar  patrols 
showed  that  upon  the  advance  of  the  Guard  only  minor  engage- 
ments with  hostile  cavalry  patrols  had  occurred,  and  that  one 
of  its  divisions  had  gone  into  bivouac  near  Braunau,  the  other 
having  advanced  to  Weckelsdorf  and  Merkelsdorf.  In  conse- 
quence of  this  the  division  commander  brought  the  left  flank 
detachment  to  Schömberg  during  the  afternoon  of  June  26. 
The  Third  battalion  moved  into  bivouac  beside  the  Third 
regiment,  and  the  3  troops  of  hussars  rejoined  their  regiment. 
The  cavalry  patrols  sent  out  by  the  advance  guard  had  again 
during  the  day  encountered  a  hostile  dragoon  patrol  west  of 
Petersdorf,  in  support  of  which  a  considerable  body  of  cav- 
alry, probably  a  squadron,  was  seen. 

Shortly  after  5  p.  m.  the  corps  order  for  the  next  day  was 
received  at  Schömberg: 

''To-morrow,  June  2y,  at  4  a.  m.  the  First  infantry  divis- 
ion and  the  corps  artillery  will  march  from  Liebau,  the  main 
body  via  Golden-Oels,  and  a  flank  detachment  via  Schatzlar, 
and  the  Second  infantry  division  with  the  cavalry  brigade 
from  Schömberg,  upon  Parschnitz.  There  the  corps  will  unite 
and  halt  two  hours,  except  that  the  First  infantry  brigade 
(First  infantry  division),  designated  as  advance  guard,  will 
continue  the  advance  on  Trautenau  and  occupy  the  city.  The 
march  will  be  resumed  in  one  column  in  the  direction  of  Arn- 
au ;  the  Second  infantry  division  with  the  Second  infantry 
brigade  and  the  corps  artillery  will  constitute  the  main  body 
of  the  corps." 

The  order  closed  as  follows : 

''It  is  of  paramount  importance  that  the  corps  be  concen- 
trated at  the  earliest  possible  moment  in  a  position  on  the  left 


8 


Studiks  in  Till-:  TjvADiNC.  Ol-  Troops. 


bank  of  the  Aupa  near  Trautenau,  both  flanks  protected 
against  the  siuklen  api)roach  of  hostile  forces. 

"The  commanding  general  will  be  found  with  the  First 
infantry  division." 

At  6  p.  m.  the  order  of  march  of  the  division  for  the  next 
day  was  given  out  to  the  advance  guard,  Second  infantry  reg- 
iment, Fourth  infantry  brigade,  hussar  regiment.  First  tiekl 
anillery  regiment,  engineer  company,  signal  corps  detachment, 
ambulance  company,  First  cavalry  brigade,  and  the  field 
hospital : 


jst  Army  Corps, 
2d  Infantry  Division. 
Page  No. . 

Distribution  of  Troops 
for  June  2/. 

Advance  Guard: 

(ATajor-Cicneral  1> . ) 

ist  Infantry  Regiment. 
Hussar  Rgt.  (less  i  tr'p) 
ist  Bn.  ist  F.  A. 
Fngineer  Company. 
I  Amb.  Co.  Section. 

Main  Body: 
(  In  order  of  march.) 
2d  Infantry  Regiment. 


Staff 


2d 


1st  F.  A 


4th  Infantry  Brigade. 
1   Amb.  Co.  Section. 
vSignal  Cori)s  Detachm't. 
Division  Piridge  Train. 
2d  Field   Hosi)ital. 
ist  Cavalrv  Brii-ade. 


1  leadquarters  at  Schömberg, 

26,  6,  '66,  6  p.  m. 

DnisioN  Order  roR  Junk  27. 

1.  Hostile  cavalry  is  watching 
the  frontier  northeast  of  Traut- 
enau. 

2.  The  army  corps  will  cross  the 
frontier  to-morrow,  June  27,  and 
unite     at     Parschnitz ;    the     Guard 

•corps  is  near  Braunau  and  Weck- 
elsdorf. 

The  First  infantry  division  will 
advance  at  4  a.  m.  from  Liebau  \'ia 
Golden-Oels. 

^^  The  »Second  infantry  division 
will  send  its  advance  guard  for- 
ward at  4  a.  m.  on  the  road  to 
Trautenau,  keeping  up  communica- 

'  tion  with  the  First  division  and  at- 
tacking the  enemy  wherever  he  is 
seen. 

4.  The  main  body  will  f(^llow  at 
4:15  a.  m.,  and  the  cavalry  brigade 
at  5  130  a.  m. 

5.  The  heavy  baggage  of  the 
main  body  will  be  jxarked  after  7 
a.  m.  north  of  Schöml)erg,  and  that 
of  the  advance  Liuard  north  of  Der- 


Si  UDii^s  IN  THK  LKx\ding  of  Troops.  9 

telsdorf   in   charge    of    Lieutenant 

X ,  First  hussar  regiment,  who 

will  also  command  the  troop  oi 
hussars  on  duty  at  division  head- 
quarters. 

6.     I    will   be   with   the    advance 
guard. 

A , 

Lieut. -General,  Conunaiiding. 

COMMJ^NTS. 

Distribution  of  First  Army  Corps. 

It  may  seem  strange,  at  first  thought,  that  the  corps  was 
not  united  at  one  point,  but  divided  into  halves  about  2,y2  miles 
^part  and  occupying  bivouacs  near  Liebau  and  Schömberg. 
Such  a  distribution  should,  however,  be  made  wherever  con- 
ditions will  permit.  The  larger  the  space  over  which  troops 
are  spread  out  the  easier  their  shelter  and  subsistence ;  furth- 
•ermore,  the  number  of  available  roads  is  increased,  and  large 
]iiasses  can  be  moved  more  comfortably  and  rapidly.  The  art 
of  directing  armies  is  principally  founded  on  distributing  the 
masses  over  large  spaces,  so  they  may  live  and  march  while 
retaining  the  ability  to  assemble  their  full  force  in  time  for 
•decisive  action. 

On  August  26,  1870,  during  their  advance  on  Paris,  the 
Second  and  the  Maas  Armies  occupied  a  front  of  about  41 
miles ;  at  noon  of  September  2  the  masses  of  both  armies, 
with  the  exception  of  the  Sixth  corps  and  the  detached  cav- 
alry about  Sedan,  occupied  a  space  a  little  more  than  4>4  by 
2)4  miles. 

Such  separation,  however,  must  never  go  so  far  that  the 
several  bodies  cannot  mutually  support  each  other.  In  the 
case  in  hand  this  could  certainly  be  accomplished,  for  the  dis- 
tance between  the  two  divisions  was  only  about  4  miles,  and 
in  the  mountain  defiles  the  advance  of  the  enemy  upon  either 
one  of  them  could  be  considerably  delayed  by  its  advance 
guard.  Then  also,  in  the  case  before  us,  the  eventual  advance 
of  the  corps  would  be  materially  facilitated  by  the  separation 
-of  the  two  divisions,  as  a  great  highway  was  at  the  disposal 


lO 


Studiks  IX  TiiK  Lkadixc.  Ol-   Troops. 


of  each  for  crossing  the  mountains.  Through  this  the  egress 
into  the  vaUey  of  i'arschnitz,  which  under  certain  circum- 
stances miglit  be  quite  dangerous,  could  be  made  in  half  the 
time  required  if  the  corps  were  conlined  to  a  single  road. 

As  the  cavalry  division  of  the  Second  Army  w^as  in  biv- 
ouac not  far  from  Uebau,  it  was  expedient  to  order  the  First 
cavalry  brigade  to  Schömberg.  A  large  accumulation  of  cav- 
alry, especially  in  mountainous  country,  materially  increases 
the  difficulty  of  sheltering  and  subsisting. 

It  was  an  especially  wise  measure  to  place  the  First  cav- 
alry brigade  under  the  orders  of  the  commander  of  the  Sec- 
ond division.  On  the  battle-field  unity  of  command  is  a  mat- 
ter of  course.  If  the  fighting  bodies  belong  to  different  or- 
ganizations, and  common  supervision  has  not  been  previously 
provided,  the  commander  highest  in  rank  on  the  spot  assumes 
authority.  In  marches  and  bivouacs  also  it  is  best  to  place 
the  various  bodies  alongside  the  same  road  under  a  common 
commander,  whenever  trouble  is  likely  to  arise  in  movements 
or  in  the  use  of  villages  for  shelter,  etc.  If  this  is  not  done, 
it  may  become  necessary  for  superior  authority  to  issue  com- 
plicated orders  (in  this  case  corps  headquarters),  which,  no 
matter  how  carefully  worded,  are  not  always  adequate  to  pre- 
vent inconvenience  and  friction. 
Information   in   the  Possession   of   the   Division   Commander. 

The  division  commander's  first  information  of  the  Guard 
corps  having  left  the  Ime  of  the  Neissc  and  approached  the 
left  wing  of  the  Second  infantry  division  w^as  contained  in 
the  order  from  headcjuarters  of  the  First  army  corps  at  Schöm- 
berg that  reached  Liebau  early  on  June  26.  Furthermore, 
up  to  this  time  he  had  no  knowledge  whatever  of  the  gen- 
eral intentions  of  army  headquarters  or  of  the  special  task 
set  for  the  First  corps. 

It  may  seem  strange  that  an  officer  of  such  high  rank  as 
a  division  commander  should  be  so  poorly  informed  of  the 
general  situation;  in  some  cases  it  is  certainly  true  that  not 
enough  is  done  in  this  direction.  We  must  always  adhere  to 
the  principle  that  every  independent  commander  ought  to  be 
sufficiently  oriented  to  be  able  to  make  proper  dispositions  in 
unforeseen  contingencies  fully  in  accord  w^ith  the  general  war 
situation,  and  on  his  own  initiative.    A  commander  may  doubt- 


Studies  in  tiii^  Leading  of  Troops.  i[ 

less  be  greatly  interested  in  what  may  lie  beyond  such  infor- 
mation, but  nevertheless  we  should  under  no  circumstances 
communicate  to  any  one  more  than  is  necessary  for  his  guid- 
ance in  forming  his  own  decisions  in  cases  of  emergency.  The 
secret  of  zvhat  is  being  done  or  is  intended  cannot  be  too 
closely  guarded. 

What  is  especially  necessary  for  every  commandLr  t) 
know  is  the  movements  of  columns  in  his  vicinity.  Subdivis- 
ions of  his  command  must  also  be  informed  of  this,  else  the 
sudden  appearance  of  marching  columns  may  cause  unneces- 
sary delays.  It  is  therefore  quite  essential  that  bodies  of 
troops  located  beside  or  behind  each  other,  even  though  they 
may  not  be  parts  of  the  same  organization,  should  keep  up 
communication  regarding  all  matters  of  importance. 

But  in  this  case  the  instructions  given  to  Lieutenant- 
General  A were  sufficient  for  all  purposes.     With  his 

attention  drawn  to  the  direction  from  which  the  enemy  could 
appear,  he  would  know  what  to  do  if  the  latter  attacked.  That 
he  himself  must  not  assume  the  offensive  until  further  orders 
is  easily  deduced  from  the  injunction  not  to  cross  the  frontier 
with  larger  bodies,  a  precaution  based  on  a  desire  not  pre- 
maturely to  draw  the  attention  of  the  enemy  to  the  plan  to 
take  the  offensive  in  that  direction  with  all  forces.  But  no 
time  was  lost  in  conmiunicating  this  purpose  when  the 
Guard  corps  had  approached  the  sphere  of  the  Second  in- 
fantry division. 

Bivouac  of  the  Division. 

Troops  should  have  the  benefit  of  roof  shelter  wherever 
possible.  Even  when  near  the  enemy  this  is  practicable  for 
some  of  the  troops,  although  for  the  most  advanced  forces  we 
must  resort  to  village  bivouacs  and  alarm  quarters.  During 
the  struggles  of  the  detached  army  of  the  Grand  Duke  of 
Mecklenburg  around  Beaugency,  where  the  nights  offered  the 
only  pauses  in  an  otherwise  uninterrupted  series  of  engage- 
ments, the  contest  for  farm-houses  as  night  shelter  was  often 
continued  to  a  late  hour. 

In  this  case  the  limited  number  of  villages  did  not  allow 
the  shelter  for  a  large  number  of  men.  Besides  Schomberg 
and  Bertelsdorf,  Merkelsdorf  might  have  been  so  used.     The 


12  StudiI'S  IX  THK  Lk adtnm;  01-  Troops. 

objection  that  this  village  was  too  far  distant  from  Schöm- 
berg  to  enable  the  main  body  to  give  timely  support  to  a  side 
detachment  is  not  tenable  whenever  an  extended  service  of 
patrols  is  established,  which  wonld  insure  the  timely  discvjv- 
ery  of  the  enemy's  approach.  Furthermore,  the  rocky  char- 
acter of  the  country  around  Adcrsbach  would  greatly  in- 
crease the  resisting  power  of  the  single  battalion. 

Stroii^th  of  the  Advance  Guard  and  the  Left  Plank 
Detachment. 

The  Schomberg-Trautenau  road  forms  the  main  line  of 
communication  in  the  network  of  roads  as  far  as  need  be  con- 
sidered here.  Furthermore,  it  was  known  that  there  were 
hostile  forces  on  this  road.  For  the  present  the  road  via  Mer- 
kelsdorf requires  less  consideration;  the  patrols  found  no  en- 
emy in  that  direction,  and  the  above-mentioned  rocky  ground 
makes  the  movement  of  large  masses  improbable.  Conse- 
quently the  division  could  secure  itself  in  that  direction  by  a 
small  force,  and  only  one  battalion  was  detached  toward  Mer- 
kelsdorf, while  the  Trautenau  road  was  covered  by  three  bat- 
talions. Jf  both  were  of  eq-ual  importance,  however,  both  with 
reference  to  terrane  and  position  of  opponent,  it  would  have 
been  necessary  for  the  division  to  send  out  two  equally  strong 
advance  guards. 

Moreover,  the  advance  needed  only  to  have  been  formed 
of  two  battalions  of  the  First  infantry  regiment,  the  third 
battalion  being  sent  in  the  direction  of  Merkelsdorf.  The  cut 
in  the  road  near  Bertelsdorf  and  the  character  of  the  moun- 
tainous ground  surrounding  would  presumably  have  enabled 
these  smaller  forces  to  offer  effective  resistance  in  case  of 
attack  until  help  could  reach  them  from  the  nearest  point. 
The  important  principle  of  breaking  up  tactical  units  as  lit- 
tle as  possible  may  well  be  disregarded  in  this  instance ;  in  the 
i)artition  here  illustrated  a  detachment  had  been  made  from 
ihe  Fourth  instead  of  the  First  regiment,  although  it  will  be 
found  that  under  subsequent  circumstances  this  would  not 
be  justifiable.  In  favor  of  the  ])artiti(Mi  made  the  following 
can  be  said:  If  the  advance  was  to  be  made  in  one  of  the 
two  directions  and  it  was  desired  to  start  out  at  once  w^ith  the 
foremost  troops,  the  third  battalion  of  the  First  regiment,   if 


Studies  in  tii;i:  Leading  of  Troops.  13 

detached  toward  IMerkelsdorf,  might  easily  be  permanently 
separated  from  the  regiment.  If,  on  the  contrary,  a  battahon 
of  the  Fourth  regiment  formed  the  left  flank  detachment,  in 
case  of  an  advance  on  Trautenau  it  could  rejoin  its  regiment 
in  time;  in  case  of  an  advance  via  Merkelsdorf,  communica- 
tion v^ith  the  other  battalions  could  be  re-established  by  plac- 
ing them  at  the  head  of  the  column  starting  from  Schömberg. 

As  for  the  cavalry,  the  Fourth  squadron  was  attached  to 
the  advance  guard,  and  the  Third  squadron,  less  i  troop,  to 
the  left  flank  detachment.  Considering  the  fact  that  the 
forces  were  in  a  mountainous  country  where  there  were  only 
a  few  practicable  roads  for  cavalry,  a  single  squadron  would 
have  been  amply  sufficient  for  both  parties,  the  more  so  as 
quarters  should  have  been  provided  in  Bertelsdorf  for  that 
portion  of  the  outpost  cavalry  not  employed  during  the  night. 
We  must  never  forget  that  the  troops  nearest  the  enemy  en- 
joy the  least  rest.  We  will  not  often  be  able  to  relieve  the 
cavalry  regiment  of  a  division ;  so  there  is  all  the  more  reason 
that  we  should  lose  no  opportunity  to  do  so. 

As  for  the  battery,  although  the  valley  would  allow  the 
use  of  more  than  two  guns  in  only  a  few  places,  we  can  gen- 
erally find  good  positions  for  a  battery  in  bends  of  a  road  upon 
projecting  ridges,  from  which  it  can  sweep  the  road  and  ad- 
joining territory.  For  this  reason  six  guns  were  sent  with 
the  advance  guard.  When  it  is  intended  to  hold  a  section  of 
country,  it  beconies  necessary  to  attach  as  inuch  artillery  as 
possible.  A  limitation  is  naturally  indicated  when  the  ground 
prevents  the  employment  of  \  this  arm  to  any  great  extent,  as 
.in  the  case  before  us. 

Another  question  is,  Should  the  left  flank  detachment  be 
provided  with  artillery?  In  favor  of  an  artillery  support  is  the 
fact  that  the  position  there  would  gain  in  power  of  resistance  ; 
in  opposition,  the  fact  that  the  division  should  keep  its  bat- 
teries together,  and  that  generally  only  so  much  artillery 
should  be  detached  as  is  urgently  needed.  Such  a  necessity 
is  not,  however,  apparent  in  this  case,  as  an  attack  near  Mer- 
kelsdorf was  not  expected,  at  least  for  the  time  being.  The 
post  there  has  really  only  the  character  of  an  observation  post, 
for  the  purpose  of  Avhich  only  a  battalion  was  sent  out,  because 
the  very  broken  terrane  demanded  extensive  measures  of  se- 


1^.  Studies  ix  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

curity  to  prevent  the  stealthy  approach  of  small  hostile  par- 
tics.  A  consequence  of  greater  dispersion  is  always  the  neces- 
sity of  posting  correspondnigly  strong  supports  for  the  most 
advanced  troops.  On  the  whole,  we  should  warn  against  at- 
tempting to  send  a  few  guns  with  every  detached  battalion, 
as  was  frequently  done  while  the  cordon  system  was  still  in 
full  favor.  Small  bodies  acting  independently  are  often  forced 
to  extend  too  far,  and  then  there  is  little  left  for  the  support 
or  protection  of  the  artillery.  The  dispersion  of  artillery 
should  be  discouraged  all  the  more  by  reason  of  the  fact  that 
the  36  guns  of  a  division  are  barely  sufficient  to  furnish  the 
necessary  artillery  support. 

It  would  seem  to  be  a  mistake  that  engineers  had  not 
been  attached  to  the  advance  guard.  In  mountainous  country 
opportunity  will  always  be  found  for  their  profitable  employ- 
ment with  the  foremost  troops. 

Positions  of  the  Advance  Guard  and  the  Left  Flank 
Detachment. 

As  a  rule,  advance  guards  on  the  march  take  up  their 
positions  during  the  afternoon,  often  not  until  evening.  Ex- 
amination of  the  ground,  measures  of  security,  etc.,  in  this 
case  should  be  carried  out  by  the  simplest  means.  We  must 
remember  that  the  near  approach  of  night  leaves  our  oppo- 
nent no  time  to  inform  himself  concerning  measures  taken 
bv  us,  sufficiently  to  permit  his  initiation  of  any  night  enter- 
])rises,  which  are  difficult  under  all  circumstances.  We  shoultf 
also  remember  that  in  day-time  the  discovery  of  movements 
of  larger  hostile  parties,  which  are  the  only  things  that  can 
cause  us  serious  trouble,  is  the  duty  of  the  reconnoitering  cav- 
alry;  so  on  that  account  it  is  not  necessary  to  cover  the  entire 
territory  i^'ith  a  chain  of  double  posts  and  corresponding!;  pick- 
ets and  outpost  eojupanirs.  Small  patrols  will  think  twice  be- 
fc^re  riding  into  the  center  of  a  hostile  position  out  of  which 
they  could  hardly  escape  if  discovered.  Consequently,  in  mod- 
ern tactics,  the  measures  of  security  taken  for  the  protection 
of  halfini:;  forces  rc/V/  be  routined   ehietly  to  Ti'a/r////;,c   f'oads. 

JUit  in  this,  too,  there  are  many  exceptions,  among  which 
may  be  classed  the  situation  of  the  advance  guard  and  left 
llank  dc-tachment  as  ijiven  in  the  ^tndv  l)efore  us.     In  the  nar- 


Studif.s  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  15 

row  valley  in  front  of  the  advance  guard  was  the  almost  un- 
broken line  of  the  farm-houses  and  gardens  of  Bertelsdorf, 
Albendorf,  and  Petersdorf,  over  4  miles  in  length.  These 
almost  totally  obstructed  the  view  to  the  front.  Nevertheless 
the  advance  guard  could  not  be  pushed  forward  to  the  exit 
of  the  defile,  which  would  be  most  expedient  under  other  cir- 
cumstances. That  point  is  8  miles  from  Sch()mberg,  and  to 
occupy  a  position  there  would  be  a  violation  of  the  injunction 
not  to  cross  the  frontier  with  larger  bodies.  The  sides  of  the 
valley  being  so  near  the  road  give  it  the  character  of  a  de- 
file ;  to  the  west  of  Bertelsdorf  it  widens  somewhat  into  a 
larger  kettle-shaped  space.  Besides  the  line  of  communica- 
tion existing  between  Oualisch  and  Golden-Oels,  there  are 
only  the  country  wagon-roads  between  Albendorf  and  Berns- 
dorf and  two  other  roads  leading  north  from  Bertelsdorf. 
Merely  to  zvaich  these  roads  zvas  not  suMeietit.  The  roads 
leading  over  the  mountains  must  be  occupied  at  the  summit 
by  a  force  strong  enough  to  maintain  its  ground  against  hos- 
tile attack  until  reinforcements  could  reach  it.  In  territory 
so  difficult  to  observe,  the  approach  of  hostile  parties  is  likely 
to  be  discovered  too  late,  all  the  more  so  because  every  foot- 
path, often  invisible  from  a  distance,  would  be  known  to  the 
enemy,  who  has  been  in  the  country  for  some  time.  The  sud- 
den dislodgment  of  one  of  the  division's  posts  on  the  summit 
might  put  the  troops  bivouacked  below  in  a  most  precarious 
situation,  [t  was  therefore  essential  to  hold  the  high  ground 
from  the  outset,  by  separate  companies  especially  advanced 
for  the  purpose. 

In  this  case  the  line  of  the  foremost  companies  formjd 
the  line  of  resistance,  although  ordinarily  the  attack  of  the 
enemy  should  not  be  met  on  the  line  of  the  supporting  out- 
post companies,  but  near  the  outpost  reserve.  Outpost  com- 
panies should  resist  only  long  enough  to  give  the  resting 
troops  time  to  gtt  ready  for  action;  they  are  not  required  to 
maintain  the  position  assigned  them,  but  to  resist  the  enemy 
only  for  a  limited  time.  Although  the  country  around  Bertels- 
dorf was  not  favorable  for  the  employment  of  cavalry,  it  was 
nevertheless  advisable  to  gain  additional  security  by  pushing 
cavalry  beyond  the  outpost  companies.  It  could  then  discover 
an  advance  of  the  enemy  in  time.     During  the  night  the  at- 


i6  Sttdiks  IX  Tin-   Li-adixc.  or  Troops. 

teiilion  of  the  cavalry  should  be  directed  toward  the  reacts, 
on  which  it  should  patrol  beyond  either  the  resiMve  or  supporis 
of  the  outposts.  Taking  into  account  the  character  of  the 
terrane,  the  sending  of  the  foremost  parties  to  the  frontier 
line,  so  that  the  cut  in  the  wagon-road  leading  from  Qualisci. 
to  the  Trautenau  highway  and  the  ravine  from  Albendori  Kj 
Bernsdorf  would  be  immediately  in  their  front,  appears  more 
judicious  than  taking  uj)  the  positions  that  were  actually  oc- 
cupied. In  this  case  the  main  body  of  the  advance  gui^rd 
should  then  be  stationed  in  the  kettle-like  space  west  of 
Bcrtelsdorf. 

We  should  add  that  the  longer  we  remain  opposite  the 
enemy,  the  more  care  must  be  devoted  to  security,  which  fre- 
(juently  leads  to  the  establishnicnt  of  a  connected  outpost  line 
— as,  for  example,  in  the  blockade  of  a  fortress.  It  must  be 
acknowledged  that  in  time  both  sides  obtain  a  better  knowl- 
edge of  the  dispositions  of  their  opponents,  and  are  thereby 
offered  better  o])portunities  to  take  advantage  of  carelessness 
or  errors  of  the  opposing  side.  Even  in  the  case  before  us  it 
would  DC  judicious,  if  the  division  remained  some  days  longer 
at  Schömberg,  to  extend  the  sphere  of  security  of  the  advance 
guard  and  to  establish  connection  with  outposts  of  the  left 
flanking  detachment  and  the  First  infantry  division. 

jt  was  the  duty  of  the  left  flanking  detachment  to  watch 
the  road  from  Friedland,  as  well  as  the  rocky  region  around 
Adersbach,  and  at  the  same  time  to  occupy  the  road  from 
Merkelsdori.  If  it  attempted  to  establish  a  connected  line 
of  outposts  there,  its  forces  would  be  quite  insufficient,  as  the 
distance  was  nearly  2]4  miles.  It  nuist  therefore  be  satisfied 
with  closing  the  main  road  and  covering  the  country  jn  both 
directions  by  detached  1)odies,  who  must  institute  independent 
measures  for  their  individual  security.  The  strength  of  these 
detached  i)arlies  depended  on  the  ]:)roximity  of  the  enemy  and 
the  formation  of  the  terrane.  Contrary  to  the  tactics  of  the 
outposts  of  the  advance  guard,  both  outpost  companies  (Ninth 
and  Twelfth)  put  out  ])ickets  in  day-time.  Before  the  front, 
outpost  cavalry  could  not  be  eni])loved  in  the  rocky  coun- 
try around  Adersbaeh  and  Mcrkelsdorf.  The  infantry  also 
had  to  provide  for  its  own  security.  Meanwhile  a  correct 
assignment    i»t'    hussars    to    the    dilTerent    comi)anies    enabled 


I 


Studif-s  in  Tiiii:  Lr,.\i)iNO  of  Tkooi'S.  17 

them  to  send  out  cavalry  patrols  and  establish  a  cavalry  non- 
commissioned officer's  post  on  the  left  wing. 

Scouting  Instituted  by  the  Outposts. 

The  duty  to  scout  at  long  range  falls  upon  the  cavalry. 
Even  in  territory  which  admits  of  the  exhibition  of  the  fight- 
ing power  of  this  arm  only  in  a  limited  degree,  it  should  pref- 
erably be  used,  unless  our  own  outposts  are  advanced  close 
upon  the  enemy.  As  in  this  instance  the  cavalry  patrols  which 
had  gone  ahead  upon  the  arrival  of  the  advance  guard  soon 
encountered  hostile  cavalry  outposts  behind  Petersdorf,  the 
cavalry  scouting  zone  was  rather  limited.  It  was  expedient 
in  the  mountainous  terrane  to  send  forward  cavalry  non- 
commissioned officers'  posts  to  points  from  which  they  couM 
continuously  observe  the  enemy's  outposts.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances the  hussar  picket  northwest  of  Albendorf  should 
be  ready  at  any  moment  to  follow  the  enemy  with  patrols  and 
ascertain  his  location  as  soon  as  his  withdrawal  was  observed. 

The  left  flanking  detachment  had  sent  out  hussars  on  dif- 
ferent roads  from  the  main  outpost  body  to  a  distance  of  6 
miles.  These  had  consequently  ranged  to  Petersdorf,  and  also, 
via  Friedland  and  Weckelsdorf,  as  far  as  Dittersbach.  Ex- 
plicit instructions  how  far  such  patrols  should  reach  our,  when 
the  enemy  is  not  in  the  near  vicinity,  can  never  be  formulat- 
ed. Ordinarily  large  masses  of  cavalry  will  go  in  advance  of 
a  marching  army  corps.  In  the  exceptional  case  before  us 
this  was  omitted,  for  it  was  desired  to  conceal  the  direction 
of  the  intended  march  into  the  enemy's  territory  as  long  as 
possible.  Under  different  conditions  the  cavalry  brigade  of 
the  First  army  corps,  or  the  Second  cavalry  division,  should 
have  driven  away  the  hostile  dragoons  along  the  frontier  and 
reached  Trautenau  long  before  the  army  corps  arrived  near 
Schomberg  or  Liebau.  After  this  its  next  task  would  be  to 
scout  the  entire  region  up  to  the  Elbe. 

But  when  larger  bodies  of  cavalry  are  not  in  front,  the 
outpost  cavalry  must  undertake  the  scouting.  It  is  also  the 
business  of  superior  commanders  to  send  out  special  officers' 
patrols,  as  their  judgment  dictates.  The  outpost  cavalry,  un- 
der the  direction  of  "its  leader,  should  keep  in  touch  with  the 
enemy.     The  outpost  commander  could  also  send  out  patrols 


l8  Studiks  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

from  the  main  bddy.  Jn  this  case  the  (hvision  had  just  arrived 
and  was  not  yet  at  all  oriented  rei^arding  the  appearance  oT 
the  enemy  in  the  country  around  Braunau.  It  would  not  'oq 
wise  to  permit  the  cavalry  patrols  to  range  over  this  territory. 
The  civil  authorities  of  the  enemy  still  exercised  their  func- 
tions;  the  telegraph  carried  information  to  the  hostile  cuni- 
manders  from  every  direction ;  the  patrols,  who  could  only 
notice  what  transpired  in  their  sphere  of  vision,  would  inva- 
riably be  watched  at  every  stej) ;  if  they  branched  out  too  far, 
they  could  not  be  efficiently  supported,  and  hostile  patrols 
could  easily  have  struck  them  a  hard  blow.  Only  the  best 
officers,  with  a  few  selected  men  and  horses,  should  be  sent 
for  long  distances.  As  soon  as  the  enemy's  position  is  ascer- 
tained, it  is  recommended  to  send  forward  entire  squadrons 
to  scout  or  assure  security,  if  troops  are  on  hand.  These  are 
not  bound  to  any  specific  position,  and  can  hang  on  to  and 
follow  the  movements  of  the  enemy.  The  sphere  of  scouting 
naturally  grows  larger  with  the  increase  in  number  of  troops 
available,  but  the  single  cavalry  regiment  of  a  division  repre- 
sents only  a  limited  force.  In  the  case  in  hand  officers'  pa- 
trols went  beyond  Dittersbach.  Whenever  conditions  at  all 
permit,  we  should  observe  the  rule  to  examine  the  country 
ahead  of  a  division  to  a  distance  equal  to  a  day's  march.  If 
the  division  remains  for  any  length  of  time  in  the  same  posi- 
tion, and  the  region  in  its  immediate  vicinity  is  under  its  con- 
trol, then  a  further  extension  of  the  cavalry  patrolling  zone 
may  follow.  In  their  own  country  patrols  may  undertake  long 
rides  at  any  time;  but  in  such  cases  they  must  nevertheless 
act  cautiously. 

At  the  same  time,  it  is  generally  considered  that  an  offi- 
cer with  a  few  selected  horses  may  be  emi)loyed  to  more  ad- 
vantage in  gathering  information  than  a  whole  regiment  of 
cavalry.  Vet  we  must  not  overlook  the  fact  that  this  propo- 
sition ap]>lies  only  in  a  limited  degree.  The  officer  can  cer- 
tainly ni(»\-e  with  more  secrecy  and  rapidity,  and  he  can  take 
a  roundabout  road,  without  serious  detriment.  i»ut  such  an 
employment  i)resupposes  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  is  not  in  its 
pr()])er  place.  ( )ur  experiences  in  the  last  war  are  of  a  decid- 
edly one-sided  nature,  for  the  h^vnch  cavalry  was  either  not 
thus  employed,  or  eNi'  onl\-  in  a  very  injii(ticious  manner.      If 


Studiks  in  the:  Leading  of  Troops.  19 

hereafter  we  meet  an  enemy  who  during  operations  uses  his 
cavahy  as  we  did,  then  we  must  famiUarize  ourselves  with 
the  m.axim  that  to  see  at  all  we  must  first  be  able  to  fight. 
The  training  of  large  cavalry  masses  must  therefore  be  car- 
ried on  in  the  most  thorough  manner. 

As  the  example  we  are  now  considering  involved  the 
sending  of  hussars  to  a  comparatively  great  distance  in  order 
to  learn  the  condition  of  affairs  at  Braunau,  the  commander 
of  the  left  fiank  detachment  did  not  fail  to  dispatch  infantry 
for  their  support.  Such  a  measure  always  appears  wise,  but 
is  especially  necessary  if  the  cavalry  finds  itself  opposed  by 
a  superior  mounted  force.  It  may  then  take  greater  risks, 
assured  that  even  if  it  should  be  unfortunate  in  an  engage- 
ment, the  pursuit  would  come  to  a  halt  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
infantry,  which  would  give  it  an  opportunity  to  reassemble. 

Patrols  were  certainly  sufficient  to  positively  determine 
whether  there  would  be  an  engagement  at  Braunau.  If  there 
should  be,  and  the  division  were  consequently  obliged  to  start 
out,  it  could  hardly  be  advised  too  soon,  in  the  most  exhaust- 
ive manner,  regarding  the  state  of  affairs  there.  It  would  be 
a  question,  however,  if  this  could  be  accomplished  by  patrols 
when  once  the  enemy  had  instituted  proper  measures  of  se- 
curity in  the  direction  of  the  approach  of  the  troops.  It  would 
then  become  important  to  force  back  the  cavalry  covering  the 
enemy  at  that  point,  so  a  better  view  of  his  lines  could  be 
obtained.  In  this  connection  it  would  have  been  quite  right 
to  make  use  of  the  First  and  Second  squadrons  from  Schöm- 
berg  in  the  reconnaissance  in  question,  the  more  so  as  the 
First  cavalry  brigade  was  available  to  replace  them. 

Selection  of  Defensive  Positions  for  the  Troops  of  the  Second 
Division  in  Bivouac. 

The  division  was  positively  instructed  to  maintain  itself 
near   Schömberg  in  case  of  a  hostile  attack;  it  is   therefore 

self-evident  that  Lieutenant-General  A would  at  once 

begin  to  plan  for  posting  his  troops.  It  would  have  been  in 
no  wise  superfluous  if  he  had  also  made  arrangements  for  the 
artificial  strength  of  the  selected  positions,  particularly  by 
throwing  up  of  emplacements  for  guns,  the  construction  of 
rifle-pits,  preparation  for  defense  of  farm-houses,  etc.      The 


20 


STrnrKs  in  titk  Lkadtnc  or  Tkoors. 


engineer  company  ofifered  material  assistance  for  these  pur- 
poses. Even  the  possibiHty  of  the  enemy's  approach  from  two 
different  directions  should  not  have  prevented  the  execution 
of  as  much  work  as  time  and  means  permitted,  without  suc- 
cessive demands  on  the  stren^^th  of  the  troops.  We  can  still 
learn  much  in  this  direction  from  the  methods  of  the  French 
Army.  As  a  rule,  we  console  ourselves  with  the  thought  that 
we  will  probably  not  remain  long  in  one  positfon,  and  the  con- 
sequence is,  that  in  many  instances  we  do  too  little,  frequent- 
ly nothing  at  all. 

Even  if  the  division  should  not  remain  long  at  that  point, 
it  would  be  the  duty  of  the  commander,  on  account  of  the 
proximity  of  the  enemy  and  his  unfamiliarity  w^th  conditions 
prevailing  on  the  hostile  side,  to  prepare  for  defense  in  case 
he  should  be  attacked ;  the  preparation  of  field  fortifications 
could  in  no  wise  be  considered  superfluous. 

Orders  from  Corps  Headquarters  for  June  26. 

The  message  from  corps  headquarters  received  at  Schöm- 
berg  on  the  morning  of  the  26th  stated  that  the  Guard  corps 
was  approaching,  directed  scouting  towards  Braunau,  and  con- 
tained positive  instructions  as  to  what  the  division  should  do 
as  soon  as  fighting  commenced  near  Braunau. 

Even  if  it  had  not  been  the  intention  of  the  commanding 
general  to  support  the  Guard  corps,  the  time  had  now  arrived 
when  the  Second  infantry  division  ought  to  be  advised  that 
other  troops  were  approaching  its  sphere,  although  up  to  that 
moment  it  was  prohibited,  as  already  explained,  in  order  that 
the  secret  of  the  operations  would  be  guarded  ;  no  necessity 
existed  for  the  Second  division's  learning  of  it  any  earlier. 

The  necessity  for  the  advance  guard's  remaining  in  posi- 
tion toward  Trautenau  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  road  thither 
could  not  be  left  uncovered  in  face  of  the  enemy's  position, 
especially  if  the  First  division  should  also  have  marched  Tn 
the  direction  of  Braunau,  in  which  case  its  flanks  must  be  pro- 
tected. The  absence  of  ad\'ice  in  the  order  from  corps  head- 
quarters, as  to  whether,  in  case  the  Second  division  did  march 
to  the  left,  the  part  of  the  corps  situated  near  Tjebau  should 
follow  it,  miglit  be  a  subject  for  comment.  This  information, 
Jiowever.  could  not  ha\'e  been  i-ivcn,  for  at  that  time  the  com- 


i 


Studiks  in  thi;  Leading  of  Troops.  21 

nianding  general  himself  did  not  know.  There  was  always  a 
possibility  that  the  positions  of  the  First  corps  might  be  at- 
tacked on  June  26  while  the  Second  started  to  the  support  of 
the  Guard.  The  commanding  general  would  then  have  the  ad- 
vance guard  of  the  Second  division  at  his  disposal,  as  well  as 
the  entire  First  division  (16  battalions),  with  which  to  hold  the 
mountain  roads  to  Liebau  and  Schömberg,  and  a  departure 
of  the  main  body  of  the  First  division  could  not  take  place. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  compliance  with  orders,  the  main  body 
of  the  Second  division  must  advance  to  an  engagement  of  the 
Guard,  under  any  circumstances,  even  should  the  advance 
guard  of  the  division  meanwhile  be  attacked.  In  any  case, 
it  had  been  specifically  ordered  that  the  advance  guard  remain 
in  position. 

Disposition  of  the  Second  Infantry  Division  June  26. 

The  Second  division  went  into  minute  detail  in  its  orders 
to  the  left  flank  detachment.  In  addition,  it  emphasized  im- 
portant points.  Such  a  procedure  is  recommendable.  Sub- 
ordinate headquarters  have  no  insight  in  the  more  general 
features ;  what  superior  headquarters  expect  to  accomplish 
through  orders  given  must  always  be  precisely  stipulated. 

The  preparation  of  a  special  order  of  march  to  cover  a 
possible  advance  toward  Braunau  did  not  seem  necessary. 
The  troops  which  would  be  affected  in  such  a  case  were  either 
in  bivouac  or  village  shelter  within  a  narrow  space.  It  was 
only  necessary  to  alarm  them  and  order  them  on  the  spot  to 
form  in  such  a  manner  that  they  could  successively  take  their 
place  in  the  column  of  march  as  intended,  except  it  must  not 
be  overlooked  to  furnish  the  advance  guard  on  the  Trautenau 
road,  as  well  as  the  one  newly  formed,  with  the  necessary 
explanations. 

It  was  a  question  whether  cooking  at  an  early  hour  should 
not  be  enjoined,  for,  if  an  engagement  should  be  brought  on 
in  the  vicinity  of  Braunau,  it  could  not  be  foreseen,  on  account 
of  the  great  distance,  whether  troops  would  have  a  chance  to 
cook  later  in  the  day.  The  theory  of  early  cooking  is  much 
abused.  Not  every  stomach  cares  to  take  a  full  meal  in  the 
early  morning.  It  requires  time  to  cook,  and  had  early  reports 
of  fighting  near  Braunau  come  in  from  the  hussar  patrols  sent 


22  Stl'dii-.s  in  tuk  Lkading  of  Troops. 

in  advance,  the  cookini^  wonkl  have  to  be  interrupted.  It  is 
advisable  to  order  early  cookini;-  only  when  certain  of  not 
being  interrupted  and  when  intense  labor  is  likely  to  be 
demanded. 

The  bringing  of  the  left  ilank  detachment  to  Schümberg 
seems  quite  proper,  as  the  presence  of  the  Guard  near  Mer- 
kelsdorf afforded  the  necessary  security  on  the  left.  As  a 
rule,  it  is  not  advisable  to  take  a  body  of  troops  out  of  bivouac 
when  once  established  there.  In  this  case,  however,  it  was 
not  known  what  hardships  the  next  day  might  bring,  and  the 
distance  a  battalion  will  have  to  march  during  a  day  is  not 
a  matter  that  should  be  treated  inconsiderately,  whether  great 
or  small. 

Division  Order  for  JuNr:  27. 
Distribution  of  Troops} 

It  is  evident  that  when  advancing  against  an  enemy  the 
various  parts  cannot  move  forward  in  immediate  succession, 
one  closely  behind  another,  as  an  accident  befalling  the  head 
would  throw  the  whole  into  disorder.  In  case  of  larger  bodies 
this  compels  us  to  segregate  an  advance  guard  composed  of 
dilTerent  arms  and  of  sufficient  stability  and  independence  to 
insure,  by  deploying  when  the  enemy  is  encountered,  ample 
time  for  the  remainder  of  the  column  to  assume  a  battle 
formation. 

In  order  to  avoid  a  deployment  of  the  whole  column  im- 
mediately upon  the  appearance  of  every  minor  party  of  the 
enemy,  and  to   facilitate  such  deployment  when  really  neces- 

Un  this  connection  let  us  note  that  we  have  gone  too  far  in 
our  methodical  limitation  of  such  technical  knowledge  as  is  neces- 
sary for  a  loader  of  troops.  Thus  a  great  number  of  things  have 
been  handed  down  traditionally,  such  as  staff  duties,  which  are 
common  property,  rather  than  a  specialty  of  the  staff.  The  art  of 
command  does  not  lie  alone  in  the  leader  of  such  bodies  as  are  gen- 
erally considered  in  connection  with  a  staff — a  division  or  army 
corps — but  it  must  be  exercised  with  skill  by  every  leader,  even  by 
the  lowest  ranking.  Command  is  in  itself  so  difficult  that  too  much 
trouble  cannot  be  taken  to  acquire  it  and  exercise  it  constantly  when 
once  acquired,  and  instruction  in  it  must  therefore  begin  from  the 
moment  of  an  officer's  first  education  in  troop-leading. 


Studif:s  in  the  Leading  oe  Troops.  23 

sary,  an  interval  of  a  certain  distance  is  left  between  the  ad- 
vance guard  and  the  main  body.  A  reserve  is  not  needed 
while  a  body  is  on  the  march,  although  in  an  action  the 
very  nature  of  combat  renders  it  impossible  for  a  commander 
to  dispense  with  a  reserve  up  to  the  moment  that  he  must  em- 
ploy it.  As  a  rule,  all  that  immediately  participates  in  the 
action  is  only  partially,  most  often  not  at  all,  in  the  hands  of 
the  highest  commander.  He  insures  a  thoroughly  efficient 
service  only  in  so  far  as  he  retains  at  his  disposal  closed  bod- 
ies of  troops,  or  understands  how  to  form  them  during  the 
various  stages  of  an  engagement.  An  engagement  should 
therefore  never  be  initiated  without  a  fighting  reserve,  but  on 
a  march  a  reserve  is  not  needed.  All  troops  not  actually  en^ 
gaged  or  assigned  to  a  special  task  are  reserves  of  the  high- 
est commander. 

In  this  case  the  advance  guard  included  a  regiment  of 
the  Third  infantry  brigade,  the  second  regiment  of  this  bri- 
gade being  at  the  head  of  the  main  body.  If  the  Third  brf- 
gade  had  not  thus  been  divided,  and  the  advance  guard  had 
become  engaged,  in  order  to  reinforce  the  advance  guard  the 
next  undivided  unit  at  the  disposal  of  the  division  commander 
would  have  been  the  brigade  of  the  main  body,  the  Fourth 
infantry  brigade.  And  as  an  order  covering  the  whole  can  be 
issued  only  in  exceptional  cases  (the  matter  in  question  being 
the  immediate  support  of  the  advance  guard),  the  division 
commander  would  either  have  to  order  forward  at  once  the 
entire  brigade,  or  parts  of  it — a  regiment  or  battalion.  As  it 
was,  he  could  reinforce  the  advance  guard  with  the  remainder 
of  its  owm  brigade ;  otherwise  he  would  have  to  break  up  the 
Second  brigade  also,  and  on  the  fighting  line  the  brigade  com- 
mander in  charge  of  the  advance  guard  would  have  to  assume 
command  over  troops  entirely  unknown  to  him. 

The  greatest  error  possible,  however,  is  the  praisewor- 
thy inclination  of  commanders  to  conduct  their  fight  inde- 
pendently. When  this  is  done,  the  way  is  prepared  for  disorder 
and  superior  control  generally  becomes  impossible.  We  must 
therefore  strive  to  preserve  as  long  as  possible  the  original 
feeling  of  unity  that  grows  out  of  the  peace  relation  of  troops 
^— their  battle  formation.     For  these  reasons  the  Second  regi- 


24  Studies  i\  Tiiiv  Lkadixc,  or  Troops. 

meiit  of  llic  'i  liird  infantry  l)riga(le  was  placed  at  the  head  of 
the  main  body. 

We  nuist  also  note  that  in  view  of  the  great  losses  which 
occur  in  a  short  space  of  time  in  a  fight  of  breech-loader 
against  breech-loader,  it  is  necessary  to  give  a  much  greater 
value  to  strong  reserves  and  depth  formation.  Had  the  Sec- 
ond infantry  regiment  been  placed  in  rear  of  the  main  body, 
the  division  commander  would  have  been  tempted  to  call  the 
Third  infantry  brigade  into  action  too  soon,  so  that  a  reserve 
of  only  one-fourth  the  strength  of  his  command  would  have 
remained  at  his  disposal.  Jiesides,  we  are  taught  by  experi- 
ence tliat  a  reserve  so  formed  w^ould  easily  have  slipped  out 
of  the  hands  of  the  division  commander,  and  he  would  then 
have  no  reserve  whatever  at  his  disposal.  The  division  com- 
mander would  be  with  the  mass  of  his  troops,  and  his  atten- 
tion would  be  directed  to  the  front  (where  the  advance  would 
be  engaged),  if  he  would  not  be  there  in  person.  The  re- 
serve regiment  would  be  separated  from  him,  out  of  his  sight 
and  the  sight  of  the  enemy,  while  it  would  be  more  anxious 
than  any  other  body  of  troops  to  take  part  in  the  engagement, 
for  its  brigade  commander  and  comrades  would  be  wrestling 
with  the  enemy  at  the  front.  Only  the  slightest  provocation 
would  be  needed,  if  at  all  justifiable,  to  start  a  runaway  to 
the  front. 

Neither  would  it  be  any  different  with  the  brigade  com- 
mander in  charge  of  the  advance  guard,  who  had  only  one  of 
his  own  regiments  at  his  disposal.  Shoiild  the  engagement 
become  hot  and  difficult  on  his  side,  he  would  want  the  other 
regiment  of  his  brigade  also.  The  interval  between  such  a 
desire  and  an  attempt  to  fulfill  it  is  brief,  and  it  frequently 
happens  that,  in  order  to  satisfy  the  desires  of  both  that  part 
of  the  brigade  fighting  at  the  head  and  the  other  parts  stand- 
ing in  the  reserve,  the  separated  parts  become  united  against 
the  will  of  their  commander.  Don't  say  that  this  could  not 
happen,  for  here  we  have  manifestations  founded  on  human 
nature,  and  human  nature  is  what  we  must  reckon  with.  In 
battle,  human  nature  on  many  occasions  triumphs  over  the 
forms  that  bind   individuals  together   for  C(^ncentrated  action. 

I'\irthermore.  this  policy  is  dictated  by  ex]->erience.  In 
the   engagement    at    C.itschin.    I  jeutenant-(  K-neral    von    Tum- 


ii 


Studijcs  in  tmk  Lkauing  of  Troops. 


25 


pling  placed  the  two  grenadier  battalions  of  the  Twelfth  regi- 
uient  in  the  reserve  of  his  division.  The  other  regiment  of 
the  brigade  was  fighting  under  its  commander  on  the  wooded 
height  of  the  Priwiszin.  Suddenly  the  two  battalions  of  the 
Twelfth,  in  reserve,  were  seen  taking  part  in  the  near-by  en- 
gagement at  Klein  Ginolitz.  It  is  immaterial  how  this  came 
about,  but  at  all  events  it  was  contrary  to  the  intentions  of 
the  division  commander,  and  it  took  the  whole  energy  of  the 
superior  leading  and  remarkable  fire  discipline  of  this  regi- 
ment to  disengage  it  from  the  fight.  Exactly  the  same  hap- 
pened with  Fransecky's  division  in  the  struggle  for  the  Swiep 
forest  near  Königgrätz,  the  very  division  that  had  to  bear  the 
brunt  of  the  heaviest  fighting. 

It  is  therefore  not  advisable  to  allow  such  an  artificial  sep- 
aration with  brigades.  We  can  do  this  if  we  adhere  to  the 
rule  that  the  regiment  which  constitutes  a  brigade  jointly  w4th 
the  advance  guard  regiment  should  always  be  left  at  the  head 
of  the  main  body.  The  same  rule  can  apply  to  larger  or 
smaller  bodies  of  troops.  It  has  the  advantage  that  the  first 
support  of  the  advance  guard  is  furnished  by  that  body  near- 
est akin  to  it  in  organization,  and  the  brigade  commander  leads 
Ills  undivided  brigade  into  action.  Besides  this,  the  division 
commander  has  at  his  disposal  an  equally  strong  reserve ;  and 
still  further,  if  it  becomes  necessary  to  suddenly  form  another 
advance  guard,  in  case  it  is  necessary  to  rapidly  move  in  an- 
other direction,  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  break  up  the  second 
brigade  also. 

Referring  to  the  cavalry,  nearly  the  whole  hussar  regi- 
ment was  assigned  to  the  advance  guard,  although  it  moved 
forward  on  a  mountainous  road  on  which  the  entire  regiment 
could  not  be  utilized.  But  the  mountains  open  out  near  Par- 
schnitz;  the  patrols  of  the  advance  guard  had  continuously 
kept  the  region  under  eye,  almost  up  to  the  village ;  and  a 
considerable  resistance  on  that  side  of  the  opening  was  im- 
probable. As  soon  as  the  plain  of  Parschnitz  \vas  reached, 
however,  com.munication  was  to  be  established  with  the  First 
infafitry  division ;  it  must  be  ascertained  positively  whether 
Trautenau  was  occupied,  the  Aiipa  valley  too  must  be  recon- 
noitered  in  a  southerly  direction,  and  all  that  while  confronted, 
in  all  probability,  by  parts  of  the  Windischgrätz  dragoons.     If 


26  Studif.s  IX  TiiK  Lkai)ix(;  of  Troops. 

the  division  commander  would  then  have  brought  up  the  hus- 
sar regiment  from  the  rear  of  the  division,  much  difficulty 
would  have  been  encountered,  as  this  must  be  accomplished  on 
the  same  road  alongside  the  »marching  column,  which,  in  any 
event,  would  have  caused  considerable  loss  of  time.  Even 
supposing  that,  contrary  to  expectations,  the  advance  of  the 
opponent  should  have  brought  on  an  engagement  while  still 
in  the  mountains,  the  one  regiment  could  hardly  have  impeded 
the  movements  of  the  foot  troops  if  the  larger  part  of  it  had 
been  attached  to  the  rear  of  the  advance  guard.  But  had  the 
cavalry  brigade  been  assigned  to  the  advance  guard,  it  would 
certainly  have  occasioned  just  such  a  hindrance,  as  the  length 
of  its  column  would  have  delayed  the  arrival  of  the  main 
body  for  at  least  half  an  hour.  Under  the  circumstances  the 
(favalry  brigade  was  consequently  relegated  to  the  rear  of  the 
entire  marching  column.  On  a  plain  the  division  commander 
would  have  sent  forward  the  entire  cavalry  brigade,  with  the 
addition  of  the  greater  part  of  the  hussar  regiment,  as  inde- 
]jendent  cavalry,  in  front  of  the  advance  guard,  if  a  separate 
road  had  been  assigned  to  the  division  for  the  march. 

The  hussar  regiment  was  short  one  troop ;  this,  accord- 
ing to  the  order,  was  under  the  command  of  an  officer  cliarged 
with  maintaining  order  in  the  heavy  baggage  of  the  division. 
The  division  had  no  means  to  accomplish  this,  and  an  entire 
troop  was  ordered  on  this  duty  during  this  first  war  march, 
because  its  heavy  baggage  must  be  formed  with  a  perfectly 
manageable  body,  and  the  passage  of  the"  mountain  defile  de- 
manded a  faultless  order  of  march.  There  was  no  cavalry  at 
the  head  of  the  main  body.  The  main  body  did  not  need  to 
worry  about  the  security  of  its  flanks  in  the  mountain  defile. 
The  mounted  riflemen,'  of  which  t  non-commissioned  officer 
and  8  men  were  with  the  Second  infantry  regiment  at  the 
head  of  the  main  body,  sufficed  to  keep  up  communication  be- 
tween the  main  bodv  and  the  advance  guard.     Resides  this^ 


iBesides  its  regular  infantry,  the  German  Army  has  19  battal- 
ions of  riflemen  (Jägers).  Their  v/ar  strength  is  the  same  as  that 
of  the  infantry  battalions,  also  their  armament,  but.  owing  to  no 
men  being  talien  from  the  ranks  for  the  Itmd.  the  number  of  rifles 
is  greater.  A  battalion  may  be  .ittached  to  an  army  corps  or  a  num- 
ber of  its  men  attached  to  an   infantry  regiment. — Translat07\ 


Studiks  in  TTir:  Lkading  of  Troops.  27 

cyclists  could  have  been  advantageously  employed  on  the  mac- 
adamized road.  As  the  situation  was  very  simple,  these  means 
of  communication  should  have  been  sufficient;  although  ordi- 
narily it  would  be  well  to  use  in  addition  a  troop  of  cavalry 
for  this  purpose,  especially,  for  example,  if  a  division  was  the 
extreme  wing  of  an  army  in  level  country. 

Detached  cavalry  should  be  relieved  at  stated  periods, 
about  every  three  days;  for,  being  less  under  control  on  ac- 
count of  their  duty,  they  mav  be  used  up  too  rapidly. 

Of  the  artillery,  the  First  battalion  (three  field  batteries) 
was  assigned  to  the  advance  guard,  while  the  Second  battal- 
ion followed  the  leading  regiment  of  the  main  body.  The 
artillery  is  the  arm  which  can  inflict  damage  on  the  enemy  at 
the  greatest  distance ;  the  bulk  of  it  must  therefore  enter  into 
action  before  the  mass  of  the  infantry.  Consequently  we 
should  never  venture  to  place  artillery  too  far  to  the  rear  in 
the  marching  column ;  its  place  is  near  the  front ;  under  cer- 
tain circumstances,  as  here,  several  batteries  may  be  assigne'd 
to  the  advance  guard.  At  first  hardly  more  than  six  guns 
could  have  gone  into  action  in  the  narrow  mountain  valley,  and 
the  activity  of  a  stronger  force  of  artillery  would  only  be  pos- 
sible when  the  Aupa  had  been  crossed.  But  for  the  latter  pur- 
pose it  must  not  be  left  too  far  in  rear,  and  the  three  batteries 
of  the  advance  guard  were  designated  to  support  the  infantry 
of  the  advance  guard  when  it  deployed  out  of  the  mountain 
pass,  so  that  it  could  assure  the  debouching  of  the  main  body 
out  of  the  mountains.  The  order  of  march  allowed  the  entire 
division  artillery  to  be  brought  into  action  as  soon  as  six  bat- 
talions of  infantry  should  have  been  deployed. 

Special  value  must  be  laid  on  keeping  each  battalion  of 
artillery  intact.  In  the  situations  of  grand  tactics  single  bat- 
teries cannot  maneuver  on  their  own  responsibility,  as  we  see 
frequently  done  during  smiall  detachment  exercises.  When 
12,000  infantry  are  striving  to  reach  an  object,  the  attached 
artillery  must  not  attempt  to  improvise  scenes  arbitrarily,  by 
separate  performances,  but  it  must  contribute  its  entire  power 
to  the  attainment  of  the  object.  But  this  is  possible  only  when 
batteries  do  not  wander  about  singly,  according  to  their  own 
ideas,  but  obev  a  common  will.  In  grand  tactics  the  rule  is 
to  employ  batteries  In  masses;  the  use  of  single  batteries  is 


28  '  StudUvS   in    THlv  LEADING  OF   TrOOPS. 

the  excepiion  ;  and  we  must  cling  to  the  rule  all  the  more  per- 
sistently by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  exception  is  often 
enough  demanded. 

It  is  quite  sKpcifluous  to  detail  a  party  of  troops  espe- 
cially to  support  artillery  on  the  march,  as  artillery  is  then 
always  in  combination  with  other  arms ;  troops  march  before 
and  behind  it.  If  a  company  or  battalion  is  charged  with  such 
duty,  we  may  be  sure  that  these  bodies  will  be  lost  to  their 
own  organizations  in  action,  at  the  same  time  furnishing  no 
protection  for  the  batteries,  for  it  will  be  impossible  to  keep 
up  with  the  rapidly  advancing  guns.  It  is  dillerent,  however, 
when  more  than  three  batteries  march  in  close  order.  In  such 
case  it  is  recommended,  especially  in  country  where  the  view 
is  obstructed,  to  insert  bodies  of  infantry  in  the  marching  col- 
umn of  the  field  artillery.  The  caissons  of  the  batteries 
follow  by  battalion  under  command  of  an  officer;  those  of 
the  First  battalion  at  the  rear  of  the  advance  guard  and  those 
of  the  Second  behind  the  First  battalion. 

There  is  nothing  else  in  regard  to  the  distribution  of 
troops  that  calls  for  detailed  explanation.  It  is  well  under- 
stood that  an  engineer  company  must  be  with  the  advance' 
guard,  and  that  half  of  the  ambulance  company,  which  is 
divided  into  two  sections,  must  also  accompany  the  advance 
guard,  the  other  half  following  the  main  body,  and  that  if  an 
engagement  is  expected,  the  field  hospital  may  be  brought  up 
to  the  troops. 

Substance  of  the  Order. 

Tlie  surest  means  of  imparting  orders  consists  of  the  ver- 
bal instructions  given  by  a  senior  officer  directly  to  those  con- 
cerned— especially  so,  as  it  afi'ords  opportunity  for  explana- 
tion and  prevention  of  misunderstandings.  Verbal  orders 
can  also  be  transmitted  by  adjutants,  aids,  etc.,  but  only  in 
cases  involving  a  brief  and  positive  command,  such  as,  "The 

brigade  will  break  camp  and  march  at  once  via  X and^ 

Y ."     If,  however,  other  conditions  are  to  be  touched  on 


which  refer  to  general  instructions  or  to  other  colunms,  etc. 

leritten  orders  arc  unnualifiedlv  preferable. 

In  this  case  tlie  division,  camped  in  separate  detachments,    ^ 
a  (]ei)th   from  main  body  of  the  advance  guard  to  rear j 


had 


S'ruDits  IN  THE  Leading  oe  Troops.  29 

of  the  cavalry  brigade  of  about  31^  miles;  written  orders  must 
therefore  be  employed.  The  division  might  have  been  ad- 
vanced, the  different  bodies  being  put  in  motion  successively, 
by  aids.  But  in  such  an  event  none  of  the  superior  officers 
would  have  known  at  first  what  to  prepare  for,  and  the  troops 
would  have  needlessly  remained  standing  under  arms  long 
before  the  last  bodies  could  have  been  put  in  motion.  Conse- 
quently such  an  expedient  is  advisable  only  when  unavoidable, 
as  would  have  been  the  case  if,  on  account  of  an  engagement 
of  the  Guard  corps  at  Braunau,  instead  of  the  halt  that  was 
ordered,  a  sudden  start  of  the  main  body  of  the  Second  in- 
fantry division  in  that  direction  had  been  necessitated.  This 
could  have  been  initiated  all  the  sooner  by  employing  aids  to 
carry  verbal  instructions,  as  the  immediate  orders  concerned 
only  the  troops  bivouacking  around  Schömberg,  the  guard  that 
had  been  previously  advanced  having  been  required  to  remain 
in  position  toward  Trautenau. 

In  a  written  order  it  is  necessary  to  inform  the  subordi- 
nate officers  of  everything  the  commander  knozus  concerning 
the  enemy,  so  far  as  it  affects  the  end  in  viezv.     All  channels 
i  of  information  unite  in  the  hands  of  the  division  commander ; 
!  every  commander  below  him  can  only  have  a  one-sided  view 
I  of  the  general  situation.     With  such  a  large  body  of  troops, 
'  the  highest  commander  cannot  be  with  all  his  subordinates  or 
give  directions  for  every  detail,  and  the  latter  can  be  placed 
:  m  position  to  make  proper  dispositions  only  by  first  receiving 
such  general  information ;  and  only  then  will  they  be  able  to 
concentrate  their  attention  toward  the  direction  from  which 
the  opponent  is  expected  and  make  dispositions  accordingly 
and  without  needlessly  fatiguing  their  troops. 
,;  Information  as  to  what  our  intentions  are  also   belongs- 

Ito  the  order.  Yet  we  must  not  go  too  far  in  this  latter  direc- 
tion. It  is  doubtless  of  interest  to  troops,  to  knpw  how  their 
better  informed  commander  views  the  situation ;  but  the  com- 
jnander  must  consider  every  eventuality  carefully.  Moreover, 
a  detailed  statement  submitted  to  subordinates  only  confuses 
them,  since  they  are  hardly  ever  so  placed  as  to  recognize  what 
has  actually  occurred.  In  addition  to  this,  one  should  bear  in 
mind  the  conditions  under  which  an  order  usually  reaches  its 
destination.     Here  army  headquarters  had  prescribed  the  pro- 


30  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

cednre  of  the  corps  for  several  days,  because  the  matter  in 
point  was  tlie  crossing  of  a  mountain  range,  and,  with  few 
roads  available,  the  army  corps,  separated  by  a  day's  march, 
must  move  with  an  extended  front.  It  was  impossible  to 
direct  the  movements  from  day  to  day.  Corps  headquarters 
was  therefore  in  the  fortunate  position  of  being  able  to  issue 
orders  for  the  next  day  at  a  very  early  hour.  Yet  such  is 
rarely  the  case.  Ordinarily  army  headquarters  can  give  out 
their  orders  only  after  the  reports  of  the  several  corps  regard- 
ing the  day's  events  have  come  in.  These  orders  get  to  the 
corps  not  located  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  headquarters 
sometimes  during  the  night,  and  the  last  subdivisions  (bri- 
gades and  regiments)  do  not  receive  them  through  official 
channels  until  early  morning.  Half  asleep,  with  a  poor  light 
to  read  his  maps  by,  the  commander  has  then  to  make  his  dis- 
positions ;  at  such  a  time  every  word  in  the  order  not  abso- 
lutely necessary  is  objectionable.  Instructions  that  are  pages 
in  length  require  much  time  to  be  read,  and  still  more  time  to 
be  correctly  understood.  The  criterion  of  a  good  order  w^ill 
alw^ays  be  simplicity  and  clearness ;  if  one  w^ord  is  stricken  out 
of  any  good  order,  it  will  become  unintelligible ;  and  any  word 
that  can  be  stricken  out  and  still  leaves  the  order  intelligible 
is  superfluous  and  consequently  harmful. 

Kvery  leader  should  therefore  deliberate  thoroughly  on 
how  much  of  the  information  given  him  should  be  transmit- 
ted to  his  subordinates.  In  the  example  we  are  here  consid- 
ering the  division  commander  had  to  know  what  the  com- 
manding general  purposed  to  do  after  Parschnitz  had  been 
reached.  I  Tis  division  might  arrive  there  before  the  other 
division  and  its  commanding  general.  What  should  be  done 
in  such  an  event,  if  this  information  had  not  been  furnished 

Lieutenant-General  A ?     If  the  corps  was  to  halt  there,  his 

troops  need  not  be  tired  out  ])y  hours  of  waiting,  but  could  es- 
tablish (heir  bivouacs  and  bring  up  their  heavy  baggage.  lUit  if 
it  had  been  the  intenlion  lo  proceed  further,  and  if  the  division 
should  be  called  on  to  furnish  tlie  advance  guard,  then  the 
sejiarate  |)arts  must  be  brought  up  in  a  ditTerent  formation 
than  would  have  ])een  necessary  if  tlie  division  were  later  to 
become  a  part  of  the  main  body  of  the  army  corps. 


StudiivS  in  the;  Leading  of  Troops.  ,  l 

It  was  accordingly  stated  in  the  order  of  the  command- 
ing general  that  all  would  unite  near  Parschnitz  in  order  To 
continue  the  march  from  there  upon  Arnau  in  one  column, 
and  further,  that  the  Second  division  would  join  the  main 
body  upon  this  continued  march,  first  halting  at  Parschnitz  for 
two  hours. 

This  information  was  absolutely  essential  for  the  division 
commander,  but  only  for  him.  As  soon  as  Parschnitz  had 
been  reached,  he  would  certainly  have  been  there  in  person 
and  have  had  it  in  his  power  to  give  the  order  to  halt,  person- 
ally, to  the  subdivisions,  as  they  arrived  successively,  and  at 
the  same  time  to  form  them  as  required  for  the  march  beyond. 
Then  the  separated  parts  of  the  infantry  brigade,  the  hussar 
regiment,  the  field  artillery  regiment,  and  the  ambulance  com- 
pany, could  have  reunited  there. 

It  was  therefore  sufficient  to  state  in  the  division  order 
that  a  union  would  be  effected  with  the  other  parts  of  the 
corps  near  Parschnitz.  By  this  the  troops  learned  at  the  same 
time  that  all  which  would  appear  on  their  right  flank  belonged 
to  the  First  infantry  division,  a  friendly  force. 

Now  that  all  necessary  information  concerning  adjoin- 
ing columns  had  been  given,  it  further  remained  to  state  zvhat 
should  be  done  in  ease  the  eneniv  zverc  encountered.  The  situ- 
ation relative  to  this  latter  point  was  very  simple,  as  the  en- 
emy could  be  expected  only  on  the  road  followed  by  the  ad- 
vance guard.  For  the  advance  guard,  however,  it  would  be 
necessary  to  add  that  it  must  attack  at  once,  as  the  division 
commander  might  possibly  not  be  with  it  at  the  moment  arid 
otherwise  time  might  be  lost. 

The  order  of  march  may  be  communicated  in  different 
V/ays,  either  by  a  "distribution  of  troops  for  June  27" 
appended  to  the  order,  or  in  the  written  order  itself  if 
the  order  of  march  must  necessarily  be  given  therein.  In 
the  division  order  for  June  27  a  blending  of  both  methods 
occurred,  which  is  indeed  customary,  for  in  the  distribution 
of  troops  given  separate  from  the  text  of  the  order  the  ad- 
vance guard  is  specified  without  indication  of  the  order  of 
march,  while  in  the  case  of  the  main  body  the  order  of  march 
is  laid  down.  Attention  is  called  to  the  same  by  the  words 
I  ""in  order  of  march"  under  heading  "main  body." 


32  Studiks  in  tite  Lkading  of  Troops. 

All  order  of  march  when  attaclied  should  give  a  compre- 
hensive, easily  understood  illustration  of  the  entire  scheme, 
but  the  sheet  on  which  the  order  itself  is  written  must  also  be 
brought  directly  under  the  observation  of  the  person  for 
whom  it  is  intended.  Whenever  orders  are  dictated  to  adju- 
tants in  their  vieniorandum-books,  it  is  therefore  well  first  to 
give  the  distribution  of  troops  and  then  follow  with  the  text 
of  the  order,  in  a  distribution  of  troops  that  is  not  at  the 
same  time  the  order  of  march,  troops  should  be  entered  ac- 
cording to  arm  (infantry,  cavalry,  field  artillery)  in  advance 
guard  and  main  body.  Independent  cavalry,  which  in  grand 
tactics  remains  under  the  immediate  orders  of  the  commander 
of  the  whole,  is  given  separately  in  the  distribution  of  troops ; 
likewise,  detachments  sent  out  under  special  instructions.  A 
special  commander  for  the  main  body  was  not  designated  in 
this  order,  as  it  would  appear  superfiuous  to  do  so.  The  suc- 
cession of  the  different  parts  of  the  main  body  was  designed 
for  the  purposes  of  the  march ;  if,  however,  a  fight  should  take 
place,  the  division 4:ommander  would  direct  these  parts  sepa- 
rately. It  is  nevertheless  permissible  to  appoint  a  commander 
for  the  main  body  when  it  appears  necessary. 

If  a  special  commander  is  designated  for  a  part  (as  don.e 
here  for  the  advance  guard),  it  becomes  his  duty  to  form  his 
troops  in  the  manner  in  which  he  intends  to  employ  them. 

Especial  attention  should  be  given  to  the  arrangement  of 
the  time  for  starting.  Unnecessary  excitement  ordinarily 
causes  us  to  OA^erlook  the  fact  that  a  mass  like  a  division,  even 
if  locally  separated,  cannot  be  put  in  motion  simultaneous!} . 
and  troops  are  fatigued  by  assembling  them  too  soon.  \\\ 
never  can  tell  what  hardships  the  day  will  bring;  and  there 
fore  all  the  greater  precaution  should  be  taken  to  avoid  un 
necessary  fatigue. 

In  the  case  before  us  the  following  calculation  served  \<> 
fix  the  time  of  starti)i^i^:  The  length  of  the  advance  guard  i;i 
column  of  march,  without  security  distances,  was.  roughly  esti- 
mated, nearly  2  miles ;  the  distance  from  the  bivouac  of  th,' 
main  body  of  the  advance  guard  to  that  of  the  main  body  oi' 
the  division  v.as  about  1V2  miles.  Now,  if  the  main  bodv 
started  simultaneously  with  the  adwuice  guard,  its  head  would 
collide   with   the   last    sul)divisions   of   the   latter   while    still    111 


i 


Studies  in  Tiiß  Leading  of  Troops.  33 

bivouac,  and  must  wait  about  4  minutes  before  it  could  fol- 
low. It  is,  however,  desirable  to  maintain  an  interval  of  about 
half  a  mile  between  the  two  divisions,  and  so  the  main  body, 
although  located  I'/z  miles  in  rear  of  the  advance  guard,  could 
fall  in  15  minutes  later  than  it.  The  column  of  the  main  body 
of  the  division  (without  the  First  cavalry  brigade)  was 
about  3I/2  miles  long,  so  its  last  subdivision  woull  'ea  e 
the  bivouac  more  than  an  hour  after  the  head  started  out. 
The  distance  from  this  place  to  the  bivouac  of  the  cav- 
alry brigade  was  ij/^  miles.  The  latter  therefore  r.ee:le:l 
to  start  only  45  minutes  later  than  the  head  of  the  main 
body,  in  order  to  follow  immediately  in  its  rear,  by  advancing 
at  a  walk.  After  that  the  cavalry  would  have  to  follow  the 
infantry  in  the  mountains  for  a  distance  of  nearly  7  miles, 
and  could  only  proceed  at  a  walk  during  the  first  3  hours ;  it 
was  therefore  better  to  let  it  remain  longer  in  bivouac,  as  it 
could  have  easily  made  up  the  time  by  trotting  part  of  the 
way,  which  is  more  advantageous  than  going  continually  at 
a  walk. 

As  regards  the  main  body,  it  should  be  noted  that  the 
starting  time  as  fixed,  4:15,  naturally  referred  only  to  the  Sec- 
ond infantry  regiment,  which  was  ordered  to  take  the  lead; 
the  Second  artillery  battalion,  which  was  likewise  located  close 
to  the  highway,  did  not  need  to  start  until  4 130,  the  Third  in- 
fantry regiment  at  4:40,  and  the  Fourth  infantry  regiment 
about  5  o'clock. 

It  is  the  duty  of  commanders  to  keep  these  facts  in  viezv 
and  have  the  troops  fall  in  accordingly.  Such  a  course  can 
be  pursued,  however,  only  by  troops  already  assembled — in 
this  case,  by  the  bodies  united  in  one  bivouac.  It  is  assumed 
here^that  infantry  heavily  burdened  in  the  field  can  do  ^ 
mile  in  from  12  to  13  minutes,  including  short  halts. 

The  First  field  artillery  battalion  (Second  and  Third  bat- 
teries) and  staff,  recently  assigned  to  the  advance  guard,  the 
engineer  company,  and  the  ambulance  company  section  must 
proceed  on  the  highway  in  proper  time  to  the  rendezvous  of 
the  advance  guard. 

If  troops  come  together  out  of  different  villages  at  the 
same  rendezvous,  the  commander  of  brigade,  regiment,  etc., 
will  want  to  have  his  entire  command  together  at  a  fixed  time. 


34 


StudiivS  is  Tine  Lkading  üi-  Tkuoj 


Tf  larger  masses  are  ordered  to  assemble  in  one  place,  the 
arrival  of  each  unit  separately  at  the  proper  time  should  be 
arranged,  because  waiting  unnecessarily  fatigues. 

Referring  to  the  division  trains,  the  light  baggage  (led 
horses  and  medical-,  company  ammunition-,  ponton-,  intrench- 
ing-, and  tool-wagons)  had  to  follow  immediately  after  the 
organizations  to  which  they  belonged.  Special  care  should  be 
exercised  so  that  led  horses  are  not  turned  into  pack-animals, 
but  can  be  mounted  as  soon  as  needed. 

The  medical-wagons  and  the  4  company  ammunition- 
wagons  with  led  horses  follow  the  battalion  marching  in  col- 
umn. With  cavalry  regiments  the  medical-  and  ponton- 
wagons  are  in  rear  of  the  regiment.  The  engineers  keep 
their  intrenching-  and  other  tool-wagons  with  them,  as  well 
as  their  field-miners'  wagons. 

The  heavy  baggage,  in  the  same  order  as  the  advancing 
troop  organizations,  follows  the  last  subdivision  of  the  main 
body  at  a  distance  of  from  lyl  to  2  miles.  To  the  heavy  bag- 
gage belong  the  headquarters,  company,  and  squadron  bag- 
gage-, subsistence-,  and  forage-wagons.  Each  artillery  head- 
quarters has  one  baggage- wagon.  With  each  battery  there 
is  a  supply-wagon  and  a  field  forge.  In  this  case  no  am- 
munition columns  and  trains  were  assigned  to  the  Second 
infantry  division,  because  on  the  27th  the  army  corps  would 
occupy  one  road.  If  the  division  had  been  given  ammunition 
columns  and  several  field  hospitals,  in  case  of  an  advance 
against  the  enemy  these  columns  would  need  to  be  brought 
up  as  a  first  echelon  in  front  of  the  heavy  baggage,  in  order  to 
have  them  at  hand  in  action.  Subsistence  supply  columns  that 
might  have  been  attached  would  have  become  the  seco  id 
echelon  to  the  heavy  baggage. 

The  field  hospital  actually  pr.'scnt  was  brought  close  to 
the  division. 

According  to  rircumstanccs,  dilYcrent  dispositions  wouUl 
be  allowable  relative  to  vdistances  and  distribution  of  wagons 
and  column.  In  the  case  before  us  due  regard  had  to  be  given 
to  tlie  narrow  mountain  defile  and  the  possibility  of  an  engage- 
ment in  or  in  front  of  it.  It  therefore  seemed  expedient  to 
leave  the  heavy  baggage  of  the  division  at  SchiMiiberg  or  near 
lU'rkelsdorf  for  the  tinio  being,  and  to  bring   it   up  when   an 


( 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  35 

engagement  might  not  be  likely,  upon  issuing  from  the  defile. 
The  bringing  up  of  the  heavy  baggage  too  soon  must  espe- 
cially be  avoided  under  the  prevailing  conditions.  If  an  un- 
fortunate engagement  should  have  forced  a  retreat  and  the 
baggage  had  followed  too  closely,  a  blockade  of  the  highway 
could  scarcely  have  been  prevented,  which  in  turn  might  have 
been  followed  by  a  rout.  On  the  other  hand,  keeping  in 
view  the  possibility  of  an  engagement,  it  would  appear  judi- 
cious to  take  along  the  field  hospital  and  place  it  near  the  rear 
of  the  division.  In  this  place  also  belongs  the  division  bridge 
train;  it  should  properly  be  with  the  engineer  company,  but 
in  the  mountain  defile  the  engineers  could  have  been  used 
with  the  advance  guard  although  the  train  itself  could  not 
have  been  employed  there.  Still  it  must  not  be  left  behind 
entirely,  as  occasion  for  its  use  might  easily  have  arisen  in 
the  plain  when  crossing  the  Aupa. 

The  signal  corps  detachment  found  no  immediate  em- 
ployment, and  followed  the  rear  of  the  division. 

The  formation  of  a  special  rear  guard  zuas  not  neces- 
sary, as  an  attack  on  the  rear  of  the  column  was  not  expect- 
ed.' Under  certain  conditions,  especially  in  a  country  aroused 
to  insurrection,  a  specially  constituted  rear  guard  cannot  be 
dispensed  with.  Its  strength  then  depends  on  prevailing 
circumstances. 

Finally,  it  must  always  be  stated  where  the  division  com- 
mander will  he  located,  so  that  all  messages  may  reach  him. 
In  this  case  he  had  chosen  his  place  with  the  advance  guard, 
because  his  dispositions  would  depend  on  what  he  found  at 
its  front.  His  presence  there,  however,  was  not  at  all  neces- 
sary, for  if  the  enemy  had  been  encountered,  the  commander 
of  the  advance  guard  would  have  been  on  the  spot  for  the  pur- 
pose of  ordering  what  was  immediately  required.  Neverthe- 
less it  is  highly  desirable  that  the  leader  of  the  whole  should 
gain  an  insight  into  the  measures  of  his  opponent  as  soon  as 
possible.  For  this  reason,  the  leader  will  in  most  cases  keep 
himself  with  the  advance  guard. 

,. -•  Nothing  is  said  in  zirritten  orders  relative  to  a  possihh 
retreat.  These  orders  come  into  too  many  hands ;  and  at  the 
very  moment  when  every  one  must  strive  only  to  gain  a  vic- 
tory the  troops  must  not  be  told  that  their  commander  enter- 


36  Studii-s  IX  THE  Leading  oe  Troops. 

tains  thoughts  of  retreat.  If  it  is  desired  to  give  directions 
regarding  a  retrograde  movement,  it  is  done  verbally.  In  this 
case,  however,  no  such  necessity  existed,  for  even  if  a  retreat 
from  Parschnitz  had  taken  place,  no  one  would  have  thought  of 
inaugurating  it  on  any  other  road  than  the  one  on  which  the 
advance  had  been  made ;  and  should  the  retreating  forces  have 
been  obliged  by  the  enemy  to  take  a  different  direction,  all 
orders  previously  given  would  have  been  useless. 

Information  Received  Concerning  the  Guard  Corps,  and. 
Consequent   Dispositions. 

About  I  a.  m.,  June  2'],  a  staff  officer  of  the  Guard  corps, 
coming  from  Liebau,  handed  the  following  communication 
to  the  commander  of  the  Second  infantry  division : 

Guard  Corps, 

1st  Inf.  Divis.     Headquarters  at  Deutsch-Wernersdorf, 

Page  No.  .  26,  6,  '66,  7  p.  m. 

To  the  Commanding  General,  ist  Army  Corps,  Liebau: 

This  division  is  ordered  to  march  early  to-morrow  from 
Dittersbach  and  Deutsch-Wernersdorf,  on  the  Trautenau 
road,  via  Adersbach,  Qualisch,  and  Petersdorf,  to  Parschnitz, 
and  thence  south  into  the  Aupa  valley.  It  is  to  commence 
the  march  when  the  troops  of  the  First  army  corps  have 
cleared  the  road ;  it  will  remain  near  Qualisch  until  that  time, 
holding  itself  in  readiness  to  support  the  First  army  corps  in 
case  of  resistance  near  Trautenau. 

In  order  to  enable  the  division  to  judge  the  time  of  start- 
ing, it  is  requested  that  'the  commanding  general  advise  when 
Albendorf  will  probably  be  passed  by  his  troops. 

X , 

IJ.entena)il-GeiieraI,  Division  Commander. 
Pcceived :     Liebau,  26,  6,  '66,  11  115  p.  m. 

Headquarters   at   Liebau, 

26,  6,  '66,  II  :i5  p.  m. 
Returned  to  the  First  infantry  division,  Guard  corps,  with 
the  information  that  the  Second  infantry  division  and  the 
First  cavalry  brigade,  located  around  Schömberg,  will  take 
up  their  march  at  4  a.  m.,  June  27,  advancing  via  Albendorf. 
The  column   will  halt   for  about  two  hours  near   Parschnitz, 


Studies  in  thk  Leading  oi<  Troops. 


37 


awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  remainder  of  the  corps,  whicn  is 
directed  to  proceed  thither  from  Liebaii.  The  time  of  arrival 
near  Parschnitz  will  depend  mainly  on  the  resistance  of  the 
enemy,  but  in  no  event  will  it  take  place  much  before  8  a.  m. 

The  Commanding  General:     Y . 

To  the  Second  infantry  division,  at  Schömberg,  for  its  infor- 
mation ;  then  immediately  back  to  the  First  infantry  divis- 
ion, Guard  corps,  at  Deutsch-Wernersdorf. 

The  commander  of  the  Second  infantry  division  added  in 
the  proper  place : 

Contents  noted. 

Headquarters  at  Schömberg,  2y,  6,  '66,  12:45  ^-  ""■• 

A ,  Lieutenant-General, 

Commanding  Second  Infantry  Division. 

The  staiT  officer  then  resumed  his  journey  to  the  infantry 
division  of  the  Guard  corps. 

In  order  that  the  cavalry  brigade  might  not  be  cut  off 
from  its  infantry  near  Albendorf  by  reason  of  the  rather  late 
start  ordered,  the  division  commander,  now  informed  as  to 
the  intended  movements  of  the  parts  of  the  army  located  on 
his  left,  felt  called  upon  to  give  appropriate  directions  to  the 
cavalry  brigade. 

The  following  written  message  was  therefore  immedi- 
ately despatched  by  cyclist  to  the  commander  of  the  cavalry: 

1st  Army  Corps, 

2d  Inf.  Division.  Headquarters  at  Schömberg, 

Page  No.  .  27,  6,  '66,  1  a.  m. 

According  to  advice  just  received,  the  First  infantry 
division.  Guard  corps,  located  near  Deutsch-Wernersdorf,  will 
move  forward  early  to-day  via  Adersbach,  advancing  thence 
on  Parschnitz  by  the  same  road  that  is  to  be  taken  by  this 
division. 

The  brigade  will  accordingly  arrange  to  reach  the  rear 
of  this  division  at  the  proper  time  near  Albendorf,  and  avoid 
being  cut  off  from  it  by  the  head  of  the  division  of  the  Guard. 

A , 

To  the  Lieutenant-General,  Division  Commander. 

1st  Cavalry  Brigade, 

In  bivouac  north  of  Schömberg. 


38  Studiks  in  trh:  Leading  01^  Troops. 

Comments. 

The  staff  officer  who  came  from  the  Guard  corps  was 
accompanied  by  a  mounted  rifleman,  and  had  to  pass  Schöm- 
berg  en  route  from  Liebau  to  Deutsch-Wernersdorf. 

Although  this  information  could  be  transmitted  to  Lieu- 
tenant-General A by  the  circular  letter  here  employed, 

such  means  of  conveying  intelligence  (admissible  and  fre- 
quently done  in  time  of  peace)  must,  as  a  rule,  be  avoided  in 
war. 

To  assure  prompt  delivery,  there  should  always  be  pre- 
pared as  many  copies  of  every  order,  etc.,  as  there  are  head- 
quarters to  receive  it. 

After  the  information  had  been  received  by  the  Second 
infantry  division,  no  transmission  to  subordinates  was  neces- 
sary, as  no  further  dispositions  were  required  on  their  part. 
Data  concerning  the  march  of  the  Guard  division,  as  far  as 
such  was  necessary  for  commanders  of  separate  parts,  could 
be  given  them  by  the  division  commander  in  person,  in  ample, 
time  at  the  start,  when  he  must  see  them. 

The  fact  that  the  Guard  division  sent  to  Liebau  for  infor- 
mation as  to  the  expected  movements  of  the  Second  infantry 
division,  which  was  then  stationed  at  Schömberg  and  was  thus 
between  Liebau  and  the  headquarters  of  the  Guard  division, 
prompts  us  to  give  some  consideration  to  the  location  of  va- 
rious headquarters. 

Ordinarily  every  commander  is  stationed  w^ith  the  bulk 
of  his  troops.  When,  however,  he  is  part  of  an  army,  he  must 
not  forget  that  his  movements  are  dependent  on  the  orders 
of  superior  authority  and  that  he  should  be  able  to  promptly 
receive  the  intimations  of  superior  authority's  intentions ;  in 
this  connection  telegraph  lines  will  exert  material  influence. 
If,  for  instance,  the  First  army  corps  had  desired  to  be  in 
communication  with  the  Guard  corps  by  the  shortest  route,  it 
would  have  had  to  transfer  its  headquarters  to  Schömberg. 
As  it  was,  however,  dependent  on  the  orders  of  the  com- 
mander of  the  Second  Army,  it  had  to  remain  at  Liebau. 
as  the  telegraph  line  there  (supposing  there  was  none  at 
Schömberg)  assured  the  most  rapid  communication  wnth  army 
headquarters. 


II 


STUDjKS    in    tue:   Ll'^ADING   OF   TrOOPS.  39 

For  the  same  reason  the  division  commander  could  not 
remain  permanently  with  his  advance  guard,  no  matter  how 
anxious  he  might  have  been  to  be  informed  early  of  moves 
likely  to  be  made  by  the  enemy,  as  the  prompt  execution  of 
an  order  from  corps  headquarters  was  more  important.  Such 
an  order  sent  by  Schömberg  (passing  therefore  the  main  body 
of  the  division)  would  have  reached  him  with  the  advance 
guard,  over  a  mile  away,  and  must  be  sent  back  to  Schömberg, 
traveling  double  this  distance,  before  the  division  could  be  put 
in  motion.  If  there  had  been  any  danger  in  delay,  the  com- 
mander of  the  advance  guard  would  have  been  there  on.  the 
spot  to  meet  any  action  of  the  enemy,  and  assistance  from  the 
division  would  have  arrived  just  as  quickly  whether  the  divis- 
ion commander  was  in  Schömberg  or  with  the  advance  guard. 

Failure  to  duly  consider  circumstances  that  influence  the 
selection  of  headquarters  can  be  shown  to  have  caused  un- 
necessary delay  and  consequent  mischief  in  war  on  many 
occasions. 

It  should  be  further  noted  that  either  the  division  com- 
mander or  his  general  staff  officer  should  always  be  present 
at  headquarters ;  the  absence  of  both  at  the  same  time  is  not 
allowable.  If  important  orders,  messages  or  inquiries  arrive 
during  their  absence,  division  adjutants  are  not,  as  a  rule,  in 
a  position  to  take  appropriate  action,  for  usually  they  lack 
general  information  and  knowledge  of  the  intentions  of  their 
commander. 

Advance  on  Parschnitz. 

At  3  130  a.  m.  Lieutenant-General  A mounted  his 

horse,  and,  accompanied  by  his  staff,  rode  forward  to  the  ad- 
vance guard. 

The  commander  of  the  Second  infantry  regiment  had 
been  directed  to  bring  the  mounted  riflemen  up  to  the  head 
of  the  regiment. 

The  hussar  regiment,  the  First  field  artillery  battalion 
(Second  and  Third  batteries  and  staff),  the  engineer  com- 
pany, and  the  ambulance  company  section  had  arrived  near 
the  reserve  of  the  advance  guard.  All  troops  were  ready 
to  fall  in.  On  account  of  the  great  distance  from  the  enemy, 
and  the  fact  that  hussar  patrols  had  already  gone  forward  on 


40 


Stl'dh.s  i\  TiiK  Lkadixc.  ur  Truops. 


XUv.  (jn\y  road,  llu-  Third  baltalion,  with  two  troo])s  of  the  Sec- 
oiid  scjuadron.  which  liad  been  on  outpost,  had  brought  in  the 
outpost  companies,  and  were  stationed  at  the  southern  exit  of 
iiertelsdorf,  with  a  strong  patrol  ahead. 

Major-General  B had  just  assembled  all  his  co  n- 

nianders  around  him  and  given  them  the  following  orders: 

"The  division  will  advance  as  far  as  Parschnitz  on  the  road 
to  Trautenau,  where  it  will  form  a  junction  with  the  First 
infantry  division,  from  Liebau. 

"Alajor  N will  take  command  of  the  vanguard,  con- 
sisting of  the  Third,  battalion,  Fourth  squadron,  and  the  en- 
,gineer  company,  and  will  start  at  4  a.  m.  The  enemy  will 
be  attacked  wherever  seen.  Communication  will  be  maintained 
with  the  First  infantry  division,  by  means  of  cavalry  patrols, 
on  the  roads  leading  over  the  mountains. 

•'Colonel  D will  follow  with  the  two  battalions  of  his 

regiment,  witli  the  First  battalion  of  field  artillery  in  rear  of 
the  regiment  as  main  body,  at  a  distance  of  700  yards.  The 
caissons  of  the  artillery  and  the  ambulance  company  sec- 
tion will  follow  the  last  battery.  The  hussar  regiment  will 
bring  up  the  rear. 

"The  heavy  baggage  will  remain  assembled  north  of  Ber- 
telsdorf  until  further  orders. 

"Messages  will  reach  me  with  the  vanguard." 

While  the  remainder  of  the  Fourth  scjuadron  and  the 
engineer  company  moved  up  to  the  Third  battalion,  the  bat- 
talion commander  hurried  ahead  and  advanced  the  Twelfth 
company  350  yards. 

A  little  before  4  o'clock  the  several  portions  of  the  van- 
guard were  formed  toward  the  front  in  the  order  in  wdiich 
Ihcy  were  to  march  ofT,  and  at  4  o'clock  the  advance  guard 
was  .set  in  motion,  the  h^onrth  scjuadron  advancing  farther  to 
the  front  at  a  tn.t. 

In  order  to  satisfy  himself  that  the  advance  guard  had 
been  formed  as  directed,  the  division  commander  had  the  sep- 
arate l)odies  march  past  him  at  the  southern  exit  of  Bertels- 
dorf,  and  there  awaited  the  main  body  of  the  division.  On 
the  arrival  of  the  main  body  he  sent  one  of  his  aids  to  advise 
the  several  commanders  concernini^  the  march  of  the  First, 
infantry  division  of  the  Guard.     The  aid   was  also  directed* 


♦ 


g:  on  Parschnitz 


PLAN  II 


4th  Squadr.  Öii  Hussars, 

4th  Troop.  2>i  Sqdrs.  «75  Yds.  to  Main  Body  of  Division, 


300  Yds.pb. 


875  Yds. 


1  St  Cav.  Brigade.     1st  Horse  Battery 


rain, 
osp. 

9t.     , 


1C80  Yd3- 


40 


Stldii.s  in  'IUI-:  LKAUiM",  ui*  Tkuoi'S. 


the  only  road,  tlu-  Third  baltaHon.  with  two  troops  of  the  Sec- 
ond s(|iiadr()n.  which  liad  been  on  outpost,  had  brought  in  the 
outpost  companies,  and  were  stationed  at  the  southern  exit  of 
ßertelsdorf,  with  a  strong  patrol  ahead. 

Major-General  B had  just  assembled  all  his  co  n- 

nianders  around  him  and  given  them  the   following  orders: 

"The  division  will  advance  as  far  as  Parschnitz  on  the  road 
iu  Trautenau,  where  it  will  form  a  junction  wdth  the  First 
infantry  division,  from  Liebau. 

"Alajor  N will  take  command  of  the  vanguard,  con- 
sisting of  the  Third  battalion.  Fourth  squadron,  and  the  en- 
gineer company,  and  will  start  at  4  a.  m.  The  enemy  will 
be  attacked  wherever  seen.  Communication  will  be  maintained 
with  the  First  infantry  division,  by  means  of  cavalry  patrols, 
on  the  roads  leading  over  the  mountains. 

"Colonel  D will  follow  with  the  two  battalions  of  his 

regiment,  witli  the  First  battalion  of  field  artillery  in  rear  of 
the  regiment  as  main  body,  at  a  distance  of  700  yards.  The 
caissons  of  the  artillery  and  the  ambulance  company  sec- 
tion will  follow  the  last  battery.  The  hussar  regiment  will 
bring  up  the  rear. 

"The  heavy  baggage  will  remain  assembled  north  of  Ber- 
telsdorf  until  further  orders. 

"Messages  will  reach  me  with  the  vanguard." 

While  the  remainder  of  the  Fourth  squadron  and  the 
engineer  company  moved  up  to  the  Third  battalion,  the  bat- 
talion commander  hurried  ahead  and  advanced  the  Twelfth 
company  350  yards. 

A  little  ])efore  4  o'clock  the  several  portions  of  the  van- 
guard were  formed  toward  the  front  in  the  order  in  which 
ihey  were  to  march  ofT,  and  at  4  o'clock  the  advance  guard 
was  set  in  motion,  the  b'ourth  sc|ua(lron  advancing  farther  to 
the  front  at  a  trot. 

In  order  to  satisfy  himself  that  the  advance  guard  had 
been  formed  as  directed,  the  division  commander  had  the  sep- 
arate bodies  march  past  him  at  the  southern  exit  of  Bertels- 
dorf.  and  there  awaited  the  main  body  of  the  division.  On 
the  arrival  of  the  main  body  he  sent  one  of  his  aids  to  advise 
the  several  commanders  concerning  the  march  of  the  First 
infantrv   division   of   the   Guard.      The   aid   was  also  directed 


1 


PLAN  II 

Order  of  March  of  the  Second  Infantry  Division /Advancing  on  Parschnitz 
Forenoon  of  June  27, 

«h  Squadr.  Hussars.  nth,  loth  and   Engrs.  1st  Infantry.      1st  Bn.  1st  Field  Artillery.    6th  Hussars. 

«h  Troop.  3d  Troop.  12th  Co.  9th  Cos.  2dBn,         Ist  Bn.  2»i  Scjdrs.  «75  Vde.  to  Miin  Body  o(  DivUiOBj 

#- -0--- o  ■-- czno cz:c:^™™™{]'000 

300  Yds.  300  Yds.  .-iOO  Vds.  600  Yds.  1  Amb. 

Co.  Sec. 

Vanguard.  Main  Body. 

Advance  Guard  (4770  Yds). 

875  Yds  to  Advance  Guard. 

2d  Infantry         Reg.  Staff  and  2d  Bn.  1st  Field  Arty.  4th  Infantry  Brigade.  Co^S^e'  1st  Cav.  Brigade,     ist  Horse  Battery 

czjczi—  .*,.*..*,.*.  £:^^::]{^^:]  ^     w     w     °'^  'r>^  rz::^^^  1 1  „-— -- 1  **^^^^ 

1350  Yds.  113i  \ds.  2720  Yds  ^Field^Hos'"' 

Sig.  Det.  ■  . 
V 515  Yds.     ^ Y 

-Main  Body  Of  Division,  .5980  Yds.     (with  distances).  1680  Ydj- 

Length  o{  Columa. 

Advance  Guard 4770  yds. 

Distance  to  Main  Body  875     ii 

Main  Body  (Including  Bridge  Train,  Field  Hospital, 

and  Sig.  Detach.) 5980    " 

11625    " 
Cav.  Brigade  with  Horse  Batttery 1680    " 

Total 13305    " 


ii 

■ 
m 

j 


0 


th 


Formation   bf:foric  Start. 
Vanguard. 


4th  troop. 
350  yards. 

3  troops. 
350  yards. 
1 2th  company 
350  yards. 


4th  squadron  hussars. 


.      3d  battalion,  ist  infantry. 


nth  company, 
loth  company. 
9th  company,     j 

Engineers. 


700  yards. 

Main  Body  of  Advance  Guard. 


2d  battaHon. 


ist  battaUon. 


ist  infantry. 


,|,  BattaHon  of  field  artillery. 

A  Ambulance  company  section. 

■  ^       ist,  2d,  and  ^  of  3d  squadrons  hussars. 


Studies  in  thf,  Lf,adtng  oi?  Troops.  41 

to  observe  whether  the  cokimn  was  marching  as  ordered. 
Meanwhile  the  division  commander  returned  to  the  advance 
guard. 

When  the  advance  guard  started,  it  sent  two  mounted 
riflemen  to  the  First  infantry  division  with  the  following 
message : 

Advance  Guard,  Bertelsdorf, 

2d  Infantry  Division.  27,  6,  '66,  4  a.  m. 

To  the  ist  Infantry  Division: 

The  advance  guard  started  at  4  a.  m.  from  Bertels- 
dorf, and  is  advancing  on  the  highway  from  Schömberg  to 

Parschnitz.  B , 

Major-General,  Brigade  Commander. 

When  the  head  arrived  in  front  of  Petersdorf,  the  divi- 
sion halted  for  a  short  while,  the  column  remaining  in  its 
formation  on  the  right  of  the  road.  On  account  of  the  road 
being  in  a  cut,  the  guns  had  to  be  stacked ;  yet  this  would  not 
ordinarily  have  been  done. 

A  road  leading  over  the  mountains  near  Albendorf  had 
allowed  the  sending  of  a  hussar  patrol  to  the  valley  of  Gold- 
en-Oels,  in  the  direction  of  Bernsdorf,  with  the  following 
message : 

Advance  Guard,  Petersdorf, 

2d  Infantry  Division.  27,  6,  '66,  5  :30  a.  m. 

To  the  ist  Infantry  Division: 

The  head  of  the  advance  guard  has  just  reached  Peters- 
dorf.   Nothing  has  been  seen  of  the  enemy. 

B , 

Major-General,  Brigade  Commander. 

At  6:15  a.  m.  a  non-commissioned  officer  and  6  dragoons 
of  the  First  infantry  division  rode  up  to  Lieutenant-General 

A- and  handed  him  the  following  message : 

1st  Infantry  Division.  Beyond  Bernsdorf, 

27,  6,  '66,  5  :25  a.  m. 
To  the  2d  Infantry  Division. 

At  4  a.  m.  this  division  began  its  advance  on  Parschnitz. 
At  a  point  1,200  yards  north  of  Bernsdorf  it  was  delayed 
some  time  by  a  demolished  bridge,  on  the  further  side  of 
which  a  troop  of  the  Windischgrätz  dragoons  attacked  the 


42  Studiks  in  the  leading  of  Troops. 

head  of  the  advanee  guard,  ])eing',  however,  repulsed  with  loss. 
The  division  has  just  reached  Bernsdorf.  Hostile  cavalry 
patrols  are  watching  us  from  the  heights. 

By  command  :  N ,    Captain, 

General  Staff  Offieer,   ist  hifantry  Division. 

The  envelope  that  contained  the  message  was  indorsed 
by  one  of  the  division  aids,  in  the  "received''  column,  "6:15 
a.  m.,"  and  then  returned  to  the  patrol  leader  with  the  verbal 
remark,  "Nothing  new  on  our  side." 

North  of  Welhota  the  hussar  troop  at  the  head  encoun- 
tered hostile  dragoons,  who  retreated  at  an  increased  gait  in 
the  direction  of  Trautenau  when  the  rest  of  the  squadron 
approached. 

At  6:30  the  head  of  the  advance  guard  infantry  debouched 
from  the  mountains  east  of  Parschnitz,  while  the  main  body 
of  the  division  reached  the  northern  exit  of  Petersdorf,  and 
the  head  of  the  cavalry  brigade  was  close  to  and  north  of 
Bertelsdorf. 

Some  mounted  men  appeared  on  a  line  with  the  western 
exit  of  Parschnitz.  Other  tiian  this,  nothing  unusual  was  ob- 
served, no  troop  movements  being  visible  on  the  Liebau  road. 

Comments  on  the  Advance  on  Parschnitz. 

Formation  cf  the  Advance  Guard. 

Even  in  the  mountains  cavalry  must  take  the  "point"  in 
advance  guard  formations,  however  limited  its  employment 
may  be  under  such  conditions.  It  can  only  reconnoiter  roads, 
and  finds  no  ground  alongside  of  them  for  attack  in  order  to 
drive  away  an  enemy.  In  this  case  the  presence  of  hostile 
dragoons  was  known.  Neither  side  would  hardly  have  at- 
tempted an  attack,  although  dismounted  they  could  occupy 
villages  or  narrow  passes.  In  view  of  this,  the  advance  guard 
commander  would  have  done  better  to  place  the  entire  hus- 
sar regiment  at  the  head;  if  fired  on,  it  could  have  dismounted, 
and  with  several  squadrons  (every  squadron  having  about  60 
carbines)  it  might  have  taken  the  occupied  territory.  It  would 
nowadays  be  useless  to  bring  up  a  rear  with  2-)4  squadrons 
(as  cavalrv  with  its  carbines  can  open  its  own  way),  and  be- 
sides, it  would  tire  both  man  and  horse  considerably. 


Studies  in  thh:  Leading,  of  Troops.  43 

Cavalry  at  the  head  of  an  advance  guard  should  be  sup- 
ported by  one  company  of  infantry,  which  can  easily  step  aside 
if  the  cavalry  is  driven  back,  and  is  sufficient  to  stop  a  pur- 
suit. On  the  other  hand,  cavalry  is  easily  brought  to  a  halt 
in  regions  of  narrow  roads,  and  then  needs  infantry  to  drive 
the  enemy  away. 

If  the  mass  of  the  infantry  is  allowed  to  follow  the  cav- 
alry in  close  formation,  it  is  impossible  for  it  to  get  out  of 
the  way  of  the  latter  quickly  enough,  if  it  should  come  dash- 
ing to  the  rear;  it  will  then  be  overridden  and  the  whole 
thrown  into  disorder. 

The  formation  of  a  vanguard  is  prescribed.  It  should 
consist  of  from  a  quarter  to  a  third  of  the  infantry,  with  the 
necessary  cavalry  and  engineers. 

Batteries  are  not  divided,  and  the  advance  guard  com- 
mander was  right  in  not  assigning  any  guns  to  the  vanguard. 

The  engineers  must  not  be  too  far  from  the  head.  A 
single  demolished  bridge  would  obstruct  the  advance  of  the 
entire  division.  Its  restoration  could  not  be  effected  too  soon,. 
and  should  therefore  be  taken  in  hand  at  once  with  the  force 
available. 

In  front  of  the  Twelfth  company  was  the  "infantry 
point,"  which  consisted  of  an  officer  and  at  least  a  section.  On 
the  road  it  marches  in  close  order,  because  no  lateral  recon- 
naissance is  practicable  in  mountainous  country  and  because 
the  cavalry  point  is  in  front  of  the  infantry  point.  Some 
cyclists  are  assigned  to  the  latter  to  keep  up  communication 
with  the  following  vanguard. 

In  the  reserve  of  the  advance  guard  troops  follow  in 
the  order  in  which  we  would  likely  wish  to  employ  them  if 
the  enemy  were  encountered.  If  the  vanguard  meets  stubborn 
resistance  so  that  the  reserve  is  obliged  to  take  part,  then 
the  artillery  must  prepare  the  attack  as  much  as  it  can.  It 
cannot  march,  however,  at  the  very  head  of  a  separate  body, 
and  in  most  cases  should  therefore  follow  the  leading  battal- 
ion. On  this  occasion  the  battalion  of  artillery  was  placed  be- 
hind the  infantry  regiment  of  the  vanguard.  The  first  em- 
ployment of  the  artillery  was  only  possible  near  Parschnitz, 
and  until  that  time  it  must  be  under  the  protection  of  the 
infantrv. 


44  Studies  in  the:  Leading  oi?  TROors. 

Colonel   D ,   who   started   the   reserve,   must   have 

the  march  commence  5  minutes  before  4,  else  the  distance 
from  the  vanguard  would  have  been  increased  beyond  700 
yards. 

Drazving  in  Outposts. 

It  is  very  unwise,  in  the  face  of  an  enemy,  to  draw  in  an 
outpost  and  place  its  forces  at  the  head  of  the  column  of 
march.  By  this  the  enemy  is  apprised  in  the  quickest  and 
most  certain  manner  that  an'  advance  is  intended.  It  would 
be  well,  therefore,  to  take  other  troops  to  the  head  upon  start- 
ing the  whole,  and  not  assemble  the  outposts  until  the  former 
have  passed  them.  However,  in  justification  of  the  deviation 
from  this  course  in  the  case  before  us,  the  following  may  be 
cited : 

The  enemy  was  not  so  near  that  he  would  discover  at 
once  the  withdrawal  of  the  outposts.  His  cavalry  patrols, 
which  may  have  dared  to  come  forward  in  the  mountains  and 
have  in  time  observed  the  drawing  in,  could  only  return  to 
their  main  body  in  a  roundabout  way,  and  would  reach  there 
most  probably  at  a  time  when  the  march  of  the  advance  col- 
umns had  already  been  discovered  by  hostile  outposts  and  duly 
reported;  besides,  the  hussar  patrols  were  further  in  front, 
and  a  connected  outpost  line  had  not  been  established. 

Further,  the  Third  battalion,  designated  as  vanguard,  was 
pretty  well  united.  The  company  designated  for  the  extreme 
point  was  already  ])repared  to  start  at  the  exit  on  the  side  to- 
ward Alben dorf.  So  the  drawing  in  of  the  outposts  of  the 
Third  battalion  involved  neither  loss  of  time  nor  fear  that  the 
enemy  would  too  soon  discover  the  preparations  for  the 
march.  It  was,  moreover,  a  fortunate  circumstance  that  the 
Third  battalion  was  the  subdivision  having  the  best  knowledge 
of  the  country  about  to  be  entered,  and  in  mountainous  country 
such  a  knowledge  has  double  value.  The  two  troops  of  the 
Fourth  squadron  attached  to  the  outpost,  with  the  exception  of 
a  few  orderlies  and  patrols,  were  still  with  the  reserve  of 
the  outpost  at  3:30  a.  m.  If  the  cavalry  picket  northwest  of 
Albcnrlnrf  had  again  been  posted,  it  would  have  had  to  remain 
there  to  i)rotect  the  assembling  of  the  advance  guard  until  the 
vanguard  had  approached;  and  after  that,  according  to  orders, 
the  cavalrv  ])\ckv{  woiild  have  had  to  join  the  infantry  of  the 


Studiks  jn  the:  leading  of  Troops.  45 

advance  guard.     The  Fourth  squadron  was  united,  and  fol- 
lowed the  scouting  patrols  in  front  on  the  highway. 

Order  of  March. 
(See  Plan  II.) 

Advance  Guard. 
Infantry    regiment    with    light    bag- 
gage and   distances i,35o  Y^s. 

Cavalry    regiment   less    i    troop.  .     .  .     350  yds. 

Battalion  of  field  artillery 1,115  yds. 

Engineer  company 120  yds. 

Ambulance  company  section 130  yds.       3,065  yds. 

Distance  between  parts Ij705  yds. 

Distance  to  m.ain  body 875  yds. 

Main  Body, 
(a)     Troops. 
Infantry    regiment    with    light    bag- 
gage and  distances i>35<^  yds. 

Battalion  of  field  artillery  with  regi- 
mental staff 1,135  yds. 

Infantry  brigade 2,720  yds. 

Ambulance   company  section 130  yds. 

With   distances 5,435  yds. 

(b)      Field  Hospital  and  Trains. 

Signal   corps   detachment 11  yds. 

Division  bridge  train 340  yds. 

Field  hospital 165  yds. 

With  distances 545  yds. 

Total 11,625  yds. 

Accordingly  the  column  of  an  infantry  division  advancing 
to  an  engagement  :s  nearly  7  miles  long.  An  order  sent  from 
front  to  rear,  going  along  the  whole  column  pf  troops,  would 
require  about  an  hour  to  reach  its  destination  (an  order  from 
rear  to  front  probably  twice  as  long). 

//  the  deployment  is  to  be  on  a  line  zvith  the  vanguard, 
then  the  last  subdivision   of  troops  has  to  advance  nearly  6 


46  Studies  in  thk  Lkading  of  Troops. 

miles,  Gild  it  xvill  fake  about  i^  hours  to  deploy  the  entire 
diz'isioii. 

To  complete  our  idea  of  the  length  of  a  mobilized  division 
the  heavy  baggage  must  also  be  taken  into  account.  Its 
length,  without  further  assignment  of  subsistence  columns  or 
several  field  hospitals,  is  about  2,730  yards.  In  case  the  troop- 
wagons  are  to  follow  immediately,  we  would  have  to  add  the 
distance  between  the  rear  of  the  division  and  head  of  these 
wagons,  2,730  yards  more.  The  entire  length  of  the  Second 
infantry  division  in  column  of  march  thus  became  17,085 
}'ards,  or  nearly  10  miles. 

In  the  example  before  us,  however,  the  cavalry  brigade 
with  its  horse  battery  must  also  be  considered. 

March  length  of  cavalry  brigade 1,200  yds. 

Horse  battery 480  yds. 

1,680  yds. 
Heavy  baggage 510  yds. 

Total 2,190  yds. 

We    consequently    have    a    total    length    for    the    column 
marching  early  on  June  2"/  from  Schömberg,  upon  Parschnitz, 
with    advance    guard    formed    and    heavy    baggage    left    be- 
hind, of: 
Advance    guard,    including    distances 

between  parts 4-770  yds. 

Distance  from  advance  guard  to  main 

body 875  yds. 

Main  body 5435  yds. 

Cavalry  brigade 1,680  yds. 

Signal  corps  detachment,  bridge  train, 

and  field  hospital 545  yds.      13.305  yds. 

If  the  heavy  baggage  should  follow 
at  a  distance  of  2,200  yards,  add: 
j^istance    between    troops    and    wag- 
ons  2,730  yds. 

Wagons 3.240  yds.       5,970  yds. 

Total 19.275  yds. 


Studti^s  in  tue  Li'ADixc  OF  Troops.  47 

It  should  be  remembered  that,  all  normal  march  depths 
here  given  are  only  approximately  correct.  We  presuppose 
that  the  troops  maintain  prescribed  distances  and  are  at  full 
strength.  In  reality  such  conditions  do  not  exist,  yet  it  is  im- 
inaterial  whether  the  deployment  of  a  division  which  requires 
an  hour  and  three-quarters  is  computed  at  5  minutes  more  or 
5  minutes  less.  The  normal  march  depths  are  only  intended  as 
a  guide  for  a  correct  illustration,  and  for  this  ^purpose  they  are 
amply  sufficient.^ 

Supervision  of  the  Order  of  March. 

It  is  urgently  recommended  that  on  the  march  every 
commander  should,  as  far  as  practicable,  have  his  troops 
march  past  him  at  least  once  each  day,  so  he  can  control  their 
march  discipline  and  observe  their  appearance. 

If  the  enemy  is  not  near  and  the  presence  of  the  com- 
mander is  not  continuously  required  with  the  mass  of  the 
troops,  it  is  well  to  extend  this  inspection  to  the  heavy  bag- 
gage and  trains  attached ;  otherwise  irregularities  of  all  sorts 
will  occur.  In  the  case  in  hand  the  division  commander  could 
not  remain  long  with  the  marching  main  body,  as  his  pres- 
ence near  Parschnitz  was  presumably  more  necessary. 

Connection  with  Adjoining  Columns. 

Connection  with  adjoining  columns,  even  in  mountains, 
can  in  most  cases  be  ke])t  up  only  by  mounted  men  and  expe- 
rienced cyclists ;  these  are,  of  course,  confined  to  the  roads, 
and  a  timed  return  is  not  to  be  expected.  This,  however,  is 
not  necessary,  provided  the  other  column  does  not  fail  to  send 
out  patrols  also,  for  in  terrain  Vv'ith  an  obstructed  view  the 
object  of  these  patrols  is  not  so  much  to  gather  information 
for  the  one  who  starts  them  out  as  to  orient  the  commander 
to  whom  they  are  sent.  The  strongest  of  these  patrols  may 
be  quite  small;  only  when  the  enemy  is  actually  in  the 
vicinity  should  more  mounted  men,  yet  no  cyclists,  be  em- 
ployed.    For  this  reason  the  First  division  dispatched  a  non- 


file. 


1  Infantry  marches  by  squads,  cavalry  by  fours,  and  artillery  in 


48  Studiks  in  THiv  LkaüIxNG  uf  Troops. 

coniniissioned  officer  and  6  troopers,  as  its  head  had  already 
encountered  hostile  cavalry. 

Information  received  from  such  patrols  is  not  without 
value.  For  example,  the  advice  as  to  the  demolished  bridge 
indicated  that  the  Second  division  would  probably  arrive  at 
Parschnitz  before  the  First,  and  would  therefore  have  to  at- 
tend to  its  own  security.  Further;nore,  the  attack  of  the 
Windischgratz  dragoons  on  the  head  of  the  First  division  in- 
dicated that  hostile  cavalry  was  on  that  road,  and  that  upon 
coming  out  of  the  Parschnitz  defile  the  Second  division  must 
send  a  good-sized  patrol  to  seek  the  opening  of  communTca- 
tions  with  the  First  division.  Finally,  if  a  mountain  range  lies 
between  the  lines  of  march  of  two  columns,  one  will  never  be 
certain  that  a  combat  starting  in  one  valley  will  be  heard  in 
the  other.  (Reference  invited  to  the  Third  and  Fifth  divi- 
sions in  the  engagement  of  Jicin.) 

If  communication  is  established,  the  detaching  of  parts  of 
the  column  not  engaged  to  the  other  side  of  the  mountain 
may  be  of  great  benefit,  especially  if  they  are  led  against 
the  enemy's  rear. 

Measures  of  Security  on  the  March. 

A  careful  reconnaissance  of  the  country,  so  frequently 
practiced  and  which  has  been  carried  over  from  our  small 
peace  exercises  in  grand  tactics,  was  not  admissible  here.  The 
division  would  require  the  entire  day  to  reach  Parschnitz  if 
such  a  reconnaissance  were  instituted.  It  is  hardly  conceiv- 
able that  a  mass  of  troops  which  could  become  dangerous  to 
an  entire  division  could  hide  in  the  ground  along  the  high- 
way, and,  if  a  small  party  should  dare  to  do  so,  its  own  exist- 
ence would  be  jeopardized. 

Furthermore,  it  is  not  feasible  to  have  a  marching  col- 
umn accompanied  by  infantry  acting  as  flank  cover  and  ad- 
vancing over  mountains.  Even  if  the  latter  started  at  the 
same  time  as  the  advance  guard,  they  would  fall  far  behind  on 
account  of  the  necessity  of  ascending  and  descending  hills 
without  roads.  It  is  possible  to  secure  flanks  in  such  a  man- 
ner only  where  ])arallcl  valleys  exist  permitting  detached  col- 
umns to  march  through  them,  \mless,  however,  the  sides  of 


I 


Studiks  in  TPiK  Le:ading  01?  Troops 


COLLEGE. 

GBi5 


the  valley  are  most  favorably  formed.   If  such  concHtrons;^ 
exist,  and  cross  valleys,  on  which  the  enemy  might  advance, 
run  into  the  road  traveled,  then   detachments   must  be   sent 
into  them  to  assure  security,  rejoining-  in  due  time  the  rear  of 
the  marching  column. 

Rendezvous  at  Parschnitz. 
(Map  IL) 

As  already  stated,  the  head  of  the  infantry  of  the  advance 
guard  arrived  at  the  Aupa  bridge,  before  Parschnitz,  at 
6:30  a.  m. 

The  division  commander  thence  proceeded  to  the  mead- 
ows lying  to  the  north,  so  as  to  get  a  better  view  of  the  coun- 
try ;  close  in  his  rear  rode  the  bearer  of  the  headquarters  flag, 
whom  the  commander  cautioned  to  keep  the  flag  out  of  sight 
whenever  in  proximity  of  the  enemy. 

The  country  around  Parschnitz  presented  an  entirely  new 
aspect.  While  for  the  last  4^  miles  the  troops  had  marched 
in  a  narrow  mountain  valley  with  steep  sides.  In  places  formed 
of  rocks,  the  valley  now  opened  into  a  broad  basin,  the  sur- 
rounding hills  rising  to  a  moderate  height  with  gentle  slopes, 
their  sides  being  steep  in  only  a  few  places. 

A  little  over  a  mile  beyond  the  exit  from  the  mountains, 
where,  on  account  of  their  white  roadbeds,  the  junction  of 
the  highways  from  Schömberg  and  Liebau  could  easily  be 
traced,  the  basin  again  narrowed,  the  sides  forming  a  defile. 
Through  the  opening  there  the  outlines  of  blue  mountains 
could  be  seen  in  the  distance,  though  they  appeared  to  be  only 
half  as  high  as  the  jiiountains  in  the  rear,  which  led  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  country  there  must  be  more  level.  The  vil- 
lage of  Parschnitz  stretched  in  a  long  line  at  the  foot  of  the 
left  side  of  the  basin  up  the  defile ;  in  its  gardens  several  large 
stone  buildings  and  some  factory  chimneys  were  visible.  To 
the  south  of  the  village  the  rise  of  the  mountains  was  com- 
paratively gradual,  but  about  a  mile  off  a  higher  ridge,  thickly 
wooded,  which  bordered -the  distant  view,  lay  in  the  way  of 
a  possible  march  over  them.  Its  extreme  points  descended 
steeply  toward  the  west  end  of  Parschnitz,  as  well  as  into  the 
valley  in  which  Raussnitz  lay.     Tlie  Raussnitz   valley  could 


^o  StudiivS  in  tiik  Lkadixg  of  Troops. 

iilso  be  surveyed  for  some  distance,  bearini;-  the  character  of 
a  defile  Hke  the  ground  already  passed. 

Looking  further  to  the  west,  could  be  seen  the  village  of 
WoUa.  stretching  up  the  mountain  on  both  sides  of  the  ravine, 
where  the  Liebau  highway  descended  into  the  valley  over  a 
spur  of  the  mountains.  Several  wooded  peaks  arose  from  the 
heights  along  the  highway  extending  from  that  village,  the 
elevation  of  which  did  not  seem  so  great  because  of  the  back- 
ground formed  at  a  considerable  distance  behind  them  by  the 
mass  of  the  Riesen  Mountains  and  the  Snow  Peak. 

It  was  at  once  clear  to  the  division  commander  that  the 
rendezvous  ordered  at  Parschnitz  could  not  be  carried  out 
without  special  measures  being  taken  for  security. 

Nothing  was  to  be  feared  from  Wolta,  because  the  ad- 
vance of  the  First  infantry  division  and  its  right  flank  de- 
tachment sent  via  Schatzlar  would  soon  be  manifest  there.  At 
all  events,  the  defile  in  the  direction  of  Trautenau,  which  was 
situated  to  the  southwest  of  Parschnitz,  must  be  occupied  un- 
til the  arrival  of  that  part  of  the  First  infantry  division  des- 
ignated for  the  advance  guard  of  the  army  corps,  and  espe- 
cial attention  must  be  directed  toward  the  high  ground  south 
of  Parschnitz  and  to  the  Raussnitz  valley.  Hitherto  the  en- 
emy could  be  expected  from  the  front  only,  a  condition  of 
affairs  that  ceased,  however,  when  the  mountains  were  left.  If 
larger  masses  of  the  enemy  were  near,  they  could  appear  only 
from  Königinhof  upon  Trautenau,  or  from  Josephstadt  b\ 
Evpel  upon  Raussnitz,  or  in  the  region  between — /.  c  on  ihc 
left  flank  of  the  column  during  its  further  advance. 

On  account  of  the  non-arrival  of  the  First  division,  I  lieu- 
tenant-General  A was   for  a   moment   in   doubt   as   to 

whether  it  would  not  be  better  to  continue  the  march  to  Traut- 
enau and  get  possession  of  the  junction  of  the  roads  there  and 
the  Aupa  crossing.  But  he  was  not  allowed  to  carry  out  this 
project,  as  it  was  clear  from  the  closing  paragraph  of  the 
corps  order  that  for  the  present  the  desire  of  the  command- 
ing general  was  only  to  unite  the  corps  on  the  left  l)ank  o\ 
ihc  .\u])a. 

In  the  meantime  the   irooi)s  had  continued  the   march  on 

the  highway.     Ueutcnant-General  .\ sent  an  order  to 

the   First   cavalrv   brigade.'   directing   that,   as    soon    as   it   had 


I 


Stldiks  in  the;  LKAoiNci  of  Troops.  51 

passed  Albendorf,  it  report  the  fact  to  the  First  infantry  divi- 
sion of  the  Guard,  and  he  then  proceeded  to  join  Major- 
General   B ,  whom  he  met  at  6:30  at  the  northern  edge 

of  Parschnitz  at  the  junction  of  the  road  from  WoUa. 

ATajor-General   H had  also  taken  into  account  the 

altered  conditions  of  the  terrane,  and  as  soon  as  he  had  crossed 
the  Aupa  bridge,  he  had  instructed  the  vanguard  commander 
as  follows :  *'Send  i  company  and  half  a  troop  of  hussars  to 
the  southern  exit  of  Parschnitz  as  cover  toward  Eypel.  The 
hussars  should  reconnoiter  the  country  beyond  Raussnitz. 
This  detachment  will  return  to  the  division  on  the  arrival  of 
the  First  infantry  division,  Guard  corps.  Also  send  i  officer 
and  half  a  troop  of  hussars  on  the  Liebau  road  to  obtain  in- 
formation concerning  the  First  infantry  division.  Inform 
this  officer  that  only  a  short  time  ago  hostile  cavalry  was  on 
that  road." 

Small  cavalry  ])atrols  had  already  been  sent  out  for  short 
distances  in  both  directions.  The  second  troop  of  the  Fourth 
squadron  reconnoitered  the  heights  south  of  Parschnitz  and 
their  vicinity. 

The  vanguard  commander  designated  the  Eleventh  com- 
pany of  his  battalion  (Third  battalion.  First  infantry)  to  en- 
ter the  Raussnitz  valley,  taking  the  necessary  cavalry  details 
therefor  from  the  Fourth  squadron,  chiefly  from  the  Third 
troop,  which  had  already  furnished  the  patrols  that  were  pre- 
viously detached  and  that  had  not  yet  returned.  The  two  re- 
maining troops  (Fourth  and  First),  with  only  a  few  horses, 
look  station  on  the  road  outside  of  the  village  at  its  northern 
edge,   which  the  rest  of  the  vanguard  occupied, 

Major-General  B then  informed  Colonel  D 

that  the  division  would  halt,  and  directed  him  to  assure  its 
security  by  sending  a  battalion  to  the  heights  south  of  Par- 
schnitz, the  hussar  troop  already  there  to  be  subject  to  the  bat- 
talion commander's  orders.  Colonel  D thereupon  direct- 
ed the  Second  battalion,  at  the  head  of  the  main  body  of  the 
advance  guard,  to  ascend  the  heights  on  a  road  leading- 
southward  from  Parschnitz,  and  to  cover  the  division  by  tak- 
ing position  toward  the  wooded  ridge  and  ])ushing  out  cav- 
alry patrols. 


52  Studiks  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

Finally  Major-General  B sent  orders  to  the  hus- 
sar regiment,  in  the  rear,  to  come  forward  at  a  trot,  not  on 
the  village  road,  but  to  the  north  of  Parschnitz,  and  to  follow 
the  two  troops  of  the  Fourth  squadron  sent  west  of  the  vil- 
lage toward  Trautenau.  Except  for  this  movement,  the  orders 
given  had  already  been  executed  or  were  in  process  of  execu- 
tion when  the  division  commander  rode  up  to  Major-General 

B ,  and  received  from  the  latter  the  following  report: 

'1  have  advanced  i  company  and  half  a  troop  of  hussars  into 
the  Raussnitz  valley  with  orders  to  cover  toward  Eypel  until 
the  arrival  of  the  First  infantry  division,  Guard  corps.  I  have 
also  sent  i  battalion  and  i  troop  of  hussars  to  the  heights 
south  of  Parschnitz  to  cover  the  resting  of  the  division,  and 
half  a  troop  of  hussars  out  on  the  Liebau  road  to  the  First 
infantry  division.' 

Lieutenant-General  A approved  these  preliminaiy 

arrangements,  and  issued  the  following  supplementary  instruc- 
tions verbally:  **It  is  the  intention  of  the  corps  commander, 
after  we  have  rested  here,  to  advance  with  the  concentrate.! 
army  corps  beyond  Trautenau  tov/ard  Arnau.  This  division 
will  then  furnish  the  flank  cover  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Aupa,  and  we  can   at  once  arrange  the   troops   accordingly. 

Have  Colonel  D occupy  the  defile  west  of  Parschnitz 

with  the  2  battalions  of  the  advance  guard  still  in  the  val- 
ley, the  First  battalion  of  field  artillery  (less  i  battery),  and 
the  First  squadron,  and  then  scout  toward  Trautenau.  You 
will  personally  guard  the  heights  south"  of  Parschnitz  with 
the  rest  of  your  troops,  and  I  shall  have  the  other  regiment  of 
your  brigade  come  up  with  you." 

In  accordance  with  these  instructions,  the  brigade  com- 
mander gave  the  necessary  directions  to  Colonel  D ,  at 

whose  disposal  the  following  troops  were  then  placed :  First 
battalion  and  3  companies  of  the  Third  battalion  of  his  own 
regiment ;  2  troops  of  the  Fourth  squadron ;  i  battalion  of 
field  artillery  less  i  battery. 

The  2^  squadrons,  united  under  their  regimental  com- 
mander, the  Third  battery,  designated  by  the  artillery  battal- 
ion  commander,   the   engineer   company,   and   the   ambulance 

company  section,  were  directed  by  Major-General  B to 

proceed  by  the   road   leading  out   of  the   village   toward   the 


Studies  in  tiik  Li:ading  o^  Troops.  53 

south,  to  the  Second  battaUon  of  the  P'irst  infantry  (Hill  290), 
while  the  Second  troop  of  the  Fourth  squadron,  already  sent 
thither,  had  gone  forward  toward  the  center  of  the  wooded 
ridge. 

These  dispositions  were  made  about  7  o'clock.  At  that 
hour  the  Twelfth  company  of  the  First  infantry,  which  was 
at  the  head,  had  reached  the  western  exit  of  Parschnitz,  and 
the  two  troops  of  the  Fourth  squadron  in  front  had  already 
passed  through  the  short  defile  about  700  yards  distant.  From 
there  the  leading  subdivisions  of  the  main  body  of  the  divis- 
ion, which  were  nearing  the  exit  of  the  Schömberg  defile,  were 
plainly  visible. 

Lieutenant-General  A had  yet  to  give  appropriate  or- 
ders to  the  main  body  and  to  designate  the  respective  stations 
to  the  arriving  troops.  He  therefore  instructed  his  general  staff 
officer  as  follows :  ''Ride  back  to  the  bridge  over  the  Aupa  and 
direct  the  Second  infantry  to  proceed  to  the  heights  south  of 
Parschnitz,  there  to  report  to  its  brigade  commander.  As  to 
the  rest  of  the  main  body,  direct  the  Fourth  infantry  brigade  to 
rendezvous  west  of  the  Wolta-Parschnitz  road,  the  Second 
battalion  of  field  artillery  and  the  cavalry  brigade  to  the  east 
of  the  road  with  the  former  holding  the  right  wing,  and 
behind  these  latter  the  bridge  train,  signal  corps  detachment, 
and  field  hospital." 

In  making  these  dispositions  the  division  commander  had 
not  mentioned  the  ambulance  company  section,  but  the  gen- 
eral staff  officer  would  have  known  that  it  should  join  the 
other  trains. 

At  7:10  the  general  staff  officer  reached  the  bridge,  which 
was  in  the  nick  of  time,  the  head  of  the  Second  infantry  hav- 
ing just  started  to  cross.  The  regiment  immediately  changed 
direction  to  the  left.  At  7:25  the  battalion  of  artillery  ar- 
rived at  the  same  place  and  was  given  direction  on  the  spur 
of  the  mountain  projecting  from  Wolta  across  the  Liebau 
highway;  there  it  halted  and  formed  close  column  faced  to 
the  west.  At  7:40  the  head  of  the  Fourth  infantry  brigade 
came  out  of  the  defile ;  at  8  it  had  reached  the  junction  of  the 
two  highways  west  of  the  Wolta-Parschnitz  road,  the  right 
wing  (First  battalion,  Third  infantry)  halting  100  paces  from 
the  Liebau  road,  the  other  battalions  forming  as  for  assembly 


I 


54 


StüdiI'S  IX  Ti!:',  Li:al)INC.  OL-   Troops. 


on  the  left  in  one  echelon.  As  each  battalion  was  in  place  it 
proceeded  to  stack  arms  and  unsling  knapsacks,  falling  out 
to  the  front  in  order  to  make  room  for  those  in  rear.  The 
Fourth  infantry  regiment  formed  the  second  echelon,  reach- 
ing its  place  at  8:25.  The  cavalry  brigade  followed  at  8:45, 
forming  in  brigade  column,  the  regiments  in  regimental  col- 
umn beside  each  other,  the  battery  in  line  behind  them.  (See 
Map  II.) 

The  general  staff  officer  availed  himself  of  the  oppor- 
tunity to  seize  newspapers  found  in  the  postoffice  at  the  Aupa 
bridge.  The  postmaster  stated  that  the  telephone  connection 
with  Trautenau  had  just  been  severed,  and  some  civilians 
passing  by,  when  questioned  about  the  enemy,  pretending 
not  to  understand  German,  answered  him  \n  the  Bohemian 
language 

At  18  minutes  after  7  the  division  conimander  received 
by    a    mounted    rifleman    a    verbal    message    sent   by    Colonel 

D ,  who  w^as  in  advance  on  the  Trautenau  road,  to  the 

effect  that  the  bridge  across  the  Aupa  near  Trautenau  w^as  bar- 
ricaded and  occupied  by  the  enemy,  the  hussars  wdio  had  ad- 
vanced against  it  having  been  fired  on.     Lieutenant-General 

A replied  that  the  detachment  must  keep  the  enemy  in 

sight,  but  otherwise  confine  itself  to  the  occupation  of  the  farm- 
houses located  in  the  defile  southwest  of  P'arschnitz. 

At  8:40  the  patrol  sent  to  the  First  division  had  returned, 
with  the  following  report  as  delivered  by  the  officer  in  charge  : 
"I  found  the  First  division  north  of  Golden-Oels,  where  the 
destruction  of  a  large  bridge  is  delaying  its  march.  The 
commanding  general,  to  whom  I  reported,  had  the  division 
lialt  there,  but  it  will  resume  the  advance  at  8:30.  No  hostile 
cavalry  was  visible,  but  according  to  the  statement  of  an  in- 
habitant of  Golden-Ols,  from  30  to  50  Austrian  dragoons 
near  Gu1)crs(l(>rf,  who  had  come  from  the  direction  of  Ikrns- 
dorf,  at  7  o'clock  disappeared  in  great  haste  in  th.^  nn  untairs 
in  a  westerly  direction." 

The  i)atrol  was  then  directed  to  join  its  s(|uadr(^n.  located 
west  of  l^arschnitz. 

Meanwhile  the  greater  part  of  the  troops  had  passed  to 
ilieir  new  ])ositions  under  the  eye  of  the  division  commander, 
who  noticed  several  irregularities  in  the  movements.     In  one 


Studies  in  thl:  Lkaüing  of  Troops.  55 

in  fa  try  rei^iment  the  shoulder-straps  were  rolled  up  instead 
of  being  buttoned,  in  several  battalions  stocks  had  been  re- 
moved and  coat  collars  opened,  which  was  indeed  ([uite  proper, 
as  the  heat  was  already  intense  ;  in  other  battalions  the  men 
had  done  the  same  thing,  but  without  orders.  In  one  reg- 
iment two  cases  of  sunstroke  had  occurred.  Contrary  to  regu- 
lations, in  the  Fourth  infantry  brigade  the  cartridge-wagons 
advanced  in  close  order  in  rear  of  the  regiments,  and  some 
of  the  led  horses  of  the  cavalry  looked  more  like  pack-animals. 
All  these  irregularities  were  at  once  corrected ;  and  an  aid 
made  note  thereof,  in  order  to  call  the  attention  of  the  entire 
division  to  them  later  in  the  day. 

Jn  the  meantime,  Lieutenant-General   A reiterated 

the  caution  that  soldiers  must  not  enter  the  village  singly,  but 
that  men  sent  to  get  water  must  be  assembled  and  taken  there 
by  officers.  The  Fourth  brigade  furnished  the  sentinels  needed 
to  enforce  this  regitlation,  and  also  a  non-commissioned  offi- 
cer's post  at  the  junction  of  the  Wolta  road  with  the  Liebau 
highway,  on  the  latter  of  which  no  one  w^as  to  pass.     He  then 

1)roceeded  to  Colonel  D 's  detachment,  to  examine  the 

territory  in  front  with  a  view  to  a  possible  subsequent  advance. 

It  may  be  of  interest  to  review  more  closely  the  disposi- 
tions of  the  several  detached  parties. 

Colonel  D had  reached  the  southwest  side  of  the 

group  of  houses  located  in  the  defile  about  i.ioo  yards  in  front 
of  Trautenau,  with  the  Tw^elfth  company,  which  was  pre- 
viously at  the  head  of  the  vanguard.  The  two  hussar  troops 
that  had  advanced  toward  Trautenau  had  found  the  Aupa 
bridge  barricaded  and  had  been  fired  on,  a  report  of  which 
action,  as  we  have  seen,  having  been  sent  to  the  division  com- 
mander. As  the  region  up  to  the  bridge  could  be  observed 
from   the    farm-houses,   the   hussars   were   withdrawn   behind 

them.    With  the  approval  of  Colonel  D ,  the  commander 

of  the  Third  battalion  now  sent  the  Tenth  company  to  the 
height  875  yards  north,  with  half  a  troop  of  hussars  charged 
to  patrol  toward  Hummelhof,  while  the  Ninth  company  re- 
mained in  reserve  behind  the  farm-houses.  The  First  bat- 
talion of  the  First  infantry  (in  double  column)  and  the  First 
artillery  battalion  (less  the  Third  battery),  also  the  remain- 
ing  T^   troops  of  hussars,  halted  on  the   west  edge  of  Par- 


56  Studiks  tx  Tin-  Lkading  of  Troops. 

schnitz,  while  a  half-platoon  of  the  First  battalion  of  the  in- 
fantry with  2  mounted  orderlies  waded  across  the  Aupa  and 
took  post  as  left  flank  cover  at  the  southwest  extremity  of  the 
steep  wooded  ridge.  The  employment  of  cavalry  was  discour- 
aged by  the  abruptness  of  the  declivity.  The  two  companies 
in  the  first  line  each  kept  a  platoon  under  arms  and  rested  un- 
der their  protection,  without  unslinging  knapsacks. 

At  7  o'clock  Major-General  B had  left  the  north- 
ern border  of  Parschnitz  for  the  central  peak  of  the  wooded 
ridge  to  the  south  (Hill  504),  where  he  arrived  6  minutes 
later;  the  Second  battalion  of  the  First  infantry  was  halted 
on  the  unwooded  peak  (Hill  290)  ;  the  Second  troop  of  the 
Fourth  squadron  reconnoitered  the  woods  and  reported  to 
the  general  that  nothing  could  be  seen  of  the  enemy  south  of 
it.  It  was  learned  that  the  woods  were  about  400  paces  wide, 
and  that  the  slope  was  not  so  steep  as  it  had  appeared  to  be 
from  a  distance,  ahhough  the  last  portion  was  the  most  diffi- 
cult to  ascend,  though  practicable  even  for  artillery,  provided 
one  did  not  go  too  close  to  the  wings  of  the  ridge  descending 
toward  the  Aupa,  where  the  slope  was  so  great  that  infantry 
could  ascend  only  in  extended  order.  The  brigade  commander 
then  went  to  the  southern  edge  of  the  woods,  to  observe  the 
country  with  a  view  to  the  necessary  dispositions  for  security 
^md  a  possible  further  advance. 

A  line  of  ravines  extending  from  Raussnitz  to  the  farm- 
houses on  the  Liebau  highway  separated  the  wooded  ridge 
from  the  heights  in  front  in  a  pronounced  manner,  up  to  a 
point  of  junction  which  was  nearly  450  yards  southwest  of 
where  the  general  stood  (Hill  504),  whence  the  ravines  de- 
scended steeply  in  both  directions  to  the  Aupa.  South  of  the 
connecting  saddle  rose  a  new  ridge,  which  extended  westward 
to  the  southern  end  of  Kriblitz  and  on  which  there  were  two 
peaks  (531  and  554)  that  overtopped  the  general's  position. 
This  confined  the  view  to  the  south  to  about  ^)4  of  a  mile. 
Toward  the  west  and  south  the  country  was  considerably 
lower  and  permitted  a  good  survey  for  about  2  miles.  Toward 
the  west  was  the  deep  Kriblitz  ravine,  behind  which  were 
l)lainly  visible  the  Hopfen  and  Galgen  Mountains  and  a  part 
of  Trautcnau.  T^p  to  this  ravine  the  terrane  seemed  to  be  a 
tolerably  level   de.dine  sloping  toward   the   Auixi  and  divided 


Studii^s  in  thi:  Li^ading  of  Troops.  57 

from  the  valley  by  a  steep  border.  Toward  the  south  the 
country  appeared  generally  to  fall,  but  presented  a  very  hilly 
and  obstructed  character  on  account  of  a  great  number  of  low 
peaks  and  patches  of  timber.  Alany  farm-houses  (the  south- 
ern extension  of  Alt-Rognitz  and  Rudersdorf)  stood  out 
against  the  horizon  which  bordered  the  intermingling  wave- 
like lines  of  the  terrane.  No  connecting  roads  were  visible 
toward  the  south,  but  the  highway  from  Raussnitz  to  Traut- 
enau  led  over  the  projecting  saddle  into  the  western  region 
toward  Kriblitz. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  was  sufficient  to  post  a 
small  patrol  where  the  general  was  then  standing.  A  post 
pushed  forward  to  the  heights  south  of  the  saddle  would  dis- 
cover the  approach  of  larger  bodies  soon  enough  to  make 
possible  the  occupation  of  the  southern  border  of  the  woods 
in  ample  time.  The  ground  was  not  so  favorable,  however, 
for  a  flank  movement  covering  the  army  corps  when  continu- 
ing  the  march.  As  from  Trautenau  the  corps  must  follow  the 
road  to  Arnau,  the  direction  of  Hohenbruck  alone  seemed 
available  for  this  purpose,  and  there  the  march  of  the  flanking 
column  across  country  would  encounter  considerable  diffi- 
culty. Hardly  any  course  remained,  therefore,  but  to  use  the 
road  from  Raussnitz  to  Kriblitz  for  the  greater  part  of  the 
troops,  especially  the  artillery,  and  then  to  see  if  there  was  not 
a  road  uniting  it  with  Hohenbruck.  This  could  be  settled  at 
once  by  a  reconnaissance.  Some  cavalry  must  nevertheless 
skirt  the  march  on  the  left,  and  follow  the  direct  route  to 
Hohenbruck. 

The  Second  troop  of  the  Fourth  squadron  was  already 
moving  toward  the  height  east  of  Kriblitz. 

Having  oriented  himself.  ATajor-General  B dis- 
patched his  aid  to  bring  up  the  Second  battalion  of  the  First 
infantry,  with  an  additional  troop  of  hussars,  but  to  instruct 
the  remaining  troops  to  move  up  to  the  north  side  of  the  wood- 
ed ridge  andhalt  there.  At  7  130  the  Second  battalion  reported 
to  the  general.  The  Fifth  company,  with  2  mounted  riflem,en, 
was  sent  ahead  to  the  fork  of  the  Raussnitz  road,  and  it  ad- 
vanced a  platoon  to  Hill  531.  The  rest  of  the  battalion  stacked 
arms  north  of  Hill  504.  The  troop  brought  up  from  the 
Third  squadron  was  sent  forward  to  scout  in  the  region  be- 


58  Sti'diis  IX  Till-:  Li:ai>i\<".  of  Tuoors. 

twecn  Ali-Rognitz  and  Raussnitz.  and  both  this  troop  and 
the  Second  were  aUo  directed  to  reconnoiter  the  roads  leacHng 
to  1  lolienbruck. 

Maiur-(ieneral    ii then  repaired  to  the  main  body 

of  liis  detachment,  whose  last  division  reached  the  rendez- 
vous designated  at  7:50.  These  troops  consisted  of  the  Sec- 
ond infantry  regiment,  2>S  squadrons  of  hussars,  the  Third 
battery,  i  company  of  engineers,  and  1  amlnilance  company 
section. 

'i"h^-  ihird  body  detached  from  the  (Hvision  (specifically, 
the  vaiii^uard  of  the  advance  guard)  at  this  moment  consisted 
of  the  Eleventh  company  of  the  First  infantry  and  half  of 
the  Third  troop  of  the  Fourth  squadron  of  hussars  which  had 
gone  mto  the  valley  of  the  Aup:-i  leading  to  Raussnitz.  The 
company  established  itself  in  the  garden  of  the  most  south- 
erlv  farm,  sending  half  a  platoon  550  yards  to  the  front, 
wliicli,  in  addition  to  the  sentry  over  the  arms,  established  a 
double  post  on  the  highway  and  one  on  the  right  slope  of 
the  valley,  from  whence  the  valley  itself  could  be  seen  for  a 
long  distance  and  communication  be  subsequently  established 
with  the  Second  infantry  regiment.  The  half-troop  of  hus- 
sars, excepting  two  mounted  orderlies,  advanced  toward 
Raussnitz. 

Such  was  the  situation  of  the  main  body  and  detached 
portions  of  the  division  when  the  division  commander  went 
forward  on  the  Trautenau  road  at  8:35..  As  he  arrived  at 
the  western  exit  of  Rarschnitz  (8:40)  a  hussar  ofhcer  handed 

iiim  the  following  message  from  Major-General  R :    "A 

strong  hostile  column  of  all  arms  is  approaching  Trautenau 
on  the  highway  from  Königinhof.  At  8:10  its  head  was  about 
1.300  vards  s«)iuli  ni  I  lohcnbruck." 

COMMICNTS    ox    THIv     Ri:XI)H7A'(  )1'7.    AT    RaKSCIIXITZ. 

A  ct)nneclc(l  consideration  of  the  arrival  of  tlie  division 
at  the  rendezvous  brings  out  the  following  facts: 

At  •):3()  the  head  of  the  advance  guard  infantry  reached 
the  .\u])a  i)ridge  and  entered  the  gnnmd  designated  for  the 
halt.  In  order  to  cross  the  space  which  the  main  body  of  the 
division   reciuired   for  rendezvous,  and    in  order  to  gain   sufti- 


Studies  in  the  Leading  oe  Troops. 


59 


cient  ground  in  advance  so  it  could  act  as  cover,  it  had  to  con- 
tinue its  march  until  7:10. 

At  7:30  the  troops  taken  from  the  column  to  serve  as 
flanking  parties  reached  their  designated  stations. 

At  8 :45  the  last  portion  of  the  entire  division  arrived. 

Leaving  out  of  consideration  the  infantry  point,  the  period 
of  the  division's  deployment  was  from  7:10  to  8:45,  i  hour 
and  35  minutes.  Deducting  the  cavalry  brigade,  which  was 
attached  only  as  an  exceptional  measure,  the  division  would 
still  require  i  hour  and  12  minutes  to  deploy.  In  this  case, 
however,  it  is  presumed  that  the  advance  guard  and  main  body 
kept  a  certain  interval,  and  that  consequently  the  latter  did 
not  form  up  on  a  line  with  the  advance  guard,  but  before 
reaching  it. 

If  the  deployment  of  the  column  had  been  effected  at  the 
place  where  the  infantry  head  halted,  the  figures  would  have 
been  changed  materially,  as  follows : 

For  a  column,  including  cavalry  brigade,  13,285  yards 
long,  2  hours  and  20  minutes;  if  heavy  baggage  follows 
(19,257  yards),  about  3  hours. 

For  an  infantry  division  without  cavalry  brigade,  vvitn 
advance  guard  formed  on  line  with  it,  without  heavy  baggage 
(about  11, 600  yards),  2  hours;  with  heavy  baggage  (about 
16,400  yards),  2  hours  and  45  minutes  to  3  hours;  without 
advance  guard  formed  (troops  in  uninterrupted  succession), 
without  heavy  baggage  (about  8,740  yards),  i  hour  and  30 
minutes;  with  heavy  baggage  (about  14,000  yards),  2  hours 
and  20  minutes. 

From  this  it  is  seen  how  much  time  the  deployment  of 
large  bodies  generally  requires.  Every  deployment  should 
therefore  be  avoided  unless  absolutely  necessary.  For  a  short 
rest,  all  that  is  needed  is  a  simultaneous  halt  in  the  marching- 
column.  F.very  deployment  is  a  "readiness,"  which  is  not  re- 
quired on  the  mere  probability  of  an  engagement,  but  when 
an  engagement  is  inevitable,  and  therefore  only  when  the  ad- 
vance guard  meets  with  resistance  in  its  progress.  In  gen- 
eral a  possible  deployment  depends  upon  the  enemy,  and  can- 
not therefore  be  anticipated,  and  in  any  case  is  dependent  on 
the  terrane  and  one's  own  purposes.  The  ground  should  facili- 
tate it,  and  it  provides  the  position   behind   which   it   is   pro- 


■6o  Studii.s  in  TiJic  Leading  of  Troops. 

posed  to  fight,  or  the  battle-field  on  which  an  attack  is  intend- 
ed. In  the  latter  case  the  deployment  should  not  be  made  too 
soon,  because  an  advance  in  order  of  battle  is  very  tiring  and 
consumes  time.  If  the  advance  guard  has  found  a  somewhat 
tenable  position,  it  is  better  to  remain  in  marching  column  un- 
til the  same  is  reached  ;  or,  if  it  is  desired  to  attain  some  ob- 
jective without  fighting,  the  troops  should  deploy  only  when 
forced  to. 

In  the  case  before  us  corps  headquarters  had  ordered  a 
general  rendezvous  on  the  Aupa.  'When  the  Second  division 
reached  Parschnitz,  the  First  division,  which  had  to  provide 
the  advance  guard,  had  not  yet  come  up,  and  as  it  was  not 
practicable  to  proceed  further,  no  time  was  lost  to  the  whole 
or  various  parts  by  the  deployment.  In  addition,  on  debouch- 
ing from  the  mountains  the  enemy  could  be  expected,  and  it 
was  proper  that  preparations  should  be  made  for  an  engage- 
ment if  it  could  be  done  without  loss  of  time,  especially  In  view 
of  the  fact  that  a  simple  halt  on  the  narrow  mountain  road 
would  not  have  been  judicious. 

Measures  of  Security  Taken. 

It  is  but  natural  that  a  force  in  the  vicinity  of  an  enemy, 
whether  marching  or  assembled  in  rendezvous,  should  secure 
itself.  In  level  country  with  an  unobstructed  view  this  duly 
can  be  performed  by  the  advance  guard,  and  even  a  small 
force  will  be  sufficient.  The  more  difficult  the  terrane  and 
general  conditions,  however,  the  more  care  must  be  exercised. 
As  a  rule,  either  too  much  or  too  little  is  done  in  this  direc- 
tion. The  "too  little'*  may  pass  a  thousand  times  with  im- 
punity, but  when  once  the  troops  are  thereby  surprised,  the 
reputation  of  their  commander  suffers  for  a  long  time.  In 
conse(|uence  of  this  the  other  extreme  is  frequently  resorted 
to.  though  at  the  expense  of  the  men's  strength.  It  must 
never  be  forgotten  that  when  troops  are  to  be  given  a  rest, 
it  should  be  done  iis  thoroughly  as  circumstances  will  permit. 

'I'his  maUer  is  especially  neglected  in  the  employment  of 
ca\-a]ry.  both  in  theory  and  practice.  In  moments  when  a 
few  patrols  would  suffice,  entire  regiments  are  frequently  sent 
to  the  front.  While  the  other  arms  rest,  the  cavalry  is  on  the 
move.     We  fori^et  that  while  men  can  l)e  encouraged  bv   fair 


I 


Studieis  in  the:  Le:ading  o^  Troops.  6r 

Avords  and  spurred  on  by  ambition  to  renewed  activity,  it  is 
quite  different  with  tlie  horse,  which  must  eat,  drink,  and  rest. 
We  certainly  can  demand  much  of  a  horse  that  has  been  well 
fed  and  in  good  condition  at  the  start ;  but  such  conditions  are 
rare,  and  even  then  we  should  not  unnecessarily  waste  the 
strength  of  animals. 

In  the  majority  of  cases  the  smallest  patrols  will  suffice. 
Good  riders  on  good  horses  and  possessed  of  the  requisite 
boldness  can  venture  a  great  deal,  especially  when  hostile  cav- 
alry is  not  about. 

The  less  the  country  is  open  to  view,  the  more  numerous 
should  be  the  cavalry  patrols  sent  out,  which  then  need  a 
supporting  body  of  their  own  arm.     For  this  reason  the  flank 

party  of  Major-General  B sent  out  a  whole  troop  in 

■each  direction,  both  west  and  southwest. 

If  larger  bodies  of  the  enemy  are  in  the  vicinity  and  his 
cavalry  is  at  hand,  the  latter  will  not  permit  our  cavalry 
patrols  to  look  into  his  lines.  So  if  we  wish  to  orient  our- 
selves with  regard  to  the  enemy,  too  much  cavalry  cannot  be 
brought  forward  and  to  spare  it  would  be  an  error.  Often  in 
such  cases  we  may  find  it  necessary  to  fight  in  order  to  see. 
Our  experiences  in  the  campaign  of  1 870-1  should  not  govern 
in  this  connection,  for  the  French  cavalry  did  not  oppose  us 
in  an  efficient  manner. 

The  sending  forward  of  cavalry  should  be  regulated  from 
these  points  of  view,  and  it  is  insisted  that  reconnoitering  and 
scouting  at  long  distances,  under  all  circumstances,  is  particu- 
larly the  duty  of  cavalry.  But  it  is  the  duty  of  higher  leaders 
to  solve  this  problem  with  proper  economy,  for  he  who  ex- 
hausts his  cavalry  before  the  engagement  commences,  can  cer- 
tainly expect  nothing  of  it  either  during  or  after  the  fight. 

As  specially  concerns  the  measures  for  security,  it  may 
be  seen  here  how  they  and  their  sphere  extend  in  proportion 
to  the  strength  of  the  bodies  to  be  protected.  An  advance 
guard  can  cover  the  front  of  its  division  for  a  certain  breadth, 
but  only  in  the  rarest  cases  will  it  suffice  for  the  protection  of 
the  flanks  of  an  isolated  division,  whether  on  the  march  or 
in  position — such  security  can  only  be  provided  by  new 
detachments. 

So  the  vanguard  of  the  advance  guard  covered  itself  by 
a  troop  of  hussars  sent  to  the  heights  south  of  Parschnitz,  the 


62  StudiI'S  IX  TTiK  Lkadixc  or  TrOoI'S. 

ciiliro  advance  guard  l)y  a  l)attaliüii  and  this  troo]).  and  the 
division  by  4  battalions,  3  scjuach'on.s,  and  1  battery.  The 
greater  the  number  of  troops  advanced  for  ])urposes  of  secur- 
ity, the  further  may  they  be  pushed  forward  and  their  sphere 
of  scoutin«^  and  security  extended. 

While  the  one  l^attahon  detached  from  the  advance  p^uard 
could  only  secure  toward  the  wooded  summit  of  the  moun- 
tains, the  larger  detachment  which  followed  made  it  prac- 
ticable for  the  flank  cover  to  reach  far  beyond  it. 

If,  however,  the  enemy  can  approach  only  from  one  direc- 
tion, through  a  defile,  then  smaller  forces  will  suffice,  accord- 
ing" to  the  formation  of  the  defile.  This  is  exemplified  by  the 
case  with  regard  to  the  Raussnitz  valley,  already  mentioned. 
Hostile  ])arties  could  advance  through  it  from  Josephstadt, 
via  Eypel.  1"he  advance  guard  had  to  protect  itself  against 
this,  which  it  did  with  a  company  of  infantry  and  half  a  troop 
of  hussars.  I'ndcr  the  conditions  of  terrane  that  there  existed, 
this  cover  was  ample  too  for  the  division  ;  accordingly  it  was 
not  reinforced,  but  ordered  to  remain  there  until  the  Guard 
arrived. 

Wui  to  keep  all  these  detached  bodies  under  arms  wouM 
IHirchase  the  rest  of  one  half  the  division  at  the  expense  of 
the  other  half.  Yet  this  was  not  at  all  necessary,  for  by  push- 
ing out  mixed  detachments  i.too  or  1,600  yards  toward  the 
west  or  south,  the  balance  of  the  division  would  be  fully  cov- 
ered, ai\d  these  detachments  need  only  to  provide  for  their 
own   safety  within  narrow  limits. 

So  it  comes  to  pass  that  in  reality  only  the  double  ])Osts 
a.nd  the  scouting  cavalry  cannot  obtain  rest ;  but  even  if  wc 
did  not  count  in  the  advanced  troops  of  huss  irs,  the  follow- 
mg  force  was  necessary  for  the  security  of  the  divi^itMi : 

Iiifdiifry. 
J'"ro;n  hirM  reginuiit  : 

loth  company '  j  platoon. 

ijth   c-ompany 1  ])latoon. 

1st   battalion [\  platoon. 

j<\   battalion 'j  platoon. 

1  I  til   cninpany ' .:  plat<K)n. 

'i'otal 3    platoon"^. 


Studies  in  thk  Leading  oe  Troops.  63 

Cavalry. 
From  First  hussars : 

With  Colonel  D 's  detachment: 

-  4th  squadron.. >^  troop 

■  With  Maj.-Gen.  B 's  detachment: 

H  4th  squadron i  troop. 

W  3d  squadron i  troop. 

With  2d  company,  ist  infantry: 

4th  squadron y^  troop. 

Total 3    troops. 

Approximately,  250  infantry  and  no  to  120  troo;ers. 

Concerning  other  dispositions  that  were  made,  it  remains 
to  be  stated  that,  after  debouching  from  the  Schömberg  de- 
file, the  conditions  which  had  up  to  that  time  demanded  a  sepa- 
ration of  the  hussar  regiment  ceased  upon  arriving  in  the 
plain  of  Parschnitz  and  before  Trautenau,  and  consequently 
the  separated  parts  had  to  be  reassembled. 

Disciplinary  Measures  Taken  7vifhin  the  Rendezvous. 

In  conclusion,  the   following   remarks  may  be  made   re- 
garding the  points  found  fault  with  by  the  division  commander: 
The  rolling  up  of  shoulder-straps  prevents   troops   from 
being  promptly  recognized,  which  is  particularly  needful  and 
I   important  in  time  of  action.     Moreover,  in  chancing  upon  sin- 
'    gle  men  (stragglers,  for  instance)  we  should  be  able  to  ascer- 
tain at  once  to  what  organization  they  belong. 

Removing  the  stocks  may  afTord  great  relief  under  cer- 
tain circumstances,  but  no  deviation  from  the  regulation  dress 
i   can  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  individual  commanders.     Such 
\   matters  are  ordered  by  regimental  and  battalion  commanders; 

■  otherwise  one  body  of  troops  would  march  with  helmets  and 
another  with  caps,  one  would  carry  the  knapsack  on  foot  and 
another  in  wagons.  Such  relief  must  be  ordered  for  all  by 
the  commander  of  the  whole.  If  one  body  of  troops  enjoys  a 
relief  that  another  does  not,  then  discontent,  disorder,  and 
want  of  discipline  easily  ensue.  Therefore  we  should  insist, 
in  war  as  well  as  in  peace,  on  the  observance  of  regulations, 
and  when  a  departure  from  the  same  becomes  desirable,  as  in 


64.  Studii;S  in  thc  leading  of  Troops. 

the  instance  before  us,  it  should  be  ordered  by  the  commander 
of  the  cohmin.  Yet  it  must  not  be  forgotten  to  direct  such  re- 
Hef  when  there  is  a  necessity  for  it.  It  has  been  stated 
that  details  of  the  Fourth  infantry  brigade  were  made  to  carry 
water.  The  parts  of  the  division  that  were  in  the  Aupa  Val- 
ley would  have  no  difficulty  in  quenching  their  thirst,  but  it 
was  different  with  the  troops  on  the  heights  on  the  left  bank 
of  that  stream.  The  latter,  when  going  through  Parschnitz, 
had  to  leave  behind  their  water-carriers,  or  else  drink  on  the 
march  while  passing  through  the  village. 

With  reference  to  the  loading  of  the  regulation  wagons 
and  the  detail  of  men  to  accompany  them,  it  may  be  well  to 
quote  here  two  circulars  which  were  actually  issued  on  the  day 
in  question : 

''Company  baggage-wagons  were  overloaded,  especially 
with  imslung  knapsacks,  in  such  a  manner  that  they  were  un- 
able to  keep  up  during  the  day's  march.  The  greatest  evils 
can  arise  from  this.  Commanding  officers  will  at  once  stop 
this  overloading  and  see  that  only  such  articles  are  carried  on 
the  wagons  as  are  permitted  by  regulations." 

"The  commanding  general  to-day  has  again  observed  that 
loo  many  men  are  detailed  with  the  heavy  baggage,  including 
orderlies,  quartermaster  sergeants,  and  sergeant  clerks,  all  of 
whom  do  not  belong  to  the  wagons,  but  must  remain  in  the 
ranks.  Regimental  and  battalion  clerks  were  also  with  the 
wagons,  and  as  a  rule  they  do  not  belong  there,  but  if  they 
are  sent  to  the  baggage,  men  out  of  the  ranks  cannot  be 
ordered  there  in  addition.  To  every  regulation  wagon  there 
should  be  detailed  only  t  man,  as  a  clerk  or  a  non-combatant, 
and  with  a  supernumerary  wagon  only  i  man  for  every  2 
vehicles  at  the  utmost,  no  matter  what  the  wagon  may  be 
loaded  witli." 

rkoiiuais.  ! 

In  order  that  the  student  may  derive  full  benefit  from  thi^ 
work,  it  is  suggested  that  whenever  he  comes  to  a  place  in 
the  text  where  certain  dispositions  of  troops  are  called  for,  he 
make  these  dispositions  liimself,  according  to  his  own  ideas, 
before  reading  the  solutions  given. 


Studies  in  Ttir:  Leading  oe  Troops.  65 

For  instance,  on  page  i  is  found  a  presentation  of  the 
general  situation,  which  states  that  the  Second  infantry  divis- 
ion and  the  First  cavalry  brigade  arrived  at  Schömberg  on 
June  25.  Following  this  is  a  statement  of  the  special  situa- 
tion with  regard  to  the  Second  infantry  division,  for  the  bet- 
ter understanding  of  which  a  terrane  sketch  is  added.  On 
page  3  the  bivouacs  of  the  various  units  are  announced,  but  it 
will  be  to  the  student's  advantage  if,  before  reading  the  an- 
nouncement, he  plan  for  himself  how  these  bivouacs  should 
be  arranged. 

It  is  true  the  fact  that  the  troops  are  already  entered  on 
the  sketch  will  naturally  interfere  with  such  a  problem.  Even 
so,  the  question  could  take  this  form:  "Will  I  divide  the 
troops  in  the  samie  manner  a^  shown  in  the  sketch?"  The 
answer  will  be,  ''No" ;  for  a  little  reflection  will  show  that  if 
the  two  divisions  bivouac  around  Liebau  and  Schömberg,  it 
would  be  advisable  for  them  to  secure  the  exits  of  the  defiles 
across  the  frontier,  which  could  be  accomplished  all  the  more 
easily  by  reason  of  only  cavalry  being  in  their  front.  Their 
advance  guards  should  therefore  be  sent  forward  to  these 
points. 

Thus  the  first  disposition  given  in  the  text  leads  to  some 
study.  The  omitting  to  send  the  advance  guards  forward  can 
only  be  explained  by  the  order  not  to  cross  the  frontier,  for 
the  time  being,  with  larger  bodies.  This  leads  to  a  further 
question:  *'What  may  have  induced  corps  headquarters  to 
give  such  an  order?"     The  answer  is  found  on  page  11. 

From  this  it  is  evident  that  circumstances  leading  to  a 
particular  situation  materially  influence  the  dispositions  that 
must  be  made,  and  that  therefore  new  situations  lead  to  new 
dispositions.  All  that  is  necessary  to  initiate  these  new  ques- 
tions is  to  alter  the  task  assigned  to  a  subdivision,  the  terrane 
upon  which  it  operates,  or  its  strength.  In  all  these  directions 
entirely  different  measures  must  frequently  follow,  especially 
when  alterations  are  made  also  with  respect  to  the  strength, 
distance,  or  position  of  the  enemy. 

The  following  will  serve  as  examples  for  new  problems : 

I.  The  Second  Army  remained  on  the  Neisse.  The 
First  army  corps,  sent  to  Liebau,  was  charged  to  draw  the  en- 
emy's attention  upon  itself,  and  to  make  him  apprehensive  of 


66  Studiks  in  the  Lkadint,  of  Troops.  m 

an  invasion  from  that  direction  into  Bohemia,  without,  how- 
ever, taking  the  offensive  beyond  that  point. 

2.  The  First  army  corps,  by  itself,  had  been  sent  for- 
ward to  cover  tlie  frontier.  If  attacked  by  superior  forces,  it 
should  give  way  in  a  northerly  direction. 

In  both  of  these  events  the  problems  would  become :  Po- 
sition of  the  army  corps.  Points  of  view  for  determining 
further  conduct  in  order  to  accomplish  the  tasks. 

3.  Take  the  situations  given  in  the  text  and  i  and  2 
above,  and  suppose  that  in  each  case  only  a  division,  instead 
of  a  corps,  was  at  hand,  or  that  the  work  had  been  assigned  to 
a  detachment  of  3  battalions,  4  squadrons,  and  i  battery. 

4.  Suppose'  that  the  roads  were  in  mostly  level  country, 
covered  with  small  patches  of  timber,  farms,  etc.,  instead  of  in 
the  defiles  of  a  mountainous  region.  Solve  all  previously 
given  problems  on  this  basis. 

5.  Suppose  it  was  known  that  there  were  large  hostile 
forces  of  all  arms  at  Trautenau,  or  that  these  had  already  sent 
forward  their  advance  guards  to  Gubersdorf  and  Petersdort. 

As  an  illustration  of  how  such  changes  necessitate  ditfer- 
ent  measures,  we  may  cite  the  following: 

If,  in  the  event  of  giving  way  before  strong  forces  of  the 
opponent,  the  retreat  should  take  a  northerly  direction,  then 
the  main  force  would  belong  at  Liebau,  and  a  detachment 
only  should  be  sent  to  Schömjjerg. 

If,  instead  of  being  mountainous,  the  country  was  open 
and  level,  it  was  not  absolutely  necessary  to  directly  cover 
both  roads  from  Liebau  and  Schömberg  to  Trautenau ;  this 
would  lead  to  an  unnecessary  dispersion. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  corps  should  unite  around  Lieb- 
au and  hold  the  road  from  there  to  Golden-Oels,  an  indirect 
securing  of  the  Schomberg-'Frautenau  road  .ould  be  accom- 
plished by  sending  a  detachment  forward  int(^  the  country 
cast  of  Piernsdorf.  Tliis  1)ody  should  remain  in  the  closest 
connection  with  the  main  body  and  advance  guard,  and  in 
view  of  this  the  march  of  a  hostile  column  upon  SclilMuberg 
would  appear  to  be  a  very  hazardous  undertaking. 

Furthermore,  in  ])racticable  country  the  service  of  secur- 
ity falls  to  the  cavalry.  The  entire  First  cavalry  brigade  could 
then  be  sent   far  in  advance,   for  the   support  of  which  only 


Studtks  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  67 

a  few  battalions  and  some  artillery  would  be  required,  and 
the  formation  of  other  separate  advance  guards  could  be  dis- 
pensed with. 

Further  on  in  the  text  we  come  to  the  actual  establish- 
ment of  the  outposts.  Here  too,  as  in  all  other  cases,  the  stu- 
dent should  picture  to  himself  how  that  work  would  be  per- 
formed, before  reading  the  text.  Later  the  outpost  formations 
that  would  be  judicious  in  the  case  of  the  varying  situations 
above  mentioned  could  be  considered.  The  following  ques- 
tions are  most  intimately  connected  with  such  dispositions: 
What  special  measures  are  required  in  case  of  hostile  attack? 
Shall  the  advance  guard  fight?  In  what  position  shall  the 
attack  be  accepted? 

The  following  problems,  among  others,  also  suggest 
themselves : 

Page  6:  The  hussars  sent  out  toward  Braunau  send  in 
word  that  the  enemy  in  considerable  force  has  taken  up  a  posi- 
tion close  to  the  south  of  the  town,  and  that  the  advance  guard 
of  the  Guard  is  already  engaged  there.  Required :  order  of 
the  Second  infantry  division  for  the  start;  message  to  head- 
quarters of  the  First  army  corps;  advice  to  the  Guard  corps ; 
instructions  to  the  advance  guard  commander,  who  is  to  le- 
main  in  position  toward  Trautenau. 

Page  7:  I.  Give  a  sketch  of  the  order  of  the  Second  in- 
fantry division  for  June  27  after  receipt  of  corps  order. 

2.  Give  a  sketch  of  the  division  order  if  the  corps  order 
dispensed  with  the  uniting  of  the  corps  near  Parschnitz,  and 
directed  instead  that  the  Second  division  advance  to  Traut- 
enau and  go  into  bivouac  there  as  advance  guard,  while  the 
First  infantrv  division  remained  near  Parschnitz.  (This  order 
should  not  provide  for  contingencies  that  cannot  yet  be  fore- 
seen.) Indicate  the  position  of  the  division  and  its  outposts 
if  it  reaches  Trautenau  without  seeing  anything  of  the  enemy 
except  cavalry  patrols. 

3.  What  place  in  the  order  of  march  should  be  assigned 
to  a  battalion  of  riflemen  and  a  battalion  of  the  corps  artillery 
regiment,  should  such  happen  to  be  with  the  division? 

Page  39:  Give  the  orders  for  the  advance  from  Schöm- 
berg  and  Bertelsdorf  if  it  is  intended  to  assemble  the  outposts 
later.  i 


68  Studies  in  the  Leading  oe  Troops. 

Page  41  :  i.  Upon  coming  out  of  Petersdorf,  the  ad- 
vance guard  reports  the  approach  of  a  hostile  column  from 
the  direction  of  Parschnitz.  Give  the  dispositions  of  the  com- 
mander of  the  advance  guard. 

2.  The  head  of  the  advance  guard  reports  that  infantry 
and  apparently  a  battery  of  the  enemy  had  occupied  a  position 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Aupa,  south  of  Parschnitz.  Give 
the  orders  of  the  commander  of  the  advance  guard ;  also  the 
dispositions  of  the  division  commander. 

3.  When  the  vanguard  approached  the  point  of  exit 
from  tlie  defile  near  Parschnitz,  hostile  cavalry  of  the  strength 
of  about  6  squadrons,  with  2  batteries,  are  seen  in  the  plain 
north  of  the  village.  How  will  the  debouchment  of  the  divis- 
ion be  conducted  under  these  circumstances?  Give  the  orders 
of  the  respective  commanders. 

4.  The  advance  guard  has  reached  the  southern  exit  of 
Albendorf  with  the  head  of  its  main  body  when  heavy  artillery 
firing  is  audible  from  about  the  direction  of  Bernsdorf.  In 
the  direction  of  Parschnitz  only  hostile  cavalry  patrols  have 
so  far  been  seen. 

5.  The  same  situation,  except  that  simultaneously  the 
advance  of  a  hostile  column  from  Parschnitz  on  Petersdorf  is 
reported. 

6.  The  head  of  the  division  has  arrived  at  Parschnitz ; 
so  far  only  hostile  cavalry  patrols  have  been  visible.  The 
division  receives  orders  to  continue  the  march  to  Trautenau 
and  occupy  bivouacs  on  the  heights  south  of  the  village.  Give 
the  orders  for  security  of  the  march.^ 

With  regard  to  this  method  of  study,  it  may  be  added  that, 
in  cases  where  the  student  makes  dispositions  with  reference 
to  the  situation  presented  in  the  text,  before  he  sees  the  solu- 
tion given  therein,  the  latter  offers  an  opportunity  to  learn  a 
different  view  of  the  case.  He  either  finds  his  own  view  con- 
firmed, or  he  notices  deviations  therefrom.  If  the  latter,  it 
leads  to  reflections  as  to  what  motives  these  deviations  may 
be  based  on,  and  it  ])ermits  a  comparison  of  such  motives 
with  those  that  he  himself  had  in  mind  when  making  hTs 
dispositions. 

It  will  be  noted,  however,  that  in  all  problems  the  student 
frames  for  himself  by  changing  the  situations  of  his  own  ac- 


Studies  in  the:  Leading  of  Troops.  69 

cord,  he  of  course  loses  the  outHnes  that  would  be  given  by 
an  instructor.  Yet  in  spite  of  this  he  will  not  fail  to  derive 
much  benefit,  as  all  earnest  reflection  on  war  situations  is  in 
itself  of  value,  and  this  will  be  the  greater  as  such  changes  in 
individual  incidents  call  forth  deviating  measures.  And  then 
another  question  will  be:  "Will  not  the  dispositions  made  in 
one  case  answer  in  another?  If  not,  why  not?"  Indeed,  it 
is  quite  true  that  new  ideas  are  developed  by  a  variation  in 
the  original  situation,  whereby  we  may  well  consider  whether 
they  could  not  be  applied  also  in  the  first  solution. 

Such  exercises  will  be  especially  instructive  if  a  number 
of  students  congregate  to  study  them  together. 

In  conclusion,  there  is  still  another  way  in  which  these 
studies  may  be  of  benefit  for  the  student  without  instructor. 
Let  him  place  himself  in  the  position  of  a  particular  com- 
mander— for  instance,  the  commander  of  the  Third  battery. 
Then  let  him  picture  to  himself  in  what  position  the  events 
place  him,  upon  what  questions  he  must  direct  his  attention  in 
the  various  situations,  where  he  should  personally  be  at  each 
moment,  and  what  dispositions  he  should  make.  This  can  be 
carried  even  so  far  as  giving  several  commands  verbally.  And 
for  this  also  the  joint  study  of  a  number  of  officers,  especially 
of  different  arms,  is  highly  recommended.  Yet  such  work  is 
necessarily  laborious,  and  presupposes  the  earnest  desire  to 
give  as  much  time  as  possible  to  progressive  studies.  This 
we  all  need  to  practice  incessantly,  for  even  a  person  with 
the  most  favorably  equipped  intellect  will  accomplish  greater 
results  if  he  applies  himself  to  his  purpose  with  zeal  and 
industry. 


I 


I 


PART   II. 

Expulsion  o^  the  Enemy  i^rom  Trautenau.^ 

We  left  Lieutenant-General  A ,  at  8  40  a.  ni.,  on 

the  western  edge  of  Parschnitz,  just  as  he  received  the  report 
of  the  enemy's  advance.  His  first  order  was  for  the  troops 
to  get  under  arms  again,  yet  the  situation  required  further 
measures.      Should    the    enemy    continue    his    march   beyond 

Trautenau,   Colonel   D *s    detachment,   which   had   been 

pushed  forward  toward  the  town,  must  very  soon  be  involved 
in  an  engagement  which  would  afifect  the  whole  division.^ 

The  question  was,  "Should  the  division  be  deployed  in  a 
defensive  position  in  case  of  contact,  or  would  it  be  more  judi- 
cious to  advance  to  the  attack  of  the  enemy?" 

iThe  experiences  of  the  campaign  of  1870-1  are  evidence  of  a 
higher  demand  for  education  in  the  subject  of  troop-leading.  The 
greatest  gallantry  will  no  longer  suffice  against  destructive  fire;  it 
must  be  supplemented  more  than  ever  by  intelligence.  This  should 
admonish  us  to  devote  ourselves  with  unceasing  care  and  solicitude 
to  our  education. 

The  less  we  can  hope  to  accomplish  by  merely  rushing  ahead, 
the  more  study  should  be  given  to  the  situation  before  us,  and  to 
maneuvering  as  conditioned  by  the  terrane.  This  increases  the  de- 
mands on  the  intelligence  of  the  leader,  from  the  lowest  to  the 
highest. 

While  in  Part  I.  we  considered  only  dispositions  concerning 
the  march,  we  now  direct  our  attention  to  the  engagement  itself, 
and  more  particularly  toi  the  maneuvering. 

2Colonel  D 's  detachment,  west  of  Parschnitz,  consisted  of 

the  First  battalion  and  3  companies  of  the  Third  battalion  of  the 
First  infantry  regiment,  2  troops  of  the  Fourth  squadron  of  the  First 
hussar  regiment,  and  the  First  battalion  of  the  First  field  artillery 
regiment,  less  the  Third  battery. 

7^ 


72  Studies  in  the  Lkading  of  Troops. 

The  first  alternative  was  in  accordance  with  the  orders 
of  the  corps  commander,  who  had  desired  to  assemble  the  en- 
tire corps  near  Parschnitz ;  the  second  was  in  accordance  with 
the  plan  as  announced,  to  continue  the  march  beyond  Traut- 
enau  in  the  direction  of  Arnau.  In  view  of  the  reported  ap- 
proach of  considerable  hostile  forces,  the  second  alternative 
could  probably  only  be  accomplished  by  a  fight  for  the  posses- 
sion of  the  heights  of  Trautenau  which  would  become  more 
difficult  the  longer  the  enemy  was  allowed  to  establish  himself 

there.     For  this  reason  lyieutenant-General  A resolved 

to  advance  to  the  attack  of  the  enemy.  As  the  arrival  of  the 
remaining  parts  of  the  corps  could  confidently  be  expected  in 
about  an  hour  and  a  half,  the  division  would  not  be  de- 
pendent  on   its   own   forces   alone    in   carrying   through    the 

igement. 

The  next  question  was,  "How  can  the  attack  be  best 
initiated?" 

This  much  was  certain — the  enemy  could  no  longer  be 
prevented  from  ocupying  Trautenau.  Further,  the  character 
of  the  terrane  did  not  permit  an  advance  of  the  main  force 
against  the  city  and  along  the  highway ;  such  an  advance  must 
be  flanked  most  thoroughly  from  the  heights  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Aupa.  And  even  should  an  advance  be  successful,  the 
group  of  mountains  rising  abruptly  south  of  the  town  would 
form  a  position  that  could  hardly  be  taken  from  the  front. 
For  the  same  reason  an  advance  of  the  main  body  over  the 
mountains  in  a  westerly  direction  did  not  appear  practicable, 
as  it  also  would  eventually  lead  to  a  frontal  attack  on  this 
strong  position. 

In  any  case  the  Aupa  must  be  crossed  and  the  right  slope 
of  its  valley  ascended.  This  could  be  done  without  an  en- 
gagement only  near  Parschnitz,  where  Major-General  B 's 

detachment  had  already  obtained  a  firiu  hold  on  the  right 
bank,  while  a  further  advance  of  the  main  forces  toward 
the  Trautenau-Königinhof  road  would  turn  the  strong  posi- 
tion of  the  op])C)nent  and  would  threaten  his  probable  line  of 
letreat;  by  this  the  region  north  of  Parschnitz  would  be 
cleared,  making  room  f(^r  the  deployment  of  the  expected  parts 


Studies  in  thk  Lkading  of  Troops.  73 

of  the  army  corps,  which  would  not  be  the  case  if  the  Second 
division  remained  on  the  plain;  besides,  the  direct  line  of  re- 
treat to  Schömberg  would  be  maintained. 

The  crossing  of  the  Aupa  near  Parschnitz  would  require 
that  the  defile  southwest  of  that  village  be  held,  under  all  cir- 
cumstances,  until  the  arrival  of  the   First  infantry   division. 

The  detachment  of  Colonel  D was  available   for  this 

purpose;  and  although  the  detachment  had  only  seven  com- 
panies of  infantry,  it  was  not  probable  that  the  enemy  would 
advance  in  the  plain  along  the  Liebau  highway  as  soon  as  the 
main  body  of  the  Second  division  advanced  against  Trautenau 
over  the  heights  on  the  right  bank.  Moreover,  the  defile  could 
be  easily  defended;  the  deployment  of  large  hostile  forces  for 
its  attack  could  hardly  be  accomplished  before  9:30;  and  the 

immediate  support  of  Colonel  D by  the  First  infantry 

division  could  be  expected  soon  after  10  o'clock. 

Lieutenant-General  A therefore  determined  to  take 

the  offensive,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Aupa,  with  his  prin- 
cipal  force,   and  gave   the    following   instructions   to   Colonel 

D ,  who  was  with  him :    "The  enemy  is  advancing  from 

Königinhof  upon  Trautenau.  I  shall  cross  the  Aupa  with  the 
division  at  Parschnitz,  and  move  against  his  right  flank. 
Meanwhile  you  will  hold  your  position  until  the  arrival  of 
the  First  division,  which  will  probably  be  about  10  o'clock ;  if, 
however,  the  enemy  should  evacuate  Trautenau  earlier,  you 
will  follow  him  on  the  highway.  The  cavalry  brigade  will 
move  up  to  your  support,  and  you  will  place  yourself  under 
the  orders  of  its  commander." 

At  the  same  time  the  general  staff  officer  of  the  division 
was  sent  in  advance  upon  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Aupa  to 
reconnoiter  the  enemy  and  the  terrane. 

The  division  commander  then  returned  to  the  main  body, 
which  had  already  fallen  in,  and  at  8:50  gave  the  following 
orders,  in  part  verbally  to  those  immediately  concerned,  in 
part  through  his  aids : 

To  the  commander  of  the  artillery  regiment :  "Lead  your 
Second  battalion  east  of  the  Parschnitz  church  on  the  heights 
and  join  the  head  of  the  Fourth  brigade." 


74  Studiks  IX  IHK  Lkadixg  of  Troops. 

To  the  Fourth  infantry  brigade:  ''The  brigade  will 
marcli  immediately  to  the  heights  by  the  roads  leading  out  of 
Parschnitz  to  the  west  of  the  church.  The  Second  battalion 
of  field  artillery  will  place  itself  at  the  head." 

To  the  First  cavalry  brigade :     "The  brigade  will  at  once 

move   u])   to   the   support   of   Colonel    D 's   detachment, 

which  is  west  of  Parschnitz  on  the  Trautenau  highway. 
Major-General  L will  at  the  same  time  assume  com- 
mand of  the  detachment  of  Colonel  D ,  who  has  already 

been  given  instructions." 

To  the  bridge  train  and  signal  corps  detachment:  "The 
division  bridge  train  and  the  signal  corps  detachment  will  re- 
turn to  the  north  exit  of  Parschnitz  and  take  position  in  the 
meadow  north  of  the  road.*' 

To  the  chief  surgeon :  "The  division  will  probably  be 
engaged  on  the  heights  of  the  right  bank  of  the  Aupa.  Have 
the  ambulance  company  and  the  field  hospital  follovv  the  troops 
in  that  direction,  obtaining  the  necessary  wagons  for  the  trans- 
port of  the  wounded  by  requisition  on  the  town.  I  shall  send 
you  some  cavalrymen  for  this  work." 

A  mounted  riileman  was  directed  to  conduct  to  the  chief 
surgeon  half  a  troop  from  the  First  cavalry  brigade. 

Having  made  these  dispositions,  hastening  on  in  advance 
of  the  troops  just  starting,  the  division  commander  repaired 

to  Major-General  B 's  detachment,  and  as  he  crossed  the 

southern  edge  of  Parschnitz  he  noticed  that  the  parts  of  the 
detachment  were  already  in  motion  and  were  entering  the 
woods  in  their  front.  At  the  same  time  a  mounted  rifleman 
approached  him  bringing  the   following  message : 

3d  Infantry  Prigadc.  Heights  south  of  Parschnitz, 

27  June,  8 :40  a.  m. 
(  )n  account  of  the  proximity  of  the  enemy,  the  brigade 
is  holding  the  southern  edge  of  the  woods  lying  in  front  of  its 

position.  B , 

^.faior-Gcucral. 

When  Lieutenant-CkMieral  A arrived  at  the  north- 
ern border  of  the  woods,  the  last  subdivision  of  the  Third 
infantry  l)ri!jade  had  also  entered  it,  and  at  the  same  time  tl^e 


i 


Studiks  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  75 

first  cannon-shot  was  heard  in  the  direction  of  Trautenau,  to 
which  the  First  and  Second  batteries  were  seen  to  reply  from 
the  plain.  The  horse  battery  was  also  seen  advancing  at  a 
rapid  gait.     (9:10  a.  m.) 

Alter  passing  through  the  woods,  the  division  commander 
came  upon  the  Third  field  battery  in  a  covered  position  near 
Hill  504;  along  its  side  the  Second  infantry  regiment  was  de- 
ploying; farther  oil  and  in  its  front  was  the  Second  battalion 
of  the  First  infantry,  near  Hill  531,  which  was   situated  to 

the  southwest  and  from  which  Major-General   B was 

then  returning;  and  the  hussar  regiment  could  be  seen  in  its 
advanced  position  extending  to  the  patches  of  wood  north  of 
Alt-Rognitz.  Hussar  patrols  appeared  on  the  heights  toward 
Kriblitz,  some  of  them  skirmishing  with  hostile  cavalry  be- 
tween that  village  and  Alt-Rognitz,  other  than  which  all  that 
could  be  seen  of  the  enemy  was  a  battery  in  action  on  the 
northwestern  slope  of  the  Hopfen  Mountain,  behind  which, 
however,  heavy  clouds  of  dust  arose,  intimating  the  presence 
of  marching  forces. 

Upon  coming  up,  Major-General  B said  :    "Accord- 
ing to   reports  of  hussars,  the  head  of  the  enemy's   column 
reached  Hohenbruck  at  8:30.     Its  rear,  as  I  have  personally 
observed,  has  only  just  now  entered  the  village.     I  therefore 
estimate  its  strength  at  about  a  brigade.     The  patrols  sent 
I    southward  by  Alt-Rognitz  were  forced  to  fall  back  before  the 
I   enemy's  uhlans,  the  reports  of  whose  strength  vary  from  i  to 
j   4  squadrons,  but  up.  to  that  time  they  had  only  seen  a  few 
I    wagons  on  the  road.     Just  now  the  hostile  cavalry  is  behind 
!   the  patches  of  wood  between  Kriblitz  and  Alt-Rognitz.     The 
I  hussar  regiment  sent  forward  against  it  was  met  with  infantry 
i  fire  out  of  the  bushes.    It  was  my  intention  to  occupy  the  edge 
i  of  the  woods  here,  so  as  to  secure  the  division  against  an  ad- 
I  vance  of  the  enemy  on  this  side  of  the  Aupa." 
i           By  this  the  division  commander  was  convinced  that  the 
j  approaching  forces  were  as  yet  inferior,  a  fact  which  demand- 
I  ed  all  the  more  that  they  be  promptly  attacked.     It  was   a 
i  question,  however,  whether  they   formed  the   advance  guard 
I  of  a  corps  in  the  rear.    However  that  may  be,  the  resolve  taken 
I  by  Lieutenant-General  A ,  based  on  the  general  situa- 


76  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

tion,  cuiild  not  be  changed.  He  therefore  informed  Major- 
Gcneral  1> that  it  was  not  necessary  to  occupy  the  bor- 
der of  the  woods,  as  the  Fourth  brigade  was  now  advancing 
and  he  intended  to  attack  the  opponent.  As  the  Fourth  bri- 
gade, however,  had  not  yet  arrived,  the  division  commander, 
for  the  time  being,  directed  his  whole  attention  to  the  terrane, 
in  order  to  arrange  his  further  movements  judiciously. 

As  already  stated,  the  ridge  (531  and  554)  extending  to- 
ward Kri blitz  divided  the  region  south  of  Aupa  into  two  sec- 
tions. Caution  demanded  that  the  main  forces  be  led  for- 
ward in  the  northern  section  along  the  right  bank  of  the 
Aupa,  in  order  not  to  disperse  them  too  much  and  endanger 
the  communication  with  the  troops  in  the  valley.  For  should 
the  enemy  in  course  of  time  show  himself  to  be  superior  and 
advance  along  the  border  of  the  valley,   Lieutenant-General 

A 's  command  might  not  only  be   separated   from  the 

First  infantry  division,  but  also  crowded  away  from  its  own 
line  of  reireat.  And  on  the  other  hand,  an  attack  across  this 
ground  would  lead  the  division  against  the  apparently  very 
strong  position  south  of  Kriblitz. 

But  if  the  principal  attack  was  transferred  to  the  region 
south  of  the  mountain  range,  this  position  could  not  only  be 
turned,  but  the  enemy  probably  forced  to  rapidly  evacuate  the 
heights  south  of  Trautenau.  If  the  latter  was  not  done  by 
him  soon,  all  that  could  be  hoped  was  to  involve  him  in  a 
serious  fighting  condition  on  his  withdrawal. 

Yet  with  all  these  advantages,  the  latter  plan  entailed  the 
disadvantage  of  considerably  extending  the  division,  for  in 
any  case  the  country  to  the  north  of  the  mountain  range  must 
not  be  left  out  of  consideration,  and  if  serious  resistance  was 
encountered  between  Kriblitz  and  Alt-Rognitz,  the  rearmost 
troops  would  ])rol)ahly  have  to  be  employed  too  soon. 

Notwithstanding    this,    Lieutenant-General    A re- 

.solved  to  make  the  principal  attack  in  that  «lircction,  for  if  it 
was  successful,  then  the  Trautenau  defile  would  be  most  quick- 
ly opened.  This,  for  the  moment,  Avas  of  the  greatest  import- 
ance. The  division  commander  was  convinced  that  for  the 
time  being  his  forces  were  superior  to  the  enemy,  but  he  could 
not  tell  whether  this  would  he  the  case  an  liour  later.  So  far 
no  furtli'jr  movements  of  troops  on  the  Königinhof  road  were 


1^ 


Studies  in  tue:  Leading  of  Troops.  77 

reported,  and  the  quicker  advantage  was  taken  of  the  enemy's 
isolation  the  better'  would  be  the  chances  of  success.  In  ad- 
dition, the  danger  of  a  premature  disposal  of  the  reserves  was 
to  some  extent  neutralized  i)y  the  expected  arrival  of  the  First 
infantry  division,  as  well  as  the  proximity  of  the  Guard  di- 
vision, which  could  reinforce  the  first  line. 

Meanwhile,  having  dismounted,  he  gave  the  following  in- 
structions to  Major-General  B ,  commanding  the  Third 

brigade  (9:23):  "Attack  the  enemy  with  your  4  battalions 
and  the  battery,  in  the  direction  of  Kriblitz.  I  shall  put  the 
Fourth  brigade  in  motion  south  of  the  mountain  ridge  lead- 
ing toward  the  village,  against  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat. 
Keep  your  right  v^'ing  at  the  edge  of  the  valley  during  the 
advance,  and  do  not  abandon  it  under  any  circumstances.  I 
shall  have  the  hussar  regiment  reconnoiter   the   left   flank." 

Major-General    B made   his   dispositions   at   once. 

The  Third  horse  battery  advanced  to  the  next  mountain  spur 
(Hill  366)  and  opened  fire  on  the  enemy's  artillery  on  the 
Hopfen  Mountain  (9:35).  The  Third  battalion  of  the  Sec- 
ond infantry  formed  up  in  two  echelons  in  company  columns, 
with  the  left  on  the  Raussnitz-Trautenau  road,  and  on  the 
same  line  with  it  and  on  its  left  was  the  Second  battalion  of 
the  First  infantry.  The  remaining  two  battalions  of  the  Sec- 
ond infantry  formed  company  columns  and  covered  them- 
selves north  and  south  of  Height  366. 

In  the  meantime  the  division  commander's  views  were 
confirmed  by  the  report  of  his  general  staff  officer,  who  at 
9:32  returned  from  the  height  in  front  of  Kriblitz: 

"The  enemy  is  preparing  to  take  up  a  position  on  the 
j  heights  south  of  Trautenau.  His  forces  do  not  seem  to  be 
i  very  large,  for  he  has  only  brought  i  battery  into  action,  and 
I  could  only  see  2  battalions  in  its  vicinity.  The  ravine  in 
which  Kriblitz  lies  is  deeply  cut,  and  on  the  other  side  is  cov- 
ered at  its  southern  end  with  a  dense  wood,  so  that  an  advance 
over  it  presents  great  difficulty.  On  the  other  hand,  the  re- 
gion south  of  the  range  of  heights,  extending  along  our  front, 
ofifers  no  material  obstacles  to  an  attack.  Furthermore,  only 
a  small  force  of  infantry  and  i  to  2  squadrons  of  uhlans  could 
be  seen  in  it."' 


78  Studii^s  IX  Tiiiv  Lkadixc  of  Troops. 

The  i^encral  staff  officer  was  then  instructed  to  prepare 
the  report  to  the  corps  commander  of  the  intended  advance, 
and  the  same  was  sii^ned  by  the  division  commander.^ 

Meanwhile  the  head  of  the  Second  battaUon  of  field  artil- 
lery had  reached  the  edge  of  the  woods  (near  Hill  504),  and 
at  9:35  the  commander  of  the  artillery  regiment  and  the  com- 
mander of  the  Fourth  brigade,  Alajor-General  C ,  joined 

Lieutenant-General   A ,   who   gave  them   the   following 

orders:  ''The  Third  brigade  will  attack  north  of  the  moun- 
tain ridge  in  our  front  in  the  direction  of  Kriblitz."     The;i 

turning  to   Alajor-General   C :     "Continue   the   march 

with  your  brigade  to  the  left  of  it  in  the  direction  of  A't- 
Rognitz.  The  hussar  regiment  which  you  see  below  will  re- 
connoiter  on  your  left  flank."  Then  to  the  commander  of  the 
artillery:  "Let  the  Second  battalion  go  into  position  on  Hill 
531,  which  you  see  before  you." 

As  this  movement  must  take  place  under  his  own  eyes, 
the  division  comn '.ander  retained  the  Fourth  brigade  as  a  re- 
serve. If  its  head  should  also  encounter  the  enemy,  he  coul'd 
either  put  in  the  entire  brigade,  or  retain  a  part  of  it  as  a 
last  reserve,  as  he  thought  best.  Orders  were  sent  to  the 
hussar  regiment  to  attach  itself  to  the  left  wing  of  the  advanc- 
ing Fourth  brigade  and  to  reconnoiter  on  the  left  flank  of  the 
division,  at  the  same  time  holding  itself  in  readiness  to  take 
part  in  the  engagement. 

As  soon  as  the  head  of  his  brigade,  which  was  marching 
in  two  columns,  had  reached  the  southern  cih^e  of  the  woods 
(near  Hill  504),  Alajor-General  C considered  it  neces- 
sary to  separate  his  two  most  advanced  battalions  into  com- 
])any  columns;  those  that  followed  remained  in  column  of 
march,  but  halted  for  a  short  time  to  re-establish  order,  as  they 
were  .somewhat  disturbed  1)\'  the  (Hfllcult  march,  and  to  close 


I2d   Infantry   Division.  Hill   504,   south  of  Parsc.huitz. 

(MossaKo  No.  1.)  27,  6,  '66,  9:35  a.  m. 

To  the  Headquarters,   1st  Army  Ccnps: 

A  ho.stilo  column  of  all  arms,  estimated  at  a  brigade,  has  just 
reached  Trautenau  from  the  direction  of  Königinhof.  The  front  ot 
its  position  is  difficult  to  force.  The  main  body  of  this  division  has 
therefore  crossed  the  Aupa  aear  Parschnitz.  and,  holding  the  T.ieb- 
au   highway,   is  advancing  to  the  attack   on   the   right  flank  of  the 

enemy.  A , 

Lieiitenant-dfeneral. 


I 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  79 

up,  whereby  a  distance  of  435  yards  was  gained  from  the  lead- 
ing battahon.  Meanwhile  the  view  the  division  commander 
had  entertained  of  the  effect  of  the  advance  on  the  enemy's 
left  flank  was  strengthened  by  the  first  move  in  its  execution. 
Although  the  enemy's  artillery  on  Hopfen  Mountain  at  first 
replied  with  a  few  shots  to  the  fire  of  the  Third  battery,  in  a 
few  minutes  its  guns  were  limbered  up  and  left  the  position. 
Soon,  too,  clouds  of  dust  rising  in  unbroken  line  in  the  cut 
of  the  woods  leading  from  the  Hopfen  Mountain  to  Alt- 
Rognitz  indicated  the  rapid  retirement  of  a  hostile  party, 
while  small  columns  were  observed  on  the  high  points  which 
rose  to  the  south  of  this  cut,  moving  in  a  southerly  direction. 

Lender  these  circumstances  the  division  commander  would 
gladly  have  hastened  the  advance  of  the  Fourth  brigade,  yet 
he  recognized  that  this  would  lead  to  a  disorderly  advance, 
and  he  refrained  from  urging  it  here,  as  the  desire  of  the  troops 
to  get  at  the  enemy  needed  to  be  curbed  rather  than  incited. 
Furthermore,  nearly  all  parties  were  then  in  motion,  and  the 
battalion  of  the  Third  brigade  advancing  along  the  crest  of 
the  heights  (Second  battalion  of  the  First  infantry)  soon  be- 
came involved  in  a  musketry  engagement  with  the  enemy's 
infantry  on  the  slope  turnins^  into  the  Kriblitz  ravine. 

The  division  commander  then  remounted  his  horse  and 
i'ode  toward  Hill  531,  south  of  the  Raussnitz-Trautenau  road, 
where  he  had  a  better  view  of  the  two  brigades  during  theii 
advance. 

At  9 150  the  situation  was  as   follows  :^ 

The  deployed  leading  battalions  of  the  Fourth  brigade 
were  crossing  the  ridge  on  both  sides  of  the  station  of  the 
division  commander  (531).  The  Second  artillery  battalion 
was  stationed  north  of  Hill  531,  under  cover,  with  thickets  ex- 
tending partially  across  its  front. 

The  battalion  of  the  Third  brigade  already  mentioned 
was  halted  in  action  on  the  western  slope.  Further  to  the  right 
the  Third  battalion  of  the  Second  infantry  was  nearing  the 
northern  part  of  Kriblitz ;  the  skirmish  line  was  about  to  go 
through  the  village,  but  so  far  not  a  shot  had  been  fired  there. 
The  First  battalion  went  to  the  rieht,  the  Second  battalion  to 


iSee  Map  III. 


8o  Studiks  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  ■ 

the  left,  in  company  columns  in  two  echelons,  past  the  Third 
battery.  The  engineer  company  was  behind  the  right  wing 
of  the  detachment.  One  ambulance  company  section  was  halt- 
ed under  cover  220  yards  east  of  the  Third  battery,  while  the 
other  section  was  trying  to  find  a  road  through  the  woods  in 
the  rear  of  the  Fourth  infantry  brigade. 

Nothing  could  now  be  seen  of  the  enemy  on  the  Hopf  en 
Mountain,  while  the  northern  edge  of  the  small  woods  south 
of  Kriblitz  was  strongly  occupied  by  hostile  infantry.  From 
the  trend  of  events  so  far  Lieutenant-General  A be- 
came convinced*  that  the  partial  engagement  of  the  enemy  had 
taken  place  only  to  cover  his  withdrawal.  He  had  no  doubt 
regarding  the  attainment  of  his  immediate  object,  the  open- 
ing of  the  Trautenau  defile;  but  there  was  still  a  possibility 
that  the  situation  might  be  turned  to  further  advantage  bv 
inflicting  serious  losses  on  the  enemy  if  he  should  succeed  in 
impeding  his  flank  march.  This,  however,  could  only  be  ac- 
complished by  his  left  wing,  in  which  case  the  present  reserve 
would  be  abandoned  and  a  new  formation  developed. 

Lieutenant-General  A therefore  gave  the  following 

order  to   Major-General   C ,   who   was   still   with   him : 

"Continue  your  advance  with  the  Fourth  brigade  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  wooded  hill  (425)  northwest  of  Alt-Rognitz  and 
press  the  enemy,  who  appears  to  be  withdrawing.  In  the 
meantime  the  Third  brigade  will  take  possession  of  Trautenau 
and  the  heights  south  of  it."     (9:50.) 

All  aid  was  sent  with  the  following  order  to  the  Third 
brigade :  "The  brigade  will  immediately  take  possession  of 
Trautenau  and  the  heights  south  of  that  city,  to  which  point 
the  detachment  under  Colonel  D will  also  be  sent." 

This  officer  was  further  instructed:  "As  soon  as  the  en- 
emy has  evacuated  Trautenau,  the  engineers  should  examine 
the  crossings  over  the  Aupa  at  that  place,  and,  if  necessary,  re- 
establish them.  Then  find  the  cavalry  brigade  and  direct  it 
to  hastily  follow  the  enemy  through  Trautenau  or  west  of  the 
city  in  the  direction  of  Königinhof,  and  at  the  same  time  have 
a  squadron   reconnoiter  the   road  to   Arnau.     Major-General 

L should  be  informed  that  the  detachment  of  Colonel 

D is  no  longer  under  his  command."     rgiqq.) 


Studi£:s  in  TiJi:  LEADING  o^  Troops.  8i 

From  his  position  the  division  commander  could  still  over- 
look the  movements  of  both  brigades.  The  Second  battalion 
of  field  artillery  took  position  behind  Hill  531  and  opened  fire 
on  the  northern  border  of  the  Kribhtz  woods,  regardless  of 
the  infantry  fire  that  there  reached  it.  The  enemy  soon  left 
the  woods  on  the  approach  of  the  right  wing  of  the  Fourth 
infantry  brigade,  but  occupied  the  patch  of  woods  at  the  north- 
western exit  of  Alt-Rognitz  (Hill  425)  as  well  as  the  ground 
along  the  cut  in  the  road  leading  from  there  to  Hohenbruck. 
In  the  Third  infantry  brigade,  the  Second  battalion  of  the 
First  regiment,  which  had  hitherto  been  in  action,  disappeared 
in  the  southern  part  of  the  Kriblitz  ravine,  while  the  Third 
battalion  of  the  Second  infantry  was  engaged  in  ascending 
the  eastern  slope  of  the  Hopfen  Mountain,  the  remaining  two 
battalions  of  the  regiment  following  at  about  650  yards. 

The  artillery  fire  ceased  almost  immediately.  The  lead- 
ing battalions  of  the  Fourth  brigade  (Third  of  the  Third  in- 
fantry and  Third  of  the  Fourth  infantry)  had  sent  out  skir- 
mishers as  soon  as  they  came  up  to  Hill  531.  The  four  other 
battalions  so  far  in  march  had  formed  columns  of  platoons, 
the  regiments  alongside  each  other.  As  soon  as  the  top  line 
of  the  depression  in  the  terrane  between  Alt-Rognitz  and  the 
Kriblitz  woods  (500)  was  reached,  fire  was  opened.  Then 
infantry  appeared,  ascending  the  declivity  on  which  the,  little 
woods  of  Kriblitz  are  situated,  while  parts  of  the  Third  brigade 
had  halted  upon  the  Hopfen  Mountain. 

At  10:25  the  little  hill  near  the  northwestern  exit  of  A!t- 
Rognitz  (425)  had  been  evacuated  by  the  enemy,  and  the  bat- 
talions of  the  Fourth  brigade  disappeared  from  the  division 
commander's  view  as  they  descended  behind  the  'depression 
in  the  terrane  (500).  Accordingly  the  commander  went  for- 
ward toward  the  north  corner  of  Alt-Rognitz,  and  was  met 
en  route  by  his  general  stafif  officer,  who  had  accompanied  the 
advance  of  the  Fourth  brigade,  and  who  reported :  ''The  en- 
emy is  retiring  in  a  southerly  direction.  The  region  in  front 
appeared  to  have  been  occupied  by  2  battalions,  to  cover  his 
march.  Only  a  brief  skirmish  took  place  with  these,  as  they 
withdrew  soon  upon  our  approach  in  the  direction  of  Neu- 
Rognitz,  where  they  were  joined  by  3  to  4  squadrons  of  dra- 
goons and  uhlans.     A  larger  column  was  also  plainly  visible 


82  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

retiring  on  the  highway  toward  Neu-Rognitz,  but  it  has  such 
a  start  now  ihat  it  will  be  difficult  to  inflict  any  injury  upon 
it.  I  have  seen  a  few  of  the  enemy's  dead,  which,  according 
to  their  uniform,  belong  to  their  Twelfth  regiment.  In  all 
probability  we  are  therefore  opposed  by  a  part  of  the  Tentli 
corps." 

At  the  same  time  an  aid  from  the  Third  brigade  brought 
the  following  message :  "The  enemy  has  evacuated  Trauten- 
au  and  is  withdrawing  upon  Hohenbruck.  The  brigade  is 
holding  the  town,  and  is  forming  on  the  heights  south  of  it, 
in  order  to  pursue  the  enemy.  The  bridges  over  the  Aupa  are 
not  damaged." 

This  officer  was  sent  back  with  directions  that  the  bri- 
gade must  await  further  orders  on  the  heights  south  of  Traut- 
enau,  and  that  the  engineer  company  should  attach  itself  to 
the  brigade. 

The  artillery  fire  of  the  enemy  having  commenced  again, 
the  general  proceeded  to  the  little  hill  near  the  northwestern 
exit  of  Alt-Rognitz.  Arriving  there  at  lo  140,  it  was  found  that 
the  view  to  the  west  was  much  limited  by  an  elevation  run- 
ning parallel  with  the  highway.  Hohenbruck  and  the  main 
road  were  almost  entirely  liidden  by  it.  A  better  view  could 
be  had  of  the  country  to  the  south,  for  the  elevation  declined 
in  several  terraces  toward  Alt-Rognitz  and  Rudersdorf.  Dry 
ravines  running  from  a  wooded  elevation  on  one  of  these  ter- 
races (527)  to  the  church  of  St.  Paul  and  St.  John  formed 
two  oblique  undulations  on  this  slope.  Beyond  the  most  dis- 
tant a  group  of  hills  arose,  the  highest  point  of  which  stood 
out,  in  the  far  distance,  beyond  Neu-Rognitz.  Half-way  up 
its  slope  this  village  could  be  seen,  partially  hidden  by  thick- 
ets. On  both  sides  of  it  and  at  the  same  height  an  uninter- 
rupted forest  seemed  to  envelop  the  group  of  hills. 

The  enemy  evidently  intended  to  take  position  again  near 
Neu-Rognitz,  as  it  was  plainly  seen  that  he  was  about  to  oc- 
cupy the  thickets  lying  before  the  village,  through  which  his 
last  infantry  and  cavalry  parties  were  retreating,  and  3  bat- 
teries could  be  seen  at  his  disposal,  standing  under  fire  before 
the  village  between  the  little  thickets. 

On  the  side  of  Lieutenant-Ceneral  A ,  the  leading  bat- 
talions of  the  Fourth  brigade  were  descending  the  northern 


* 


Studie:s  in  the:  Leading  of  Troops.  83 

slope  of  the  hollow  northwest  of  Alt-Rognitz,  while  the  four 
other  battalions  followed  across  the  meadow  in  columns  of 
platoons,  passing  closely  by  the  position  of  the  division  com- 
mander. The  Third  troop  of  the  Third  squadron  accompanied 
the  advance  of  the  Fourth  infantry  brigade  on  its  left  wing. 
The  hussar  regiment  (2>^  squadrons)  tried  to  get  through 
Alt-Rognitz  toward  the  south.  On  Hill  531  the  Second  bat- 
talion of  field  artillery  again  came  into  action,  firing  on  hos- 
tile bodies  that  again  appeared  ascending  to  Neu-Rognitz. 
Toward  the  northwest  several  wooded  peaks  near  by  com- 
pletely obstructed  the  view,  so  that  nothing  could  be  seen  of 
the  Third  brigade. 

Lieutenant-General  A 's  first  act  was  to  issue  the 

following   instructions   to   Major-General    C :      "Take 

a  covered  position  with  your  brigade  on  both  sides  of  this 
height  (425).  At  the  same  time  secure  your  left  flank  by 
occupying  the  nearest  farm-buildings."     (10:45.) 

It  was  clear  to  the  division  commander  that  the  intended 
continuation  of  the  advance  on  Arnau  could  not  be  carried 
out  as  long  as  the  enemy  made  a  stand  near  Neu-Rognitz; 
equally  plain  was  it  that  the  more  time  there  was  allowed  the 
enemy,  the  more  difficult  would  it  become  to  dislodge  him. 
But  more  important  than  either  of  these  considerations  was 
the  fact  that  although  the  Fourth  brigade  was  at  the  com- 
'<  mander's  disposal  for  carrying  out  an  attack,  yet  the  entire 
I  division  was  not  available,   and  that  the   brigade   would   be 
destroyed  in  the  execution  of  an  energetic  attack  before  the 
\  Third  brigade  could  support  it.    Although  he  had  one  brigade 
j  under  his  eye,  he  could  not  see  how  matters  stood  with  the 
i  other.     A  serious  engagement  had  not  yet  taken  place,  but 
1  nevertheless  the  course   of  events  had  widely  separated   the 
I  division   into  three   parts,   and   his   first   concern   must  be   to 
1   reunite    his    command.      It   was    then    a    question    with    him 
1  whether  for  the  time  being  the  attack  should  be   continued, 
or  the  arrival  of  the  other  portions  of  the  corps  and  the  de- 
cision of  the  commanding  general  should  be  awaited. 

For  the  present  he  could  be  satisfied  with  the  secured 
possession  of  the  Trautenau  defile.  The  commanding  general 
might  arrive  at  any  m.oment,  and  it  could  not  be  known  under 
prevailing  conditions  whether  he  intended  to  advance  farther 


84  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

on  the  Königinhof  road  or  establish  himself  firmly  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Aupa  with  his  entire  corps.  If  the  Second 
infantry  division  attacked  the  enemy,  there  would  be  no  other 
alternative  for  the  commanding  general  than  to  lead  the  re- 
mainder of  the  corps  on  the  same  road  to  its  assistance.  Under 
such  circumstances  it  did  not  seem  proper  to  Lieutenant- 
General   A to   anticipate   his   superior's   intentions,    so 

he  determined  to  assemble  his  division  in  such  a  way  that  he 
might  effectually  meet  any  attack  by  the  enemy,  and  also 
utilize  the  ground  for  his  own  advance. 

Accordingly,  at  10:55,  ^^  sent  the  following  written  order 

to  Major-General  B by  two  mounted  riflemen:     ''The 

Third  brigade,  with  the  Fourth  squadron  of  hussars  and  the 
First  battalion  of  artillery,  will  hold  the  highway  and  move 
up  to  the  cut  in  the  Alt-Rognitz-Hohenbruck  road,  taking  up 
a  covered  position  toward  Neu-Rognitz." 

Then  he  sent  the  following  verbal  order  to  the  First  cav- 
alry brigade,  by  an  aid :  ''The  enemy  has  fallen  back  on  Neu- 
Rognitz.  Your  brigade  will  advance  to  the  west  of  the  Trau- 
tenau-Königinhof  highway  and  observe  his  movements." 

He  also  despatched  the  following  written  instructions  to 
the  hussar  regiment,  by  a  mounted  rifleman :  "Your  regiment 
will  watch  the  enemy  to  the  east  of  the  highway,  and  at  the 
same  time  examine  the  ground  toward  Eypel." 

The  orders  given  the  Fourth  brigade  were  gradually 
carried  out,  the  two  leading  battalions  moving  back,  under  a 
heavy  artillery  fire,  and  occupying  the  wooded  hill  (425)  as 
well  as  the  adjoining  buildings  in  Alt-Rognitz.  During  this 
retirement  the  Second  battalion  of  field  artillery  attempted 
to  draw  the  fire  of  the  hostile  guns  upon  itself,  the  First  and 
Second  battalion  of  the  Third  infantry  took  position  south- 
west of  Hill  500.  covered  by  a  patch  of  woods,  and  the  First 
and  Second  battalions  of  the  Fourth  infantry  withdrew  from 
the  hostile  fire  by  taking  up  a  position  north  of  Hill  425. 
(11:10.) 

After  the  infantry  had  occupied  their  new  positions,  the 
artillery  on  both  sides  continued  firing,  while  the  division  com- 
mander and  his  staff  returned  to  Hill  500. 

Meanwhile  the  general  staff  ofiiccr  had  inquired  of  the 
nearest  battalions  whether  any  jM-isoners  had  been  taken.    At 


Studies  in  the  Leading  oe  Troops.  85 

length  he  found  some  hostile  infantrymen  who  had  hngered 
behind  on  the  retreat  from  the  KribUtz  woods.  He  reported 
the  result  of  their  examination  to  the  division  commander  as 
follows : 

"According  to  the  statements  of  prisoners,  we  are  con- 
fronted  by   the   First   infantry   brigade   of   the    Tenth   corps, 

under  command  of  Colonel  N .     The  prisoners  belong 

to  the  same  regiment  as  the  dead  already  found,  but  they 
assert  positively  that  the  other  regiment  of  the  brigade  (a 
regiment  of  uhlans)  and  artillery  is  also  present.  They  could 
not  state  how  many  batteries.  Their  brigade  bivouacked  since 
day  before  yesterday  in  a  village  close  to  the  highway,  and 
advanced  to  Trautenau  early  this  morning,  where  they  had 
hardly  arrived  when  the  engagement  commenced.  The  march 
to  Trautenau  had  occupied  only  about  an  hour  and  a  half. 
It  seems  that  the  brigade  therefore  came  from  Praussnitz- 
Kaile. 

"They  cannot  state  where  the  other  brigades  of  the  corps 
are  located.  As  late  as  the  25th  they  marched  with  a  large 
part  of  the  corps  through  Josephstadt,  where  the  brigade  was 
soon  afterwards  detached.  Since  then  they  have  seen  nothing 
of  their  commanding  general.'' 

On  the  whole,  these  statements  confirmed  the  views 
entertained.  The  fact  last  mentioned  might  lead  to  the  as- 
sumption than  on  the  morning  of  that  day  the  corps  must  have 
been  quite  far  away  from  this  brigade.  Had  this  not  been  the 
case  and  had  the  brigade,  as  advance  guard,  been  the  usual 
distance  before  the  corps,  the  commanding  general  would  most 
likely  have  informed  himself  in  person  on  the  27th  regarding 
conditions  at  his  front.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  nevertheless 
strange  that  the  enemy,  who  could  not  have  escaped  noticing 
the  superiority  of  his  opponent,  should  have  again  disposed 
himself  for  action  in  the  immediate  vicinity. 

Yet  these  were  only  assumptions.  It  was  still  possible 
that  the  commanding  general  of  the  Tenth  Austrian  corps 
was  present  with  the  brigade,  though  the  prisoners  had  not 
seen  him.  Various  assertions  were  made,  yet  without  any 
decided  information  being  obtained,  as  to  whether  stronger 
forces  of  the  enemy  were  in  the  neighborhood.  At  all  events, 
it  appeared  necessary  to  advise  corps  headquarters  of  what 


86  Studies  ix  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

had  taken  place,  and  an  aid,  accompanied  by  a  mounted  rifle- 
man, was  accordingly  despatched  with  the  following  inessage : 

2d  Inf.  Division.       Hill  500,  northwest  of  Alt-Rognitz, 

(  .Message  No.  2. )  27,  6,  '66,  11  :  15  a.  m. 

To  the  Headquarters,  ist  Army  Corps: 

In  consequence  of  the  advance  of  this  division  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Aupa,  the  enemy  abandoned  the  position  of 
Trautenau  after  a  slight  action,  and  has  posted  himself  at 
Neu-Rognitz. 

So  far  he  has  shown  the  First  brigade  of  the  Tenth 
corps,  3  batteries,  and  several  squadrons,  which  have  appar- 
ently been  at  Praussnitz-Kaile  since  the  25th ;  nothing  has  as 
yet  been  learned  of  other  forces. 

I  am  assembling  the  division  between  Alt-Rognitz  and 
Hohenbruck,  holding  the  road  to  Königinhof,  and  await  fur- 
ther orders.  A , 

Lieutenant-General. 

Lieutenant-General    A then    directed    his    general 

staff  officer  to  go  to  the  Third  brigade  and  examine  the  coun- 
try along  the  highway  with  regard  to  attack  and  defense,  and 
to  ascertain  from  there  all  he  could  of  the  enemy. 

From  the  chief  surgeon,  who  had  in  the  meantime  come 
lip,  he  received  the  following  report:  "The  losses  worth  men- 
tioning are  only  those  of  the  Second  battalion  of  the  First  in- 
fantry, which  occurred  in  the  attack  on  the  Kriblitz  woods ; 
for  these,  however,  a  dressing  station  established  in  Kriblitz 
is  all  that  is  necessary.  The  small  number  of  wounded  in  the 
PV)urth  brigade  have' for  the  present  been  sent  to  Kriblitz,  as 
well  as  an  ambulance  company  section.  Twenty-one  wagons 
have  so  far  been  rc(|uisitioned  in  Parschnitz  ;  these  are  being 
taken  to  Kriblitz  with  the  field  hospital." 

To  this  the  general  replied:  "I  cannot  yet  tell  whether 
the  engagement  will  assume  greater  dimensions.  Have  the 
field  hospital  and  the  wagons  take  a  covered  position  behind 
the  Kriblitz  woods." 

l-'urther  communication  was  interrupted  by  a  report 
brought  bv  a  non-commissioned  officer  oi  hussars,  from  Major- 

( General    H ,    as    follows:      ''His    Excellency,    the    com- 

niandinj?-  wneral,  has    just   arrived   with   the   Third   brigade." 


Stüdiks  in  THi-:  Leading  of  Troops.  87 

Whereupon  the  division  commander  rode  down  the  west- 
ern slope  of  the  hill,  and,  taking  the  cut  in  the  woods  north 
of  the  Alt-Rognitz-Hohenbruck  road,  accompanied  by  his  staff, 
proceeded  at  a  gallop  to  join  the  commanding  general.  It 
was  now  1 1  130  a.  m.  At  the  same  time  the  leading  portions 
of  the  Third  brigade  could  be  seen  to  occupy  the  thickets  south 
of  the  cut  in  the  road.  The  division  was  therefore  in  position 
to  carry  out  any  dispositions  of  the  commanding  general. 

Time  Consumed  in  Deploying. 

It  was  8:40  when  the  news  of  the  enemy's  advance 
reached  the  division  commander.  Although  the  latter  issued 
his  orders  at  once,  the  entire  division  was  not  deployed  on 
line  with  the  advance  guard  until  9:50,  an  hour  later,  the 
movement  having  naturally  been  delayed  by  the  mountainous 
terrane.  These  figures  show  how  essential  it  is  to  reconnoiter 
the  ground  in  front  for  a  great  distance,  even  for  an  assem- 
bled division. 

The  enemy  did  not  seriously  delay  the  advance,  and  at 
1 1 130  the  division  was  assembled  on  the  Hohenbruck-Alt- 
Rognitz  line,  and  in  possession  of  the  ground  needed  for  the 
debouching  of  the  army  corps  from  the  defile. 

The  detachment  of  Colonel  D and  the  main  body 

of  the  Third  brigade  had  to  pass  over  a  distance  of  about  3 
miles,  and  the  Fourth  brigade  nearly  2i/4  miles,  after  the  de- 
ployment of  the  division  was  effected.    Only  the  four  battalions 

under  Major-General  B and  the  two  leading  battalions 

of  the  Fourth  brigade  executed  a  part  of  this  march  in  bat- 
tle formation,  the  four  others  proceeding  in  columns  of  pla- 
toons, but  roundabout  routes  and  counter-marches  could  not 
have  been  avoided,  even  if  events  had  been  otherwise  or  had 
the  leader  so, wished  it. 

When  it  comes  to  practice,  we  must  discard  the  ideas  of 
the  drill-ground  concerning  movements  of  deployed  masses. 
On  the  drill-ground  a  brigade  can  cover  2^2  miles  in  40  min- 
utes. But  when  the  terrane  loses  the  character  of  a  parade,  it  is 
entirely  different,  and  the  time  needed  increases  with  the  diffi- 
culty of  the  terrane  and  size  of  the  force.  In  this  case,  the  ad- 
vance of  some  separate  bodies  took  half  as  much  time  again. 


88  Studies  in  thk  Leading  oe  Troops. 

and  others  twice  as  much,  as  if  the  ground  had  been  level.  In 
this  case  it  did  not  appear  to  be  necessary  for  the  several  parts 
of  the  first  line  to  maintain  the  same  alignment.  But  had  the 
united  division  advanced  at  once,  with  brigades  formed  beside 
each  other,  much  more  time  would  have  to  be  allowed  for  cov- 
ering the  ground.  And  right  here  we  may  state  that  by  form- 
ing cokimns  of  platoons  too  early  and  soon  afterwards  extend- 
ing them  in  company  columns,  the  commander  of  the  Fourth 
infantry  brigade  rendered  the  advance  of  the  two  leading  bat- 
talions of  his  infantry  regiments  more  difficult;  in  order  to 
facilitate  the  march  and  to  have  his  forces  more  available  for 
later  employment,  it  would  have  been  better  had  he  left  them 
remain  in  colum.n  of  march. 

Imagine  for  an  instant  an  advance  of  deployed  masses  on 
such  ground  as  this.  Here  a  battalion  in  column  of  platoons 
encounters  a  steep  height  or  a  patch  of  woods,  and  has  to  fall 
back  behind  the  other  battalions;  in  another  place  a  deep 
ravine  compels  one  part  of  the  company  column  to  make  a 
detour;  here  a  plateau  permits  an  unhindered  advance,  while 
just  alongside,  in  a  valley  broken  up  by  ditches  and  pools, 
progress  can  be  made  only  with  difficulty.  To  help  pass  these 
obstacles,  an  art  of  troop-leading  is  required.  Often  a  leader 
must  guide  an  entire  column  as  it  changes  direction,  due,  for 
instance,  to  difficulties  in  terrane  or  new  dispositions  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy.  Then  come  movements  to  keep  the  troops 
out  of  the  enemy's  sight,  and  especially  out  of  his  artillery  fire. 
But  if,  actuated  simply  by  a  desire  to  get  at  the  enemy,  the 
leader  pays  no  attention  to  these  matters,  keeping  in  view  only 
the  rapid  advance  of  the  subdivisions  most  favorably  situated, 
then  battalions  of  difl:"erent  regiments  will  soon  come  together 
and  become  mixed  up  either  in  one  place  or  another,  while 
elsewhere  gaps  will  be  created ;  and  instead  of  a  well-ordered 
brigade,  ready  for  any  employment,  we  will  have  a  mass  lack- 
ing in  order  and  consequently  hard  to  lead.  A  good  leader 
must  keep  this  in  mind,  even  though  a  loss  of  time  in  the  case 
of  deployed  l:)rigades  and  divisions  may  result.  In  the  ex- 
tended maneuvering  of  large  masses,  Infantry  Drill  Regula- 
tions prescribe  that  points  of  march  direction  shall  be  desig- 
nated with  ])rccision,  and  preclude  indei-)endent  flank  move- 
ments being  taken  anionc:  the  troops  themselves;  in  cases  of 


1 


Studies  in  the  Leading  o^  Troops.  89 

necessity,  however,  communication  should  be  established  be- 
tween such  parties. 

Especial  value  should  be  placed  on  these  matters  if  it  is 
a  question  of  retreat  with  deployed  masses. 

RESOLUTIONS  O^  THE  DIVISION   COMMANDER. 

When  the  division  had  arrived  at  Parschnitz  and  Lieu- 
tenant -  General   A learned   that   the   bridge  over   the 

Aupa  at  Trautenau  was  barricaded,  he  saw  no  necessity  for 
the  immediate  seizure  of  that  town.  But  as  soon  as  he  was  ap- 
prised of  the  advance  of  a  hostile  force  of  all  arms  on  the 
Trautenau-Königinhof  road,  he  immediately  broke  up  his 
troops  and  made  dispositions  to  gain  possession  of  this  im- 
portant point. 

From  this  it  would  seem  that  the  general  was  rather  in- 
consistent in  his  process  of  reasoning.  If  he  attributed  such 
a  high  degree  of  importance  to  the  occupation  of  Trautenau, 
it  would  have  been  simpler  to  continue  the  march  there  at  once 
and  seize  ground  for  debouching,  than  to  lose  valuable  time 
and  permit  the  enemy  to  bring  up  reinforcements. 

As  we  know,  for  a  moment  the  general  hesitated,  unde- 
cided whether  he  should  go  beyond  the  corps  order  or  simply 
follow  its  letter,  which  stated  that  it  was  important  first  to 
unite  the  corps  at  the  exit  from  the  mountain  passes,  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Aupa.  He  decided  to  pursue  the  latter  course, 
and  so  he  permitted  the  division  to  complete  its  deployment 
for  the  rendezvous. 

It  is  questionable  whether  he  decided  correctly.  For  the 
time  being  his  forces  had  no  further  independent  task;  the 
part  given  him  was  now  performed;  he  had  arrived  at  the 
rendezvous  at  Parschnitz. 

But  let  us  closely  examine  the  corps  order  once  more.  It 
says  positively:  "It  is  of  paramount  importance  that  the 
corps  be  concentrated  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  in  a  posi- 
tion on  the  left  bank  of  the  Aupa  near  Trautenau,  both  flanks 
protected  against  the  sudden  approach  of  hostile  forces."  To 
carry  out  this  intention  the  division  had  done  all  that  was  in 
its  power ;  it  was  in  place.  No  reproach  could  fall  on  its  com- 
mander if  he  awaited,  near  Parschnitz,  the  arrival  of  the  other 


90  Studif.s  in  the  Leading  oe  Troops. 

division  and   further  orders   from  the   commanding  general. 

However,  the  order  referred  to  contained  some  very  im- 
portant intimations  concerning  the  intentions  of  corps  head- 
quarters, in  that  it  stated:  "The  corps  will  unite  there^  and 
halt  two  hours,  except  that  the  First  infantry  brigade  (First 
infantry  division),  designated  as  advance  guard,  will  continue 
the  advance  on  Traut enau  and  occupy  the  city.  The  march 
will  be  resumed  in  one  column  in  the  direction  of  Arnau." 
But  the  First  infantry  brigade,  which  was  to  occupy  Traut- 
enau,  was  not  on  the  spot,  the  column  of  the  right  wing,  as 
learned  from  a  messenger,  having  suffered  some  delay  by  the 
destruction  of  a  bridge,  so  that  the  task  assigned  to  one  of  its 
parts  could  not  be  carried  out. 

Nevertheless,  it  was  intended  by  the  corps  commander  to 
occupy  Trautenau  and  also  to  continue  the  march  beyond  that 

town,  and  Lieutenant-General  A knew  this  to  be  the 

case.  If,  therefore,  he  had  occupied  Trautenau  when  his 
division  arrived  at  Parschnitz  and  failed  to  find  the  First 
division  there,  although  he  certainly  would  have  gone  contrary 
to  the  wording  of  the  orders,  yet  he  would  probably  have  been 
in  accord  with  the  intentions  of  corps  headquarters. 

Thus  in  war  different  measures  may  be  taken,  without 
our  being  able  to  say  that  this  one  is  correct  and  that  one  is 
false.  And  more  frequently  does  it  happen,  as  in  this  case, 
that  although  there  may  be  no  objection  to  one  decision,  yet 
the  other  would  be  the  more  advantageous. 

If  the  corps  order  had  stated  that  the  column  first  issuing 
from  the  mountains  near  Parschnitz  must  seize  Trautenau,  all 
doubt  would  have  been  removed.  But  this  was  not  done.  The 
troops  to  perform  this  task  were  rather  distinctly  designated, 
all  other  dispositions  of  corps  headquarters  were  based  there- 
on, and  what  was  conclusive  for  the  decision  of  Lieutenant- 
General  A was,  that  nothing  had  changed  in  the  gen- 
eral situation  since  the  corps  order  was  issued. 

Tliat  Trautenau  had  been  occupied  had  been  known  for 
several  days,  and  that  it  had  not  since  been  much  reinforced 
could  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  the  advancing  colunm  had 
not  been  met  with  a  single  shot. 

'At  Par.schnitz. 


I 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.                  91 
Under  these  circumstances,  Lieutenant-General  A 


could  hardly  have  been  reproached  for  not  occupying  the 
town.  But  the  situation  assumed  a  different  aspect  when  the 
approach  of  strong  hostile  forces  on  Trautenau  was  confirmed, 
and  it  became  possible  that  the  enemy  would  make  a  strong 
position  of  the  place,  instead  of  merely  an  observation  post. 

It  was  certainly  clear  that  even  if  the  .opponent  should 
not  advance  beyond  Trautenau,  the  division  could  not  continue 
its  rendezvous  near  Parschnitz  with  its  head  only  1,300  yards 
from  the  enemy.  Two  alternatives  were  then  open  to  the 
division  commander,  each  of  which  appeared  equally  justifi- 
able. He  could  either  occupy  a  position  astride  the  Aupa  on 
both  sides  of  the  defile  southwest  of  Parschnitz,  and  thus  cover 
the  debouching  of  the  rest  of  the  corps,  or  he  could  attack  the 
enemy  in  an  effort  to  gain  possession  of  Trautenau.  The 
former  would  be  in  accordance  with  the  expressed  will  of 
corps  headquarters  and  could  incur  no  censure,  the  latter 
would  be  the  bolder  course  and  would  still  be  within  the  pub- 
lished intentions  of  the  corps  commander.  We  must  again  call 
attention  to  the  fact  that  the  corps  intended  to  march  beyond 
Trautenau  in  the  direction  of  Arnau,  and  to  do  so  must  occupy 
Trautenau.  And  the  possession  of  that  town  could  be  bought 
only  the  more  dearly  the  longer  the  enemy  was  allowed  to  es- 
tablish himself  there.  Furthermore,  conditions  under  which 
the  commanding  general  had  issued  his  original  orders  had 
now  changed. 

Instead  of  finding  only  an  observation  post  at  Trautenau, 
it  was  certain  that  its  occupation  would  be  opposed  by  a  still 
larger  body  of  troops.  Under  such  conditions  a  leader  of 
troops  must  consider  whether  a  deviation  from  the  orders 
given  him  is  in  the  interest  of  his  superior's  intentions,  as 
they  are  known  to  him.  In  this  case  such  a  deviation  could  in 
no  wise  be  regarded  as  unjustifiable. 

We   have .  already   discussed   the   conditions   that   led   to 

Lieutenant-General  A 's  decision  as  to  which  bank  of 

the  Aupa  he  should  initiate  the  attack  on.  Inasmuch  as  the 
arrival  of  the  First  infantry  division  was  expected,  he  could 
direct  the  crossing  of  the  Aupa  near  Parschnitz,  and  the  ad- 
vance on  the  right  bank,  with  only  7  companies,  9  squadrons, 
and  18  guns  covering  the  main  road.     If,  however,  he  had 


92  Studies  in  the:  Leading  of  Troops. 

to  depend  on  his  own  forces  to  carry  through  the  engagement, 
lie  would  not  have  dared  to  take  the  mass  of  his  troops  so  far 
from  the  main  road.  On  the  right  bank  of  the  Aupa,  how- 
ever, the  movement  took  an  apparently  unusual  course,  as  the 
two  brigades  of  the  division  (as  yet  relying  wholly  upon  itself) 
gradually  came  up  alongside  of  each  other,  and  thereby  in- 
creased the  front  extension  of  the  division  to  nearly  2  miles.^ 
Such  a  dispersion  is  too  great  for  an  attack,  and  only  peculiar 
conditions  can  eliminate  the  danger  that  is  inherent  in  it. 

In  our  engagements  of  1866,  as  well  as  in  the  campaign 
of  1870-71,  we  certainly  found  divisions  extended  for  greater 
distances  than  in  this  case,  yet  it  can  not  be  asserted  that 
they  were  always  the  result  of  faulty  generalship.  In  1866  the 
superiority  of  our  infantry  equipped  with  breech-loaders  per- 
mitted such  a  course.  In  1870-71,  during  the  period  follow- 
ing the  overthrow  of  the  Imperial  Army,  it  was  justifiable  be- 
cause the  newly  formed  forces  of  the  Republic  were  only  in 
loose  formations,  instituted  under  the  pressure  of  the  moment, 
whose  innate  qualities  made  them  decidely  inferior  to  our 
troops.  Both  of  these  instances,  however,  are  unusual;  in  the 
first  period  of  the  campaign  of  1870  they  were  exceptions,  and 
must  also  be  considered  so  in  future  wars.  We  should  rather 
turn  to  such  conditions  that  always  develop  in  the  case  of 
equally  good  opponents  with  approximately  similar  armament 
and  chiefly  depending  for  success  on  the  destructive  effect  of 
the  magazine  gun. 

In  a  frontal  attack  we  must  therefore  be  prepared  to  suf- 
fer tremendous  losses.  A  few  moments  will  decide  the  fight- 
ing capacity  of  companies  and  battalions,  and  second  and  third 
lines  are  needed  as  reserves,  to  fill  up  the  rapidly  occur- 
ring gaps. 

At  distances  of  less  than  i.ioo  yards,  a  well-led  skirmish 
line  oup^ht  to  be  able  to  disperse  any  column  advancing  with- 
out cover  or  unprotected  by  its  own  skirmishers;  at  distances 
less  than  t,6oo  yards  the  loss  should  be  considerable. 

Unless  well  prepared  and  sufficiently  supported  by  artil- 
lery, a  frontal  attack  on  infantry  in  good  position  nowadays 

iln  brining  troops  Into  aotJon.  as  a  rule,  it  Is  not  admlesible 
to  deploy  two  ])riga(les  -ilonpslde  of  each  other  In  the  case  of  an 
Independent  division;   when,  on  the  contrary,  divisions  are  not  de- 
pendent upon  themselves,  it  can  frequently  be  done. 


I 

I 


Studies  in  tkk  Lkadixg  of  Troops.  93 

has  little  prospect  of  success;  even  a  considerable  superiority 
in  no  wise  guarantees  against  failure.  Nevertheless  the  ad- 
vantage possessed  by  infantry  in  the  assault  is  not  to  be  under- 
estimated, in  that  under  good  discipline  it  may  concentrate  its 
fire  on  a  certain  point  in  the  line  of  defense  and  exert  the  prin- 
cipal pressure  on  places  designated  for  the  final  assault.  A 
well-planned  attack  will  not  expose  closed  troops  to  hostile 
fire  until  the  latter  has  been  subdued  or  at  least  lessened  by 
skirmish  fire.  On  level  ground  the  prospect  of  a  successful 
attack  does  not  rest  upon  rapidity  of  action  or  assumed  spe- 
cial formations  or  upon  definite  rules,  but  it  rests  on  the  plen- 
tiful use  of  numerous  swarms  of  skirmishers,  whose  well- 
conducted  fire  at  mid-range  strikes  the  vital  points  in  the  de- 
fender's line  and  so  subdues  it.  After  that,  closed  bodies  may 
be  ordered  to  the  assault  without  hesitation,  and  then  only  a 
rush,  regardless  of  consequences,  can  lead  to  the  goal. 

Weil-trained  infantry  with  magazine  guns  need  not  fear  a 
frontal  attack  even  on  level  terrane. 

Although  a  threatening  of  flanks  should,  wherever  prac- 
ticable, be  combined  with  a  frontal  attack,  we  should  never 
lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  by  a  deep  formation  alone  can  we 
prevent  the  threatened  falling  to  pieces  of  an  entire  body  of 
troops  in  consequence  of  large  losses. 

The  advantages  of  infantry  fire  are,  however,  greater  on 
the  side  of  the  defense,  and  the  more  skirmishers  the  defense 
can  deploy  the  greater  will  be  the  eflPect  produced  by  their 
inherent  power. 

Even  if  relatively  small  reserves  will,  as  a  rule,  suffice  for 
such  skirmish  lines,  we  must  never  overlook  the  danger  to 
which  the  flanks  ar©  always  exposed.  The  longer  the  line,  the 
greater  is  this  danger.  And  where  the  terrane  or  adjoining 
forces  do  not  furnish  protection,  troops  should  be  placed  in 
echelon  behind  the  threatened  flanks. 

It  can  be  proved  that  in  the  campaign  of  1866,  when  the 
long  lines  of  our  infantry  were  forced  to  fall  back,  their  with- 
drawal was  always  the  efifect  of  a  flank  attack,  or  even  of  a 
threatened  flank  attack  when  reserves  were  no  longer  avail- 
able. In  this  way  the  advance  guard  of  the  Fifth  army  corps 
had  to  fall  back  at  Nachod,  its  right  in  the  woods  of  the  Wen- 
zels hill  being  turned  only  by  i  battalion,  while  frontal  attacks 


94  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

of  very  superior  forces  were  shattered  by  the  effect  of  its 
fire.  In  consequence  of  this,  the  center  of  their  long  Une  was 
also  involved  in  retreat,  and  only  when  the  center  and  right 
wing  were  reinforced  by  fresh  forces  and  were  reunited  in 
a  narrow  space  with  their  flanks  secured,  did  they  succeed 
in  repulsing  the  attack  of  the  superior  opponent  on  the  edge 
of  the  plateau.. 

Near  Trautenau,  however,  the  8  battalions  of  the  Second 
infantry  division  were  not  so  fortunate,  in  a  joint  action 
against  single  bodies  of  the  advance  guard  between  Alt- 
Rognitz  and  Hohenbruck.  Extending  in  a  line  nearly  2  miles 
in  length,  the  mere  threatening  of  the  left  wing,  which  was 
not  supported,  gave  an  impulse  to  retreat,  which  was  grad- 
ually yielded  to  by  other  parts,  and  finally  by  the  right  wing. 
Although  in  this  case  the  ensuing  frontal  attacks  were  re- 
pulsed with  great  steadiness,  yet  the  continued  retreat  brought 
these  masses  in  no  way  together,  but  all  the  further  apart,  and 
the  unprotected  wings  found  no  support. 

We  can  hardly  count  on  the  flank  attack  of  a  hostile  bri- 
gade being  any  longer  brilliantly  repulsed  by  a  few  companies, 
as  was  done  by  the  left  wing  of  Tiimpling's  division  at  Git- 
schin.  Just  as  little  can  we  count  on  being  opposed  again  by 
the  shock  tactics  so  popular  with  the  Austrians  in  1866,  by 
which  single  battalions  can  force  the  withdrawal  of  vastly 
superior  forces. 

Consequently  we  must  depend  all  the  more  on  maneuver- 
ing. But  in  many  instances  such  a  course  is  impracticable. 
Circumstances  may  arise  with  a  corps  or  an  army  that  in  de- 
cisive moments  make  a  frontal  attack  imperative.  In  such 
cases  the  first  line  must  be  followed  by  relatively  strong  re- 
serves, to  make  up  the  huge  losses,  and  this  in  itself  will  re- 
sult in  less  front  extension  and  greater  depth. 

The  defense,  on  the  contrary,  needs  fewer  reserves,  and 
may  thercfon^  occupy  a  m^rc  extended  front.  It  should  be 
well  understood  that  defense  begins  only  when  the  enemy's  at- 
tack assumes  a  definite  direction,  and  that  with  greatly  extend- 
ed lines  it  is  impossible  to  maneuver  (that  is,  to  change  front 
or  shift  troops  about).  What  formations  arc  best  suited  to 
satisfy  the  requirements  of  both  the  attack  and  the  defense 
will  be  considered  in  detail  later  on. 


Studies  in  the  Leading  ©f  Troops.  95 

As  regards  the  case  in  hand,  it  need  only  be  stated  that, 
jor  a  division  taking  the  offensive,  whose  artillery  prepares  the 
attack,  an  extension  of  about  a  mile  is  the  maximum,  if  we  would 
provide  the  attack  ivith  sufficient  power  through  competent  reserves. 
It  is  not  only  almost  impracticable  to  lead  an  entire  force 
when  extended  beyond  that  limit,  but  it  will  be  impossible  to 
gain  sufficient  concentration  in  order  to  develop  the  necessary 
energy  at  decisive  points. 

A  dcploxment  beyond  these  bounds  does  not  appear  suited 
to  carry  through  an  action  the  extent  of  which  canm,t  he  seen  and 
which  as  yet  only  permits  maneuvering. 

The  first  condition,  in  order  to  maneuver,  is  that  the  mass 
of  troops  be  divided  into  organized  and  connected  subdivis- 
ions. Subordinate  commanders  are  then  independently  given 
their  separate  tasks,  while  the  commander-in-chief  sees  that 
the  parts  co-operate  for  the  common  end  in  view. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  the  situation  before  us.  The  advance 
against  the  position  southwest  of  Trautenau  partially  occupied 
by  the  enemy  bore  the  nature  of  a  maneuver.  But  whether  a 
maneuver  shall  be  resorted  to,  always  depends  on  circum- 
stances. In  peace  exercises,  it  should  be  remembered,  we  are 
generally  misled  into  maneuvering,  by  reason  of  the  fact  that 
tliere  the  most  effectual  means  of  leading  (moral  effect)  finds 
no  occasion  for  employment ;  in  practice,  however,  the  thing 
that  is  always  sought  in  the  first  line  is  the  decision  of  arms. 

It  was  noticed  that  the  enemy  was  in  the  act  of  approach- 
ing from  the  direction  of  Königinhof;  it  was  therefore  prob- 
able that  the  road  to  that  town  would  also  be  his  line  of  re- 
treat. After  the  division  commander  had  decided  not  to  give 
liis  opponent  time  to  firmly  establish  himself  at  Trautenau,  he 
had  the  choice  of  two  moves :  first,  to  advance  with  his  main 
body  against  the  line  formed  by  the  Kriblitz  ravine ;  second, 
to  cover  himself  against  this  line,  and,  reaching  out  further 
with  the  rest  of  his  troops,  menace  the  line  of  retreat.  In  the 
first  case  he  rnust  proceed  to  a  direct  attack  on  the  difficult 
position  behind  the  Kriblitz  line.  But  the  terrane  limited  this 
attack  to  the  space  between  the  Aupa  and  the  heights  east  of 
Kriblitz  (554),  nearly  a  mile  in  length,  and  the  division  was 
sufficiently  strong  to  carry  through  the  attack  with  vigor,  and 


96  Stldiks  in  thk  Leading  of  Troops 

in  case  of  a  repulse  tliere  would  be  nothing  to  fear  consider- 
ing its  own  retreat. 

Tn  the  second  case,  on  the  contrary,  the  extension  must 
be  very  great.  Sufficient  force  w^as  not  available  to  make  an 
energetic"  frontal  attack  and  to  employ  any  surplus  in  flank 
n.iovements.  If  the  division  extended  too  far  and  attempted 
I'.,  act  widi  its  left  wing  against  the  line  of  retreat,  it  woul  I 
lun  the  risk  of  being  dispersed  by  an  attack  against  its  own 
center,  or  losing  connection  with  the  other  division  if  the 
.'ittack  should  be  directed  against  its  right  wing.  Uut  if  this 
movement  did  succeed,  it  would  certainly  be  the  quickest  way 
of  accomplishing  the  end  in  view — the  capture  of  Trauterau. 

In  spite  of  these  considerations,  the  division  commander 
nevertheless  chose  to  maneuver,  and  he  can  be  justified  in  his 
choice  only  in  so  far  as  he  considered  the  hostile  force  infe- 
rior. If  he  had  not  been  so  convinced,  prudence  would  have 
demanded  the  frontal  attack  on  the  Kriblitz  line. 

The  danger  incident  to  this  maneuvering  might  certainly 
have  been  lessened  if,  instead  of  putting  the  4  battalions  of 
the  Third  brigade  in  the  center,  he  had  employed  there  the 
Fourth  brigade,  6  battalions  strong.  But  in  this  connection 
the  fact  must  not  he  overlooked,  that  with  lari:;er  bodies  the 
direction  of  attack  is  determined  for  the  most  part  by  the 
direction  of  approach. 

Had  TJeutenant-General  A awaited  the  coming  up 

of  the  Fourth  brigade  to  utilize  it  in  the  center,  precious  time 
would  have  been  lost ;  had  he  tried  to  avoid  this,  an.d  started 
out  at  once  south  of  the  ridge  with  the  Third  brigade,  wliich 
was  on  the  spot,  as  advanced  left  wing,  then  the  enemy  would 
be  likely  to  evacuate  Trautenau  sooner,  and  the  chances  of 
damaging  him  during  retreat  would  be  less. 

r>ut  by  allowing  the  Third  brigade  to  set  out  at  first  to- 
ward the  Kri])litz  ravine,  he  could  hope  by  this  less  danger- 
ous disposition  to  retain  the  enemy  in  his  position,  and  then 
the  interposition  of  the  left  wing  would  have  a  more  decisive 
effect.  These  dispositions  gave  him  this  further  advantage, 
that  if  the  Fourth  brigade  followed  in  the  left  rear  as  t1ank 
echelon,  its  6  battalions  were  for  the  time  being  available  as 
a  reserve.  Should  new  columns  of  the  eneniv  be  observed,  or 
>honld  the  enemy  be  found  stronger  than  at  first  supposed,  the 


I 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  97 

movement  need  not  be  pursued  further  and  the  division  could 
concentrate  much  easier  on  its  threatened  center  than  if  from 
the  start  the  left  wing  had  been  far  advanced  and  come  in  con- 
tact with  the  enemy. 

When  the  enemy  withdrew  in  consequence  of  the  flank 
movement,  the  general  did  not  hesitate  a  moment  about  ad- 
vancing the  Fourth  brigade,  which  had  been  considered  as  re- 
serve. At  least  the  attempt  to  damage  the  opponent  must  be 
made  during  his  flank  march.  Under  these  conditions,  how- 
ever, the  entire  division  would  have  got  out  of  hand  if  the 
Third  brigade  had  not  promptly  received  the  order  to  assem- 
ble and  remain  on  the  heights  south  of  Trautenau  after  ob- 
taining possession  of  them.  Thus,  at  any  rate,  a  new  reserve 
would  soon  be  created. 

As  the  enemy  withdrew  from  the  flanking  movement  in 
time,  the  attempt  of  the  Fourth  brigade  only  resulted  in  bring- 
ing him  to  a  stand  before  Neu-Rognitz.     Lieutenant-General 

A did  not  continue  the  action,  because  he  considered  he 

had  carried  out  the  intentions  of  the  commanding  general,  as 
far  as  they  were  known  to  him,  and  he  did  not  know  whether 
the  bringing  on  of  a  more  extensive  engagement,  which  would 
have  taken  the  corps  out  of  the  direction  assigned  it,  was  in 
accord  with  the  intentions  of  the  commanding  general,  who 
was  expected  to  arrive  at  any  moment. 

He  therefore  preferred,  first  of  all,  to  put  his  force  in 
such  shape  that  it  would  be  ready  for  any  employment.  The 
several  parts  of  the  division  were  brought  closer  together,  so 
that  it  occupied  a  front  of  a  little  over  a  mile. 

This  is  one  of  the  most  essential  points  for  a  leader's  con- 
sideration. We  know  from  experience  in  action,  that  when 
an  important  object  has  been  attained,  there  is  either  a  reck- 
less, impetuous  rush  ahead,  or  a  sort  of  relaxation  in  which 
every  one  remains  on  the  spot  where  he  happens  to  be,  and, 
excited  over  what  has  just  happened,  forgets  to  think  of  what 
remains  to  be  done. 

It  generally  happens  to  be  the  first-mentioned  impulse  that 
a  leader  has  to  curb,  as  was  the  case  with  the  two  leading 
battalions  of  the  Fourth  brigade  ;  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  no 
leader  should  let  himself  become  infected  with  the  spirit  of 
relaxation — lie  must  give   the  impulse  for  rapid  assembling, 


98  Studiks  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

he  cannot  foresee  what  tasks  may  lie  before  him,  and  at  all 
events  his  troops  must  be  so  disposed  that  they  zvill  be  ready 
for  any  contingency. 

The  Division  Commanders  Management  oe  the 
Engagement. 

As  shown  above,  for  nearly  three  hours  the  division  com- 
nmnder  had  comparatively  few  dispositions  to  make,  but  these 
were  of  great  importance.  He  had  scrupulously  refrained 
from  interfering  with  any  details ;  his  orders  invariably  went 
to  the  brigades,  the  commander  of  the  detachment  on  the  Lieb- 
au  highway,  the  commander  of  the  division  cavalry  regiment, 
and  the  commander  of  the  artillery  regiment,  and  concerned 
only  what  afifected  these  leaders  and  the  entire  force  under 
them.  Their  execution  was  left  absolutely  to  the  commanders 
concerned,  and  only  in  one  case  was  an  intended  movement 
checked,  and  an  already  initiated  movement  in  another  case. 

This  was  when  Major-General  B desired  to  occupy  the 

south  edge  of  the  long  straggling  woods  so  as  to  protect  the 
division  (Lieutenant-Getieral  A having  meanwhile  re- 
solved to  assume  the  offensive)  and,  later,  when  the  Fourth 
brigade  advanced  beyond  Alt-Kognitz,  and  the  division  com- 
mander, on  arriving  there,  found  that  the  situation  no  longer 
demanded  a  continuation  of  the  action. 

By  such  a  course  alone  is  it  possible  to  maintain  super- 
vision over  the  whole  and  at  the  same  time  allow  the  indi- 
vidual commanders  that  independence  which  is  so  necessary  to 
correct  leading.  In  war,  however,  such  conduct  meets  zvith 
great  ditficuities. 

First  of  all,  we  must  remember  that  interest  is  involun- 
tarily attracted  l)y  events  close  at  hand  ;  what  takes  place  right 
under  our  eyes  is  of  greatest  moment.  Furthermore,  the 
commander-in-chief  is  anxious  to  assist  such  of  his  troops  as 
are  in  action  and  in  danger,  by  his  own  advice  and  his  own 
deed ;  he  would  like  to  see  even  the  smallest  divisions  of  his 
troops  act  just  as  though  he  himself  were  leading  them.  This 
temptation  is  often  very  strong,  and  few  there  are  who  can 
resist  it.     One  should  ne7>er  Jet  himself  yield  to  if. 

Rut  although  the  division  comtnander  gave  relatively  few 
orders  for  over  two  hours,  yet  the  orders  he  did  give  intimately 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  99 

concerned  the  situation  of  the  whole  army  corps,  and  were 
not  confined  alone  to  what  was  actually  in  sight.  In  order  to 
survey  a  general  situation,  we  must  throw  aside  all  useless 
details.  The  higher  the  leader,  the  more  important  for  the 
whole  is  every  decision  he  is  obliged  to  make.  Movements 
and  evolutions  of  large  masses  of  troops  require  considerable 
time,  and  when  once  started,  it  is  with  great  difficulty  that 
their  direction  is  turned — in  fact,  it  is  impossible  when  contact 
with  the  enemy  has  been  established. 

So  weighty  are  these  decisions  and  consequent  disposi- 
tions of  the  leader,  that  are  conceived  in  time  of  action,  that 
they  claim  all  his  mental  faculties ;  from  him  alone  can  they 
emanate,  and  in  them  his  duty  lies.  But  if  he  allows  him- 
self to  dwell  upon  details,  he  dissipates  his  energies  and  can- 
not focus  them  on  his  work. 

Moreover,  as  a  rule,  such  interference  is  seldom  bene- 
ficial, for  the  plans  of  subordinate  commanders  are  thereby 
crossed.  Every  commander  has  the  right  to  solve  his  prob- 
lems according  to  his  own  ideas,  so  long  as  he  does  not  com- 
mit a  manifest  error,  and  he  may  proceed  to  do  so  in  various 
ways.  Every  one  chooses  that  which  comports  most  nearly 
with  his  character  and  training.  He  -has  been  placed  in  the 
position  he  holds,  in  the  confidence  that  he  will  fulfill  the 
duties  pertaining  to  it;  if  he  does  not,  then  he  should  be  re- 
moved. But  if  is  the  duty  of  the  leader  to  give  the  necessary 
orders  to  his  subordinates  in  an  unmistakable  manner  and  to 
watch  their  execution,  and  interference  should  be  made  only 
when  it  is  clear  that  any  dispositions  are  endangering  the  end 
in  view. 

For  example,  a  regimental  commander  is  commissioned 
to  lead  his  regiment,  and  not  a  battalion  or  company.  If  he 
should  suddenly  appear  at  the  head  of  that  company  which 
has  first  touched  the  enemy,  he  may  forsooth  perform  bril- 
liant deeds,  but  we  can  rest  assured  that  he  will  soon  be 
ignorant  of  what  has  become  of  the  other  parts  of  his  regi- 
ment, which,  as  such,  have  slipped  completely  out  of  his  hand. 
And  to  a  division  commander  it  is  of  less  concern  what  may 
have  become  of  a  company,  than  that  a  regiment  be  conducted, 
as  a  manageable  whole,  in  accordance  with  his  intentions. 


loo  Studies  in  thk  Leading  of  Troops. 

In  decisive  nionicnts,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  different. 
Here  the  time  conies  to  incite  the  troops  to  their  utmost  efforts. 
So  when  the  iinal  dispositions  for  the  guidance  of  the  whofe 
have  been  made,  the  commander  is  free  to  hurry  to  his  most 
advanced  hnes,  where  danger  must  be  met,  and,  as  a  shining 
example,  carry  all  along  with  him.  Such  supreme  moments 
chance  most  frequently  with  the  leader  in  front  of  his  platoon, 
or  the  chief  of  a  company.  The  higher  we  ascend,  the  less 
frequent  they  become,  and  only  very  exceptional  situations 
should  prompt  a  commanding  general  to  such  action.  In  real 
work  the  tasks  of  each  leader  are  not  similar.  With  the  com- 
mander of  a  large  force  they  are  chiefly  these :  he  makes  his 
plans  iviih  due  regard  to  general  conditions ;  he  issues  orders 
to  his  subordinates  in  accordance  therewith;  he  then  follozcs 
the  execution  of  these  orders,  interfering  only  when  his  plans 
have  been  violated  or  not  attained. 

This  sounds  very  simple ;  but  in  practice,  as  has  been  re- 
marked, it  is  quite  difficult.  On  account  of  the  diversity  of 
situations  that  we  meet  in  actual  war,  theory  can  give  us  only 
general  suggestions,  but  no  rules  ;  and  the  training  in  peace' 
exercises  is  efficient  only  when  the  utmost  attention  is  paid 
to  theory,  although  the  necessity  for  this  may  be  not  at  all 
apparent  at  the  time,  since,  from  the  very  nature  of  man  and 
events,  a  commander  is  more  concerned  about  the  deportment 
of  his  troops  during  a  peace  maneuver  than  about  his  own 
training  for  action.  Many  here  are  more  influenced  by  what 
the  critique  is  likely  to  bring  forth  than  by  what  the  enemy 
might  do,  and  many  a  false  movement  is  righted  only  by  the 
leader  ])lacing  himself  in  the  skirmish  fire.  Those  charged 
with  the  conduct  of  maneuvers  can  hardly  give  too  much  at- 
tention in  this  direction.  It  would  certainly  be  a  benefit  if 
commanders  oi  rej^nments  and  brigades  would  start  leading 
their  troops  from  farther  to  the  rear  during  peace  exercises, 
as  must  be  done  in  war  when  an  enemy  is  in  front.  By  so 
doing  .self-restraint  would  be  decidedly  promoted  among  those 
commanders  who  must  often  be  called  upon  to  act  on  their 
own  responsibility  in  the  field.  Infantry  Drill  Regulations 
for  peace  exercises  dwell  with  emphasis  on  the  choice  of  posi- 
tion, and  in  the  case  of  subordinate  commanders  even  pre- 
scri])c  how  one  should  stand  when  giving  orders.     In  peace. 


S'lL'DiKs  IN  THE  Leading  of  Troops.  ioi 

niounted  officers  are  occasionally  required  to  dismount,  at  mid 
and  short  distances,  so  they  may  learn  to*  appreciate  the  diffi- 
culties of  command  and  how  to  overcome  them,  and  also  to 
familiarize  their  men  with  seeing  them  afoot  when  under 
heavy  fire. 

The  Division  Commander's  Choice  of  Position. 

The  choice  of  spot  from  which  to  direct  troops  is  of  espe- 
cial value  to  every  commander.  Here  too  in  war  the  govern- 
ing conditions  differ  for  the  various  degrees  of  leadership. 
The  division  commander  directing  an  engagement  is  guided 
by  other  considerations  than  his  subordinate  brigade  co  n- 
mander,  who  leads  his  regiments  to  the  attack. 

By  wisely  choosing  his  position  a  leader  is  enabled  effect- 
ively to  resist  the  injurious  temptation  to  meddle  with  details. 
For  this  reason  it  is  desirable  that  the  commander  should  not 
be  too  near  the  first  line,  but  yet  at  a  point  where  he  can  over- 
look it,  as  well  as  the  enemy ;  but  in  doing  this  he  should  never 
lose  control  of  his  reserves. 

Accordingly,  when  Lieutenant-General  A had  made 

the  necessary  dispositions  at  Parschnitz,  he  went  forward  up 
to  his  most  advanced  lines,  in  order  to  obtain  personally  an 
idea  of  the  terrane  and  such  movements  of  the  enemy  as  could 
be  seen.  At  the  same  time  he  came  up  with  troops  that  had 
already  been  observing  the  opponent,  and  he  received  from 
their  commanders  explanations  relative  to  points  upon  which 
reports  hitherto  had  left  him  in  doubt.  We  m'lst  insist 
that  no  matter  how  good  any  report  may  be,  it  cannot  orient  a 
commander  as  well  as  his  own  personal  observation,  and  the 
maneuvering  of  large  masses  of  troops  will  afford  all  the  time 
needed  for  that  purpose. 

To  eft'ect  this  reconnaissance  the  division  commander  was 
not  obliged  to  ride  around  very  much.  By  going  to  the  cen- 
tral peak  on  the  wooded  ridge  (Hill  504),  which  was,  more- 
over,   the    easiest    to    reach    and    near    vxdiich    Major-General 

ß was  stationed,  he  hit  upon  the  most  favorable  point 

for  his  survey.  L^pon  the  opinions  he  formed  ihere  he  direct- 
ed the  next  movements.  These  led  the  troops  forward  into 
the  country  divided  by  the  Kriblitz  ridge.     He  accompanied 


I02  Studiks  in  Tnic  Lkadinc,  of  Troops. 

this  advance,  for  by  so  doing  he  could  best  observe  the  sepa- 
rated ])arts  of  the  division  until  he  oould  reach  Hill  531,  a 
point  that  for  the  time  being  afforded  him  a  quite  sufficient 
outlook. 

From  the  latter  hill  he  could  see  into  the  valley  of  the 
Aupa  and  witness  the  movements  of  both  the  Third  and 
Fourth  brigades.  So  he  zvas  able  to  supervise  the  carrying 
out  of  the  movements  ordered,  to  watch  the  enemy  as  far  as 
the  terrane  icould  perinit,  arid  was  posted  where  his  ozi'n 
troops  could  easily  Und  him. 

The  headquarters  flag  should  be  placed  where  it  cannot 
be  seen  by  the  enemy. 

In  observing  the  opponent  the  following  were  the  only 
points  that  were  of  importance :  Is  he  advancing  with  an  in- 
creased force?  Is  he  trying  to  hold  his  position?  or,  Is  he 
withdrawing?  The  details  of  his  movements,  it  is  true,  were 
of  some  importance,  but,  as  a  rule,  only  for  the  foremost  line. 
There  was  no  necessity  to  ascertain  whether  new^  columns  of 
the  enemy  were  approaching;  such  information  is  rarely  ob- 
tainable at  early  stages  of  the  action,  although,  considering  the 
location  of  the  hostile  line  of  retreat  in  this  case,  it  might 
have  been  obtained  had  the  attention  of  the  division  cavalry 
been  directed  to  it. 

The  great  distance  from  which  an  engagement  begins 
makes  it  difficult  to  find  a  position  which  is  both  near  enough 
to  observe  the  enemy  continuously,  and  at  the  same  time  will 
allow  us  to  keep  the  reserves  in  view.  Nevertheless  these  are 
two  conditions  that  the  leader  should  never  disregard ;  the 
care  for  the  one  urges  him  forward,  while  the  other  holds 
liiiii  back  toward  the  rear. 

ilowever,  it  is  impossible  to  properly  coiidiict  an  action 
}!iiless  the  leader  is  fully  ii} formed  with  reference  to  the 
chief  incidents  in  the  visible  movements  of  the  enemy.  Such 
a  question  naturally  arises  more  frequently  with  the  leader 
of  a  (Hxi^ion  than  with  the  leader  of  an  army.  The  greater 
liie  mass  to  be  moved,  the  more  titne  is  there  for  reflectic^n. 
Such  reports  as  arc  received  come  only  from  different 
parts  of  the  battle-field,  where  the  advance  of  a  few  hos- 
tile battalions  is  taken  for  a  general  attack  by  the  oppon- 
ent ;  and,  as  a  rule,  reports  as  to  what  has  been  observed  of 


I 


Studies  in  thk  Leading  of  Troops.  103 

the  enemy  by  those  engaged  in  front  are  received  only  dur- 
ing the  initiation  of  a  combat — if  any  come  later,  they  are 
requests  for  a  support.  Consequently  the  division  commander 
should  personaliv  oversee  the  most  advanced  line.  And  there- 
fore, when  Lieutenant-General  A could  no  longer  ob- 
serve the  action  from  Hill  531,  he  immediately  went  to  Alt- 
Rognitz,  and  even  into  the  first  line  of  his  troops,  in  order  to 
obtain  reliable  information  concerning  the  terrane  and  the 
whereabouts  of  the  enemy. 

When  a  leader  pays  as  close  attention  as  this  to  the  move- 
ments of  the  enemy,  it  follows  as  a  matter  of  course  that  he 
need  not  pay  especial  attention  to  his  oivn  ßghting  line. 

The  continued  observation  of  the  reserves,  however,  is 
not  so  easy.  We  might  assume  that  discipline  would  keep 
the  latter  fully  subject  to  the  will  of  the  commander-in-chief. 
Yet  there  is  a  more  dangerous  enemy  than  the  absence  of  dis- 
cipline, which  any  efficient  commander  is  able  to  forestall — 
and  that  is  misunderstanding  and  accident.  For  the  trans- 
mission of  an  order  three  persons  are  responsible :  first,  the 
commander  who  issues  the  order — he  may  not  express  himself 
distinctly,  may  omit  something  that  to  him  appears  self- 
evident,  or  may  give  a  wrong  name ;  second,  the  bearer,  who 
may  not  hear  correctly  or  may  misunderstand  the  order,  or, 
anxious  to  ride  away,  may  impress  it  upon  his  mind  for  the 
moment,  but  after  he  has  galloped  along  for  a  few  minutes 
the  words  may  assume  a  different  shape  as  he  endeavors  to 
recall  them,  or,  even  if  he  has  retained  their  import,  he  may  ex- 
press them  in  a  manner  peculiar  to  himself,  and  so  change  the 
sense  of  the  whole ;  and  finally,  the  person  to  whom  the  order 
is  addressed,  who  may  misunderstand  or^  not  fully  compre- 
hend it.  Besides  this,  the  transmission  itself  requires  time, 
and  conditions  may  in  the  meanwhile  have  changed.  Field 
Service  Regulations  prescribe  that  whenever  a  verbal  message 
is  given,  the  bearer  of  the  same  should  repeat  it. 

At  the  battle  of  Ligny,  for  example,  when  the  reserves 
of  the  First  and  Second  Prussian  army  corps  were  exhausted, 
the  Third  corps  was  directed  to  send  2  infantry  brigades 
through  Sombreff  and  support  the  center.  l"he  corps  sent 
only  I  brigade  (the  Twelfth),  and  with  orders  to  take  post 
on  the  other  side  of  Sombreff';  while  the  brigade  claims  to 


104  Studies  ix  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

nave  received  orders  to  advance  via  Sombreff  and  take  post 
at  that  village  in  order  to  maintain  communication  zvith  the 
Second  corps.  (4  p.  m. )  If  the  2  brigades  of  the  Third 
corps  had  reached  the  designated  position,  the  French  would 
probably  have  been  unable  to  break  through  the  lines  ;  and  as 
it  was,  however,  all  that  was  available  to  oppose  the  assault 
vvas  cavalry. 

Another  example  from  the  same  period  is  no  less  inter- 
esting. On  the  i8th  of  June,  1815,  Lieutenant-General  von 
Thielemann  found  himself  unable  to  initiate  the  march  ordered, 
from  Wavre  upon  Couture,  on  account  of  obstructed  roads ; 
he  accordingly  resolved  to  deploy  his  corps  on  the  heights 
behind  Wavre.  To  this  end  the  Ninth  brigade,  which  was  still 
south  of  the  creek,  was  directed,  after  crossing  it,  to  occupy 
Wavre  with  2  battalions,  forming  a  reserve  on  the  highway 
with  the  remainder.  When  later  this  reserve  was  needed,  it 
was  not  on  hand.  The  report  of  the  Third  army  corps  refer> 
tc  this  as  follows : 

"After  General  von  Borck'  had  passed  through  the  city,  he 
was  misled  by  a  number  of  minor  accidents  to  march  with  the 
rest  of  his  brigade  upon  Couture,  under  the  impression  that  the 
corps  had  in  the  meantime  gone  there  and  that  he  must  join 
its  rear  in  accordance  with  a  former  order.  Tn  this  way  the 
corps  was  deprived  of  6  ])attalion5,  i  battery,  and  2  squadrons, 
in  a  manner  for  which  no  one  could  account ;  the  line  of  retreat 
led  directly  through  the  center  of  the  position,  and  an  officer 
sent  from  it  was  expressly  told  that  the  general  might  march 
a  short  way  down  the  road  and  post  himself  in  reserve.  It 
was  not  discovered  until  late  that  a  mistake  must  have  oc- 
curred in  posting  the  brigade  ;  but  it  was  never  imagined  that 
it  had  gone  to  Couture,  and  so  no  one  was  sent  there  to  bring 
it  back." 

On  the  (jther  hand,  tiie  rei)ort  of  the  brigade  explains  this 
"luunber  of  minor  accidents"  as  follows: 

"Toward  noon  information  was  received  that  the  enemy  ^ 
was  forcing  back  the  Second  army  corps  upon  Wavre,  and  | 
that  it  would  retreat  throui^h  the  defile,  covered  bv  the  Ninth 

'ConiiiKinding   the  Ninth   brigade. 


Studii:s  in  thj-  Leading  of  Troops.  105 

brigade,  which  was  in  front  of  it.  The  battaUons  were  posted 
accordingly. 

"When  the  rear  guard  of  the  Second  corps  was  nearly 
,  abreast  of  the  Ninth  brigade,  the  written  order  was  received' 
i  directing  that  it  march  to  Couture  via  St.  Lambert,  and  that 
j  it  leave  2  battalions  and  i  squadron  of  the  Ninth  brigade  to 
i  occupy  Wavre  and  defend  the  crossing  of  the  Dyle. 
j  "The  rest  of  the  troops  had  hardly  been  directed  to  take 

!  their  departure,  and  they  were  just  in  motion,  when  a  new 
I  order  was  received,  which  directed  the  covering  of  the  left 
I  flank  of  the  rear  guard  of  the  Second  corps  until  its  retirement 
j  was  completed. 

;  "The   necessary  dispositions   were  made.     The   6  battal- 

ions retreated  on  the  left  side  of  the  city  simultaneously  with 
the  retreat  of  the  Second  corps,  so  that  the  corps  would  not 
obstruct  the  defile. 

"After  the  troops  of  the  Ninth  brigade  had  reached  the 
Brussels  road  on  the  bend  around  the  city,  and  had  taken  post 
there,  the  order  to  continue  the  march  on  the  Brussels  road 
arrived ;  the  order  previously  received  to  go  to  Couture  was 
accordingly  carrierl  out,  and  the  brigade  arrived  at  that  town 
late  in  the  evening." 

In  both  cases  we  notice  a  complete  disappearance  of  the 
reserves,  the  commander  not  having  had  them  immediately 
under  his  eye,  or  at  least  not  having  been  able  to  control  them. 
This  is  a  point  that  a  leader  should  always  keep  in  view  when 
choosing  his  position. 

In  the  case  before  us  Lieutenant-General  A changed 

his  position  but  once  in  an  hour  and  a  half  after  the  fight 
began. 

In  spite  of  our  best  efforts,  a  position  cannot  always  be 
found  from  which  the  entire  fighting  line  can  be  observed.  In 
such  case  the  commander  should  be  where  he  can  at  least  over- 
look the  most  important  part  of  the  field  of  action,  despatch- 
ing to  other  parts  reliable  officers  who  can  see  for  him  and 
keep  him  oriented.  It  is  also  desirable,  when  circumstances 
will  permit,  that  a  position  be  selected  from  which  communi- 
cation with  the  next  higher  authority  may  be  easily  established. 

^Probably   from  headquarters  of  the  Third  army  corps. 


io6  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 


The  Division  Commander's  IMode  oe  Issuing  Orders  and 
Seking  to  Their  Execution. 

W'c  liave  already  discussed  the  issuing  of  an  order.  See- 
ing to  its  execution,  however,  is  quite  another  thing. 

Alost  important  of  all  in  an  order  is  lucidity ;  the  clearer 
it  is,  the  more  remote  is  the  possibility  of  a  misunderstanding. 
Ever  remember  that  it  is  no  easy  matter  to  issue  an  order ;  it 
is  an  art  that  must  be  acquired  and  practiced. 

The  next  thing  is  to  obviate  misapprehension  and  acci-^ 
dent,  to  the  best  of  our  ability.  In  this  the  written  order  has 
the  advantage,  but  in  battle  its  use  is  only  practicable  with 
large  masses,  as  in  the  direction  of  an  army  corps  from  gen- 
eral headquarters — in  short,  only  between  superior  command- 
ers. But  as  the  distance  between  commander  and  subordi- 
nate is  shortened,  the  more  will  the  former  become  personally 
involved  in  the  action,  and  the  more  quickly  must  his  com- 
mands reach  their  destination  ;  and  in  general  this  can  only 
be  done  by  a  verbal  order. 

It  is  a  good  practice  to  inclose  all  written  orders  in  en- 
velopes. Carried  in  the  hand  or  in  the  breast-pocket,  pencil 
writing  is  apt  to  become  illegible.  The  message  card  is  gen- 
erally used  by  headquarters  in  the  field  in  preparing  written 
orders.  Where  official  paper  or  message  cards  are  not  at 
hand,  a  field  postal  card,  a  leaf  from  a  memorandum-book, 
etc.,  will  serve  the  purpose. 

If  orders  are  of  special  importance,  and  the  troops  for 
whom  thev  are  intended  are  at  so  great  a  distance  that  the 
superior  commander  cannot  supervise  their  execution  by  per- 
sonal observation,  it  is  well  to  send  a  second  horseman  with 
the  bearer.  Further,  if  the  country  which  the  dispatch-carrier  ' 
must  traverse  is  made  insecure  by  hostile  patrols,  a  second  or 
third  copy  should  be-  sent,  if  practicable,  on  different  routes. 
In  the  case  of  greater  distances  and  at  night,  officers,  accom- 
panied by  infantrymen  in  wagons,  may  be  advantagcc^usly 
employed. 

In  case  of  verbal  transmission  by  officers,  mounted  mes- 
sengers, orderlies,  and  mounted  men  <m-  cycHsts,  the  carriers 
should  always  repeat  the  message  in  a  loud  voice  before 
ridiiiL'-  off. 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  107 

The  surveillance  of  the  execution  of  an  order  is  not  diffi- 
cult so  long  as  troops  are  under  the  commander's  eye.  The 
situation  changes  when  this  is  not  the  case.  We  can  never 
be  sure  that  a  body  of  troops  in  action  will  send  timely  and 
sufficient  reports,  no  matter  how  positively  this  may  have  been 
enjoined;  the  progress  of  the  fight  usually  absorbs  their  entire 
attention;  the  superior  commander  is  seldom  thought  of,  so 
long  as  he  is  not  on  the  spot.  '  Experience  having  demonstrat- 
ed this  to  be  the  rule,  we  must  do  our  utmost  to  obviate  the 
evil  consequences  which  may  arise  from  it. 

Officers  should  be  sent  to  ascertain  if  directed  move- 
ments have  been  commenced;  if  distances  are  great,  they 
should  be  permanently  attached  to  the  different  detachments 
for  that  purpose,  and  furnished  a  few  mounted  orderlies. 

For  example,  on  July  3,  1866,  strong  reconnaissances  by 
the  Second  Army  toward  the  Aupa  had  been  ordered  by  the 
Prussians,  before  reports  of  the  presence  of  large  hostile  forces 
on  the  Bistritz  were  received.  ()n  the  preceding  day  a  general 
staff  officer  had  accordingly  been  dispatched  from  Miletin  to 
Königinhof  by  the  general  headquarters  to  accompany  the 
reconnaissance. 

When,  on  the  morning  of  the  3d,  orders  were  received 
at  the  headquarters  of  the  Second  x\rmy  to  join  at  once  with 
all  available  forces  the  expected  engagement  of  the  First  Army 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe,  the  following  officers  were  de- 
spatched from  the  commander  of  the  Second  Army's  staff: 
one  to  each  of  the  four  corps  of  the  Second  Army ;  upon  leav- 
ing Königinhof  a  general  staff*  officer  to  the  headquarters  of 
the  commander-in-chief,  to  report  that  the  Second  Army  was 
in  motion  pursuant  to  orders;  also  a  general  staff  officer  to 
the  nearest  division  of  the  First  Army  (Fransecky's),  as  the 
right  of  the  Second  Army  must  seek  to  establish  connec- 
tion there. 

Upon  arriving  at  the  heights  of  Choteboreck,  whence  the 
approach  of  the  Guard  corps  and  the  Fifth  corps  could  be  seen, 
an  officer  was  sent  to  the  First,  and  another  to  the  Sixth  corps, 
to  satisfy  themselves  that  these  corps  were  actually  in  motion, 
and  to  ascertain  where  their  heads  were  located. 

Just  after  they  had  ridden  away,  the  Sixth  corps  was 
seen  opening  the  action  to  the  left  front. 


io8  S'rroiKs  ix  the  Leading  of  Troops. 


During-  the  campaign  of  1870-71  also,  the  comniander-in- 
cliief,  as  well  as  the  commanders  ()f  the  several  corps,  greatly 
appreciated  the  value  of  obtaining-  in  this  manner  timely  and 
full  information  regarding  events  at  places  where  they  them- 
selves could  not  be  present. 

Thus,  on  August  16,  three  general  stafif  officers  happened 
to  be  at  Vionville  and  Mars-la-Tour,  who,  in  view  of  the  jios- 
sibility  of  an  encounter,  had  been  sent  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  15th  from  Herny  to  the  advancing  Third  corps.  In  the 
battle^  of  Gravelotte  and  St.  Privat  two  were  attached  ])y  the 
same  headcjuarters  to  the  Second  Army ;  at  Beaumont  some 
to  the  Third,  as  well  as  to  the  Meuse  Army;  and  again  at 
Sedan  to  the  Aleuse  Army  by  the  commander-in-chief,  and 
also  to  the  Fifth  army  corps,'  which  was  turning  the  other 
wing.  Even  two  officers  from  the  far-distant  headquarters 
of  the  Third  Army  appeared  on  the  battle-field  at  Gravelotte 
during  the  afternoon,  and  returned  thither  at  night,  after  the 
battle  was  ended. 

All  these  general  staff  officers  continually  sent  reports 
during  the  progress  of  the  action,  and  only  returned  when 
the  battle  was  over  and  they  had  informed  themselves  fully 
regarding  the  positions  of  the  various  subdivisions  and  the 
intentions  of  their  commanders  for  the  following  day. 

The  detachments  made  for  the  transmission  of  orders  and 
information  relative  to  the  course  of  the  battle  were  entirely 
independent  from  these  general  staff  officers. 

Messa(;es.  •* 

What  has  been  said  concerning  the  means  of  convoying 
orders  applies  equally  to  that  of  messages. 

Field  Service  Regulations  prescribe  that  all  messages  sent 
by  any  headquarters  or  by  any  officer  shall  each  day  be  num- 
bered in  a  separate  series  for  each  person  who  shall  receive 
them.  When  this  is  done,  a  recipient  is  able  to  determine 
whether  all  messages  have  reached  him,  or  some  have  gone 
astray. 

This  was  not  done  in  the  messages  sent  by  the  recnnnoi- 
tering  detachment  on  June  26,  but  that  no  mischief  resulted 
is  no  reason   for  disregarding  such   measures  of  precaution. 

As  a  general  thing,  advance  forces  cannot  report  too 
much,  while  at  the  same  time  thcv  should  not  fail  to  use  dis- 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  109 

crinnnation  in  doing  so.  In  the  face  of  the  enemy  the  service 
of  spies,  as  a  rule,  proves  ineffective ;  it  is  therefore  the  duty 
of  the  troops  to  furnish  higher  headquarters  with  such  knowl- 
edge concerning  the  enemy  as  is  indispensable,  and  if  neces- 
sary concerning  their  own  movements,  and  to  do  this  in  the 
most  exhaustive  manner. 

We  must  therefore  consider  it  an  error  when  the  divis- 
ion failed  to  advise  corps  headquarters  of  the  arrival  of  the 
Guard  at  Braunau  on  June  26,  as  reported  by  its  recdtonoirer- 
ing  detachment. 

As  regards  Lieutenant-General  A the  question  that 

immediately  concerned  him  was,  "What  messag:e  shall  I  send 
to  my  commanding  general,  who  is  not  also  on  the  spot?" 
We  have  seen  that  he  sent  two  communications — the  first  rela- 
tive to  the  approach  of  the  enemy  and  his  decision  to  resist  him 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  xA-upa,  and  the  second  conveying  in- 
formation that  Trautenau  had  been  seized. 

Although  these  messages,  as  they  were  gotten  up,  con- 
tained suthcient  information  relative  to  the  situation,  the 
division,  nevertheless,  did  too  little  in  this  direction. 

Just  consider  for  a  moment  the  position  of  the  command- 
ing general.  How  anxiously  must  he  have  awaited  further  ad- 
vice after  receipt  of  word  that  half  of  his  corps  was  facing 
the  enemy !  As  soon  as  he  should  arrive  on  the  First  divis- 
ion's battle-ground,  the  conducting  of  the  action  would  d^vo've 
upon  himself ;  he  could  therefore  not  be  advised  too  soon  re- 
garding the  engagement.  Moreover,  if  the  Second  division 
should  be  thrown  back  into  the  mountain  passes  before  the 
First  was  enabled  to  leave  them,  he  would  be  obliged  at  an 
early  moment  to  take  different  measures  than  if  it  had  gained 
ground.  In  the  latter  case,  cavalry  and  artillery  reinforce- 
ments could  be  quickly  brought  up  and  sent  out  in  advance 
of  the  column,  which  was  still  on  the  march;  the  first  case, 
however,  would  forbid  this. 

In  any  event,  it  would  have  been  a  wise  move  on  the  part 
of  the  commanding  general  if  he  himself  had  hastened  to  the 
front  or  sent  forward  a  general  staff  officer  as  soon  as  he 
heard  the  thunder  of  the  cannon. 

In  any  ordinary  situation,  such  as  this  was,  it  is  deemed 
o-bsolutely  necessary  to  furnish  the  superior  commander  not 


iio  Studies  in  the  Lkadixc.  of  Troops. 

on  the  spot  zcith  reports  of  the  state  of  aftairs  at  regular  inter- 
vals, per  Imps  every  half -hour.  Well-inounted  aids  may  most 
advantageously  be  used  for  this  purpose ;  but  their  number 
hardly  suffices  for  ihe  demand.  The  division  cavalry  is  weak- 
ened too  much  by  the  detachment  of  officers,  and  on  such  oc- 
casions it  is  advisable  to  establish  relay  lines,  v^hich  are  mobile  * 
and  can  follow  the  changes  in  position  of  the  commander.  | 
The  First  cavalry  brigade  could  have  furnished  a  platoon  for 
this  purpose  on  June  27.  Wheelmen,  too,  could  have  been 
profitably  used  on  the  macadamized  highway.  | 

The  signal  corps  is  unable  to  help  out  in  such  contingen-  I 
cies,  as  it  requires  from  20  to  30  minutes  to  lay  a  mile  of  tele- 
graph.    Flag  signals,  as  used  by  the  Navy,  are  never  visible 
for  more  than  a  mile;  and  besides,  they  require  cavalrymen 
trained  in  signaling,  who  are  not  available  in  most  cases. 

The  General  Staee  Oeeicer. 

The  one  first  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  the  division 
commander,  and  the  one  who  should  always  be  at  his  side,  is 
the  general  staff  officer.  He  should  relieve  his  general  of  all 
details  in  issuing  orders.  His  special  concern  in  battle  is  to 
aid  his  commander  in  acquiring  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the 
situation,  so  that  he  may  make  judicious  dispositions.  This 
he  cannot  do  unless  he  absents  himself  at  times  from  his  com- 
mander, who  cannot  be  everywhere  and  who  should  change 
liis  station  as  little  as  possible  ;  yet  he  should  never  be  a\\*ay 
more  frequently,  or  remain  away  longer,  than  seems  to  be 
urgently  necessary,  and  such  absence  should  never  be  option- 
al. The  place  of  the  general  staff  officer  is  at  the  side  of  his 
general,  zvhom  he  should  never  leave  except  by  his  order  or 
7\'iih  his  pennissi/^u.  1 

Occasions  for  his  absence  arise  often  enough.  Even  when 
the  fighting  line  is  not  unusually  extended,  the  commander, 
from  his  station  in  the  rear,  can,  as  a  rule,  observe  only  the 
general  trend  of  events.  He  sees  where  the  action  comes  to  a 
f-tandstill,  and  where  it  advances  or  retires,  yet  often  he  is  at 
a  loss  to  know  whv  in  one  place  progress  is  made  and  in  an- 
other the  troops  give  way.  If  he  tried  to  go  everywhere,  he  • 
would  soon  lose  control  of  the  whole. 


L 


Studies  in  the:  Leading  of  Troops.  i  1 1 

Although  the  terrane  may  hide  the  movements  of  part  of 
his  own  or  the  enemy's  forces,  or  reports  that  he  receives  may 
not  be  expHcit  enough  to  enable  him  to  form  a  clear  idea,  yet 
it  will  not  be  wise  for  him  to  leave  his  position,  because  he 
must  keep  the  bulk  of  his  troops  under  his  eye. 

Moreover,  when  a  division  is  advancing  upon  the  enemy, 
there  is  not  time  enough  for  any  one  man  to  survey  the  large 
terrane  it  will  cover.  Troops,  too,  are  awaiting  their  orders. 
Yet  no  proper  disposition  can  be  made  without  at  least  a  gen- 
eral sur^^ey  of  the  ground. 

In  all  such  cases  a  leader  of  a  large  force  needs  someone 
who  can  go  and  see  for  him,  and  on  whose  judgment  he  can 
depend.  This  trust  is  the  general  staff  officer's.  He  can  fill 
his  position  only  when  he  has  been  specially  trained  for  such 
duty.  And  above  all,  he  should,  of  his  own  volition,  he  ever 
intent  on  lessening  his  commander's  work  as  best  he  can. 

The  general  staff  officer  must  not  only  be  able  to  compre- 
hend the  part  that  his  troops  are  to  play  in  the  general  situ- 
ation, but  also  to  correctly  judge  the  several  periods  the 
action  necessitates,  and  the  character  of  the  terrane ;  all  of 
which  demands  the  most  thorough  education.  The  greatest 
difficulty  -he  encounters  lies  in  the  fact  that  in  order  to  judge 
correctly  he  must  always  retain  a  general  grasp  of  the  entire 
situation,  whereas  his  duties  frequently  carry  him  to  places 
from  which  he  can  see  only  a  part.  Therefore  he  should  not 
fail  to  inform  himself  fully  upon  his  return,  of  all  that  has 
happened  during  his  absence. 

As  regards  ihe  example  before  u«,  at  8:50,  while  the 
division  commander  was  engaged  in  issuing  his  orders  near 
Parschnitz,  the  general  staff'  officer  was  instructed  to  recon- 
noiter  the  movements  of  the  approaching  opponents,  and  also 
the  country  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Aupa,  with  a  view  to  an 
attack  by  the  division. 

At  9:32  (42  minutes  later)  he  returned  to  his  commander 
on  Hill  504  (about  a  mile  south  of  the  F^arschnitz  church) 
after  he  had  meanwhile  ridden  to  the  most  advanced  hussars 
scouting  toward  Kriblitz.  When  it  became  impossible  to  ob- 
serve any  longer  from  this  hill  what  was  happening  in  front 
of  the  advancing  Fourth  brigade,  at  about  to  o'clock  he  was 
sent  out  to  the  brigade.    He  returned  with  his  report  at  10:25, 


112  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

only  to  leave  again  at  J  i  :20  to  reconnoiter  the  ground  before 
the  Third  brigade  with  a  view  to  the  possible  continuation  of 
the  advance,  a  region  that  the  commanding  general  could  not 
see  from  his  new  position.  He  had  not  yet  returned  when  the 
division  commander  rode  away. 

In  this  period  of  2>^  hours  (from  8:50  to  11 :20j  Major 

X was  present  with  the  division  staff  83  minutes  and 

absent  6y  minutes,  during  which  time  he  had  ridden  about  7 
miles.  His  absence  had  been  necessary,  for  in  each  case  a 
thoroughly  trained  officer  was  required;  and  as  the  division 
had  only  one  general  staff  officer  who  could  be  so  employed,  it 
was  certainly  very  difficult  for  him  to  keep  himself  informed 
continually  of  the  general  course  of  the  action. 

Experience  teaches  that  it  is  very  desirable  to  attach  to  a 
division  staff  aids  who  have  had  instruction  at  the  war  acad- 
emy and  in  practice  rides.  These  can  very  well  take  the  place 
of  the  general  staff'  officer  in  making  reconnaissances.  It  is 
certainly  not  wise  for  a  division  commander  frequently  to 
send  his  general  staff  officer  away  during  an  engagement,  un- 
less it  cannot  be  prevented.  The  latter  is  familiar  with  his 
plans,  can  assist  him  in  directing  the  action,  and  can  take  his 
place  if  any  accident  should  happen  to  him,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
necessary  to  advise  his  successor  regarding  the  situation.  The 
general  staff  officer  must  make  out  the  report  of  the  engage- 
ment, which  he  can  do  only  provided  he  has  been  constantly 
near  the  one  who  directs  the  action.  Furthermore,  he  must 
see  to  his  commander's  recuperation,  and  keep  away  all  things 
that  would  disturb  him  while  seeking  rest.  Messages  are  con- 
stantly arriving  during  an  action,  and  if  in  writing,  they  must 
be  opened  and  read  in  perfect  composure.  Before  he  can 
read  aloud  a  message  that  has  just  been  brought  in.  he  fre- 
quently has  to  first  sort  over  a  number  of  others  that  have 
accumulated,  as  many  messages  are  unimportant  and.  if  read 
without  examination,  draw  the  commander's  attention  away 
from  the  real  course  of  the  engagement. 

It  is  also  the  duty  of  the  general  staff  officer  to  keep  away 
all  persons  who  have  no  business  at  headquarters,  but  crowd 
around  the  conmiander,  express  their  opinions  in  a  loud  voice, 
and  even  presume  to  give  advice,  or  otherwise  create  disturb- 
ance in  the  staff. 


i 


Studie:s  IN  THE  Leading  o^  Troops.  113 

Under  his  direction  the  senior  aid  makes  the  details  of 
orderly  officers  and  mounted  messages,  and  in  action  observes 
that  order  is  maintained  in  the  subordinate  staff  and  among 
the  led  horses. 

Even  when  the  division  is  not  engaged  his  tasks  are  just 
as  comprehensive. 

We  can  here  study  only  one  period  of  his  activity,  from 
the  time  he  was  first  sent  away  from  Parschnitz  at  8:50  un- 
til he  returned  to  the  division  commander  on  Hill  504  at  9 132. 

From    the    division    commander's    message    to    Colonel 

D ,  the  general  staff  officer  knew,  when  he  left,  that  the 

division  intended  to  cross  the  Aupa  near  Parschnitz  and  ad- 
vance on  the  right  bank  to  the  attack  of  the  enemy  who  was 
reported  to  be  approaching ;  he  also  knew  that  in  the  meantime 

Colonel  D 's  detachment  and  the  First  cavalry  brigade 

must  cover  the  Liebau  highway.  His  orders  were  to  recon- 
noiter  the  enemy  and  the  terrane,  with  a  view  to  an  attack  by 
the  division.  To  accompUsh  this  he  had  relatively  little  tirfte, 
for  it  was  evident  that  the  attack  must  commence  as  soon  as 
the  troops  had  crossed  the  stream.  The  most  exact  and  ex- 
haustive reconnaissance  is  useless  unless  its  results  become 
known  at  the  right  time. 

Under  these  conditions  it  was  necessary  to  reach  a  point 
as  far  in  front  as  possible  and  from  which  a  good  view  could 
be  obtained.  Such  a  point  was  only  to  be  found  south  of  the 
wooded  mountain  ridge.  Then  the  officer  must  communi- 
cate with  the  commanders  farthest  to  the  front,  to  learn  what 

they  had  observed  in  the  meantime.     Major-General  B 

had  already  ridden  forward  to  Hill  531  (nearly  a  mile  north 
of  Alt-Rognitz).  There  the  general  staff  officer  found  him, 
and  the  two  watched  the  hostile  movements  for  a  short  while ; 
then  he  hurried  along  the  Kriblitz  ridge  to  the  troop  of  the 
Fourth  squadron,  scouting  in  front  of  Kriblitz,  whose  leader 
gave  him  some  details  and  pointed  out  the  spot  from  which 
he  could  best  continue  his  observations. 

From  what  the  hussar  officer  told  him,  he  was  convinced 
that  the  enemy  was  not  A^ery  strong,  and  that  he  was  not 
endeavoring  to  advance  beyond  Trautenau,  but  was  establish- 
ing himself  there.  At  the  same  time  he  carefully  examineH 
the  character  of  the  Kriblitz  line,  and  perceived  that  a  frontal 


114  Studies  in  thic  Leading  of  Troops. 

attack  against  it  presented  greater  difficulties  than  an  advance 
south  of  it. 

He  then  became  anxious  to  go  to  the  hussar  regiment  on 
the  left  wing,  to  learn  in  person  what  had  been  seen  there. 
He  also  looked  around  to  see  whether  a  prisoner  had  not  been 
taken  during  contact  with  some  of  the  cavalry  patrols,  from 
whom  he  could  learn  what  hostile  troops  were  in  front,  of 
which  hitherto  no  one  had  any  idea. 

Upon  first  contact  with  an  enemy,  it  is  especially  neces- 
sary to  ascertain  whether  information  previously  gathered 
concerning  his  composition  is  correct.  To  know  this  quickly 
is  of  the  greatest  value  to  the  leader  of  an  army. 

It  was  found  that  no  prisoners  had  been  brought  in,  and 
there  was  no  time  to  continue  the  reconnaissance.  At  any 
rate,  its  main  object  might  be  considered  accomplished.  Major 
X consequently  hurried  back  to  the  division  com- 
mander, whom  he  found  at  9 :32  on  Hill  504.  While  absent 
42  minutes  the  general  staff  officer  had  traveled  nearly  4  miles, 
having  stopped  at  times  to  make  observations  and  at  times  to 
converse  with  others.     When  he  returned,  it  was  found  that 

the  report  sent  by  Major-General  B had  given  better 

information  than  he  was  able  to  bring.  What  he  learned  was 
consequently  of  value  only  as  confirmation,  and  particularly 
with  regard  to  the  character  of  the  terrane. 

The  general  staff  officer  might  possibly  have  been  sent  out 
sooner.  Yet  wc  must  not  forget  that  the  division  had  only  one 
general  staff  officer  assigned  to  it,  whose  duties  were  of  such 
a  manifold  nature  that  his  strength  must  not  be  used  up  by 
what  was  immaterial  or  unnecessary. 

For  instance,  had  he  gone  forward  to  reconnoiter  toward 
Alt-Rognitz  during  the  halt  at  Parschnitz,  and  in  fhe  mean- 
time the  enemy  was  seen  approaching  from  the  west  or  in 
the  valley  from  Raussnitz,  he  would  not  have  been  on  hand 
at  the  important  moment  of  the  initiation  of  the  engagement. 
Only  when  everything  unnecessary  has  been  avoided  will  his 
powers  be  equal  to  his  task,  if  an  emergency  should  demand 
them  regardless  of  consequences. 

His  first  duty  on  returning  to  the  staff  was  to  learn  what 
had  been  rei:)orted  of  the  enemy  during  his  absence,  and  what 
dispositions  had  been  made  among  his  own  troops ;  also  where 


J 


Studies  in  thk  Lejading  of  Troops.  115 

the  various  subdivisions  were  located,  and  to  assure  himself 
that  necessary  details  had  not  been  overlooked  in  making  the 
dispositions. 

He  could  certainly  not  trouble  his  commander  at  that 
important  moment  with  questions,  and  inquiries  of  other  mem- 
bers of  the  staff  could  only  furnish  incomplete  information. 
If,  in  view  of  this  condition,  his  general  does  not  of  his 
own  accord  take  the  trouble  to  inform  him,  the  general  staff 
officer  easily  looses  that  complete  survey  so  necessary  for  him. 

Among  the  details  needing  attention  are  the  providing 
of  vehicles  for  the  transport  of  wounded,  arrangement  of 
movements  of  trains  and  prisoners,  sending  reports  to  higher 
headquarters,  and  providing  a  guide  familfar  with  the  country. 

This  last  may  «eem  superfluous,  but  it  certainly  is  not  so. 
Even  when  the  most  minute  maps  are  at  hand,  all  the  sections 
of  a  map  cannot  be  carried  in  the  saddle-bags,  and  the  unex- 
pected course  of  events  may  suddenly  call  for  a  certain  sec- 
tion that  was  left  behind,  there  having  been  no  intimation 
that  it  would  be  needed  until  next  day.  It  thus  happened  in  one 
of  the  superior  staffs  at  Königgrätz,  which  was  well  supplied 
with  map  material,  that  upon  going  on  the  battle-field  not  a 
single  section  of  the  proper  ground  could  be  found. 

However,  even  when  a  complete  map  is  at  hand,  errors 
are  not  impossible.  With  map  in  hand  orientation  can  be  lost 
during  a  rapid  ride,  where  direction  is  often  changed  and  at- 
tention distracted  by  passing  events.  Finally,  with  the  best 
maps,  mistakes  with  regard  to  distant  points,  such  as  church- 
steeples  rising  behind  woods,  are  easily  possible.  The  old 
saying,  "A  guide  tied  to  a  string  is  better  than  the  finest  map," 
is  as  pertinent  to-day  as  ever,  and  it  is  well  to  charge  an  officer 
in  every  staff  with  continual  observation  of  the  country. 

Another  thing:  Exercises  on  the  map  are  not  always 
conducted  in  a  sufficiently  thorough  manner.  In  war  the  value 
of  maps  giving^  general  surveys  needs  no  further  proof,  but 
for  map  studies  such  surveys  and  such  general  information 
is  not  enough.  The  entire  landscape  should  rather  be  men- 
tally pictured,  as  has  been  frequently  attempted  in  the  sketch 
before  us.  When  we  assume  we  have  come  to  a  certain  place 
on  the  map,  we  should  stop  and  ask  ourselves  what  picture 
the  landscape  would  present,  according  to  the  map.     In  this 


ii6  Studies  in  thk  Leading  of  Troops. 

manner  preliminary  exercises  will  become  highly  beneficial  in 
training  us  to  make  proper  dispositions  later  on  when  we  are 
on  the  ground  itself. 

The  Third  Infantry  Brigade  from  8:40  to  11:30. 

We  left  Major-General  B at  7:40,  as  he  returned 

to  the  main  body  of  his  detachment  after  having  reconnoitered 
the  terrane  in  his  front.     His  detachment  consisted  of 
3  battalions,  2d  infantry  regiment, 
23^2   squadrons  of  hussars, 
3d  horse  battery, 
Engineer  company, 
I  ambulance  company  section. 

These  troops  were  on  Hill  290,  south  of  Parschnitz,  their 
most  advanced  subdivision  having  moved  up  to  the  edge  of 
the  woods  toward  the  south.  They  had  stacked  arms,  removed 
packs,  and  rested,  the  cavalry  and  artillery   dismounting. 

The  second  battalion  of  the  First  regiment  was  at  the 
southern  edge  of  the  woods  (near  Hill  504),  with  guns 
stacked  also,  but  not  with  packs  unslung.  Its  Fifth  company, 
sent  forward  to  the  Raussnitz  road,  had  posted  a  platoon  on 
Hill  531  in  front,  and  established  a  non-commissioned  officer's 
post  in  the  direction  of  Raussnitz. 

The  Second  troop  of  the  Fourth  squadron  had  advanced 
toward  Kriblitz,  and  the  Third  troop  of  the  Third  squadron 
toward  the  center  of  Alt-Rognitz.  Shortly  a  message  from 
the  former  brought  the  information  that  it  could  not  get 
beyond  the  ravine,  as  a  larger  body  of  hostile  dragoons  was 
halted  near  the  Hopfen  iVIountain. 

As  this  message  contained  no  new  information,  it  was 
not  forwarded  to  higher  headquarters,  the  presence  of  hostile 
dragoons  at  Trautenau  having  already  been  learned  while 
at  Schömberg. 

To  save  alarming  the  troops,  the  Second  troop  of  the 
Fourth  squadron  was  directed  to  continue  watching  the 
enemy's  cavalry. 

Nothing  further  hai)i)cncd  until  8:28,  when  a  non-com- 
missioned officer  of  hussars,  accompanied  by  a  trooper  of  the 
Third  troop  of  the  Third  squadron,  arrived  and  reported  that 
a  hostile  rnlnnm  of  all  arms  wa«;  on  the  highway  advancing 


I 


Studies  in  thi^:  Leading  of  Troops.  117 

on  Trautenau,  and  that  at  8:10  its  head  was  still  about  two- 
thirds  of  a  mile  south  of  Hohenbruck. 

Alajor-General  B did  not  wish  to  send  such  im- 
portant information  to  the  division  commander  without  fur- 
ther investigation,  but,  as  it  would  take  too  much  time  to 
satisfy  himself  personally  of  its  correctness,  he  had  to  be  con- 
tent with  closely  questioning  the  non-commissioned  officer. 
According  to  the  statement  of  the  latter,  the  Third  troop  of  the 
Third  squadron  had  gone  forward  to  the  nearest  village  (Alt- 
Rognitz)  and  halted  north  of  it.  Shortly  afterwards  great 
clouds  of  dust  were  seen  in  a  village  about  a  mile  away 
(Neu-Rognitz)  through  which  the  highway  passed.  The 
troop  had  accordingly  gone  through  the  former  village  and 
taken  up  a  covered  position  farther  to  the  front,  while  the 
officer  in  command  of  the  troop,  together  with  the  non-com- 
missioned officer  himself,  went  up  to  a  small  wooded  hill  ( 527} 
not  far  from  the  highway  southwest  of  Alt-Rognitz.  From 
that  point  the  enemy's  advance  could  be  watched  from  a 
distance  (in  the  words  of  the  non-commissioned  officer)  of 
*'not  over  a  thousand  paces."  First  a  battalion  in  white  coats 
came  out  of  the  village,  followed  by  a  battery.  Then  more 
clouds  of  dust  were  seen,  when  suddenly  a  squadron  of  uhlans 
dashed  from  the  side  of  the  village  against  the  hussars,  forc- 
ing the  Third  troop  to  retreat,  and  they  had  not  yet  come  to 
a  halt  when  the  officer  directed  him  to  ride  on  in  advance  as 
fast  as  he  could  to  Major-General   B . 

With  this  statement,  there  could  be  no  further  doubt  as 
to  the  correctness  of  the  report. 

As  the  horses  of  both  hussars  were  somewhat  exhausted 
on  account  of  their  rapid  ride,  the  general  instructed  an  officer 
of  the  regiment  to  take  the  message  to  the  division  commander, 
and  himself  repaired,  without  having  the  troops  fall  in,  to  the 
infantry  platoon  posted  in  front,  where  a  hussar  sent  from  the 
Second  troop  of  the  Fourth  squadron  met  him  and  handed 
him  the  following  message:  "A  hostile  column  is  marching 
against  Trautenau  on  the  highway  from  Königinhof.  At 
8:30  its  head  reached  Hohenbruck."    . 

From  the  hill  where  the  troop  was  stationed  (531),  by 
looking  between  some  peaks  with  a  good  glass,  the  point 
where  the  houses  of  Hohenbruck  touched  the  highway  could 


ii8  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

be  seen ;  moving  infantry  was  plainly  visible  there,  the  clouds 
of  dust  raised  by  their  march  extending  from  a  point  north  of 
the  village  into  the  woods  in  front  of  Neu-Rognitz.  The 
troops  of  hussars  sent  in  advance  were  also  visible,  in  front  of 
both  Kriblitz  and  Alt-Rognitz. 

To  ascertain  more  closely  the  strength  of  the  enemy 
more  cavalry  was  needed,  and  at  the  same  time  the  general 
thought  it  best,  in  order  to  secure  the  division,  to  occupy  the 
southern  edge  of  the  long  stretch  of  woods  behind  which  the 
main  body  of  the  detachment  was  located.  He  therefore 
despatched  his  aid  at  8:38  to  bring  up  the  hussar  regiment, 
and  to  direct  the  rest  of  his  troops  to  come  up  to  the  southern 
edge  of  the  woods.  At  the  same  time  the  Second  battalion  of 
the  First  regiment  was  directed  to  take  up  a  covered  position 
as  support,  north  of  the  hill  (531)  lying  in  front. 

Report  of  his  intention  to  prepare  to  occupy  the  southern 
edge  of  the  woods  was  sent  to  the  division  commander. 

Meanwhile  the  general  continued  his  observations. 

At  8:50  the  hussar  regiment,  now  only  2^  squadrons 
strong,  came  up  to  him.  Its  commander,  who  had  ridden 
on  ahead,  was  advised  of  the  situation  and  instructed  to 
advance  between  Kriblitz  and  Alt-Rognitz,  in  the  direction 
of  Hohenbruck,  and  ascertain  the  strength  of  the  enemy. 

The  Second  infantry  regiment  began  to  form  on  the  south- 
ern edge  of  the  woods,  the  Third  battalion  in  column  of  pla- 
toons on  its  right  wing,  on  its  left  the  First  and  Second  battal- 
ions, also  in  column  of  platoons,  and  covered  in  the  woods,  and 
the  Third  battery  took  station  behind  the  Third  battalion.  The 
engineer  company  deployed  into  column  of  platoons^  at  the 
side  of  the  Second  battalion. 

Soon  afterward  the  Third  troo]:)  of  the  Third  squadron 
sent  in  the  following  written  message: 
3d  Troop,  3d  Squadron.  Hill  north  of  Alt-Rognitz, 

Vist  mes.sage.)  27,  6,  '66,  8:54  a.  m. 

As  yet  only  single  baggage-wagons  are  passing  through 
Neu-Rognitz.  At  8:54  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  column  is  only 
a  few  hundred  paces  from  Hohenbruck.  Hostile  uhlans  fap- 
l)arently  4  squadrons)  have  halted  behind  the  thickets  east  of 
the  village. 

iThree  platoons,  of  71  men  each. 


Studies  in  thk  Lkading  of  Troops.  119 

Shortly  after  9  o'clock  a  hostile  battery  was  seen  on  the 
Hopfen  Mountain;  it  opened  fire  on  the  troops  in  the  valley 
toward  Liebau.  At  the  same  time  the  brigade  commander 
noticed  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  column  entering  Hohenbruck. 
The  head  of  the  hussar  regiment  had  reached  the  open  coun- 
try between  Kriblitz  and  Alt-Rognitz,  when  it  was  met  by 
infantry  fire  from  the  thickets  in  front;  it  then  turned  toward 
the  forest  of  Alt-Rognitz. 

Major-General  B returned  to  the  main  body,  to  ar- 
range the  details  for  posting  it,  and  there,  on  Height  504,  he 
met  the  division  commander,  and  reported  what  had  so  far 
occurred.  (9:15.)  The  latter  divulged  his  plan  of  advanc- 
ing on  the  right  bank  of  the  Aupa  against  the  enemy's  flank, 

and  directed  Major-General   B to  take  up  the  march 

toward  KribHtz.     (9:23.) 

The  orders  that  Major-General  B accordingly  gave 

were  as  follows : 

To  the  battery  commander:  "The  brigade  will  attack 
Kriblitz  from  the  north  of  the  projecting  ridge.  Prepare  the 
attack  from  Hill  366.  The  cavalry  you  see  over  there  toward 
Alt-Rognitz  are  our  hussars.  Hostile  dragoons  and  uhlans 
are  east  of  Hohenbruck." 

To  the  commander  of  the  Second  infantry  regiment,  who 
had  heard  the  order  given  the  battery  commander:  "Have 
I  battalion  attack  the  northeastern  corner  of  Kriblitz,  and  the 
Second  battalion  of  the  First  regiment  march  along  the  heights 
in  front  abreast  of  it.  You  will  follow  in  the  direction  of  the 
northern  part  of  Kriblitz  also,  with  the  2  other  battalions,  as 
reserve  and  at  my  disposal.  The  Third  battery  will  prepare 
the  attack.  A  troop  of  hussars  is  watching  the  enemy  in  your 
front." 

To  the  commander  of  the  Second  battalion,  First  regi- 
ment (up  to  whom  he  rode  and  delivered  the  order  in  person)  : 
"The  brigade  wil\  attack  Kriblitz,  the  battery  preparing  the 
attack.  Make  a  right  turn  with  your  battalion,  and  connect 
on  the  right  with  the  leading  battalion  of  the  Third  infantry 
regiment,  in  the  direction  of  the  northeastern  corner  of  Krib- 
litz.    The  Fourth  brigade  will  advance  on  your  left." 

The  engineer  company  and  ambulance  company  were  in- 
structed to  follow  the  Second  regiment. 


20  Studiks  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

Tlie  Third  battery  at  once  sent  scouts  ahead  to  Hill  366 
(east  of  Kriblitz)  and  the  commander,  riding  ahead,  directed 
the  battery  to  follow  in  the  valley  in  column  of  platoons'  at 
a  trot.  When  the  infantry  skirmishers  came  up,  it  took  a 
covered  position  on  the  eastern  slope  of  the  hill,  and  at  9:35 
suddenly  opened  fire  on  the  hostile  artillery  on  the  Hopfen 
Mountain,  at  a  distance  of  a  little  over  a  mile. 

The  commander  of  the  Second  infantry  gave  the  new 
point  of  direction  to  the  Third  battalion,  which  was  on  the 
right  wing,  whereupon  the  battalion  commander  had  the  col- 
umn of  platoons  change  direction  to  the  right  toward  Hill 
366  and  designated  the  Ninth  and  Eleventh  companies  as  first 
line,  which  sent  forward  only  thin  .skirmish  lines,  as  no  hos- 
tile infantry  was  visible.  The  two  other  companies,  with  the 
Tenth  in  echelon  to  the  right,  followed  at  220  yards.  The 
First  and  Second  battalions  followed  the  Third  in  column  of 
platoons  at  a  distance  of  150  yards,  the  former  on  the  right 
and  the  latter  on  the  left. 

The  Second  battalion  of  the  First  regiment,  which  had 
taken  post  south  of  Hill  531  with  the  Eighth  company  under 
cover  and  the  others  at  a  distance  of  100  yards,  had  the  col- 
umn of  platoons  of  each  company  wheel  to  the  right  and 
pushed  its  right  wing  (Sixth  company)  toward  the  Raussnitz- 
Kriblitz  road,  the  rest  of  the  battalion  forming  in  two  lines, 
echeloned  to  the  left,  skirmishers  in  front,  and  connecting  with 
the  Third  battalion  of  the  Second  infantry.  The  commander 
sent  the  mounted  riflemen  to  Hill  554  to  watch  the  enemy. 

At  9:40  the  first  line  of  the  infantry  was  advancing  in 
close  order  on  each  side  of  the  battery.  The  rear  of  the 
brigade  had  left  the  woods  near  Hill  504.  The  heads  of  the 
Fourth  brigade  were  coming  into  the  open  at  the  southern 
edge  of  the  woods. 

The  hostile  artillery  had  replied  with  only  a  few  shots, 
and  had  then  withdrawn,  together  with  the  infantry^  and; 
dragoons  that  had  been   stationed  on  the    llopfen   Mountain. 

The  Second  troop  of  the  Fourth  squadron,  advancing 
through  the  northern  end  of  Kriblitz,  tried  to  gain  informa- 

'Three  platoons. 

2Rf»f'onnoitore(l  by  the  general  staff  officer  of  the  division,  and 
therefore  not  further  reported  by  the  Third  infantry  brigade. 


Studie:s  in  the  Leading  oi?  Troops.  121 

tion  as  to  the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy ;  they  had  to  proceed 
with  caution,  however,  as  single  dragoons  stiU  appeared  be- 
hind the  projecting  hills,  and  it  was  not  yet  known  whether 
Trautenau  was  occupied.  At  the  same  time  skirmishers  from 
the  Third  battalion  of  the  Second  infantry,  having  been  re- 
inforced during  a  short  halt,  were  approaching  the  eastern 
edge  of  Kriblitz.  The  Sixth  and  Eighth  companies  of  the 
First  infantry  had  entered  the  thickets  on  the  declivity  east 
of  the  village,  and  received  a  lively  skirmish  fire  out  of  its 
western  section  on  the  opposite  slope.  In  the  first  excitement 
the  deployed  platoons  (i  from  each  company)  rushed  down 
the  ravine  to  the  attack,  followed  by  the  two  supports.  Order 
among  the  latter  was  somewhat  impaired  on  account  of  the 
difficult  terrane,  but  they  still  formed  a  closed  mass,  upon 
which  the  skirmish  fire  of  the  enemy  made  such  an  impression 
that  the  leaders  ordered  them  to  lie  down.  The  greater  part 
of  the  skirmishers  of  both  companies  reached  the  bottom  of  the 
ravine,  where  they  found  they  could  move  neither  forward 
nor  backward,  and  they  sought  cover  in  the  sunken  road  and 
near-by  buildings.  Their  supports,  deployed  in  the  edge  of 
the  woods,  finally  took  up  the  fire,  and  were  soon  reinforced 
by  the  Seventh  company. 

The  losses  were  not  inconsiderable,  and  a  dressing  station 
was  established  behind  the  thicket,  where,  by  order  of  the  bri- 
gade commander,  several  medical  officers  from  the  Second  reg- 
iment rendered  assistance ;  it  did  not  yet  seem  necessary  to 
bring  the  ambulance  company  section  into  service. 

Major-General  B ordered  the  battalion  commander 

to  desist  from  a  further  advance,  but  to  hold  the  hill  east  of 
Kriblitz.  The  brigade  reserve  (First  and  Second  battalions 
of  the  Second  infantry)  was  directed  to  follow  the  Third 
battalion,  crossing  the  northern  part  of  Kriblitz.  The  same 
direction  of  march  was  given  the  Third  battery,  as  it  was 
impracticable  to  go  into  action  behind  the  Kriblitz  hill  (554) 
under  the  effective  fire  of  the  enemy. 

After  crossing  the  ravine,  the  Third  battalion  detached  the 
Tenth  company  toward  Trautenau  as  right  flank  cover,  and 
with  the  others  fthe  Eleventh  leading)  turned  toward  the 
thicket  occupied  by  the  enemy,  in  order  to  join  in  the  action 
of  the  Second  battalion  of  the  First  infantry.     As  this  move- 


122  Studiks  in  the  Leading  oe  Troops. 

ment  was  in  full  accord  with  his  plans,  the  brigade  com- 
mander allowed  it  to  proceed,  and  repaired  to  the  First  and 
Second  battalions  of  the  Second  infantry,  whose  leading  com- 
panies were  entering  Kriblitz,  after  each  battalion  had  de- 
ployed near  Hill  366  in  two  lines  in  company  columns.  As 
he  rode  down  the  hill  the  brigade  commander  noticed  that 

Colonel  D 's  detachment,  on  the  Liebau  highway,  was 

also  moving  toward  Trautenau. 

In  Kriblitz  the  Second  troop  of  the  Fourth  squadron  re- 
ported that  Trautenau  had  been  evacuated,  but  that  the 
bridges  were  obstructed  by  strong  barricades.  The  general 
accordingly  despatched  the  engineer  company  to  Trautenau, 
with  directions  to  clear  the  crossings  over  the  Aupa.  and  occupy 
and  reconnoiter  the  southern  and  western  exits  of  the  city,  in 
connection  with  the  Tenth  company,  which  had  already  pro- 
ceeded thither.  The  next  moment  (it  was  now  after  10 
o'clock)  the  division  commander's  order  to  seize  Trautenau 
and  the  hill  south  of  it,  and  to  bring  up  Colonel  D 's  de- 
tachment, was  received. 

The  first  had  been  done  already,  and  as  the  aid  who 
brought  the  order  had  yet  to  go  to  the  First  cavalry  brigade, 
he  was  directed  to  give  the  necessary  instructions  at  the  same 
time  to  Colonel  D , 

The  enemy  withdrew  from  the  patch  of  woods  on  the  ap- 
proach of  the  Third  battalion  of  the  Second  regiment,  after 
a  slight  skirmish  with  only  2  platoons  of  the  Eleventh  com- 
pany. On  entering  the  woods  it  encountered  parts  of  the  Sec- 
ond battalion  of  the  First  regiment,  which,  when  they  saw 
the  enemy  was  retreating,  followed  in  pursuit.  These  two 
bodies  were  the  more  certain  of  becoming  mixed  up,  as  the 
Ninth  and  Twelfth  companies  were  also  entering  the  woods. 

About  that  time  Major-General  B ,  with  the  First 

and  Second  battalions  of  the  Second  regiment  and  the  battery 
in  rear,  approached  the  deep  ravine  on  the  northeastern  slope 
of  the  TTopfen  Mountain.  The  troop  of  hussars,  which  was 
now  reduced  to  a  strength  of  t6  by  reason  of  its  having  sent 
patrols  beyond  Trautenau,  was  scouting  on  the  further  side 
of  the  hills  west  of  the  Hopfen  Mountain. 

Colonel  D 's  column  at  t]ie  same  time  suddenly  halt- 
ed in  the  valley,  while  the  cavalry  brigade  trotted  past  it ;  this 


Studies  in  thi:  Le:ading  of  Troops.  123 

delay  was  attributed  to  the  obstruction  of  the  Aupa  crossing. 

Major-General  B then  ordered  the  2  battalions  to 

cease  their  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  and  to  assemble  near  the 
main  body  of  the  brigade,  south  of  the  Hopfen  Mountain. 
It  required  some  time  to  execute  the  order,  as  portions  of 
both  battalions  that  had  become  mixed  in  the  woods  had  fol- 
lowed the  opponent  beyond  the  woods  before  order  was  re- 
established. 

The  commander  conducted  the  main  body  to  Hill  504, 
southeast  of  Trautenau.  On  account  of  the  sunken  road  in 
front,  the  battery  was  forced  to  make  a  detour,  turning  around 
along  the  western  edge  of  the  little  woods  of  Kriblitz,  in  the 
direction  of  Trautenau,  before  making  a  junction  again. 

Before  the  hill  was  ascended  hussars  reported  that  hostile 
infantry  was  marching  off  on  the  highway,  and  that  the  last 
section  had  already  reached  Hohenbruck ;  also  that  a  battalion 
and  several  squadrons  were  retreating  through  the  western 
part  of  the  village. 

This  message  was  forwarded  to  the  division  commander, 
with  additional  information  to  the  effect  that  the  brigade,  hold- 
ing the  city,  was  assembling  south  of  the  Hopfen  Mountain, 
for  the  purpose  of  pursuing  the  enemy. 

At  10:30  the  main  body  of  the  brigade  began  to  arrive  at 
Hill  504,  whence  the  leading  sections  of  the  Fourth  brigade 
were  seen  approaching  Alt-Rognitz.  The  rest  of  the  Second 
troop  of  the  Fourth  squadron  reconnoitered  the  country  up  to 
the  sunken  road  leading  from  that  village  to  Hohenbruck. 
The  Third  battery,  being  necessitated  to  make  a  detour  by  rea- 
son of  the  difficult  terrane,  was  not  able  to  come  up  in  time 
to  fire  upon  the  retreating  enemy  on  the  highway. 

This  was  the  situation  when  word  was  received  from  the 
hussar  patrols  that  had  advanced   farther  to  the   west,   and 

shortly  afterward  from  Colonel  D also,  that  a  column 

of  all  arms  was  approaching  Trautenau  along  the  upper  Aupa, 
whose  point  was  only  }i  of  a  mile  from  the  city. 

The  news  was  extremely  surprising.  Nothing  whatever 
was  known  of  the  presence  of  friendly  bodies  in  that  direction ; 
therefore  they  could  only  be  the  enemy.  Under  these  circum- 
stances the  brigade's  situation  was  a  disagreeable  one,  inas- 
much as  it  would  have  to  change  front  toward  the  west  and 
south,  and  at  the  same  time  occupy  the  city  and  the  hills. 


124  Studif:s  in  the  Leading  of  TRoors. 

However,  before  any  dispositions  were  made,  Major-Gen- 
eral B rode  forward  in  that  direction  to  see  for  himself 

whether  the  report  was  correct.  But  before  he  reached  his 
point  of  observation  his  mind  was  set  at  rest  by  a  second  mes- 
sage from  Colonel  D ,  which  stated  that  the  approach- 
ing body  belonged  to  a  flank  detachment  of  the  First  infantry 
division,  and  that  his  hussars  had  already  established  com- 
munication with  its  dragoons. 

The  general  returned  to  his  brigade,  where,  at  10:50,  he 
was  joined  by  one  of  the  division  commander's  aids,  who 
had  brought  him  instructions  to  halt  on  the  hills  until  further 
orders. 

The  battalions  that  had  been  deployed  near  the  little 
woods  at  Kriblitz  now  began  to  arrive  with  the  main  body. 
Only  the  Tenth  company  was  still  in  Trautenau.  The  Second 
battalion  of  the  First  infantry  posted  itself  at  the  right  of  the 
Second  regiment. 

Soon  afterward  the  head  of  Colonel  D 's  detach- 
ment, coming  through  Trautenau,  also  approached  the  rendez- 
vous, having  moved  off  from  the  farm-buildings  near  the 
Liebau  highway  when  the  brigade  reached  Kriblitz  The  2 
troops  of  the  Fourth  squadron  that  had  pushed  on  ahead  had 
cleared  away  the  barricades  on  the  bridges  before  the  engineer 
company  arrived.  As  the  infantry  did  not  advance  on  the 
highway,  but  to  the  south  of  it,  the  First  cavalry  brigade  was 
able  to  trot  forward  on  the  latter  and  make  use  of  a  wooden 
bridge  to  the  west  of  the  main  bridge. 

At  Ti  o'clock  the  head  of  Colonel  D 's  detachment 

had  arrived  near  the  Third  infantry  briga:le  and  began  to 
draw  up  on  the  right  at  the  side  of  the  Second  regiment,  which 
was  formed  in  double  platoon  column.  The  cavalry  brigade 
formed  column  of  troops^  alongside  the  highway  leading  to 
Arnau,  and  despatched  a  squadron  to  reconnoiter  the  road  to 
that  town. 

At  11:09  the  order  arrived  from  the  division  commander, 
directing  the  Third  infantry  brigade  to  advance  as  far  as  the 
sunken  road  leading  from  Alt-Rognitz  to  ITohcnbruck,  mafn- 
taining  its  hold  on  the  highway,  and  to  occupy  the  hills  south 


n  the  German  Army  a  troop  is  formed  in  two  ranks. 


I 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  125 

of  it.  The  brigade  moved  off  by  wings,  the  regiments  abreast, 
the  Third  battaUons  in  the  first  echelon,  with  the  First  bat- 
taUon  of  field  artillery  to  the  right  where  the  ground  was  bet- 
ter suited  for  its  movement.  Shortly  afterward  Major- 
General  B saw  the  columns  of  the  First  division  near- 

ing  Trautenau  on  the  Liebau  highway. 

At  II  :20  the  corps  commander  came  up  with  the  brigade, 

to  whom  Major-General   B reported   what  had  taken 

place,  also  the  object  of  the  movements  then  in  progress,  and 
at  the  same  time  sent  word  of  his  arrival  to  Lieutenant- 
General  A . 

At  1 1  :30  the  Third  battalion  of  the  First  regiment,  less 
the  Eleventh  company  which  was  posted  near  Raussnitz,  had 
occupied  the  portion  of  Hohenbruck  near  the  highway  with 

2  companies  (one  deployed  and  the  other  in  close  order  behind 
it).  The  Tenth  company  was  on  the  eastern  edge  of  the 
patch  of  woods  situated  to  the  east. 

The  Third  battalion  of  the   Second  regiment,  also  only 

3  companies  strong,  deployed  2  companies,  making  connec- 
tion on  the  left,  the  first  line  stretching  beyond  the  sunken 
road  from  Alt-Rognitz  to  Hohenbruck,  the  last  company  in 
rear  as  reserve.  Both  battalions  had  sent  their  mounted  rifle- 
men to  Hill  527  (southeast  of  Hohenbruck)  to  observe  the 
enemy  near  Neu-Rognitz. 

Further  to  the  rear  at  the  bend  of  the  defile  toward  the 
i  north  were  the  other  battalions,  the  First  regiment  on  the 
I  right,  the  Second  regiment  on  the  left  in  double  platoon  col- 
\  umn,  the  First  battalion  of  field  artillery  on  the  right  near  the 
i  highway,  while  still  to  the  right  the  leader  of  the  Fourth 
!  squadron  was  endeavoring  to  assemble  his  force  as  quickly 
I  as  he  could  by  bringing  up  the  Second  troop  and  various 
I   patrols. 

jl  The   corps   commander   gave    permission    for    the    Tenth 

I   company  of  the  Second  regiment,  which  was  still  in  Traute- 
ij   nau,  and  also  the  company  of  engineers,  to  be  withdrawn. 
i  The  cavalry  brigade,  in  column  of  masses,  occupied  a  cov- 

ered position  behind  a  slight  elevation  north  of  Hohenbruck. 

These  events  with  the  Third  infantry  brigade  permit  of  a 
more  minute  investigation. 


126  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

Its  4  battalions  (together  with  2\'i  squadrons  of  hussars, 
a  battery,  an  engineer  company,  and  an  ambulance  company 
section)  which  had  been  detached  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Aupa,  were  charged  with  the  security  of  the  division  camped 
in  the  valley  of  Parschnitz. 

Its  leader,  a  brigade  commander,  must  make  his  dispo- 
sitions in  such  a  manner  that  the  detachment  could  perform 
its  task  even  if  necessary  to  fight.  Yet  as  the  conditions  would 
depend  upon  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  it  was  impossible 
to  tell  in  advance  whether  the  fight  must  be  carried  on  in  the 
direction  of  Kriblitz  or  Raussnitz,  or  in  both  directions.     All 

that  Major-General  B could  therefore  do  was  to  hold 

the  mass  of  his  troops  in  readiness  to  strike  the  enemy  wher- 
ever he  might  approach. 

To  do  this,  it  was  necessary  to  reconnoiter  in  the  probable 
directions  of  the  enemy's  approach  in  such  manner  that  he 
would  be  promptly  discovered  and  sufficient  time  gained  to  de- 
ploy for  action  in  a  suitable  position ;  at  the  same  time,  the 
position  itself  should  be  reconnoitered  in  advance. 

General  B 's  first  disposition  must  be  governed  by 

these  considerations. 

It  Vv^as  at  once  clear  to  him  that  in  case  of  an  engagement 
the  brigade  must  be  deployed  somewhere  along  the  southern 
edge  of  the  long  stretch  of  woods  in  front.  To  facilitate  ar- 
riving there  at  the  right  moment,  and  at  the  same  time  to  re- 
connoiter, a  battalion  was  pushed  forward  beyond  the  border 
of  the  woods,  while  a  troop  of  hussars  examined  the  country 
in  front  to  the  west,  and  another  troop  to  the  south. 

Even  under  these  conditions  it  was  not  a  matter  of  indif- 
ference which  battalion  was  brought  forward  for  the  per- 
formance of  the  service  of  security.  For  this  task  the  Sec- 
ond battalion  of  the  Fir.st  regiment  was  designated.  By  this 
means  the  entire  Second  regiment  was  kept  together  under 
its  commander,  in  pursuance  of  the  maxim  not  to  divide 
organizations  any  more  than  can  be  helped.  For  instance, 
had  another  battalion  of  the  First  regiment  been  already  on 
the  spot,  it  would  have  been  proper  to  bring  forward  a  battal- 
ion of  the  Second  regiment  instead  ;  by  this  means  the  two 
regimental  commanders,  each  with  two  of  his  battalions,  would 
have  remained  with  the  main  bodv. 


I 


Studies  in  thu  Leading  of  Troops.  127 

li;  is  difficult  to  dispense  with  subordinate  commanders  in 
the  conduct  of  an  action ;  they  certainly  are  of  material  aid. 
When  part  of  an  organization  is  detached,  its  leader  should 

remain  with  its  greater  part.     Thus  Colonel  D was  in 

command  where  at  least  7  companies  of  his   regiment  were 

still  united,  and  General  B also  had  4  battalions  of  his 

brigade  in  hand.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  battalions  of  a 
regiment  are  dispersed  separately  in  different  directions,  there 
remains  nothing  for  its  commander  to  do  but  to  watch  as  a 
spectator.  But  as  he  certainly  does  not  relish  this,  he  attaches 
himself  to  one  of  his  battalions,  which  thereby  acquires  two 
commanders,  and  nothing  is  gained. 

The  principles  here  laid  down  should  never  be  disre- 
garded when  detachments  are  made. 

Another    question    might    be,    Why    was    Major-General 

B content  with  employing  only  2  troops  of  hussars  to 

reconnoiter  the  roads?  It  is  the  duty  of  the  division  cavalry 
regiment  to  perform  all  reconnaissances  for  the  division,  both 
before  and  during  an  engagement,  and  even  at  long  distances 
if  no  other  cavalry  is  present.     Here  there  were  2^   more 

squadrons  at  General  B 's  disposal.      The  only  answer 

is :  A  commander  must  never  forget  that  many  different  pur- 
poses arise  with  the  many  changes  in  the  situation,  and  there 
is  no  rule  applicable  to  all  cases.  A  commander  should  always 
see  how  he  can  accomplish  the  object  before  him  with  the 
least  means.  Now,  had  it  not  been  known  that  hostile  cav- 
alry was  in  the  vicinity,  and  had  the  terrane  which  was  to  be 
reconnoitered  not  been  so  great   (from  the  Kriblitz  valley  to 

the  valley  of  Raussnitz),  Major-General  B could  have 

contented  himself  with  sending  only  an  officer  and  a  few  se- 
lected troopers  in  each  direction. 

The  mistake  is  often  made  of  sending  forward  the  entire 
division  cavalry  regiment  at  once,  even  where  a  few  intelli- 
gent and  daring  riders  could  obtain  a  better  view  and  would 
not  be  so  quickly  discovered.  Such  procedure  is  the  imme- 
diate  ruination  of  the  division  cavalry,  and  sometimes  occurs 
before  the  first  contact  has  taken  place,  nor  will  it  be  on  hand 
if  suddenly  needed  to  scout  in  another  direction.  It  will  sel- 
dom be  the  task  of  the  division  cavalry  to  enter  an  engage- 
ment with  a  view  of  piercing  strong  hostile  cavalry  and  see- 


128  S'lUDItS    [X    TIIK    LKADIXG    OF    TrOOPS. 

ing  what  columns  are  marching  l)ehin(l  it;  it  is  too  weak  for 
this,  although  it  may  reinforce  a  cavalry  division  for  such  pur- 
pose. When  with  an  infantry  division,  it  is  dependent  upon 
itself,  and  must  reconnoiter  before,  during,  and  after  an  en- 
gagement. How  and  when  the  cavalry  of  a  division  should 
take  part  in  an  action  of  the  other  arms  depends  on  the  in- 
clinations and  perceptions  of  its  regimental  and  squadron 
commanders.  Yet  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  cavalry  with 
an  infantry  division  has  other  duties  to  perform  bi^sides 
reconnoitering. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  should  not  demand  too  much  of 
the  small  patrols  mentioned,  which  are  conducted  by  officers 
when  on  important  reconnaissances.  We  cannot  expect  them 
to  rove  alone  far  over  the  country  in  hostile  territory  with  an 
enemy  near  by.  If  they  had  no  cavalry  support  behind  them, 
they  would  be  doomed  to  destruction.  Only  a  considerable 
force  of  cavalry  can  afford  to  push  out  patrols  simultaneously 
on  all  roads  and  in  every  direction,  and  assure  them  the  neces- 
sary security  by  detaching  entire  squadrons  and  by  its  own 
position.  In  such  situations  the  problem  can  be  solved  only 
by  a  larger  mass  of  cavalry,  and  the  extent  and  sphere  of  its 
exploration  is  determined  by  its  strength.  It  can  even  be  ex- 
pected that  large  masses  of  cavalry,  although  at  great  distance 
from  the  main  force,  should  not  seek  to  avoid  engagements 
when  on  reconnaissance  duty. 

Major-General  B sent   forward  only  the  snialle-t 

])Ossible  number  of  horses,  as  it  was  yet  early  in  the  morning 
and  there  was  no  foretelling  wdiat  demands  might  be  made 
on  the  cavalry  during  the  day.  Nevertheless,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  .scouting  on  the  most  extensive  scale  is  always  nec- 
essary, such  ])rocedure  might  not  be  fully  justified,  and  for 
this  the  division  cavalry  should  be  despatched  when  larger 
masses  of  cavalry  are  not  available.  Furthermore,  the  situa- 
tion was  soon  changed  when  the  Second  trooj)  of  the  Fourth 
squadron  reported  that  hostile  dragoons  prevented  its  cross- 
ing the  Kriblitz  ravine. 

It  was  ^lesirable  to  obtain  (|uickly  some  information  re- 
garding conditions  at  Trautenau  :  for  this  ])urpose  the  general 
must  allow  the  remainder  of  the  hussar  regiment  (  J^^  squad- 
rons)   to  go  forward,  and  these  would  probably  be  involved 


I 


Studif.s  in  Tiii^  Leading  of  Troops.  129 

in  a  cavalry  fight.  But  if  such  an  action  occurs  near  troops 
at  rest,  it  is  bound  to  draw  all  into  the  engagement.  The 
bringing  forward  of  the  battery  could  then  hardly  have  been 
avoided,  as  well  as  the  despatching  of  the  leading  battalion  to 
the  support  of  the  hussars  while  another  battalion  took  its 
place.  Äioreover,  if  it  had  been  in  accordance  with  his  inten- 
tions, the  division  commander  would  at  the  start  have  ordered 
the  advance  of  the  hussar  regiment.  And  finally,  the  situation 
was  not  new,  for  the  presence  of  hostile  cavalry  near  Traut- 
enau  was  known  for  a  long  time.  All  these,  however,  were 
only  excuses.  The  main  error  remains,  that  neither  the  divis- 
ion nor  the  brigade  commander  knew  how  to  employ  his  cav- 
alry ;  the  reconnaissance  should  have  been  made  by  the  entire 
3  regiments  of  cavalry  at  hand. 

As  already  stated,  it  would  have  been  perfectly  proper 
to  place  the  hussar  regiment  in  front  of  the  advance  guard 
infantry  during  the  advance  to  Parschnitz,  and  as  soon  as 
Parschnitz  had  been  reached  by  the  advance  guard,  the  cavalry 
brigade  should  have  been  brought  forward  from  the  rear  of 
the  Second  infantry  division. 

Major-General  B failed  to  make  further  disposi- 
tions when  the  presence  of  hostile  dragoons  was  reported  near 
KribHtz.  But  the  entire  situation  changed  when,  at  8 128,  the 
approach  of  a  hostile  column  of  all  arms  was  reported  by  the 
Third  troop  of  the  Third  squadron.  It  was  necessary  to  ad- 
vise the  division  commander  of  this  as  quickly  as  possible,  nor 
must  any  time  be  lost  by  a  personal  corroboration  of  the  re- 
port, desirable  as  this  might  have  been.  But  to  avoid  sending 
forward  anything  that  was  incorrect  and  thereby  creating 
alarm,  the  general  closely  questioned  the  non-commissioned 
officer,  and  then  sent  his  report,  by  an  officer,  to  the  divis- 
ion commander,  while  he  himself  proceeded  to  the  front  to 
reconnoiter. 

As  superior  cavalry  had  driven  in  the  troop  of  the  Third 
squadron  and  prevented  a  closer  inspection  of  the  enemy's 
movements,  all  possible  means  must  now  be  employed  in  order 
to  gain  the  neces.?ary  information;  and  although  the  ground 
in  front  was  broken  and  covered  with  patches  of  woods,  this 
could  only  be  quickly  accomplished  by  the  cavalry. 

Under  these  circumstances  the  division  cavalry  must  re- 
pulse the  cavalry  of  the  enemy,  using  its  whole  force  if  nee- 


130  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

essary.  To  do  this,  it  was  essential  that  the  superior  com- 
mander assemble  at  the  point  of  danger  all  the  cavalry  avail- 
able, and,  if  the  achievement  of  the  immediate  object  in 
view  lay  in  a  forward  movement,  to  see  that  no  part  of  it  was 
held  back  as  reserve.  Accordingly  the  hussar  regiment  was 
brought  to  the  front,  although,  as  it  appears,  the  commander 
did  not  think  of  the  First  cavalry  brigade  with  its  horse  bat- 
tery, when  the  use  of  the  latter  would  have  insured  absolute 
certainty  with  regard  to  the  enemy. 

It  often  happens  upon  such  occasions  that  the  responsible 
commander  is  insufficiently  instructed,  by  reason  of  not  hav- 
ing received  a  definite  order  or  sufficient  information  concern- 
ing the  general  situation  as  far  as  it  affects  him.  But  this 
latter  is  quite  necessary.  Imagine  for  a  moment  that  the  reg- 
imental commander  has  up  to  this  time  had  no  knowledge  of 
the  messages  received,  and  that  from  his  former  position  he 
could  not  obtain  a  good  view  to  his  front ;  suddenly  he  is  con- 
fronted with  an  entirely  new  situation;  he  does  not  know 
whether  the  dimly  seen  scouts  riding  about  a  mile  to  the  front 
are  his  own  hussars  or  hostile  cavalry.  If  at  such  a  great  dis- 
tance friendly  bodies  were  in  his  front,  he  would  have  to  ad- 
vance differently  than  if  he  must  be  prepared  to  encounter  the 
enemy  at  any  moment.  His  order  should  therefore  not  simply 
state  that  the  approach  of  a  hostile  column  of  all  arms  on  the 
Königinhof-Trautenau  highway  had  been  reported,  its  head 
having  just  reached  Hohenbruck,  and  that  he  should  advance 
with  his  regiment  toward  Hohenbruck  to  reconnoiter  more 
closely,  but  it  should  state  in  addition  that  the  mounted  men 
visible  belonged  to  a  troop  of  his  own  regiment  that  had  aT- 
ready  been  sent  in  that  direction. 

Major-General  B should  rather  have  worded  his  in- 
structions thus :  "The  marching  column  you  see  over  there 
is  a  column  of  the  enemy.  It  has  just  entered  Hohenbruck. 
Over  there  to  the  left  front  near  the  next  village,  which  is 
Alt-Rognitz,  a  troop  of  your  regiment  has  watched  the  ad- 
vance, but  has  been  forced  back  by  hostile  dragoons.  The 
scouts  there  belong  to  that  troop.  Go  forward  in  the  same 
direction  and  reconnoiter  the  enemy,  as  \  am  anxous  to  be 
])romptly  informed  as  to  his  strength.  Over  there  on  the 
right  flank,  where  the  deeply  cut  ravine  of  Kriblitz  can  be 


Studiks  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  131 

seen,  is  the  other  troop  of  your  regiment ;  but  it  could  not  ad- 
vance farther  because  superior  hostile  dragoons  are  south  of 
the  ravine.  A  battalion  of  infantry  will  occupy  this  hill  for 
your  support  in  case  of  necessity." 

Of  course  more  time  is  needed  for  giving  such  instruc- 
tions than  for  giving  a  short  order,  but  if  a  commander  goes 
on  in  advance  of  his  regiment,  the  necessary  time  can  be  found. 
At  all  events,  it  is  better  to  lose  a  few  minutes  than  to  lead 
troops  suddenly  into  ground  and  into  a  situation  of  which  they 
cannot  be  expected  to  obtain  a  correct  and  prompt  survey 
themselves. 

The  most  frequent  errors  in  this  connection  are  made  in 
bringing  up  reserves.  Nearly  all  the  reinforcements  brought 
up  at  Ligny  on  the  i6th  of  June,  181 5,  from  the  reserves  of 
the  First  and  Second  Prussian  army  corps,  received  the  order 
to  throw  back  the  enemy.  Thereupon  the  troops  rushed  into 
the  village,  often  when  it  was  absolutely  unnecessary  to  do  so, 
and  always  advanced  farther  beyond  the  edge  of  the  village  on 
the  side  of  the  opponent,  the  only  instructions  being  to  "throw 
back  the  enemy."  In  every  case  this  resulted  in  their  turn- 
ing back  themselves,  so  that  the  enemy  again  entered  the  vil- 
lage on  the  heels  of  the  retreating  Prussians.  But  if  the  va- 
rious comanders  had  known  how  the  battle  had  progressed  be- 
fore they  participated  in  these  rushes,  they  would  probably 
have  made  other  dispositions.  It  would  have  been  better  had 
their  instructions  been,  "Move  up  to  Ligny  and  report  to  Gen- 
eral X ,  who  is  now  in  command  there."    Then  it  would 

have  been  the  duty  of  the  latter  to  instruct  the  various  com- 
manders, and  a  proper  direction  of  the  entire  force,  according 
to  a  uniform  plan,  would  have  been  possible. 

In  case  of  an  unsuccessful  action,  the  support  of  routed 
cavalry  is  always  more  necessary  than  that  of  infantry.  There- 
fore, wherever  possible,  cavalry  will  be  supported  by  infantry. 

For  this  reason  Major-General  B brought  his  leading 

battalion  up  to  the  nearest  covering  hill  (531). 

As  we  have  seen,  upon  receipt  of  the  message  relative  to 
the  approach  of  the  enemy,  Major-General  B rode  for- 
ward to  reconnoiter  in  person.  Before  placing  troops  in  ac- 
tion, the  commander  should  first  see  for  himself,  if  possible. 
Of  course,  with  larger  masses  this  is  not  always  practicable. 


132  Studies  in  thk  Leading  of  Troops. 

else  half  the  day  would  i)e  spent  before  troops  received  their 
march  directions. 

Napoleon  I.  gave  expression  to  the  rule,  "On  s' engage 
ct  puis  on  voit."  But  to  open  an  engagement  in  order  to  see 
is  nowadays  dangerous.  Long-range  fire  inflicts  losses  on  re- 
connoitering  troops  and  gives  rise  to  a  partial  defeat,  while 
the  commander-in-chief,  on  account  of  great  distances,  him- 
self can  see  hut  little.  Modern  ideas  rather  call  for  reconnoit- 
ering  by  cavalry,  officers'  patrols,  and  mounted  riflemen,  and 
with  larger  forces  by  means  of  balloons,  and  in  all  cases  by 
the  use  of  good  field-glasses. 

At  the  same  time  the  hussars  advanced,  the  general 
brought  the  remainder  of  his  force  up  to  the  southern  edge 
of  the  woods.  He  did  not  then  hesitate  a  moment  about  dis- 
turbing their  rest.  As  it  was  possible  that  the  near-by  enemy 
might  soon  advance  to  attack  his  brigade,  the  brigade  must 
be  prepared  for  the  attack.  Such  an  advance  might  first  be 
expected  from  the  direction  of  Kriblitz  or  Hohenbruck.  And 
no  matter  what  position  the  Third  brigade  might  occupy,  the 
ground  about  was  not  in  its  favor,  as  the  terrane  was  wide, 
the  field  of  fire  limited,  and  the  conditions  for  withdrawal  diffi- 
cult. But  in  this,  as  in  many  similar  cases,  the  ground  had 
to  be  accepted  as  it  was,  for  the  general  situation  demanded 
that  there  the  enemy's  attack  be  met. 

If  the  general  had  intended  to  deploy  the  brigade  along 
the  southern  edge  of  the  woods  (509  to  504),  his  choice  of 
position  would  not  have  been  very  fortunate.  The  brigade 
was  not  able  to  occupy  such  an  extended  line ;  there  was  noth- 
ing for  the  flanks  to  rest  upon,  and  no  position  from  which 
artillery  might  cover  them;  it  was  hardly  possible  to  conduct 
the  action,  and.  furthermore,  before  its  center  was  a  command- 
nig  ridge  (554  to  531)  from  which  the  entire  position  could 
he  taken  under  fire. 

Tt  i)robably  would  have  been  better  had  the  brigade  com- 
mander first  occupied  Hill  531  with  the  battery  and  i  or  2 
battalions,  keeping  the  other  battalions  behind  it  in  close  order 
as  reserve.  He  Would  then  have  been  in  a  position  to  give 
i?nmediate  su])port  to  the  defense  of  the  hill,  which  was  not 
unfavorably  situated,  and  could  take  in  flank  any  advance  of 
the   cncniy    wliicli    might   possibly    follow    from    Kriblitz    in    a 


Studiks  in  thk  Leading  oi?  Troops.  133 

northeasterly  direction.  It  was  not  within  his  province  to  ad- 
vance independently  to  the  attack.  From  his  own  standpoint, 
the  dispositions  he  intended  to  make  for  defense  were  the  e- 
fore  perfectly  correct,  and  the  division  commander  could  only 
approve  them,  although  the  latter  at  once  determined  to  pur- 
sue an  entirely  different  course. 

The  directions  given  by  Major-General  B when  is- 
suing his  orders  o  the  brigade  for  its  attack  upon  Kriblitz, 
which  then  followed,  seem  to  be,  in  part,  judicious.  He  left  to 
each  unit  its  full  independence,  his  orders  having  been  direct- 
ed to  the  commander  of  the  Second  infantry  regiment,  to  the 
independent  Second  battalion  of  the  First  infantry  regiment,  to 
the  battery,  to  the  engineer  company,  and  to  the  sanitary  de- 
tachment. At  the  same  time  he  gave  each  subdivision  its  task, 
designated  the  direction  of  march,  provided  for  uniformity 
in  the  advance,  and  oriented  each  part  with  reference  to  ad- 
joining parts  and  with  reference  to  the  hussars  still  in  front. 
It  was  not  necessary  to  tell  the  Second  battalion  of  the  First 
regiment  of  this  last  fact,  as  the  advance  had  been  made  un- 
der its  eyes.  Nevertheless  the  brigade  commander  somewhat 
anticipated  the  action  of  the  battalion  commander,  in  a  correct 
manner,  by  ordering  a  wheel  to  the  right,  by  which  means  the 
battalion  commander  could  at  once  orient  himself  in  the  en- 
tirely new  situation. 

As  regards  the  opening  of  the  attack,  the  battery  com- 
mander was  not  left  with  the  direct  selection  of  the  most  ap- 
propriate position.  The  choice  of  such  position  is  a  very  im- 
portant matter,  upon  which  the  success  of  any  decisive  at- 
tack depends.  It  would  indeed  have  been  rather  ventureso  re 
to  occupy  Hill  366,  as  the  hill  was  only  about  1,400  yards 
from  the  eastern  boundary  of  Kriblitz.  Furthermore,  it  was 
not  simply  the  question  of  an  attack  upon  Kriblitz,  but  a  flank- 
ing of  the  hostile  artillery  upon  the  Hopfen  Mountain.  Hill 
531,  near  which  the  advanced  battalion  was  ])reviously  sta- 
tioned, would  have  been  preferable,  in  that  it  would  bring  the 
battery  out  of  the  infantry  fire.  A  little  more  or  less  than  a 
thousand  yards  does  not  matter  when  guns  are  once  within 
range.  But  Hill  531  offered  an  unfavorable  field  of  fire  on 
Kriblitz  and  the  Hopfen  Mountain ;  besides,  the  battery  would 
soon  lose  connection  with  the  infantry,  and  vvould  remain  en- 


^34 


Studiics  i\  tuk  Lkadixc.  of  Troops. 


lirely  uncovered  in  the  direction  of  Alt-Roi^nitz,  as  the  hus- 
sar regiment  had  been  assigned  a  special  task  and  was  not 
hound  by  consideration  of  the  l)attery.  Moreover,  the  posi- 
tion east  of  Mill  366  seemed  to  be  more  exposed  than  it  really 
was.  A  considerable  force  of  hostile  infantry  could  not  as 
yet  have  been  in  Kriblitz.  If  a  few  companies  did  actually 
direct  their  fire  on  the  half-covered  battery,  sufficient  skir- 
mishers of  the  Third  mfantry  brigade  would  have  been  on 
hand  to  keep  down  their  fire.  The  battery  alone  was  in  a  posi-- 
lion  to  keep  off  the  enemy,  by  using  shrapnel.  It  would  have 
been  wrong  to  go  into  action  at  such  close  range  in  a  planned 
attack  against  a  position  Qccupied  by  the  enemy. 

Two  battalions  were  employed  on  the  first  line,  and  al- 
though the  actual  attack  was  directed  against  Kriblitz,  the 
ridge  along  the  left  flank  could  not  be  ignored ;  for  this  rea- 
son the  orders  issued  to  the  brigade  were  not  entirely  unob- 
jectionable. The  employment  of  2  battalions  at  the  outset  ap- 
pears fully  sufficient ;  nor  can  any  criticism  be  offered  against 
joining  the  Second  battalion  of  the  First  infantry  with  the 
right-wing  battalion  (Third  of  the  Second  infantry),  which 
was  next  to  it  and  which  must  first  take  up  the  new  direction. 
The  common  point  of  march  direction,  however,  was  desig- 
nated too  far  to  the  north.  According  to  it,  the  advance  move- 
inent  of  the  Second  battalion  of  the  First  infantry  would  bare- 
ly touch  the  northern  slope  of  Tlill  554,  and  this  was  hazard- 
ous, as  the  ap])carance  of  hostile  infantry  was  first  to  be  ex- 
pected in  the  southern  part  of  Kriblitz  and  at  the  ravine.  It 
would  have  been  better  to  direct  the  left  wing  of  the  Third  bat- 
talion of  the  Second  regiment  uj-jon  the  center  of  Kriblitz. 
The  two  other  battalions  would  remain  disposable  as  reserves, 
ready  to  be  employed  against  Kriblitz,  or  also,  should  it  be- 
come necessary,  at  Ridge  554. 

On  the  advance  the  brigade  commander  had  to  consider 
the  enemy  a^  well  as  his  own  troops.  1  le  must  see  that  his 
two  leading  battalions  maintained  tlie  direction  of  march  and 
acted  in  concert;  as  for  the  ))attery.  lie  must  see  that  it  was 
in  condition  for  further  use  as  soon  as  it  had  accomplished  the 
first  duty  assigned  it ;  and  lastly  he  must  see  that  the  two  re- 
serve battalions  were  kept  for  their  destined  purpose.  As  re- 
tiards  the  reserve  baltalions.  In-  mr.<t  mU  lose  siHit  of  the  fact 


Studies  in  tke  Leading  of  Troops.  135 

that,  since  they  followed  their  own  Third  battalion,  after  the 
latter  got  under  fire  it  would  have  to  advance  more  slowly, 
whereby  the  distance  to  the  following  battalions  would  become 
less  and  they  would  be  tempted  to  crowd  into  the  first  fight- 
ing line.  At  any  rate,  such  crowding  happened  many  times 
during  our  last  war,  and  often  regimental  commanders  al- 
lowed themselves  to  be  carried  away  in  an  efifort  to  interpose 
the  second  and  third  lines  as  soon  as  the  advance  of  the  first 
line  had  to  slow  up.  Such  a  step  is  justifiable  only  in  case  of 
a  decisive  attack  after  fighting  that  has  lasted  for  some  time 
and  a  superiority  of  fire  has  been  attained.  In  the  brigade 
commander's  order  to  the  commander  of  the  Second  regiment, 
the  injunction  to  "follow  with  the  two  other  battalions  *  *  * 
as  reserve  and  at  my  disposal,"  was  therefore  not  superfluous. 
But  for  all  that,  continual  surveillance  of  the  execution  of  the 
order  was  necessary. 

Which  battalion  of  the  Second  regiment  the  regimental 
commander  should  send  forward  and  in  what  formation  the 
two  battalions  of  the  first  line  should  take  up  the  march,  con- 
cerned only  the  respective  commanders.  The  brigade  com- 
mander had  occasion  to  interfere  only  when  he  discovered  a 
manifest  error,  such  as  a  battalTort  advancing  too  long  in 
close  column  or  failing  to  maintain  the  proper  direction  or 
connections. 

The  first  interference  of  Major-General  B occurred 

when  the  Sixth  and  Eighth  companies  of  the  First  regiment' 
advanced  in  rather  a  reckless  manner ;  it  is  true  this  interfer- 
ence was  somewhat  late,  but  this  may  be  explained  by  the  fact 
that  the  general  remained  with  the  reserve  on  Hill  366  as  long 
as  he  could  overlook  the  fight.  It  was  evident  that  the  Sec- 
ond battalion  of  the  First  infantry  lost  alignment,  else  its  left 
wing  could  not  have  gotten  so  far  in  the  little  woods  east  of 
Kriblitz.  The  mounted  riflemen  called  the  battalion  con- 
mander's  attention  to  the  hostile  infantry  south  of  Kriblitz, 
and  the  battalion  wheeled  toward  the  south  of  its  own  accord. 
No  criticism  could  be  made  against  this,  but  the  battalion 
should  have  reported  the  fact  at  once,  and  under  no  circum- 
stances should  have  permitted  two  of  its  companies  to  cross 
the  ravine  and  make  an  independent  attack.  The  action  de- 
manded independence  of  the  subordinate  leaders  within  their 


136  Stl'diks  in  tiik  Lkadixg  Ol-  Tkoors. 

respective  cominaiuls,  vigilance  regarding  the  enemy,  but  also 
mindfulness  of  the  common  commander  and  the  situation.  The 
commanders  of  the  Sixth  and  Eighth  companies  completely 
disregarded  the  two  last  considerations.  As  it  was  only  in- 
tended to  use  the  Second  battalion  of  the  First  regiment  as 
a  containing  force  after  it  had  encountered  the  enemy,  until 
the  influence  of  the  right  wing  could  be  exerted,  the  order 
was  given  to  the  battalion  commander  to  desist  from  the  at- 
tack. This  order  had  to  emanate  from  the  brigade  com- 
mander; otherwise  there  w^ould  have  been  danger  that  the 
battalion  com:nander  would  seek  only  to  overthrow  the  forces 
opposed  to  him,  and  probably  used  his  entire  unsupported  bat- 
talion for  that  purpose. 

As  the  enemy  did  not  defend  Kriblitz  itself,  the  Third 
battalion  of  the  Second  infantry,  which  was  on  the  right  wing 
and  which  had  crossed  the  ravine,  turned  of  its  own  accord 
against  the  patch  of  woods  still  occupied  by  the  enemy,  bit 
as  that  movement  coincided  with  the  intentions  of  the  brigade 
commander,  he  did  not  interfere. 

Often  movements  of  this  character,  even  when  conducted 
by  subordinate  bodies  of  troops,  happen  to  be  very  decisive  at 
certain  stages  of  the  action,  while  later  disputes  frequently 
arise  as  to  the  party  who  should  receive  the  credit  for  having 
initiated  them.  Without  here  recalling  the  fact  that  credit 
should  not  be  sought  in  the  simple  performance  of  duty,  and 
that  the  degree  of  credit  cannot  be  measured  by  a  foot-rule, 
we  wish  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  the  superior,  even  though 
he  has  not  given  the  order,  remains  responsible  for  all  he  per- 
mits his  subordinates  to  do  under  his  eyes.  If  the  brigade  com- 
mander quietly  approved  this  turn  tow^ard  the  ravine,  it  must 
have  become  evident  to  him  that  his  order  for  attack  rested 
upon  a  false  supposition ;  Kriblitz  was  not  occupied  by  the 
enemy  at  .all.  The  division  commander  too  had  only  ordered 
the  attack  in  the  '"direction  of  Kriblitz."  Tt  would  have  as- 
sumed a  more  simple  and  uniform  plan  had  the  brigade  com- 
mander desiq^nated  a  more  distant  ])oint  of  direction,  even  via 
the  Hopfen  Mountain.  Holding  of  the  edge  of  the  Aui)a  va" lex- 
was  assured  by  the  echeloning  of  2  battalions  behind  the  right 
wing.  By  this  more  judicious  designation  of  the  direction  of 
!narch  it  would  have  been  possible  to  avoid  the  "left  wheel" 


I  Studii<:s  in  thk  Leading  of  Troops.  137 

cf  the  Second  infantry  regiment  in  Kriblitz,  a  movement  that 
:  cannot  be  executed  by  skirmishers  and  deployed  companies, 
'and  which  must  certainly  have  caused  a  troublesome  crowd- 
I  ing  among  the  former.  The  regimental  commander  probably 
i  regretted  that  he  had  allowed  the  First  and  Second  battalions 
;  to  form  company  columns  near  Hill  366.  A  change  of  front 
could  have  been  executed  much  easier  in  column  of  march 
or  column  of  platoons. 

The  brigade  commander's  order  for  the  attack  supposed 
Kriblitz  to  be  occupied  by  the  enemy.  If  the  troop  of  the 
Fourth  squadron  of  hussars  had  made  no  report  q(i  this  mat- 
ter at  the  proper  time,  mounted  riflemen  were  at  bis  disposal 
for  reconnoitering.  Furthermore,  it  would  have  been  advis- 
able for  him  first  to  gallop  to  Hill  366  and  give  his  orders  af- 
ter he  had  obtained  a  good  view  from  that  height.  As  it  was, 
the  entire  movement  turned  out  favorably  in  the  end,  as  the 
enemy  soon  withdrew;  and  although  the  brigade  did  hold  its 
ground,  it  might  have  been  led  into  very  serious  difficulties. 
As  soon  as  the  right  wing  advanced  upon  the  Hopfen 
Mountain,  it  became  necessary  to  obtain  information  relative 
to  conditions  in  Trautenau.  If  this  was  not  done  voluntarily 
by  the  troop  of  hussars  or  the  battalion  on  the  right  wing,  the 
brigade  commander  himself  would  have  to  order  it.  The  send- 
ing of  the  engineer  company  into  the  city  was  certainly  in 
accord  with  the  general  situation,  but   that   fact  was  known 

only  to  Major-General  B ,  and  therefore  the  order  must 

come  from  him. 

Report  of  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  was  sent  to  the  divis- 
ion commander,  and  the  latter's  order  for  the  brigade  to  re- 
unite was  duly  executed. 

I  Finally,  it  should  be  stated  that  the  uncertainty  caused 
by  the  news  of  the  approach  of  a  hostile  column  along  the 
Aupa  shows  anew  how  necessary  it  is  for  superior  leaders  to 
have  full  information  relative  to  the  movements  of  any  col- 
umns v/ith  which  they  are  likely  to  come  into  contact. _ 

The:  Fourth  Infantry  Brigade  from  8:40  to  11:30. 

At  8:25  the  entire  Fourth  infantry  brigade  was  assem- 
bled at  the  rendezvous  near  Parschnitz,  and  the  Second  bat- 
talion of  field  artillery  had  also  arrived  there. 


138  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

\\  lien  the  report  of  the  enemy's  approach  was  received, 
the  brigade  got  under  arms  (8:45),  and  at  8:50  it  received 
orders  to  cross  the  Aupa  near  Parschnitz  with  the  Second 
artillery  battalion. 

The  brigade  commander,  with  the  commander  of  the  ar- 
tillery regiment,  hastened  on  in  front,  and  at  9:35  arrived  near 
the  division  comniander,  who  was  on  Hill  504  (a  mile  and  a 
quarter  south  of  Parschnitz),  from  whom  the  former  re- 
ceived instructions  to  continue  the  march  for  the  time  being 
upon  Alt-Rognitz  through  the  open  country,  while  the  Third 
brigade,  on  his  right,  should  advance  to  the  attack  of  Kriblitz. 
The  artillery  commander  was  instructed  to  post  the  Second 
artillery  battalion  on  Hill  531. 

The  brigade  advanced  in  two  columns,  the  Third  regi- 
ment on  the  right  and  the  Fourth  on  the  left.  The  battalions 
were  in  column  of  march,  in  the  order  of  Third,  Second, 
First.  When  the  leading  squads  reached  Hill  504,  the  2  Third 
battalions  formed  company  columns  and  were  drawn  out  in  two 
lines  at  intervals  of  130  yards,  and  distances  of  220,  the  com- 
panies of  the  second  line  echeloned  outward.  The  First  and 
Second  battalions  remained  in  march  formation,  halting  for 
a  short  time  to  re-establish  order  and  to  close  up.  The  com- 
mander of  the  Second  artillery  battalion  received  orders  by  his 
adjutant,  whom  he  had  sent  ahead  to  his  regimental  command- 
er, to  take  a  position  in  readiness,  covered,  north  of  Hill  531  ; 
this  movement  was  executed  at  a  trot,  in  order  to  quickly  make 
room  for  the  infantry,  and  was  executed  in  column  of  pieces 
in  such  a  manner  that  the  entire  division  was  deployed  by  the 
command.  ''Left  front."  Half  of  the  caissons  of  the  batteries 
halted  220  yards  r.orth  of  the  battalion,  a  position  south  of 
Hill  504  having  been  assigned  to  the  remainder. 

The  regimental  commander  had  not  carried  out  literally 
the  order  of  the  division  commander  to  take  position  on  Hill 
531,  and  with  good  reason.  Tn  the  first  place,  he  saw  no  ob- 
jective before  him  :  besides,  he  first  wanted  to  have  infantrv 
between  the  position  and  .Mt-Rognitz.  ATeanwhile  the  battery 
commanders  were  brought  up  fnim  the  po«^ition  in  readiness, 
nnd  .sections  were  assigned  to  the  individual  batteries.  The 
battery  commanders  dismounted  while  performing  this  duty 
so  as  not  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  enemv.     Scouts  kept 


Studiks  in  thk  Leading  of  Troops.  139 

up  communication  with  the  hussar  regiment,  and  scouts  were 
also  sent  forward,  by  direction  of  the  regimental  commander, 
toward   Rudersdorf  and  Raussnitz,   to  secure   the  left   flank. 

At  9:50  Hill  531,  where  the  division  commander  was 
standing,  was  crossed  by  the  companies  of  the  Third  battal- 
ions, and  the  march  direction  toward  the  southwest  assumed, 
w^hile  the  left-wing  battalion  of  the  Third  brigade  was  already 

engaged  near  the  Kriblitz  ravine.      Major-General   C 

was  here  informed  that  the  enemy  was  evacuating  Trautenau, 
and  that,  in  conjunction  with  the  hussar  regiment,  he  should 
drive  the  enemy's  retreating  forces  back  as  far  as  possible, 
while  the  Third  brigade  should  reassemble  on  the  heights 
south  of  Trautenau. 

As  the  commander  of  the  artillery  regiment  now  observed 
hostile  infantry  columns  in  retreat  south  of  the  little  woods 
of  Kriblitz,  he  directed  the  Second  battalion  to  go  into  posi- 
tion. Two  batteries  posted  themselves  behind  Hill  531,  and 
the  left-wing  battery  on  the  eastern  slope  to  the  east  of  the 
patch  of  woods.  There  they  received  rifle  fire  from  the  Krib- 
litz woods,  though  at  long  range,  and  i  battery  was  obliged 
to  open  fire  on  the  edge  of  the  woods,  while  the  others  fol- 
lowed the  retreating  bodies  with  shrapnel.  In  so  doing  they 
were  forced  to  fire  over  their  own  infantry,  but  as  the  latter 
was  moving  down  a  depression  in  the  terrane,  they  were  not 
endangered  by  the  artillery  fire. 

The  right  wing  of  the  Third  battalion  of  the  Third  regi- 
ment (the  Ninth  company)  turned  toward  the  woods.  Two 
platoons,  deployed  as  skirmishers,  and  the  third  platoon,  in 
close  order  210  yards  to  the  rear,  very  cautiously  took  ad- 
vantage of  the  undulations  in  the  ground.  However,  the  en- 
emy soon  evacuated  the  edge  of  the  woods,  which  the  company 
entered  without  difficulty  and  came  in  contact  with  skirmish- 
ers of  the  Third  brigade.  Some  prisoners  were  taken.  The 
men  who  had  pushed  forward  into  the  open  terrane  to  the 
south  we^e  received  with  such  a  brisk  fire  that  they  hurriedly 
retreated  into  the  woods  again. 

Meanwhile  the  enemy  had  also  posted  a  strong  force  of 
infantry  on  the  isolated  and  wooded  hill  (425)  at  the  north- 
western entrance  of  Alt-Rognitz.  During  a  short  halt  the  en- 
tire Ninth  and  Twelfth  companies  of  the  Third  battalion  of 


140  Studiics  in  thi;  Leading  of  Truops. 

the  Fourth  regiment  deployed  against  that  position  as  skir- 
mishers, further  to  the  north  of  the  ridge  in  front  and  the 
Eleventh  company  was  brought  up  out  of  the  second  echelon 
for  the  purpose  of  prolonging  the  left  wing,  forming  two 
platoons  into  a  skirmish  line,  while  the  third  followed  in  close 
order  as  flank  cover  on  the  extreme  left.  The  Tenth  company 
remained  in  the  second  line,  behind  the  center. 

The  other  battalions  of  the  brigade  continued  the  advance 
by  regiments,  one  alongside  another,  in  columns  of  platoons, 
from  220  to  330  yards  from  the  battalions  in  front,  following 
the  undulations  of  the  terrane  for  purposes  of  shelter. 

The  attempt  of  the  five  leading  companies  of  the  Third 
battalion  to  cross  the  crest  of  the  ridge  (500)  without  halting, 
miscarried,  as  considerable  losses  forced  the  skirmishers  to  lie 
down  and  open  fire  by  command.  With  some  attention  on 
the  part  of  the  platoon  leaders  this  loss  could  have  been  avoid- 
ed, if  the  skirmishers  while  yet  unseen  had  lain  down  behind 
the  ridge,  fixed  sights,  and  had  suddenly  opened  fire  by  com- 
mand. As  nothing  could  be  seen  from  the  bottoms,  the  offi- 
cers dismounted,  and,  contrary  to  custom,  the  commanders  of 
the  Third  battalions  went  up  into  the  foremost  fighting  line. 
When  the  Eleventh  company  of  the  Fourth  regiment  envel- 
oped the  enemy's  right  flank,  and  the  Twelfth  company  of 
the  Third  regiment,  followed  by  the  Tenth  and  Eleventh  com- 
panies, had  cleaned  out  the  patch  of  woods  west  of  the  sunken 
road  leading  from  the  Hopfen  Mountain  to  Alt-Rognitz,  the 
opponent  evacuated  his  position  and  retreated  upon  some 
squadrons  located  farther  to  the  rear. 

The  com])anies  of  the  IMiird  battalions  in  the  first  line 
closely  followed  the  retreating  enemy.  The  greater  part  of 
the  Eleventh  com])any  of  the  Fourth  regiment  turned  into 
Alt-Rognitz,  while  the  Tenth  company  of  the  same  regiment 
was  sent  to  the  wooded  hill  just  abandoned  by  the  hostile 
forces. 

The  rest  of  the  brigade  crossed  Ridge  500,  but,  as  it 
came  too  clo.se  up(^n  the  slowly  advancing  firing  line,  it  had  to 
be  halted  l)y  the  brigade  commander  at  the  foot;  in  a  meadow 
that  extended  to  the  northern  slope  of  Hill  425  it  sought  cover 
against  the  fire  of  the  three  hostile  batteries  that  were  posted 
amonL--  the  thickets  before   Neu-Roonitz. 


1 1. 


Studies  kn  the  Leading  oe  Troops.  141 

The  Second  artillery  battalion  had  unlimbered  -on  Hill 
500,  and  was  firing  on  the  retreating  parties  below. 

This  was  the  situation  when  ]\Iajor-General  C re- 
ceived the  order  of  the  division  commander  to  withdraw  his 
leading  battalions  and  take  position  with  the  brigade  on  both 
sides  of  Hill  425,  securing  his  left  flank;  in  consequence  of 
this  order  he  sent  his  aid  to  the  Third  battalions  with  the  fo"- 
lowing  instructions : 

To  the  battalion  of  the  Fourth  reginent:  "The  battalion 
will  discontinue  the  pursuit,  and  will  occupy  the  little  woods 
near  the  sunken  road,  which  it  has  already  taken." 

To  the  battalion  of  the  Third  regiment:  "The  battalion 
will  discontinue  the  pursuit,  and  will  occupy  'he  little  woods 
near  the  defile,  which  it  has  already  taken.*' 

These  orders  were  carried  out.  So  as  not  to  give  the 
enemy's  artillery,  which  was  directed  against  the  retiring 
Third  battalions,  too  favorable  a  mark  to  fire  upon,  the  lead- 
ing companies  remained  in  extended  order,  while  the  Tenth 
and  Eleventh  companies  of  the  Third  regiment,  which  had 
meanwhile  assembled,  marched  alongside  each  other  by  squads. 

At   11:10  the  brigade  occupied  the   following  positions: 

The  Eleventh  company  of  the  Fourth  regiment  occupied 
the  farm-buildings  nearest  to  the  western  entrance  of  Alt- 
Rognitz  and  covered  itself  by  sending  forward  a  half-platoon 
to  the  village  street,  and  another  before  the  western  edge  of 
the  village.  The  Tenth  company  of  this  regiment  was  on  Hill 
425  ;  the  rest  of  the  battalion  assembled  behind  it. 

The  Tenth  and  Eleventh  companies  of  the  Third  regiment 
were  in  the  little  woods  west  of  the  sunken  road  running  from 
the  Hopfen  Mountain  to  Alt-Ros^nitz.  In  the  rear  and  as  re- 
serve was  the  Twelfth  company,  with  the  Ninth  company, 
which,  however,  consisted  of  only  2  platoons,  part  of  the  com- 
pany having  attached  itself  to  the  Third  brigade  in  the  Krib- 
litz  woods. 

The  First  and  Second  battalions  of  both  regiments 
formed  on  both  sides  of  the  thicket  lying  to  the  east  of  the 
sunken  road. 

So  far  during  the  engagement  the  formation  assumed  Ijy 
the  brigade  in  motion  was  that  of  regiments  .^ide  by  side  by 
wings,  the  battalions  following  one  behind  the  other.     In  the 


142  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

last  moments  and  after  its  subdivisions  had  been  reunited,  the 
Third  brigade  had  also  adopted  this  formation.  In  another 
formation  for  asserfibling  a  brigade  each  line  is  composed 
of  the  battalions  of  the  same  regiment,  one  regiment  follow- 
ing the  other  by  battalions  in  double  column.  But,  according 
to  Drill  Regulations,  the  first  formation  was  equally  correct. 
How  far  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  second  are 
observable  in  the  progress  of  an  action  will  be  touched  on 
later;  the  first  formation  would,  however,  be  preferable  for 
the  march  of  a  brigade  across  fields.  In  any  case,  two  battal- 
ions moving  with  one  front  can  be  more  easily  led  than  three, 
obstacles  can  be  more  easily  avoided,  and  a  cliange  of  front 
more  easily  effected.  In  advancing  by  regiments  one  behind  the 
other,  three  columns  are  formed,  or  even  more  than  three,  and 
the  center  column  is  crowded  first  from  one  side  and  then  the 
other,  while  the  columns  themselves  are  each  composed  of  dif- 
ferent regiments.  True,  it  is  often  said,  we  can  march  better  in 
three  columns  than  in  two ;  this,  however,  applies  only  to  roads, 
while  in  a  field  the  fewer  columns  there  are  the  more  easily  cai 
troops  be  kept  together.  Besides,  with  the  wing  formation, 
each  regimental  commander  has  his  battalions  together  in  one 
column.  In  the  formation  of  the  Fourth  infantry  brigade  it 
was  not  a  question  of  the  rigid  use  of  the  double  column  while 
under  hostile  artillery  fire.  The  battalions  were  so  grouped 
that  they  could  withdraw  independently,  if  at  all.  from  the  fire 
of  the  opponent.  The  Third  battalions  "were  still  extended  in 
company  columns,  while  the  other  battalions,  in  the  second  and 
third  lines,  could  use  line  of  companies  in  platoon  columns, 
single  colunm  of  platoons,  or  double  column  of  platoons,  ac- 
cording to  the  terrane. 

In  advancing  to  an  action  it  appears  necessary  to  leave 
the  several  battalions  in  march  formation  as  long  as  possible, 
for  in  such  manner  each  battalion  can  cross  the  ground  more 
easily  and  with  comparatively  less  exertion  than  in  double 
or  single  column  of  platoons.  Often  when  we  come  near  to 
the  enemy  it  will  be  possible  to  deploy  at  first  only  the  head, 
and  to  let  the  following  battalions  deploy  whenever  the  head 
becomes  engaged  as  was  the  case  here.  There  was  no  neces- 
sitv  for  the  first  and  second  battalion^  forming  single  columns 


f 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Trooi's.  143 

of  platoons.  The  deployment  for  action  could  have  been  eas- 
ily accomplished  from  the  march  formation. 

In  an  advance,  brigade  and  regimental  commanders  must 
be  constantly  on  the  watch  to  see  that  the  original  order  is 
properly  maintained.  If  it  should  be  disturbed  by  the  char- 
acter of  the  terrane,  it  is  better  to  halt  and  re-establish  it.  This 
will  be  especially  necessary  in  passing  through  woods,  since  a 
formed  brigade  when  entering  woods  will  generally  be  thrown 
out  of  order,  as  it  will  there  meet  with  denser  timber,  hills, 
meadows,  or  a  view  obstructed ;  in  such  cases  Regulations  .spe- 
cifically prescribe  a  shortening  of  distances. 

The  commander  of  the  Fourth  brigade  had  to  see  that  the 
leading  battalions  kept  connection,  and  that  distances  were 
preserved  by  the  following  subdivisions.  He  was  certainly 
right  in  halting  the  main  body  when  it  came  too  near  the  first 
line,  and  was  equally  right,  from  his  own  standpoint,  in  allow- 
ing them  to  follow  on  the  heels  of  the  retreating  enemy,  al- 
though the  division  commander  saw  fit  to  suspend  the  pur- 
suit for  other  reasons. 

Finally,  it  is  a  question  whether  the  Ninth  and  Twelfth 
companies  did  right  in  deploying  the  whole  line  as  skirmishers 
on  the  crest  of  Ridge  500.  Regulations  caution  against  this, 
and  ]iermit  '^uch  a  dispo<=;ition  only  in  exceptional  ca^es.  How- 
ever, the  Tenth  company  followed  as  support,  and  the  situa- 
tion called  for  a  rapid  deployment  of  the  skirmishers.  The 
Eleventh  company,  which  was  on  the  left  wing,  should  have 
retained  i  platoon  in  close  formation  under  all  circumstances, 
which  it  in  fact  did. 

The  Division  Cavalry  Regiment  from  8:40  to  n  :.7,o. 

Thus  far  the  work  of  the  hussars  consisted  of  scouting 
and  orderly  and  requisition  service.  Although  the  force  was 
indeed  expended  with  economy,  it  is  nevertheless  seen  how 
quickly  it  will  crumble  away  and  become  disintegrated  by  these 
tasks,  and  it  cannot  be  too  strongly  urged  to  proceed  in  this 
with  the  greatest  caution. 

When  the  regiment  was  brought  up  to  reconnoiter  the 
enemy's  approach,  it  was  required  to  be  as  strong  as  possil  le, 
since    it   might   probably   have    to   accomplish    its   purpose    by 


144  S'r I'Dir.s  in  tiii:  Lkadinc  oi-  'I'kooi'S. 

force.  But  the  coniniander  had  only  2J/2  squadrons  available. 
In  like  maimer  the  leader  of  the  Fourth  squadron  with  the 
advance  guard  saw  his  troopers  reduced  to  one-half  when 
the  enemy  approached  it.  In  time  of  war  we  are  too  prone 
to  resort  to  the  use  of  entire  troops,  or  even  squadrons,  instead 
of  small  patrols ;  in  such  cases  the  regiments  may  appear  on  the 
battle-field  possibly  more  scattered  and  reduced  tiian  hap- 
pened in  this  case. 

Considering-  the  fact  that  the  same  demands  are  made 
on  600  horses  day  after  day,  we  should  not  expect  too  much 
from  a  division  cavalry  regiment  in  an  engagement.  Its  special 
employment  should  be  scouting  and  security  service  for  the 
division.  In  this  way  the  regimental  commander  can  relieve 
his  general  of  many  detailed  dispositions,  and  become  of  great 
value  by  his  personal  enterprise  and  industry.  Although  the 
commander  should  not  lead  the  mass  of  his  regiment  away 
without  orders  from  the  division,  he  can  scout  in  all  directions 
and  keep  up  communication  with  adjoining  columns  by  incaiis 
of  small  patrols,  linthoiit  such  special  instructions.  But  this, 
on  the  other  hand,  requires  that  his  superior  commander  in- 
form him  fully  as  to  the  situation,  a  condition  that  will  only 
happen  when  the  regimental  commander  makes  the  division 
commander's  cause  his  own  cause,  and  devotes  himself  wholly 
to  the  end  in  view. 

If  the  enemy  drives  back  the  smaller  ])atrols  or  forces 
them  to  halt,  then  that  i)art  of  the  regiment  which  is  still 
intact  will  usually  be  obliged  to  come  to  their  assistance.  For 
this  reason  it  is  generally  the  division  commander's  business 
to  bring  the  regiment  to  the  place  from  which  it  can  render 
effective  service  at  the  right  time.  During  the  advance  of 
the  division  on  a  road  in  the  early  morning,  the  cavalry  regi- 
ment was  accordingly  attached  to  the  advance  guard.  lUit 
as  the  ground  opened  out  on  the  left  flank  in  the  direction  of 
the  enemy,  only  one  squadron  was  left  with  the  advance 
guard,  the  remainder  being  assigned  to  the  left  Hank  detach- 
ment of  Major-General  B (Third  brigade).     ;\s  soon 

as  the  Fourtli  brigade  reached  the  left  of  the  Third  during  the 
further  advance,  and  conditions  on  the  left  demanded  scout- 
ing at  great  distanrcs.  tlu-  tlixi^inn  '•<  »minandcr  again   had  the 


I 


I 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  145 

hussar  regiment  at  his  disposal  for  this  purpose,  only  one  troop 
remaining  in  front  of  the  Third  brigade. 

As  a  rule,  the  cavalry  regiment  receives  its  orders  direct 
from  the  division  commander,  and  only  when  attached  to  a 
separate  detachment  should  it  be  placed  under  the  orders  of 
the  detachment  commander.  Only  too  frequently,  when  a 
new  task  must  be  assigned  a  cavalry  regiment  so  attached,  it 
is  taken  away  without  information  being  given  to  the  detach- 
ment commander  concerning  the  altered  circumstances.  This 
should  not  be.  The  superior  headquarters  issuing  such  new 
order  must  communicate  it  to  the  detachment  commander, 
and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  regimental  commander,  if  the  order 
has  not  reached  him  through  the  detachment  commander,  to 
report  his  departure  to  the  latter. 

Further,  effective  scouting  in  front  of  the  infantry  allows 
it  to  remain  in  convenient  formation  for  march  up  to  the  last 
moment,  and  may  even  guard  it  from  sudden  artillery  fire. 
When  conditions  demand  a  considerable  dispersion  of  troops, 
it  is  therefore  proper  to  assign  a  troop  of  cavalry  to  each  of 
the  several  brigades,  to  scout  in  their  front,  in  case  it  does 
not  appear  feasible  to  employ  the  regiment  as  a  whole  for 
such  purpose ;  such  indeed  was  done  in  the  case  before  us.  By 
means  of  mounted  riflemen  infantry  regiments  are  able  to 
scout  independently  in  their  front  for  distances  of  half  a  mile 
or  a  mile.  The  Second  troop  of  the  Fourth  squadron  could 
have  been  relieved  from  the  duty  of  scouting  to\tard  Kriblitz 
and  replaced  by  mounted  riflemen.  The  mounted  riflemen  sent 
forward  on  Hill  554  by  the  Second  battalion  of  the  First  reg- 
nncnt  did  not  conduct  themselves  skillfully,  because  they  either 
failed  altogether  to  report  the  occupation  of  the  Kriblitz  woods 
by  the  enemy,  or  else  reported  it  too  late.  The  leading  bat- 
talions of  the  Third  infantry  brigade  did  send  iheir  mounted 
riflemen  ahead  during  the  last  halt  opposite  Neu-Rognitz,  but 
those  of  the  Fourth  infantry  brigade  neglected  fo  do  so.  When 
finally  the  Fourth  squadron  assembled  north  of  Hohenbruck, 
the  commander  of  the  Third  brigade  could  spare  it  and  return 
it  to  the  cavalry  regiment,  as  he  had  under  his  command, 
mounted,  2  non-commissioned  oflicers  and  18  riflemen.  By 
so  doing  the  cavalry  regiment  would  have  attained  a  strength 
of  nearly  four  squadrons. 


1.1 6  SriKiKs  IN  TiiK  Leading  of  Troops. 


Tin:  Division  Artillkrv  Rkcimknt  from  8:40  to  11:30. 

Only  the  Second  battalion  is  seen  in  joint  action,  the  bat- 
teries of  the  First  battahon  having  been  otherwise  employed. 

Although  circumstances  may  call  for  such  a  division  of 
force,  it  should  be  resorted  to  only  when  absolutely  necessary. 
On  account  of  the  great  extension  of  the  Second  infantry 
division  a  necessity  existed  in  this  case,  as  well  as  by  reason 
of  the  independcmt  tasks  assigned  to  the  two  brigades  em- 
ployed on  the  first  line  and  to  the  advance  guard. 

As  a  rule,  we  should  strive  to  keep  the  batteries  together 
in  action  under  the  guidance  of  the  regimental  commander. 
The  division  commander  should  avail  himself  as  far  as  prac- 
ticable of  the  division  artillery  regiment  as  a  closed  body  of 
troops,  and  understand  how  to  handle  it  in  this  sense.  In 
battle  the  division  generally  needs  the  combined  artillery  effect. 
And  even  when  there  is  only  room  for  isolated  batteries,  these 
must  never  develop  an  arbitrary  activity  according  to  the 
personal  views  of  their  commanders. 

The  division  commander  must  therefore  not  let  his  artil- 
lery get  away,  but  he  must  employ  it,  and  give  it  the  necessary 
orders.  The  same  may  be  said  of  other  commanders  to  whom 
artillery  has  been  assigned. 

The  presence  of  the  regimental  commander  in  the  divisictTT 
staff  was  a  judicious  measure,  but  in  an  action  he  should  be 
where  more*than  one  of  his  battalions  are  employed. 

Should  it  become  necessary  to  oppose  the  enemy  in  any 
one  ])lace,  it  will  be  well  to  employ  all  batteries  available. 
When  the  hostile  artillery  o])ene(l  fire  against  the  Second  bat- 
talion (less  the  Third  battery),  the  horse  battery  did  not  wait 
to  see  if  the  latter  succeeded  in  beating  off  the  op])0'ient,  but 
hurried  forward*  at  once  to  the  fighting  line.  Later  the  Third 
battery  also  came  into  action  against  the  same  objective. 

Further,  should  the  advancing  infantry  become  engaged 
and  objects  for  artillery  fire  appear,  the  artillery  should  ac- 
com])any  the  advance  as  far  as  its  (^wn  security  will  per- 
mit, so  as  to  prepare  for  the  attack  as  long  as  possible, 
as  was  done  by  the  Second  battalion  ujion  the  first  start  of  the 
Fourth  briiiadc.      As  soon  as  the  eneni\-   withdrew,   the  artil- 


Stl^diks  in  the  Lkading  of  Troops.  147 

lery  should  rejoin  the  troops  to  which  it  belongs ;  otherwise 
it  should  remain  in  the  position  it  has  occupied  as  long  as 
necessary. 

Although  an  artillery  action  must  generally  take  place  at 
a  distance  of  1 5^  to  2  miles,  in  many  cases  we  may  have  to 
upen  it  at  longer  ranges. 

It  is  seen  that  thus  far  the  fight  of  the  Second  infantry 
division  succeeded,  also  that  the  regiment  of  artillery  had  but 
few  opportunities  to  come  into  action.  Yet  its  commander 
cannot  escape  censure  for  having  permitted  matters  to  take 
their  own  course  and  not  having  himself  interposed.  He  ac- 
cepted all  the  dispositions  of  the  division  commander  without 
objection  from  the  artillerist's  standpoint,  although  there  was 
occasion  for  raising  objections.  Especially  was  this  so  when, 
at  7  a.  m.,  the  division  commander  divided  the  First  battalion 
and  left  two  of  its  batteries  in  the  Aupa  valley ;  it  was  the 
regimental  commander's  duty  to  call  attention  to  this  severance 
of  units.  Besides,  the  regimental  commander  could  have  had 
seven  batteries  at  his  disposition  during  the  action,  as  the 
division  commander  would  have  assigned  the  horse  battery 
to  him,  if  requested,  and  this  was  sufficient  for  the  part  of  the 
advance  guard  in  the  valley  of  the  Aupa.  If  he  had  familiar- 
ized himself  with  the  situation  and  the  terrane.  a  decisive 
artillery  effect  would  have  followed  on  the  southern  bank  of 
the  Aupa.  If  he  had  arranged  with  the  division  commander 
to  have  the  First  battalion,  in  close  order,  follow  the  Third 
brigade,  in  the  same  manner  as  later  the  Second  battalion 
joined  the  Fourth  brigade,  he  would  have  had  all  his  batteries 
in  hand  and  could  have  appeared  on  Hill  500  ( northwest  of 
Alt-Rognitz)  with  36  guns;  as  it  was,  shortly  after  11  a.  m. 
the  Second  battalion  was  upon  this  hill,  while  the  First  bat- 
talion was  over  a  mile  away,  near  Hohenbruck.  Had  the  en- 
gagement not  come  to  an  end  at  that  time,  it  would  have  been 
difficult  to  secure  the  combined  employment  of  the  artillery. 
Near  Neu-Rognitz  three  hostile  batteries  were  under  fire ;  the 
Second  battalion  could  indeed  dispute  with  them,  but  it  was 
not  likely  soon  to  gain  superioritv  over  th^m.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  two  battalions,  if  they  had  been  united,  could  have 
attained  a  superiority  of  fire  in  15  minutes. 


148  Studii:s  in  the  LhadixXG  of  Troops. 


PROBLE^IS. 

Here  are  a  few  problems,  as  at  the  conclusion  of  Part  I., 
which,  by  means  of  assumptions  that  may  be  very  readily 
suggested,  can  be  solved  in  connection  with  the  situations 
we  have  just  been  considering.  These  are,  however,  only 
specimens,  showing  how  great  a  latitude  may  be  given  to  such 
studies  by  independent  work. 

Page  71 :  The  report  of  the  enemy's  approach  came  from 
the  flank  detachment  near  Welhota,  and  stated  that  its  ad- 
vanced patrols  had  encountered  the  enemy,  who  was  advanc- 
ing from  the  direction  of  Kaussnitz.  Give  the  dispositions  of 
the  division  and  the  various  detachments. 

Page  71 :  Upon  receiving  the  report  of  the  approach 
of  hostile  columns  upon  Hohenbruck,  Lieutenant-General 
A decided  to  deploy  his  division  in  a  defensive  posi- 
tion and  await  the  arrival  of  the  First  infantry  division.  How 
was  the  division  disposed? 

Page  71 :  After  receipt  of  the  above  report,  the  division 
commander  decided  to  immediately  employ  the  First  cavalry 
brigade  and  the  hussar  regiment  for  further  reconnaissance. 
Give  the  orders  to  the  cavalry  and  a  detailed  statement  of  the 
course  pursued  by  the  same. 

Page  74:  The  enemy  occupied  Trautenau,  but  deployed 
his  main  forces  on  the  Kriblitz-Alt-Rognitz  line.  How  should 
the  attack  upon  this  position  be  initiated? 

Page  "JT.     When  Major-General  B received   the 

order,  he  was  also  advised  that  the  highway  to  Liebau  was 
damaged  to  such  an  extent  that  the  arrival  of  the  First  divi- 
sion could  not  be  counted  on  for  4  hours.  Shall  Lieutenant- 
General  A carry  out  his  present  intentions? 

Page  78:  While  the  division  commander  was  about  t(i 
set  the  Fourth  brigade  in  motion,  re])orts  came  in  from  the 
cavalry  in  advance,  establishing  a  considerable  superiority  of 
the  enemy  and  ]jlacing  its  strength  at  about  an  army  corps. 
What  courses  of  action  will  the  general  decide  upon?  WHiat 
orders  will  he  give? 


» 


Studiks  in  THiv  Leading  of  Troops.  i4t>- 

Page   79:      The   division   advanced   in   the   manner   dc-  - 
scribed,  when  advice  was  received  of  the  advance  of  a  second 
hostile   coknim   in   the   valley   of   the   Aupa,    via   Raussnitz.  • 
What  orders  will  Lieutenant-General  A issue? 

Page  80:  The  enemy  evacuated  the  position  near  Trau- 
tenau,  but,  instead  of  retreating  on  the  Hohenbruck  road, 
withdrew  via  Arnau.    What  will  the  division  commander  do? 

Page  83:  Lieutenant-General  A decided  to  fol- 
low the  enemy  after  occupying  the  position  of  Trautenau. 
Give  the  division  commander's  orders. 

These  assumed  situations  may  serve  as  a  basis  for  further 
problems  if  the  strength  of  the  troops  is  changed ;  for  instance, 
we  could  assume  that,  instead  of  the  Second  infantry  division, 
there  was  only  a  brigade  of  6  battalions,  4  squadrons,  and  2 
batteries,  or  a  detachment  of  3  battalions,  2  squadrons,  and  .1 
battery,  on  the  spot.  These  troops  coidd  be  regarded  as  either 
the  advance  guard  of  a  column  in  the  rear,  or  as  acting  in  a 
perfectl}^  independent  capacity. 

Beginning  with  page  1 16,  we  may  likewise  bring  the  dif- 
ferent parts   of  the   division   in  entirely   different   situations, 

either  through  orders  from   Lieutenant-General  A or 

measures   of  the   enemy.      For   instance,   Lieutenant-General 

A could  receive  the  order  to  hold  the  wooded  ridge 

for  the  time  being,  and  at  the  same  time  be  attacked  from  the 
direction  of  Kriblitz,  Alt-Rognitz,  or  Raussnitz.  Only  a  small 
detachment  might  advance  to  attack  him,  and  so  induce  him 
to  make  a  counter-attack  on  his  own  responsibility. 

Furthermore,  the  enemy  might  have  occupied  the  country 
about  Kriblitz  in  force  and  induce  the  Third  brigade  to  push 
home  the  attack  as  soon  as  the  Fourth  brigade,  on  its  left, 
made  no  progress.  It  would  be  interesting  to  picture  the 
details  of  such  an  attack,  with  all  its  vicissitudes. 

Assumed  changes  in  the  character  of  the  terrane  would 
demand  manifold  changes  in  measures  adopted.  We  might 
assume  that  there  was  a  level  or  rolling  country  from  the 
wooded  Hill  504  up  to  the  Trautenau-Hohenbruck  road,  or 
that  the  country  to  the  west  of  the  Kriblitz- Alt-Rognitz  line 
was  covered  by  a  dense  forest.  If  we  apply  to  such  a  terrane 
the  various  assumptions  mentioned  above,  a  multitude  of  new 


I 


150  Sri'DiKs  IX  TiiK  Lkadix«'.  ok  Troops. 

Problems  will  arise,  the  solution  of  which  will  clearly  illus- 
trate the  heterogeneity  of  military  situations  which  may  appear 
to  Ix;  quite  similar,  and  the  study  of  these  in  all  their  parts 
will  afford  an  excellent  opi)ortunity  for  the  exercise  of  judg- 
ment,  resolution,  and  dexterity  in  giving  orders. 


I 


PART  III. 

Dispositions  of  the  Corps  Commander  between  ii  130  a.  m. 

AND   12  45   p.   M. 

At  11:35  Lientenant-General  A came  up  with  the 

corps  commander,  who  was  with  Major-General  B south 

of  St.  John's  Chapel  (Hill  504).  He  reported  what  had  pre- 
viously occurred,  and  also  the  state  of  the  engagement  at  that 
time. 

His  troops  were  ready  to  comply  at  once  with  any  order 
the  corps  commander  might  issue.  (Their  position  is  shown  on 
Map  IV.) 

The  enemy  in  no  wise  appeared  to  have  abandoned  his  in- 
tention to  offer  resistance.  The  strip  of  woods  along  the  high- 
way north  of  Neu-Rognitz,  the  thickets  northeast  and  east  of 
the  village,  as  well  as  the  Sorge  quarry,  appeared  still  to  be 
occupied  by  strong  bodies  of  his  infantry.  Near  the  quarry  i 
battery  which  had  recently  come  on  the  field  had  gone  into 
position,  also  3  others  not  far  from  the  eastern  edge  of  Neu- 
Rognitz,  sending  an  occasional  shrapnel  into  the  position  of 
the  First  infantry  brigade. 

On  account  of  the  position  of  the  corps,  its  aim.  and  its 
connection  with  the  Guard  corps,  which  was  expected  to  reach 
Eypel  during  the  day,  the  presence  of  the  enemy  so  near 
Trautenau  could  not  be  permitted. 

The  head  of  the  First  infantry  division  had  become  vis- 
ible on  the  Liebau  highway  on  line  with  the  western  entrance 
to  F^arschnitz,  and,  as  its  early  assistance  could  therefore  be 
expected,  the  corps  commander  resolved  to  continue  the  action 
with  the  entire  force  at  his  disposal,  and  to  renew  the  attack 
without   delay.      He   accordingly   directed    Lieutenant-General 

A to  continue  his  hold  on  the  highway,  and  to  attack  the 

enemv  in  front  and  at  the  same  time  to  turn  his  right  flank. 


152  STUDIKS   IX   TliK    Ll-ADIXr.   Ol*    TkOüPS. 

The  Plrst  infantry  division  ni  the  meantime  was  to  deploy 
west  of  the  Galgen  Mountain,  for  the  eventual  support  of 
the  attack.  Orders  were  also  at  once  despatched  to  the  corps 
artillery  (8  batteries)  to  advance  rapidly  to  the  heights  south 
of  Trautenau. 

The  cavalry  brigade  now  passed  again  under  the  direct 
orders  of  corps  headquarters,  of  which  fact  the  division  and 
brigade  commanders  were  duly  advised.  The  brigade  com- 
mander was  at  the  same  time  instructed  to  secure  the  right 
flank  of  the  Second  infantry  division  advancing  to  the  attack 
east  of  the  liighway,  not  neglecting,  however,  to  watch  the 
road  to  Arnau. 

it  took  about  20  minutes  to  discuss  past  events  and  fur- 
ther instructions,  and  at   11:55   Lieutenant-General   A 

was  ready  to  issue  his  further  orders. 

At  the  same  time  the  commander  of  the  First  infantry 
division  reported  to  the  corps  commander,  he  having  hurried 
on  in  advance  of  his  troops,  and  stated  that  the  point  of  his 
advance  guard  had  crossed  the  Aupa  and  was  entering  Traut- 
enau. His  right  flank  detachment  (1  battalion  of  riflemen, 
I  squadron,  2  guns)  had  reached  the  foot  of  the  Galgen 
Mountain,  via  Nieder-Altstadt  (see  ^lap  V.),  without  seeing 
anything  of  the  enemy,  and  was  already  in  position  there. 

It  was  now  foimd  that  the  con)s  artillery,  which  was 
ordered  to  hasten  up,  could  not  soon  be  expected.  As  it  was 
placed  behind  the  infantry,  by  this  time  it  must  have  been  far 
back  of  Wolta.  Ihider  these  circumstances  the  commander  of 
the  First  infantry  division  was  ordered  to  bring  up  the  artil- 
lery regiment  of  his  division  and  support  the  attack  of  the 
Second  division  by  having  it  take  a  position  on  the  east  of 
the  Galgen  Mountain.     (12:10  p.  m.) 

Shortly  afterwards  the  battalions  of  the  Third  l)rigade, 
then  south  of  Ilill  504,  were  also  seen  to  be  moving,  while  at 
the  same  time  the  general  staff  ofticer  of  the  First  infantry 
division  of  the  Guard  arrived  with  the  information  that  it 
was  approaching,  its  head  on  the  Schomberg  road  about  1I/4 
miles  from  Parschnitz,  and  that  its  commander  was  anxious 
to  know  the  state  of  the  engagement,  and  also  if  he  could  join 
it  and  give  su])])ort,  and  if  so,  the  i)oint  of  juncture.  The 
general  staff  officer  was  at  once  advised  by  the  chief  oi  staff 


I 

I 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  153 

of  the  army  corps  regarding  past  events  and  further  inten- 
tions; to  which  the  corps  commander  added:  "Tell  your 
general  that  I  hope  to  overcome  the  resistance  of  the  oppo- 
nent, with  my  forces  and  without  serious  difficulty.  The  stand 
of  the  enemy  in  such  proximity,  however,  leads  to  the  con- 
clusion that  he  expects  still  further  reinforcements.  With  a 
view  to  all  contingencies,  I  would  be  pleased  if  the  Guard 
division  would  be  directed  from  Welhota  upon  Alt-Rognitz, 
so  as  to  be  at  hand  to  join  in  the  action." 

With  this  answer,  the  general  staff  officer  left  at  12:20 
to  return  to  the  division  of  the  Guard.  At  the  same  time 
the  point  of  the  First  infantry  division  reached  the  right  flank 
detachment  west  of  the  Galgen  Alountain,  where  the  division 
commander  made  his  dispositions  for  deployment.  At  12:30 
he  had  at  his  disposal,  however,  only  2  battalions  of  the  ad- 
vance guard,  the  battalion  of  riflemen  of  the  right  flank 
detachment,  the  cavalry  regiment  (which  had  been  ordered 
up),  and  a  battery.  The  third  battalion  of  the  advance  guard 
was  engaged  in  deploying.  The  5  other  batteries  of  the 
division  artillery  regiment,  although  ordered  to  advance  at  an 
increased  gait,  had  not  yet  arrived.  The  deployment  of  the 
entire  division  and  the  corps  artillery  could  not  be  expected 
within  less  than  an  hour  and  a  half,  on  account  of  the  town 
streets  through  which  it  passed  being  so  narrow  and  its  ad- 
vance guard  having  been  separated  from  it. 

Comments  on  the  Dispositions  oe  the  Corps  Commander 
between  11:30  a.  m.  and  12:45  p.  m. 

As  already  indicated,  the  deployment  of  the  enemy  so 
close  to  his  front  had  convinced  the  corps  commander  that 
he  was  either  expecting  reinforcements  very  soon  or  had  al- 
ready received  them.  Such  a  view  of  the  situation  was  cer- 
tainly not  groundless.  From  the  commanding  heights  south 
of  Trautenau  the  enemy  had  been  able  to  minutely  overlook 
the  approach  and  deployment  of  the  Second  infantry  division ; 
furthermore,  the  reports  of  the  Windischgratz  dragoons,  who 
had  come  in  contact  with  the  First  division  on  the  Liebau 
road,  must  have  given  him  the  certainty  of  a  very  consider- 
able superiority  on  the  part  of  his  assailant. 


154  Stli)1i;s  jn  tül-;  Lkadixc,  or  Troops. 

Unusual  circumstances  alone  could  have  induced  the  en- 
cniy,  after  a  short  retreat,  to  form  his  troops  for  action  and 
•on  an  extended  front,  .is  a  rule,  large  masses  onee  deployed 
for  action  are  forced  to  fight  on  the  approach  of  the  oppo- 
nent, and  are  in  no  positioti  to  zvithdraz\.'  at  pleasure.  To  with- 
draw, it  is  necessary  to  be  in  possession  of  highways  and 
roads,  and,  above  all,  sufficient  time ;  also  to  leave  detachments 
behind,  which  on  the  attack  of  the  enemy  will  either  fulfill 
their  object  of  covering  the  retreat  at  a  great  sacrifice,  or,  if 
unable  to  hold  out  sufficiently  long,  will  be  thrown  on  the 
trooj)s  while  in  the  act  of  forming  columns  of  march.  In  the 
last  case  the  entire  body  of  troops  will  find  itself  compelled 
to  fight  with  all  its  force,  against  its  will,  and  under  most  un- 
favorable conditions. 

Still  far  more  disastrous  would  it  be  to  march  oft"  after 
tJK  most  advanced  line  of  the  deployed  troops  is  already  en- 
gaged. Unless  the  imfavorable  situation  is  counterbalanced 
]jy  superior  strength,  defeat  can  hardly  be  escaped. 

These  points  are  deserving  of  the  utmost  consideration 
on  the  part  of  troop  leaders.  They  are  not  as  evident  in  maneu- 
vers as  they  are  in  war.  In  proof,  let  us  cite  the  engagement 
at  Weissenburg  on  August  4,  1870.  With  4  battalions  in  his 
first  line  and  5  in  his  second,  General  Douay  deployed  his  weak 
division  to  meet  the  heads  of  Bothmer's  Bavarian  division  and 
the  Fifth  and  Eleventh  Prussian  army  corps.  As  soon  as  he 
])erceived  the  great  superiority  of  the  enemy,  it  seems  he  was 
sufficiently  prompt  in  giving  the  order  to  retire.  By  that  time, 
however,  the  trooj)s  were  hotly  engaged  in  front  of  Weissen- 
burg and  on  the  Lauter.  It  was  no  longer  possible  to  with- 
draw the  troops  fighting  there,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  bat- 
talions of  the  second  line,  in  support,  were  obliged  to  join  \v 
the  action  on  the  heights  of  the  Geisberg,  which  ended  with 
the  complete  defeat  of  the  French  division. 

Only  extraordinarily  advantageous  circumstances  can  ad- 
mit of  exceptions  to  this  rule,  such  as  a  strong  natural  ])osi- 
lion  in  front,  which  forces  the  oi)ponent  to  restore  order  after 
distur])anrc  has  arisen  from  crossing  the  jHxsition  for  the  final 
assault.  -At  Weissenburg,  however,  the  fortified  town  and 
the  terrane  along  the  Lauter  were  of  no  avail,  by  reason  of 
the  overwhelming  sui)eriority  of  the  German  troops,  and  also 


Studies  in  the  Leading  oe  Troops.  155 

the  fact  that  the  direction  of  their  approach  enabled  them  to 
envelop  the  hostile  right  Hank  simnltaneonsly  with  the  attack 
in  front. 

In  the  case  before  us  the  opponent  does  not  even  appear 
to  have  occupied  a  strong  line.  Perhaps  he  was  forced  to 
risk  an  engagement  without  hope  of  success,  by  circumstances 
not  visible  to  the  assailant,  relating,  perhaps,  to  the  direction 
of  the  entire  hostile  army.  So.  there  is  all  the  more  reason 
that  the  First  army  corps  should  take  advantage  of  the  sit- 
uation, although  it  is  more  likely  that  the  opponent  had  al- 
ready received  reinforcements,  or  expected  them  soon,  which 
permitted  him  to  risk  an  engagement  at  that  time. 

We  can  therefore  find  no  fault  with  the  commander  of 
the  First  army  corps  for  deciding  to  continue  the  attack  and 
placing  his  entire  force  in  readiness.  The  intended  continua- 
tion of  the  march  upon  Arnau  certainly  became  dubious, 
and  for  the  time  being  prevailing  conditions  forbade  it.  The 
strength  the  enemy  might  develop  the  same  day  or  the  fol- 
lowing could  not  be  foreseen.  Moreover,  his  position,  which 
was  only  2]/2  miles  from  Trautenau,  the  point  of  exit  from 
the  defiles  through  which  ran  the  only  line  of  retreat  of  the 
corps,  permitted  him  to  close  the  line  of  retreat  at  any  mo- 
ment, simply  by  a  short  advance.  Nor  was  there  any  basis  for 
determining  how  great  a  force  should  be  left  behind  to  pro- 
tect the  point  now  occupied,  should  the  march  be  continued. 
Besides,  the  enemy  from  the  direction  of  Neu-Rognitz  threat- 
ened  the  communication  between  Trautenau  and  Eypel,  on 
which  line  the  Guard  corps  had  been  put  in  motion. 

The  corps  commander's  determination  to  continue  the  ac- 
tion was  therefore  fully  justified.  Even  should  it  assume 
such  dimensions  as  to  preclude  an  advance  of  a  part  of  the 
corps  the  same  day  upon  Arnau.  the  disadvantage  would  be 
more  than  balanced  by  a  possible  victory  over  larger  hostile 
forces. 

There  was  still  another  condition  that  had  to  be  consid- 
ered. The  artillery  of  the  two  sides  "was  only  V/i  miles  apart, 
and  the  most  advanced  skirmishers  only  Yi  mile.  So  in  any 
case,  should  the  enemy  stand  his  ground,  the  fire  would  soon 
commence  atrain.  and.  once  commenced,  the  action  must  be 
carried  on  with  full  vigor. 


156  Sti'diks  J-n  TiiK  Ij:.\I)1X(".  oi-  Troops. 

Thus  it  seemed  to  be  perfectly  proper  to  put  the  whole  dis- 
posable force  in  readinesfe  to  prosecute  the  attack,  and  accept 
the  proffered  assistance  of  the  First  infantry  division  of  the 
(juard.  We  can  never  have  too  many  troops  on  a  battle-field 
large  enough  for  their  deployment.  The  stronger  we  are, 
the  better  are  our  prospects  of  victory.  The  truth  of  thes^ 
axioms  sometimes  leads  to  too  wide  an  interpretation  of  their 
meaning.  Thus  we  are  often  told  to  bring  on  the  field  of 
battle  all  available  forces;  that  every  combination  must  fall 
before  a  tactical  victory.  If  this  were  always  so,  the  conduct 
of  war  would  be  much  easier  than  it  really  is. 

For  example,  if  the  advantage  gained  on  the  battle-field 
might  be  neutralized  or  losses  even  result  from  the  simul- 
taneous advance  of  the  enemy  at  other  points,  one  would  never 
be  justified  in  failing  to  make  timely  provision  against  such 
danger  by  detaching  part  of  his  force.  We  must  learn  to  dis- 
pense on  the  battle-field  with  some  of  the  troops  available. 

When  the  Allies  were  carrying  out  their  operations  against 
Dresden  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Elbe  after  the  armistice  of 
1813,  Napoleon,  with  the  main  body  of  his  troops,  was  still 
on  the  right  bank  of  that  river.  The  possession  of  König- 
stein enabled  him  to  cross  the  river  with  a  part  of  his  troops 
and  fall  upon  the  rear  of  the  Allies  engaged  before  Dresden. 
In  view  of  such  a  contingency,  the  latter  should  have  left  a 
considerable  force  there  at  the  outset  to  secure  themselves 
against  such  a  blow.  Too  little  was  done  in  that  direction, 
and  tlie  allied  armies  were  threatened  with  annihilation,  which 
was  only  averted  by  the  extraordinary  bravery  of  the  Rus- 
sians, coupled  with  other  favorable  circumstances. 

So,  although  battle  demands  the  greatest  ]iracticable  con- 
centration of  all  forces,  conditions  do  arise  which,  in  view  of 
the  general  situation,  force  us  to  employ  a  part  of  our  troops 
elsewhere.  However,  as  many  as  are  not  needed  elsewhere 
belong  on  the  field,  where  the  decision  of  arms  is  expected. 

A  leader  should  not  therefore  lightly  decline  assistance 
offered  by  strange  troops.  One  is  often  led  to  do  so  by  erro- 
neous estimates  of  the  situation,  as  well  as  by  false  pride.  In 
the  engagement  at  Trautenau  on  June  2'].  1866,  it  is  known 
that  the  former  was  tiie  reason  for  dechning  the  actually 
nff(«rt  <1  a^sistanc«'  of  the  First  infantrv  (hvision  of  the  Guard. 


I 

I 

I 


Studiks  IX  THE  Lkadixg  of  Troops.  157 

Examples  of  the  latter  may  be  learned  from  military  history. 
It  is  in  the  very  nature  of  strong  wills  to  accomplish  things 
by  their  own  energy  alone,  without  assistance.  So  it  often 
happens  that  a  leader  will  say  to  himself:  *'I  and  my  own 
troops  will  gain  this  victory,  and  will  not  divide  the  glory  with 
others.  If  I  accept  assistance,  then  my  opportunity  is  lost ;  for 
a  senior  officer  niight  arrive,  who  would  assume  command  and 
carry  off  the  honors  himself." 

Don't  say,  "I  wouldn't  think  of  doing  such  a  thing!"  It 
has  happened,  and  it  will  happen  again,  especially  when  there 
is  a  chance  to  win  a  victory  by  one's  own  forces  alone.  We 
must  never  forget  that  conditions  may  change  within  a  short 
space  of  time;  and  when  the  action  goes  amiss,  all  previous 
scruples  quickly  vanish,  and  we  welcome  support  that  hur- 
ries up  of  its  own  volition,  though  shordy  before  we  had 
declined  it. 

From  this  it  follov/s  also  that  the  well-known  rule,  to 
advance  only  to  the  sound  of  cannon,  's  subject  to  exceptions. 
Sometim.es  conditions  prevail  which  demand  that  a  point  not 
yet  assailed  by  the  enemy  be  held  at  all  hazards ;  and  that 
troops  posted  there  must  not  move  to  the  assistance  of  their 
sorely  pressed  comrades,  or  at  least  in  part.  Such  situations 
are  of  frequent  occurrence.  In  the  investment  of  Paris 
(1870-71)  we  have  numerous  examples  of  it. 

Instructions  given  by  superior  headquarters  to  subordi- 
nate commanders  must  be  explicit  enough  to  enable  them  to 
act  judiciously  of  their  own  accord  in  situations  similar  to 
those  we  have  just  been  describing.  The  principle  should  al- 
ways govern,  that  whenever  a  body  of  troops  finds  itself  in 
action,  no  matter  how  insignificant  it  may  appear,  there  is  a 
decision  of  arms  impending.  Therefore  every  individual  must 
be  animated  by  the  desire  to  hasten  to  the  spot  and  join  in. 
The  issue  is  victory  or  defeat.  Fortunately  indeed,  this 
thought  has  become  the  flesh  and  blood  of  our  Army.  In  the 
orders  to  cross  the  frontier  given  to  the  Third  Army  in  1870 
it  was  emphasized  that  if  any  one  of  the  various  columns 
should  encounter  the  enemy,  adjoining  columns  must  change 
direction  to  take  part  in  the  action.  In  pursuance  of  this,  the 
Fifth  Prussian  corps  supported  P)Othmer's  Bavarian  division 
at  Weissenburg  on  the  4th  of   August,   while   the   Eleventh 


158  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

Prussian  corps  advanced  further  than  its  original  destination 
in  order  to  fall  upon  the  enemy's  right  flank. 

Still  more  are  we  indebted  to  this  principle  for  our  vic- 
tory at  Spicheren  on  the  6th  of  August.  1870,  an  action  which 
might  easily  have  been  turned  into  defeat  had  there  been  no 
inclination  among  the  forces  to  hasten  to  points  where  decis- 
ions of  arms  were  impending. 

All  that  the  corps  commander  did  in  the  example  we  are 
now  considering,  as  measured  by  the  foregoing  standards,  ap- 
pears to  be  perfectly  justifiable.  But  there  is  still  another  of 
his  measures  that  calls  for  a  careful  scrutiny. 

At  11:55  he  gave  orders  to  the  Second  infantry  division 
to  continue  the  attack.  As  the  troops  were  in  readiness,  and 
l>art  of  the  enemy  was  less  than  two-thirds  of  a  mile  away, 
the  infantry  action  would  probably  begin  within  a  short  time. 
Cjranting,  however,  that  half  an  hour  might  elapse  before  the 
actual  attack,  the  point  of  the  First  infantry  division  would 
then  be  deployed  only  to  the  Galgen  Mountain.  In  the  mean- 
while the  First  division  had  advanced  on  the  Liebau  road  in 
a  formation  similar  to  that  taken  by  the  Second  division  on 
the  Schömberg  road.  (See  Plan  TI.)  The  distances  between 
the  different  subdivisions  of  the  vanguard,  the  reserve  of 
the  advance  guard,  and  the  main  body  of  the  division  had 
been  well  preserved.  Therefore  if  the  deployment  should 
commence  at  12:30,  the  division  could  be  in  position  between 
the  Galgen  Mountain  and  Hohenbruck,  ready  to  support  the 
action,  only  in  the  following  order:  the  leading  regiment  al 
r  o'clock,  the  leading  l^rigade  at  1  :30,  and  the  entire  infantry 
after  2  o'clock. 

Now  we  come  to  llic  (|uc-tion.  What  is  the  limit  o\  the 
fighting  ])ower  of  a  division  at  the  i)resent  time?  Its  defens- 
ive strength,  in  a  favorable  position,  with  flanks  iirotected. 
may  suffice  for  lialf  or  even  an  entire  day  even  against  a  supe- 
rior enemv,  ])rovided  its  artillery  has  not  1)cen  annihilated.  Tf. 
however,  the  artilk^ry  has  been  silenced  b\-  the  sui)eri()r  tire  of 
the  o])ponent.  the  enemy's  guns  will  train  on  tlu>  infantry  of 
the  division,  and  its  resistance  can  last  but  a  few  hours.  lUit 
in  the  attack  by  an  infantry  division  different  i)rinciples  ob- 
tain. ]\  the  ground  affords  good  co\er  for  the  assailant's  ajv 
])roach,  one  or  more  unsnccessful  attaeks  need  not   decide  the 


I 


Studies  in  the  Leadixg  oe  Trooi-s.  159 

action,  and  he  can  still  carry  on  the  fight  in  a  desultory  man- 
ner. But  if  the  attack  must  be  made  over  open  ground  com- 
manded by  hostile  guns,  half  an  hour  will  often  suffice  to  put 
even  a  large  body  of  attacking  troops  out  of  action,  although 
the  entire  force  may  be  engaged  (which,  of  course,  must  hap- 
pen in  an  attack).  Such  indeed  was  the  fate  of  Von  Wedel's 
gallant  brigade  of  5  battalions  on  August  16,  1870,  during  its 
brilliant  but  unfortunate  charge  between  Mars  la  Tour  and 
V'ionville. 

-Now,  although  open  ground  in  the  front  favors  the  de- 
fense and  intersected  or  covered  ground  the  attack,  and  each 
party  to  the  action  will  seek  to  choose  his  own  ground,  the 
kind  of  ground  that  we  actually  fight  on  will  depend  upon 
circumstances.  So  we  must  be  contented  with  the  ground  as 
we  find  it. 

Attacks  with  larger  masses  over  unfavorable  terrane  can- 
not always  be  avoided.  If  the  opponent  checks  our  progress 
by  occupying  a  position  which  for  local  or  tactical  reasons 
cannot  be  turned,  we  must  assail  it,  if  we  would  advance  at 
all,  no  matter  how  difficult  the  ground  may  be.  Especially  is 
this  so  when,  in  an  offensive  action,  a  brigade  or  division  is 
confined  by  other  troops  at  the  sides ;  in  such  case  it  cannot 
make  a  turning  movement,  and  may  be  forced  to  pass  over 
even  the  most  open  terrane. 

Later  on  in  this  study  we  shall  attempt  to  illustrate  how 
such  an  attack  should  be  carried  through  in  accordance  with 
regulations ;  for  the  present  we  shall  make  only  a  few  remarks, 
referring  to  the  management  of  larger  masses  before  such  an 
attack  is  undertaken. 

In  the  case  before  us  the  Second  infantry  division  could 
have  gone  to  pieces  before  Neu-Rognitz  before  a  single  regi- 
ment of  the  other  division  had  time  to  complete  its  deploy- 
ment between  the  Galgen  Mountain  and  Hohenbruck,  and  in 
such  an  event  the  strength  of  this  one  regiment  would  have 
been  insufficient  to  change  the  condition  of  affairs. 

The  belated  interposition  of  the  First  infantry  division, 
then  forming  up,  could  hardly  miss  being  accompanied  by  far- 
reaching  consequences.  Under  the  most  unfavorable  conditions 
it  might  find  itself  compelled  to  make  an  entirely  fresh  attack, 
and  instead  of  the  combined  employment  of  the  full  force  of 


■i6()  S'i"ri)ii:s  IN  Tiii;  Li;.\i)i.\(.  oi'  Tkoüps. 

Hic  corps,  there  zcifiiU/  be  only  an  isolated  employment  of  tzvo 
halves. 

It  is  therefore  advisable,  when  eonditions  will  permit,  not 
■lo  begin  an  attack  until  all  troops  have  reactied  their  places. 
By  so  doing  we  can  best  prevent  part  of  the  force  from  being 
amiihilated  before  the  remainder  is  able  to  interfere.  This 
injunction  should  be  heeded  to-day  more  than  ever,  when  we 
V(^nsider  the  increased  strength  that  the  defense  has  gained 
through  rapid-fire  guns,  and  especially  in  case  the  terrane  as- 
sures the  defender  the  full  use  of  his  arms. 

Even  wdicn  the  arms  of  the  assailant  are  fully  equal  to 
those  of  the  defense,  the  latter  can  maintain  a  superiority  as 
long  as  he  has  an  extended  field  of  fire,  and  before  the  assailant 
has  subdued  him  by  employing  a  superior  number  of  guns 
at  mid-range  or  shaken  him  by  his  artillery.  The  assailant 
must  be  the  stronger  at  points  selected  for  the  attack,  so  he 
can  deploy  a  superior  force.  A  preponderance  of  fire  on  the 
points  of  penetration  must  be  relied  on  to  give  the  decision. 

There  are  times  w  hen  a  leader  is  not  in  a  position  to  first 
await  the  complete  deployment  of  his  troops.  Should  his 
advance  guard  suddenly  encounter  the  enemy,  he  -night  often 
have  to  support  it  by  other  divisions  as  they  come  up.  Fur- 
ther than  this,  under  the  pres.su re  of  the  moment  battalions 
iwt  thrown  into  action  singly,  one  here  and  another  elsewhere, 
which  leads  to  the  severance  of  the  higher  units  and  mixing 
u\j  of  troops,  a  condition  of  affairs  that  often  proves  fatal.  In 
such  cases  it  is  generally  advisable,  if  conditions  permit,  to 
|)re.scribe  a  restraining  order  of  the  advance  guard,  until  the 
deployment  of  the  main  body  can  be  eflfected. 

At  any  rate,  an  action  will  be  initiated  by  the  ])arties  th-st 
(rv.  the  ground,  and  in  most  cases  condition^  a'-'d  torranc  will 
permit  the  gradual  employment  of  the  ui  i  e  fo  c  •.  K\ten- 
f;ive  attacks,  especially  such  as  must  pass  over  ojkmi  ground 
against  a  strr>ng  and  sufficiently  manned  position,  proceed  so 
«apidly  in  our  day,  as  alrcarly  stated,  that  it  is  always  recom- 
nicndable  to  delay  the  attack  until  all  troops  intended  for  it 
arc   in  ])osition  and  ready  for  immediate  employment. 

In  this  ease  the  corps  cc^mmancler  deviated  from  such 
a  course  bccau.se  he  did  not  consider  the  strength  of  his  oppo- 
VKMit  as  verv  ^reat.  and  he  had  tlu-   utmost   confidence   in   the 


I 


I 


Studies  in  the  Leading  or  Tkuops.  i6i 

ability  of  the  division  commanders  and  his  troops.  He  might 
also  have  been  influenced  by  the  thought  that  if  he  succeeded 
in  quickly  forcing  the  enemy  back,  a  part  of  his  corps  might 
advance  sufficiently  far  on  the  ^Vrnau  road  the  same  day. 
Nevertheless,  existing  conditions  could  hardly  be  surveyed 
with  sufficient  clearness  to  count  with  certainty  on  an  early 
victory,  and  it  would  have  been  better  to  have  ordered  the 
attack  by  the  Second  division  later,  or  at  least  not  before  the 
leading  brigade  of  the  First  infantry  division  had  deployed. 
This  time  would  in  no  wise  have  been  lost  had  it  been  skill- 
fully utilized  in  preparing  the  attack  by  artillery  fire. 

It  has  always  been  a  desirable  thing  to  prepare  an  attack 
by  the  use  of  artillery,  while  to-day  it  has  become  such  a 
necessity  that  in  all  cases  such  preparation  must  be  made  in 
the  most  comprehensive  manner.  In  like  measure  artillery 
support  is  needed  during  the  action.  If  the  superior  com- 
mander precipitates  his  dispositions,  it  becomes  doubtful 
whether  a  sufficient  number  of  guns  can  be  brought  up  in 
time ;  at  all  events,  it  is  certain  there  will  not  be  enough  time 
available  for  preparation. 

The  corps  commander,  therefore,  was  quite  right  in  plac- 
ing a  large  number  of  guns  at  the  disposal  of  the  Second  in- 
fantry division.  An  oversight  not  at  all  insignificant,  how- 
ever, appears  in  the  directions  given  for  that  purpose. 

The  duty  of  division  artillery  is  naturally  to  first  sup- 
l^jort  its  own  division.  Corps  artillery  should  be  employed 
wherever  it  appears  wise  to  secure  a  massed  effect.  The 
sphere  of  artillery  is  to  fight  at  long  distance ;  if  we  would 
therefore  derive  its  full  benefit,  it  should  come  into  action 
sooner  than  the  infantry,  and  consequently  its  whole  force 
should,  as  a  rule,  be  deployed  early  in  the  fight.  For  this  rea- 
son corps  artillery  should'  not  be  assigned  to  the  rear  of  a 
marching  column,'  but  rather  as  near  the  head  as  terrane  and 
other  conditions  will  permit.  As  the  leading  division  has  at 
its  disposal  a  sufficient  number  of  guns  in  its  own  artillery 
body  to  initiate  an  action,  the  corps'  artillery  will  generally  be 
l)ut  between  the  two  infantry  divisions.  If,  however,  it  is 
intended  to  attack  the  enemy  in  a  place  already  reconnoitered. 
then  the  mass  of  the  artillery  may  be  brought  forward  still 
nearer  the  head. 


1 62  Studius  IX  TUE  Lkading  of  Troops. 

When  initiating  important  attacks,  it  should  be  seen  that 
corps  artillery  is  brought  up  to  reinforce  the  batteries  at  the 
front  in  proper  time;  this,  however,  does  not  apply  "in  case 
the  corps  artillery  itself  is  engaged  in  an  independent  action. 
The  commander  intended  to  pursue  such  a  course,  but  at  the 
same  time  he  recognized  that  his  corps  was  divided,  and 
marching  in  two  columns  instead  of  a  single  column.  Now, 
as  the  right  wing  division  might  also  come  upon  the  enemy 
in  the  mountain  passes,  its  order  of  march  was  arranged  so 
as  to  bring  the  infantry  into  action  first.  Its  own  batteries, 
kept  together  as  much  äs  possible,  could  be  echeloned  among 
the  infantry;  but  the  place  for  the  corps  artillery  was  at  tlie 
rear  of  the  entire  column. 

Should  it  become  necessary  quickly  to  reinforce  the  Sec- 
ond division  with  artillery,  the  batteries  which  could  arrive 
most  promptly  would  be  called  into  service ;  these  w^ere  the  36 
guns  of  the  Sixteenth  artillery  regiment  of  the  First  infantry 
division.  Taking  away  its  own  artillery  from  a  division  is  a 
measure  that  should  be  resorted  to  only  in  rare  cases.  We 
should  always  abide  by  the  rule  that  artillery  should  act  only 
in  connection  with  the  division  to  which  it  beloni^s.  Here, 
however,  the  preparation  and  support  of  the  impending  attack 
could  only  be  properly  arranged  by  making  an  exceptional 
disposition  of  the  artillery  of  the  First  infantry  division. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  commander  of  the  First  infantrv 
division  would  have  done  well  to  hasten  his  artillery  regijnent 
forward  to  the  battle-field  quite  early,  on  his  own  responsibil- 
ity, under  cover  of  his  cavalry  regiment.  Tt  is  certain  that  tlie 
occupation  of  Trautenau  by  the  Second  division  was  soon  re- 
ported to  him  by  his  cavalry  patrols,  and  the  fire  of  the  guns 
in  that  direction  must  surely  have  been  heard,  which,  even  if 
not  very  brisk,  at  least  indicated  that  the  Second  division  was 
in  action,  and  it  was  impossible  to  foresee  how  events  would 
stand  an  hour  later.  Tlie  re  was  therefore  every  inducement 
to  hasten  the  march  as  much  as  possible  in  order  to  reach  the 
field  of  action  at  the  earliest  moment.  Infantry  cannot  main- 
tain a  quickened  pace  for  any  length  of  time,  but  cavalry  and 
artillery  can.  and  it  is  therefore  recommended  to  send  these 
arms  ahead  in  such  cases. 


Studies  in  thk  Lüadinc.  of  Troops.  163 

Finally,  let  us  consider  the  horse  battery  attached  to  the 
cavalry  brigade.  The  expediency  of  such  a  permanent  assign- 
ment may  appear  questionable.  Larger  masses  of  caviilry, 
such  as  divisions,  certainly  need  artillery  as  soon  as  they  pur- 
sue independent  tasks.  For  purposes  of  reconnaissance  it  is 
absolutely  necessary.  On  the  battle-field  the  horse  batteries 
remain  with  the  cavalry,  as  they  are  indispensable  for  the 
many-sided  work  of  the  latter  during  and  particularly  after 
an  engagement.  The  division  commander  should  deliberate 
well  before  he  employs  his  batteries  in  connection  with  the 
rest  of  the  artillery. 

To  attain  its  maximum  of  efficiency  in  the  case  before  us, 
the  horse  battery  present  on  the  field  should  unite  its  action 
vv'ith  the  division  artillery  regiment,  and  with  it  prepare  and 
support  the  attack  of  the  Second  division.  This  could  only 
be  done,  however,  by  putting  it  under  the  orders  of  the  regi- 
mental commander.  AH  batteries  on  a  field  of  action  must  be 
imder  the  guidance  of  a  single  superior  officer. 

The  Second  Ineantry  Division  erom  11:30  a.  m.  to 
12:45  P-  ^^• 

Lieutenant-General  A had  considered  the  matter 

of  continuing  the  action  before  the  corps  commander  arrived, 
so  he  was  well  posted  regarding  dispositions  to  be  made  when 
he  received  his  order. 

He  first  turned  to  the  commander  of  the  First  artillery 

regiment,  Lieutenant-Colonel  J ,  who  was  riding  at  his 

side,  and  said  (n  155)  :  ''The  division  will  attack  the  enemy 
before  Neu-Rognitz  both  in  front  and  in  the  flank,  the  flank 
attack  being  made  from  the  direction  of  Alt-Rognitz.  Assem- 
ble your  6  batteries  under  the  ridge  where  the  Second  artil- 
lery battalion  is  now  in  position,  and  prepare  the  attack.  I 
shall  request  the  cavalry  brigade  to  send  the  horse  battery  into 
position  on  the  Galgen  Mountain,  where  the  corps  artillery 
is  also  expected  to  join  in  the  action  in  half  an  hour."  Next 
he  despatched  an  aid  to  the  First  cavalry  brigade,  to  request 
the  assistance  of  the  horse  battery.  Then,  turning  to  another 
aid,  he  said :  "Direct  the  Fourth  brigade  to  form  up  in  Alt- 
Rognitz,  with  the  left  550  yards  from  the  church  of  St.  Paul 


164  StiDIKS    in    TIIK    Li'ADIXC,    Ol     TrOOPS. 

and  St.  John,  for  a  Hank  attack  on  Xcu-Rognitz,  leaving  i 
battalion  south  of  the  little  Kriblitz  woods  at  my  disposal. 
The  Third  brigade  will  advance  east  of  the  Trautenau- 
Königinhof  road,  while  the  artillery  regiment  will  prepare  the 
attack  from  the  crest  of  Ridge  500.  1  will  later  give  the  exact 
time  for  the  attack  to  commence,  i  will  be  found  with  the 
left  wing  of  the  artillery."  The  aid  was  required  to  repeat  the 
order  before  riding  away. 

Turning  to  the  commander  of  the  Third  infantry  brigade. 

Major-General  B ,  who  had  overheard  his  conversation 

with  the  commanding  general  and  the  orders  just  given,  he 

said  :     '^Major-General  B ,  you  know  the  situation,  and 

also  my  intentions.  Post  your  brigade,  ready  for  attack,  in 
the  extended  woods  north  of  Neu-Rognitz.  I  will  give  the 
exact  time  for  the  attack  later.  I  will  be  with  the  left  wing 
of  the  artillery." 

By  12:04  p.  m.  these  orders  were  issued. 

As  the  corps  com.mander  had  no  further  instructions  to 
give  him,  the  division  commander  went  up  to  Hill  500,  north 
of  Alt-Rognitz,  from  which  he  could  best  survey  the  field  of 
attack  and  could  assure  accord  in  the  movements  of  his  2 
brigades.  At  12:15  the  division  surgeon  came  up  to  him,  and, 
after  being  advised  briefly  of  the  course  of  action  planned, 
proposed  to  establish  the  field  hospital  immediately  in  Kriblitz. 
to  assemble  the  ambulance  company  near  the  eastern  exit,  and 
to  send  it  to  Alt-Rognitz  just  as  soon  as  he  could  do  so.  The 
general  approved  of  these  arrangements,  and  ordered  tliat  tlic 
troops  l>e  informed  of  them  by  mounted  riflemen. 

At  12  o'clock  the  commander  of  the  First  regiment  of 
field  artillery  had  received  in  person  the  verbal  order  of  the 
division  commander,  and  had  then  started  at  a  gallop  from 
Hill  504  down  to  the  First  battalion,  which  he  found  in  the 
act  of  indepiMidently  going  into  action  near  Hill  468  to  engage 
the  hostile  artillery  northwest  of  Neu-Rognitz.  He  at  once 
put  a  stop  to  these  movements,  and,  pointing  out  to  the  bat- 
talion commander  the  position  of  the  Secon  1  battalion,  direct- 
ed him  to  lead  his  batteries,  through  the  sunken  road  south  of 
Hill  504,  up  to  its  right  wing.  The  battalion  formed  column 
of  pieces  to  the  left  out  of  line,  withdrawing  by  battery  at  a 
trot  out  of  range  of  the  shrai)nel  with  which  the  hostile  artil- 


Studies  in  tiik  Lkadinc.  ov  Troops.  i6.^ 

lery  had  opened.     The  First  horse  battery  had  gone  into  ac- 
tion at  a  gallop  on  the  southern  slope  of  the  Galgen  Mountain^ 
just  at  the  right  time,  and  drew  the  enemy's  fire  upon  itself.' 
Nevertheless,  some  of  the  gunners  of  the  First  battalion  were 
wounded  and  left  behind.     The   second  echelon   had  halted, 
under  cover  of  the  sunken  road  east  of  the  Galgen  Mountain,- 
and  followed  the  last  battery  of  the  battalion  without  being 
fired  on  by  the  enemy.     The  battalion  commander  had  hurried 
forward,  with  his  adjutant  and   several   scouts,   to  meet   the 
regimental  commander  with  the  Second  battalion.     In  riding' 
forward  he  noticed  that  the  batteries  would  be  forced  to  keep 
the  road  on  account  of  the  steepness  of  the  hill  south  of  Krib- 
litz  (457).     He  sent  a  scout  back  to  the  leading  battery  with 
advice  to  that  effect,  and  ordered  the  march  to  be  continued, 
covered,  behind  the  ridge  along  the  little  woods  south  of  Krib- 
litz.     On  the  top  of  this  ridge,  440  yards  from  the  right  wing 
of  the  Second  battalion,  he  found  the  regimental  commander, 
who  had  hastened  there  to  await  him.     He  was  then  given  the* 
following  order:     *'Put  your  battalion  in  action  south  of  the 
little  Kriblitz  woods,  and  fire  on  the  three   hostile  batteries 
located  east  of  Neu-Rognitz,  against  which  the   Second  bat- 
talion is  already  in  action ;  at  the  same  time  harass  the  infantry 
m  the  patches  of  wood  north  of  the  village."     The  battatioit 
commander  thereupon  called  for  his  battery  commanders,  and 
assigned  to  them  the  positions  shown  on  the  plan  of  the  en- 
gagement.    When  the  batteries  had  gone  into  action,  the  lim« 
bers  were  taken  back  to  the  edge  of  the  woods,  and  2  ammuni- 
tion-wagons were  sent  to  each  battery  from  the  first  echeloii 
standing  near  by.     Contrary  to  the  general  custom,  all  the 
caissons  halted  440  vards  on  the  flank,  instead  of  in  the  rear  of 
the  guns,  covered,  north  of  Hill  457  and  near  the  woods ;  this 
was  due  to  the  nature  of  the  terrane.     The  hostile  batteries 
east  of  Neu-Rognitz  had  not  interfered  with  this  movement, 
as  they  were  kept  busy  by  the  Second  battalion.     Although 
the  regiment  had  thus   far  used  but  little   ammunition,   and 
had  an  ample  supply  for  3^4  hours  at  the  ordinary  rate  of 

fire,  Lieutenant-Colonel  I did  not  fail  to  appreciate  the 

fact  that  if  the  battle  should  become  fiercer  on  the  long  sum- 
mer's day,  it  might  lead  to  scarcity  of  ammunition.  He  accord- 
ino-ly  sent  an  officer  to  the  commander  of  the  artillery  brigade» 


i66  Siui)[i:s  IN  THE  Lkading  of  Troops. 

requesting  that  an  artillery  ammunition  column  be  placed  in 
readiness  for  the  reginient  at  Trautenau  near  the  exit  to 
Kaussnitz.  At  12:20  p.  m.  the  First  battalion  opened  fire  with 
all  its  batteries,  evidently  to  the  enemy's  surprise. 

Meanwhile  the  initiatory  movements  of  the  Third  bri- 
gade  had  also  commenced.     When   Major-General   B 

had  received  his  instructions  from  the  division  commander  at 
12:04  P-  ^^i-»  ^^^  fi^'st  rode  to  Hill  513  (situated  in  the  most 
advanced  line),  and  dismounted  behind  the  hill  with  his  staff. 
Both  his  regimental  commanders  were  ordered  to  this  point, 
where  they  arrived  at  12:10  p.  m.,  and  received  the  following 
instructions : 

"The  attack  on  the  enemy's  forces  near  Neu-Rognitz 
will  be  resumed.  Corps  artillery  has  received  orders  to  de- 
ploy on  the  Galgen  Mountain.  The  entire  First  regiment 
of  field  artillery  will  go  into  action  on  Ridge  500,  which  you 
see  in  the  distance.  The  Fourth  brigade  will  act  against  the 
right  flank  of  the  enemy,  from  the  direction  of  Alt-Rognitz, 
while  we  attack  his  front  as  soon  as  ordered  to  do  so  by  the 
division  commander. 

"Colonel  D [First  regiment  | ,  you  will  ])ropare  the 

attack  with  your  fire,  but  do  not  advance  beyond  the  line  now 
held  by  the  Twelfth  and  Tenth  companies.  When  you  attack, 
the  center  of  your  regiment  will  take  as  march  direction  the 
northwest  corner  of  the  large  woods  north  of  Neu-Rognitz, 
and  you  will  connect  with  the  Second  regiment. 

"Colonel  E [Second  regiment],  deploy  your  forces 

to  the  left  of  the  First  regiment,  in  a  covered  position ;  your 
objective  will  be  the  left  wing  of  the  same  woods. 

"A  line  separating  your  regiments  would  run  from  Hill 
513  to  the  western  edge  of  Hill  527." 

The  commanders  thereupon  returned   t(i  their  respective 
regiments. 

Colonel  D^ ordered  his  Second  battalion  to  fall  in 

at  once,  and  to  deploy  for  the  preparatory  fire  between  Hohen- 
bruck  and  the  Tenth  comi)any,  which  was  near  the  edge  of  the 
woods.  The  Third  battalion' likewise  was  directed  to  open  fire 
with  the  3  companies  present.  Near  12:30  the  Ninth  and 
Twelfth  companies  from  the  direction  of  the  village,  followed 
by  the   iMfth.   Sixth,  and   Seventh  c(^mpanies,  and  the  Tenth 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  167 

company  from  the  direction  of  the  edge  of  the  woods,  were 
engaged  at  900  to  1,000  yards  in  a  brisk  fire  with  the  hostile 
skirmishers  lying  north  of  Neu-Rognitz.  The  Eighth  com- 
pany was  lying  under  cover  in  line  in  the  woods  on  Hill  509. 
The  First  battalion,  under  orders  of  the  regimental  com- 
mander, moved  in  column  of  march  in  a  depression  close  up 
to  Hohenbruck,  where  it  halted  under  cover.  The  Second 
regiment  was  so  posted  that  the  Third  battalion  (3  compa- 
nies) moved  up  more  closely  to  Hill  513,  thereby  making  room 
for  the  Second  battalion,  which  was  grouping  on  the  same 
line.  Both  battalions  had  posted  themselves  under  cover  in 
two  echelons  in  company  columns,  a  few  skirmishers  in  front, 
because  it  was  not  the  intention  for  them  to  open  fire,  by 
reason  of  the  great  distance  and  the  obstructed  view  to  their 
front.  The  First  battalion,  in  column  of  platoons,  moved  up 
behind  the  center  of  the  two  leading  battalions. 

The  brigade  commander  inspected  the  positions  of  the 
closed  subdivisions,  and  when  the.  preparatory  fire  of  the 
companies  of  the  infantry  regiment  was  heard  to  be  steadily  in- 
creasing, he  directed  that  the  amrunifon  in  lh^  cartridge- 
wagons  be  at  once  issued.  This  issue  proceeded  prompty  and 
without  difficulty  in  the  case  of  the  companies  not  under  fire. 
The  companies  already  partially  deployed  sent  back  men  under 
a  non-commissioned  officer  to  the  cartridge-wagons,  who  car- 
ried the  cartridges  up  in  bags  and  threw  the  packages  to  the 
men  on  the  skirmish  line.  The  latter  found  room  for  the 
cartridges  in  their  haversacks  and  trousers  and  coat  pockets. 
At  12  :45  p.  m.  the  empty  cartridge-wagons  were  sent  back  to 
Trautenau,  going  east  of  the  Hopfen  Mountain.  At  that  time 
Major-General  B again  returned  to  Hill  513. 

It  could  be  distinctly  seen  that  the  enemy  occupied  the 
foot  of  the  line  of  hills  from  the  strip  of  woods  near  the  high- 
way to  the  meadow  situated  to  the  east  of  the  highway,  with 
strong  lines  of  skirmishers.  Near  the  patches  of  woods  sit- 
uated to  the  northeast  and  east  of  Neu-Roq-nitz  large  closed 
bodies  appeared,  between  which,  as  previously  stated,  3  bat- 
teries were  in  position  not  very  far  from  the  village. 

When   Major-General   C received   the   order   that 

the  division  commander  had  sent  bv  his  second  aid    (12:08 


i68  St  um  i:s  in  tuk  Lkadix'-.  of  Troops. 

p.  111.),  he  was  standing  with  the  two  regimental  commander': 
between  the  Third  and   Fourth   regiments. 

It  was  a  source  of  great  satisfaction  to  the  brigade  com- 
mander that  the  artillery  on  Ridge  50CJ  was  reinforced.  If  the 
batteries  on  his  side  did  not  obtain  a  superiority  over  those 
of  the  enemy,  the  position  of  the  densely  massed  Fourth  in- 
fantry brigade  w^ould  be  endangered  by  shrapnel  although  it 
might  be  well  covered.  At  all  events,  some  time  must  elapse 
before  the  First  battalion  of  field  artillery  would  come  up,  and 
even  after  its  arrival  it  would  be  out  of  the  question  to  lead  the 
brigade  to  Alt-Rognitz,  by  a  flank  march,  over  country  in  full 
view  of  the  enemy,  about  ^  mile  from  the  hostile  infantry  and 
13/2  miles  from  the  hostile  artillery.  As  a  consequence  Major- 
General  C issued  the  follovv^ing  order : 

"The  attack  on  the  enemy  in  position  ne  ir  Neu-Rognitz 
will  be  resumed.  The  division  artillery  will  prepare  the  as- 
sault from  the  crest  of  Hill  500,  the  Third  brigade  attacking 
the  front  from  the  direction  of  Hohenbruck,  the  Fourth  bri- 
gade attacking  the  flank  from  Alt-Rognitz.  Orders  for  the 
initiation  of  the  attack  will  be  issued  by  the  division  com- 
mander. Colonel  F (Third  infantry]  will  leave  i  bat- 
talion here  for  use  by  the  division  commander,  but  will  ad- 
vance with  the  two  others  behind  the  Second  battalion  of  ar- 
tillery, and,  passing  Hill  530  through  the  woods  in  front  of 
Alt-Rognitz,  post  the  battalions  on  the  Jeft  wing  in  the  sec- 
ond line  under  cover.     Colonel   G r    [Fourth   infantry] 

will  post  his  regiment  in  such  manner  that  it  will  be  ready  for 
both  attack  and  defense  in  the  depression  of  Alt-Rognitz,  with 
a  breadth  of  875  yards  and  the  right  resting  on  Hill  425. 
Messages  will  reach  me  near  Hill  425.  Each  legiment  will 
send  me   i   mounted  officer." 

Colonel  F at  once  designated  the  Third  battalion 

to  pass  under  the  direct  orders  of  the  division  commander: 
his  3  battalion  adj'.itants  had  already  come  up  to  him  for  in- 
structions. The  First  and  Second  battalions  of  the  Third 
infantry,  in  double  i^latoon  cohnnns,  were  at  once  given  orders 
to  start  without  delay,  proceeding  in  column  of  march  along 
the  southern  e.lge  of  the  Kriblitz  woods  and  turning  toward 
Hill  530.  At  that  point  the  regimental  commander,  who  had 
ridden  ahead,  directed  i  battalion  upon  each  of  the  roads  lead- 


I 


Studh:s  in  Tili;  Lkadinc.  ()i-  Tkoops.  i6<> 

ing  south  toward  Ait-Rognitz.  The  shifting  of  tlie  battahons 
to"  the  left  wing  had  been  effected  without  serious  loss,  as  it 
had  taken  place  mostly  under  cover;  the  Second  battalion  of 
the  Third  infantry,  which  was  in  rear  of  the  artillery  battal- 
ion, had,  however,  lost  about  30  men  by  shrapnel  that  had 
reached  farther  than  expected.  At  12:45  the  battalions  were 
in  single  platoon  columns  at  the  southern  edge  of  the  woods 
north  of  Alt-Rognitz.  (See  Map  V.)  The  commander  of 
the  Fourth  infantry  regiment  waited  until  the  First  battalion 
of  artillery  had  gone  into  action,  and  when  at  12:30  the  fire 
from  the  enemy's  batteries  appeared  to  slacken,  he  ordered  the 
Third  battalion  to  shift  440  yards  to  the  left,  in  the  bottoms 
near  Ait-Rognitz,  under  cover.  The  Second  battalion,  in 
company  column,  immediately  took  the  place  of  the  Third 
near  Mill  425.  The  First  battalion  advanced  over  open 
ground  with  the  companies  in  column  of  march,  but  without 
much  loss,  up  to  and  along  the  road  leading  into  the  center  of 
Alt-Rognitz,  and  about  12:45  took  up  a  position  on  the  south- 
ern edge  of  the  village  to  the  left  and  alongside  the  Third  bat- 
talion.' The  latter  had  sent  forward  2  companies  into  the  un- 
dulating ground  361,  which  entered  into  a  fire  fight  with  hos- 
tile skirmish  lines  at  a  distance  of  about  1,200  yards. 

In  the  meantime  the  l-rigade  commander  had  repaired  to 
the  northeastern  corner  of  the  thicket  in  front  of  Mill  425, 
where  he  had  dismounted  to  observe  the  progress  of  the  de- 
ployment of  his  brigade.  When  he  chanced  to  see  the  divis- 
ion flag  on  the  eastern  hill  (500),  he  sent  his  aid,  on  foot,  up 
to  the  hill,  to  report  the  dispositions  he  had  made.  The  divis- 
ion commander  approved  his  dispositions,  and  sent  word  back 
that  he  would  give  the  order  to  attack  as  soon  as  the  2  bat- 
talions of  the  Third  infantry  had  arrived  on  the  left  wing. 

At  12:45  the  artillery  regiment  had  gained  a  superiority 
of  fire  over  the  3  hostile  batteries  east  of  Neu-Rognitz,  and 
the  hostile  infantry  had  extended  farther  to  the  east,  occupy- 
ing the  thickets  along  the  wagon-road  on  the  right  wing. 

Lieutenant-General   A .  who  had  been  on  Hill  500 

for  about  half  an  hour,  sent  an  aid  to  the  hussar  regiment, 
with  instructions  to  follow  the  advance  of  the  Fourth  infantry 
brigade,  and  at  the  same  time  continue  to  keep  watch  over 
the   country  between   Rudersdorf   and   the   Aupa   by   patrols. 


ijo  Studiks  IX  Tin:  Leading  of  Troops. 

He  also  sent  a  niountcd  rifleman  with  the  following  written 
order  to  the  engineer  company  in  Trautenau : 

"The  company  of  engineers  will  proceed  to  Hohenbruck 
and  prepare  that  village  for  defense,  especially  along  the  high- 
way, as  soon  as  it  will  be  no  longer  needed  in  Trautenau." 

Another  mounted  rifleman  was  sent  to  the  flank  detach- 
ment still  situated  near  Welhota  (the  Eleventh  company  of  the 
First  infantry,  and  half  a  troop  of  the  Fourth  squadron),  with 
written  orders  to  advance  to  Raussnitz,  where  they  would  join 
the  division  of  the  Guard  as  soon  as  any  part  of  it  should  reach 
there,  and  take  direction  toward  Alt-Rognitz. 

Comments  on  thk  DjspOvSjtions  of  the  Second  Infantry 
Division  from  11:30  a.  m.  to  12:45  p-^^- 

The  corps  commander  had  already  ordered  that  the  at- 
tack be  made  by  a  turning  movement.  Consequently  a  part 
of  the  forces  must  be  put  in  motion  against  the  right  flank 
of  the  enemy  simultaneously  with  the  advance  against  his 
front.  In  this  the  division  was  at  an  advantage  in  its  being 
already  deployed  to  some  extent ;  otherwise  still  more  time 
would  have  been  lost  in  making  preliminary  movements. 
Only  most  urgent  circumstances  can  justify  a  simple  frontal 
attack.  (See  page  92,  Part  II.)  The  great  strength  of  the 
defense  compels  us  to  combine  a  frontal  attack  with  a  turn- 
ing movement,  whenever  practicable. 

It  is  essential,  however,  in  a  successful  attack  of  this 
kind,  that,  if  possible,  the  turning  movement  remain  con- 
cealed from  the  enemy  for  a  long  time,  or  else  that  he  be 
held  fast  in  front  until  it  becomes  effective.  In  this  lat- 
ter direction  too  much  is  frequently  done ;  as  a  rule,  we  im- 
agine the  enemy  can  only  be  effectively  held  in  his  front  by 
a  more  or  less  energetically  executed  attack.  This  is  by  no 
means  so  H'itJi  Iar_i^c>'  bodies  of  troops:  in  such  cases  it  is  only 
necessary  that  the  troops  near  the  enemy  be  held  in  readiiYcss 
for  the  attack,  since,  as  we  have  previouslv  noted,  the  deployed 
enemy  is  no  longer  in  position  to  withdraw  altogether  from 
the  action.  The  battle  of  Oravelotte  and  St.  Privat,  August 
18,  1870,  both  in  general  and  in  detail,  affords  examples  which 
cannot  be  too  carefully  considered. 


I 


Studies  in  thi^  Leading  of  Troops. 


171 


How  far  the  turning  movement  should  extend  can  be 
foreseen  only  in  the  lesser  operations  of  war,  and  when  the 
ground  can  be  fully  surveyed.  In  general,  it  should  be  gov- 
erned by  the  strength  of  troops  available,  else  too  great  an 
extension  may  easily  follow. 

In  the  battle  above  mentioned  it  was  intended  to  hold  the 
enemy  firmly  in  front  until  it  would  be  possible  for  the  left 
wing,  wheeling  around,  to  grasp  the  right  flank  of  the  French 
army.  General  headquarters  was  in  error,  however,  in  believ- 
ing that  the  hostile  position  reached  only  to  Amanvillers ;  in 
reality  it  extended  beyond  it  to  St.  Privat  la  Montague,  and 
later  even  to  Roncourt. 

The  village  of  Alt-Rognitz  was  assigned  to  the  Fourth 
infantry  brigade  as  the  point  at  which  to  begin  the  turning 
movement.  But  in  order  to  avoid  a  premature  attack,  the 
line  beyond  which  it  should  not  advance  was  also  stated,  the 
extension  of  the  left  wing  having  been  fixed  at  about  550 
yards  west  of  the  church  of  St.  Paul  and  St.  John.  However, 
it  could  not  be  foreseen  whether  the  flank  attack  would  act- 
ually take  place  from  that  point;  in  the  meantime  the  enemy 
could  have  started  counter-measures,  or  he  could  have  extend- 
ed his  right  wing  and  placed  reserves  behind  it.  In  such  a 
case  the  attack  of  the  Fourth  infantry  brigade  would  also  be 
a  frontal  one. 

Under  any  circumstances,  however,  the  combined  action 
of  both  brigades  must  be  secured;  otherwise,  if  the  enemy 
should  make  use  of  the  most  effective  counter-measure  in 
such  tactics  (an  offensive  advance,  say  against  the  Third  bri- 
gade, to  annihilate  it  before  the  too  distant  Fourth  could  ren- 
der assistance),  the  whole  division  might  be  dispersed. 

In  view  of  this  it  seems  wise  that  Lieutenant-General 
A should  have  designated  the  southern  exit  of  Alt- 
Rognitz  as  the  point  beyond  which  the  Fourth  brigade  should 
not  extend.  From  that  point  to  the  highway  the  distance  was 
about  a  mile  and  a  half,  and  would  gradually  become  less  as 
the  two  brigades  advanced.  Comnron  action  of  the  separate 
bodies  would  probably  be  practicable  very  soon. 

The  division  commander  had  reserved  for  himself  the 
fixing  of  the  time  for  beginning  the  attack,  as  he  wished  first 
to  await  the  effect  of  the  artillery  fire.      By  this  he  assured 


172  Studies  in  the  Leading  oe  Troops. 

llie  simultaneous  start  of  both  brigades.  For  instance,  had 
lie  ordered  the  Third  brij^ade  to  start  as  soon  as  the  Fourth 
advanced  from  Alt-Rognitz,  the  commander  of  the  Third  bri- 
gade might  be  induced  to  lead  forward  his  entire  force  at  the 
moment  single  companies  of  the  Fourth  might  come  out  for 
hre  preparation.  .Vt  a  mile  and  a  quarter  from  Hohenbruck. 
where  the  commander  of  the  Third  brigade  had  halted,  it  wa:s 
difficult  to  overlook  the  left  wing,  while  the  operations  of  the 
I'ourth  brigade,  in  the  bottoms,  could  not  be  seen  at  all. 

Jt  was  therefore  better  for  the  division  commander  to 
have  instructed  the  brigades  not  to  start  before  he  had  given 
the  orders.  Everything  depended  on  the  simultaneous  onset 
of  both  brigades,  which  must  be  governed  by  the  effect  of  the 
artillery  and  the  movements  of  the  brigade  on  the  left  wing. 
As  soon  then  as  Lieutenant-General  A selected  a  sta- 
tion from  which  he  could  oversee  the  deployment  of  the  lat- 
ter for  attack,  he  was  in  position  to  chose  a  time  for  the  start 
of  the  Third  brigade. 

The  division  commander  ])roposed  to  use  all  his  troops 
for  the  attack,  retaining  t  battalion,  however,  at  his  disposal. 
We  have  already  stated  that  generally  ai\  action  must  not  be 
initiated  without  a  reserve,  but  here  we  may  say  that  as  the 
corps  commander  v/as  conducting  the  fight,  the  entire  First 
division  was  a  fighting  reserve.  For  the  Second  division  it 
meant  a  decisive  attack,  and  therefore  all  its  parts  must  be 
jHit  in  motion  in  such  a  manner  that  they  may  proiuptly  par- 
ticipate in  the  action.  Only  absolutely  necessary  detachments 
must  be  made,  like  the  company  near  Welhota  in  the  valley 
of  the  Aupa.  The  front  of  the  division  is  so  extensive  that  the 
decision  would  come  quickly,  and  a  few  battalions  held  in 
reserve  far  to  the  rear  could  hardly  l)e  led  up  in  time  to  where 
thev  might  be  needed.  They  might  arrive  soon  enough  to  sup- 
port retiring  forces,  but  to  assure  a  victory  they  niust  repeat 
an  attack  at  which  a  regiment  or  a  brigade  had  just  failed, 
the  chances  for  success  in  which  in  all  probability  would  be 
less  than  if  retiring  troops  were  merely  supported.  The  main 
\nnut  is  this:  give  the  artillery  .plenty  of  time  for  its  work; 
liave  the  terrane  thoroughly  reconnoitered ;  and  carefully  (Ifs- 
l>o.se  your  infantry.  The  support  of  the  most  advanced  tn^^ps 
is   then   the  dnlv  of  the   succeediuL:   echelons,    which    must   be 


Studii^s  in  the  Lkadixg  of  Troops.  173 

near  enough  to  join  in  the  action  before  hesitation  in  the  fight 
ing  Hne  grows  to  a  retrograde  movement.  JVhcn  the  time  for 
d  decidiui^  action  has  arrived,  and  it  is  no  longer  a  matter  of 
merely  initiating  an  attack,  it  is  not  advisable  to  detach  a  spe- 
cial reserve  from  tJie  troops  that  are  disposable  for  the  attack, 
so  long  as  there'  are  already  other  troops  in  readiness  for 
reserve  dutv.  The  i  battaUon  that  the  division  commander 
retained  at  his  disposition  was  to  be  put  into  action  at  such 
])oint  of  the  attacking  hne  at  which  a  clieck  might  occur. 

We  should  not  fail  to  note  that  the  reserve  put  in  readi- 
ness by  the  First  infantry  division  was  very  incomplete.  In 
the  act  of  forming  up  on  the  right  tlank  of  the  line  of  battle, 
it  was  not  in  condition  to  afford  timely  relief  to  the  left  wing 
of  the  division  in  case  it  failed  in  the  attack.  In  such  an  event 
it  would  be  entirely  dependent  upon  accident  at  what  point 

J.j'eutenant-General    A could    rally    his   troops,    and    it 

would  have  been  better  had  he  reserved  still  more  of  his 
trtops,  so  that  he  could  rendQr  innricdiatc  support  to  the  at- 
tacking troops  at  a  decisive  point. 

As  it  was,  his  division  for  the  time  being  was  entirely 
dependent  upon  itself,  and  an  isolated  division  will  not  do  well 
if  it  attacks  without  a  special  fighting  reserve. 

A  still  greater  error  was  seen  in  our  battles  of  1866,  in 
that  brigades  or  divisions  advancing  for  a  decisive  attack  left 
battalions  behind  in  defensive  positions  in  suitable  sections  of 
the  terrane.  When  the  object  is  the  forcing  of  a  decision  in 
front,  a  single  reserve  battalion  may  often  turn  the  scale ; 
therefore,  it"  must  not  be  wanting.  Retiring  forces,  on  the 
other  hand,  if  their  power  of  resistance  is  not  completely  bro- 
ken, will  of  themselves  make  a  stand  in  a  favorable  position. 

The  issue  of  the  orders  by  the  division  commander  pro- 
ceeded in  the  rotation  of  their  importance,  according  to  his 
«jwn  judgment. 

First,  instructions  were  verlmlly  given  to  the  commander 
of  the  artillery  regiment,  .whose  batteries  must  prepare  the 
attack  as  long  as  necessary.  Then  came  the  orders  to  the 
Fourth  brigade,  wliich  had  to  march  the  farthest  on  account 
of  the  proposed  turning  movement  before  it  could  join  in  the 
action.  Finally  he  gave  the  orders  to  the  Third  brigade,  which 
l^robablv  need' not  start  for  three-quarters  of  an  hour. 


174  Studiks  in  Til};  Ljcadi.ng  of  Trooi'S. 

If  a  judicious  sequence  in  giving  orders  is  observed  in 
such  situations,  a  few  precious  minutes  may  generally  be 
gained. 

The  issue  of  a  regularly  arranged  written  division  order 
for  all  parties  could  hardly  be  expected  on  account  of  the  lit- 
tle time  available.  Verbal  orders  were  accordingly  issued  to 
the  various  headquarters.  The  transmission  of  orders  is  has- 
tened and  fa  'Hi täte d  if  commanders  keep  up  communication 
with  their  si/^erior  through  staff  officers.  While  the  com- 
mander of  tl  si  Third  infantry  brigade  rode  up  to  the  division 
commander,  the  commander  of  the  artillery  had  remained  with 

Lieutenant-General  A .    Major-General  C (Fourth 

infantry  brigade)  was  nearly  a  mile  away,  by  reason  of  the 
situation  of  the  combat,  and  his  orders  must  be  sent  by  one 
of  the  aids.     It  was  very  fortunate  that  both  the  regimental 

commanders  were  with  Major-General  C ;  one  of  them 

had  his  battalion  adjutants  with  him,  so  that  the  regiment 
(  Third  infantry)  could  transmit  its  orders  directly  to  the  com- 
panies. We  should  endeavor  to  issue  in  writing  all  orders 
for  brigades  or  larger  units ;  lack  of  time  alone,  as  in  this  case, 
can  justify  an  exception. 

Right  here  we  would  ngain  state  that  it  is  better  to  make 
your  orders  somewhat  too  explicit  than  to  leave  a  subordinate 
commander  without  a  sufficient  view  of  the  situation.  With 
regard  to  the  order  given  the  comniander  of  the  artillery,  it 
seems  that  the  least  possible  was  said ;  but  the  few  words  that 
were  said  embraced  the  main  points  necessary  for  the  com- 
mander to  know — the  objective  of  th^  attack,  its  p'an,  and 
the  task  which  fell  to  the  artillery  regiment  for  the  time  b:- 
ing.  It  said  explicitly,  "Assemble  your  6  batteries  '•'  '•'  '"^' 
and  prepare  the  attack."  It  could  not  be  inferred  from  this 
that  the  activity  of  the  batteries  would  cease  with  the  prepara- 
tion, but  rather  that  as  soon  as  the  infantry  advanced  to  the 
attack,  the  artillery  would  receive  further  orders,  governing 
its  action  during  the  Fight.  Nevertheless  the  order  might  have 
gone  further  and  directed  the  regiment  hrst  to  subdue  the  bat- 
teries east  of  Xeii-Rognitz,  and  tlun  turn  its  lire  ui)on  the 
infantry  in  the  patches  of  woods  lunih  of  the  village. 

As  a  rule,  it  is  the  artillery  that  is  least  informed  regard- 
ing the  course'  of  affairs.     "I  p  to  tli-.'  coinnieneement  of  llie 


Studies  in  thk  Leading  of  Troops.  175 

action  the  artillery  commander  is  with  the  leader  of  the  bod^ 
of  troops  to  which  he  is  attached,  and  the  first  orders  neces- 
sary for  his  part  in  the  action  will  come  from  that  leader.  He 
will  then  take  command  of  his  troops,  or  at  least  the  largest 
united  body  of  them,  but  will  keep  up  continuous  communi- 
cation with  his  regular  commander."  This  is  what  Drill  Reg- 
ulations prescribe  for  the  field  artillery.  If  th^  artillery  com- 
mander is  not  given  the  necessary  orders  or  th-  general  view, 
he  must  insist  that  it  be  done.  In  the  case  t  fore  us,  how- 
ever, all  that  was  necessary  had  been  given  in  the  orders. 

Furthermore,  it  was  judicious  to  point  out  at  the  proper 
time,  to  tlie  artillery  commander,  the  plan  of  the  leader  of  the 
action,  and  to  assign  his  part  therein.  A  division  commander 
must  acquire  the  habit  of  considering  his  36  guns  as  a  col- 
lective battle  unit,  as  he  does  with  his  infantry  brigades  and 
his  cavalry  regiment.  He  would  dispose  of  single  battalions 
of  his  brigades  only  in  exceptional  cases,  and  he  must  adopt 
the  same  principle  with  reference  to  his  batteries. 

Judging  from  the  course  of  the  action  up  to  1 1 130,  there 
was  always  danger  that  the  2  battalions  of  field  artillery 
would  become  separated.  Should  such  happen,  it  would  have 
been  doubtful  whether  the  3  hostile  batteries  east  of  Neu- 
Rognitz  could  have  been  promptly  subdued,  and  the  speecty 
attack  that  was  planned  would  then  have  to  be  aban- 
doned; or,  if  the  infantry  attack  were  nevertheless  under- 
taken, it  would  be  a  very  bloody  affair  and  its  outcome 
uncertain.  While  so  separated  the  First  battalion  of  ar- 
tillery could  hardly  go  into  action  at  any  other  point  than 
the  Galgen  Mountain,  and  as  the  Sixteenth  regiment  of  field 
artillery  was  also  to  take  position  there,  all  would  have  been 
obliged  to  go  into  action  at  diminished  intervals  or  in  terrace 
formation.  At  all  events,  the  position  would  have  been  a  very 
crowded  one.  Furthermore,  the  division  commander  would 
have  lost  control  of  half  his  artillery;  for  if  the  First  battal- 
ion remained  near  the  Galgen  Mountain,  according  to  regu- 
lations it  would  pass  under  the  command  of  the  senior  artil- 
ler}^  commander,  who  in  this  case  was  the  commander  of  the 
Sixteenth  regiment.  If  the  division  commander  should  keep 
the  6  batteries  together  under  his  command,  he  could  not 
only  prepare  the  attack  from  stage  to  stage,  but  accompany 


1 76  Stitdiks  IX  TiiK  Leadixg  of  Troops. 

it  with  his  artillery.  It  \v(nil(l  have  been  still  better  if  the  artil- 
lery could  have  i:^one  into  action  farther  off  on  the  left ;  it 
would  not  have  been  necessary  then  to  fire  over  the  heads  of 
the  infantry,  although  the  latter  was  posted  in  a  deep  ravine. 
The  terrane,  however,  did  not  permit  this. 

As  for  the  cavalry  regiment,  it  was  directed  to  follow  the 
fourth  brigade  and  at  the  same  time  reconnoiter  with  patrols 
the  country  between  Rudersdorf  and  the  Aupa.  We  know 
from  experience  that  such  an  order  is  a  rare  one,  ^and  that 
generally  an  entire  regiment  is  charged  with  reconnaissance. 
The  latter  course,  however,  does  not  seem  to  be  the  correct 
one.  The  engagement  about  to  be  initiated  was  the  main 
object  in  view,  and  for  it  all  forces  should  be  put  in  readiness. 
For  other  purposes  detachments  only  should  be  used,  and 
these  only  as  far  as  unavoidably  necessary.  An  advance  of 
hostile  bodies  between  Rudersdorf  and  the  Aupa  would  be  in 
the  highest  degree  dangerous,  but  there  was  not  the  last  indi- 
cation that  such  was  likely  to  occur.  All  that  was  necessary 
was  to  take  measures  l)y  which  such  a  movement  of  the  enemy 
would  be  discovered  in  time  to  meet  it  properly,  for  which 
purpose  ])atrols  would  suffice,  ^vhile  the  rest  of  the  cavalry 
could  be  used  to  advantage  in  the  action  itself.  It  would 
tlien  have  been  better  to  have  given  it  such  an  order  as  would 
permit  it  to  join  in  the  action  according  to  the  terrane  and 
the  special  conditions. 

The  commander  of  the  hussar  regiment  interpreted  his 
order  aright  in  his  not  following  directly  behind  the  Fourth 
brigade,  but  keeping  in  line  with  its  left  wing  at  a  distance  of 
•from  400  to  500  yards. 

It  is  always  necessary  to  secure  the  fianks  (^f  troops  in 
action.  Rut  we  should  l)ear  in  mind  that,  as  a  rule,  this  can 
be  accomi)lished  by  patrols.  .\n  observance  of  this  ])rin- 
ciple  will  avoid  the  misuse  of  the  cavalry  regiment  of  a  divis- 
ion that  so  often  ()ccurs  in  actual  war,  and  the  regiment  will 
not  be  lost  to  its  j^-oper  role. 

TmC    v'^l'A'KRAI.    1*\RTS    OK    Till-;     l)l\K10\. 

As  for  the  Mrst  battalion  of  the  First  field  artillery  reg- 
hnent.  in  accordan::e  with  i)revious  arrangements  it  must  re- 
ceive its  orders   from   Major-Oeneral    I» until   it  again 


Studies  in  the  Leading  oe  Troops.  177 

reverted  to  its  regimental  commander.  The  latter  received  his 
instructions  from  the  division  commander,  in  the  presence  of 

Major-General   B ,   on    Hill   504    (south   of   the   Hopfen 

Mountain),  and  this  made  it  clear  to  Major-General  B 

that  he  was  then  deprived  of  the  command  of  the  battalion  of 
artillery.  While  the  commander  of  the  artillery  regiment  was 
receiving  the  orders  of  the  division  commander,  the  First  bat- 
talion was  led  to  seek  em])]oyment  which  was  not  warranted 
by  the  circumstances.  This  will  always  happen  when  sub- 
ordinate commanders  are  ambitious  to  achieve  great  results 
and  their  superiors  do  not  understand  how  to  restrain  them. 
The  difficulty  increases  when  the  two  commanders  are  not 
sufficiently  acquainted  with  each  other,  which  generally  hap- 
pens with  the  commanders  of  the  infantry  and  the  artillery 
at  the  beginning  of  a  war.  This  makes  it  all  the  more  nec- 
essary that  an  officer  should  acquire  perfect  familiarity  with 
the  art  of  commanding  troops. 

The  temptation  that  led  the  First  battalion  to  act  on  its 
own  responsibility  was  indeed  great.  Just  examine,  for  in- 
stance, the  situation  before  us.  The  enemy's  shrapnel  are 
reaching  the  Third  infantry  brigade,  in  consequence  of  which 
the  troops  suffer  some  losses,  which  cause  much  depression 
when  nothing  is  done  to  subdue  or  divert  the  enemy's  fire. 
Not  far  distant  are  18  of  our  own  guns,  the  arm  that  alone 
is  capable  of  accomplishing  such  a  task  at  long  range,  and 
vet  they  do  not  show  the  slightest  inclination  to  undertake 
'their  task.  Is  it  not  natural  that  every  one  should  then  become 
impatient  and  exclaim,  *'\Vhy  do  you  not  rid  us  of  the  hostile 
artillery?  What  are  you  here  for?"  In  most  cases  the  artil- 
lery will  be  put  to  such  use,  but  the  orders  for  such  should 
come  from  the  superior  commander. 

It  was  Major-General  B 's  duty  to  bring  the  artil- 
lery into  action  there;  or,  if  he  no  longer  controlled  it   (as 

was  indeed  the  casej,  then  it  was  Lieutenant-General  A 's 

duty  alone.  Yet  if  the  battalion  should  open  the  engagement 
on  its  own  account,  it  might  bring  about  a  more  extended 
action,  for  which,  in  the  leader's  opinion,  the  time  had  not  yet 
arrived,  or  it  might  become  engaged  on  the  left  wing  while 
the  leader  needed  it  more  urgently  on  the  other. 


178  Studiks  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

Without  the  Tipproval  of  the  commander  of  the  Third 
brigade,  under  whom  the  battahon  still  remained,  it  should 
not,  under  the  circumstances,  take  post  on  Hill  468  (southeast 
of  the  Galgen  Mountain)  and  open  fire.  Inquiry  of  the  brigade 
commander  would  not  have  otTended  the  latter,  even  though 
he  might  not  have  especially  recommended  inquiries,  for  the 
right  to  ask  if  one  may  act  with  troops  under  one's  command 
will  be  granted  by  every  commander  to  the  leader  of  an  inde- 
pendent subdivision  under  his  orders.  Abrupt  answers,  how- 
ever, should  always  be  avoided  on  the  part  of  superiors,  as 
they  stifle  independent  thought  and  create  indifference  in 
subordinates. 

As  already  stated,  the  regimental  commander  prevented 
the  leader  of  the  First  battalion  from  carrying  out  his  inten- 
tion to  bring  his  battalion  independently  into  fire  on  the  right 
wing.  At  first  the  batteries  may  not  have  comprehended  the 
meaning  of  this  order,  and  thought  it  strange  they  should  not 
be  permitted  to  silence  a  hostile  battery  when  they  could  eas- 
ily do  so.  But  from  their  standpoint  they  could  not  perceive 
the  general  purpose  of  the  engagement,  nor  did  they  know 
that  soon  the  Sixteenth  regiment  would  take  their  place  and 
they  would  be  assigned  work  on  the  left  wing. 

The  evacuation  of  a  position  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the 
enemy  ought  certainly  to  be  avoided,  no  less  than  the  losses 
resulting  from  a  flank  march,  but  in  this  case  the  hostile  bat- 
tery did  not  have  the  range,  and  the  distance  of  the  flank  march 
was  not  much  over  200  yards,  which  could- be  quickly  covered 
at  a  gallop.  At  all  events,  this  temporary  impleasant  situa- 
tion was  for  the  purpose  of  applying  the  rule  to  deploy  from 
the  start  a  superiority  of  guns  in  one  place,  so  as  to  secure 
their  combined  effect  early.  The  fire  was  to  be  directed  on 
the  hostile  artillery,  the  batteries  east  of  Neu-Rognitz.  The 
position  south  of  the  little  Kriblitz  woods  assigned  the  First 
battalion  was  almost  a  mile  and  two-thirds  from  the  enemy's 
batteries.  This  is  a  favorable  distance  for  eff'ect  and  observa- 
tion, although  guns  have  a  much  greater  range.  The  oppor- 
tunity of  observing  the  ])osition  of  the  o|)p(^n'Mit  and  the  effect 
of  fire  d(.'creases  materially  with  longer  distances.  The  posi 
tion  chosen  for  the  l^^irst  battalion  had  the  further  advantage 
of  bein</  able   to    .'each   tlir   rii^lit    wiuL!'  <»f   'he   enemv   with   .v 


I 


.  Studies  in  the:  Leading  of  Troops.  179 

f!aiiking  fire.  The  entire  artillery  regiment  had  an  extensive 
field  of  fire,  which  was  almost  everywhere  open.  It  was  also 
in  a  position  to  establish  a  line  of  fire  at  right  angles  to  the 
front.  There  was  ample  room  for  the  6  batteries,  each  bat- 
tery having  a  space  100  yards  wide,  and  the  interval  between 
guns  need  not  be  shortened.  The  distance  of  200  yards  be- 
tween the  2  battalions  was  caused  by  the  terrane,  and  in  no 
wise  interfered  with  the  supervision  of  fire.  It  was  indeed 
impossible  to  sweep  the  ground  at  short  distance,  as  the  slope 
to  the  southwest  was  very  steep  and  the  country  in  front  could 
not  be  seen.  As  it  was,  however,  the  danger  of  attack  by 
hostile  infantry  was  very  remote;  our  infantry  was  massed  in 
front  of  the  artillery,  and  the  division  commander  had  reserved 
the  Third  battalion  of  the  Third  infantry  for  emergencies. 

Placing  the  guns  behind  the  crest  of  Ridge  500-547,  with 
the  muzzles  above  the  ridge,  was  a  wise  measure.  It  is  true 
the  enemy  was  assisted  in  determining  his  own  range  and  ob- 
serving the  efi'ects  of  his  own  fire  by  the  artillery  regiment 
having  been  placed  near  the  southern  point  of  the  little  Krib- 
litz  woods,  but  this  was  a  measure  that  could  not  be  avoided ; 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  dark  background  formed  by  the 
pines  (especially  so  with  the  First  battalion)  made  it  difficult 
for  the  enemy  to  obtain  a  good  aim  on  the  ground  in  front 
where  the  batteries  were  stationed. 

The  position  of  the  First  battalion  had  been  reconnoitered 
and  designated  by  the  regimental  commander.  The  battalion 
commander  quickly  perceived  that  for  his  batteries  to  stand 
at  right  angle  to  the  front,  they  must  be  echeloned  to  the 
right  and.  rear  at  distances  of  50  to  60  yards;  a  formation, 
however,  which  would  not  interfere .  with  the  supervision  of 
fire.  The  First  battalion  was  certainly  poorly  located  for  an 
eventual  retreat.  But  there  need  hardly  be  any  fear  of  this, 
and  the  battalion  could  be  withdrawn  to  the  east  or  west,  go- 
ing around  the  little  Kriblitz  woods.  The  advance  of  the  Sec- 
ond battalion  in  line  to  the  fire  position  was  a  simple  move- 
ment ;  the  battalion  was  fired  upon  but  little,  and  the  advance 
could  be  made  under  cover.  With  the  First  battalion  the  posi- 
tion of  each  battery  commander  had  to  be  designated,  not 
alone  on  account  of  the  echelon  formation  and  the  steepness  of 
the  slope,  but  also  because  Hill  460  obstructed  the  view  to  a 


.8o  Studies  in  the  Leading  oi^  Troops. 

certain  extent,  as  it  lay  between  the  position  and  the  enemy. 
On  account  of  the  mountainous  terrane,  the  batteries  moved 
into  position  at  a  walk,  and  unlimbered  toward  the  right  flank. 
The  First  battery,  on  the  right  wing,  was  forced  to  carefully 
select  a  position  for  each  gun,  because  of  the  hills  in  front, 
and  therefore  its  chiefs  of  pieces  advanced  on  foot.  As  stated, 
the  First  battalion  opened  fire  at  12:20.  Special  measures  had 
to  be  adopted  at  once  to  lessen  the  recoil  of  the  pieces. 

While  the  Second  battalion  had  contested  a  fully  equal 
artillery  without  a  decided  success  since  11:30,  the  First  bat- 
talion could  expect  to  reach  a  decision  very  soon  if  no  new 
hostile  batteries  appeared.  It  seems  the  enemy  had  not  ob- 
served it  go  into  position,  and  the  sudden  opening  of  fire  by 
this  superior  artillery  must  have   made  a  strong  impression. 

The  division  commander  had  designated  the  purpose  of 
the  action — the  attack  on  the  enemy  before  Neu-Rognitz.  To 
make  this  attack,  it  was  first  necessary  to  drive  away  or  sub- 
due the  batteries  east  of  the  village.  It  was  therefore  entire- 
ly proper  that  the  right  and  center  batteries  ( First  and  Second 
respectively)  of  the  First  battalion  should  be  ordered  to  open 
on  the  hostile  artillery  with  increased  rapidity.  The  center 
battery  was  instructed  to  get  the  range,  although  the  distance 
could  be  reasonably  well  determined  by  the  map.  The  task 
of  the  battery  on  the  right  wing  was  difficult.  In  the  first 
place,  its  position  was  in  the  neighborhood  of  Contour  450, 
while  the  opposing  batteries  occupied  positions  between  Con- 
tours 450  and  500;  furthermore,  some  intervening  wooded  hills 
forced  the  battery  chief  to  use  indirect  fire.  The  left  wing  bat- 
tery (Third)  was  directed  to  fire  on  the  hostile  infantry  in  the 
patch  of  woods  north  of  Ncu-Rognitz.  As  it  stood  on  Hill  475, 
it  could  overlook  the  hostile  j^osition  tolerably  well,  and  took  the 
entire  skirmish  line  between  the  highway  and  the  northern 
footpath  under  fire,  as  well  as  the  troops  in  close  order  in  the 
edge  of  the  larger  piece  of  woods. 

The  commander  of  the  First  b.ittalion  sent  an  assistant 
observer  and  three  motmted  orderlies  to  Hill  513.  .\ftcr  sev- 
eral rounds  of  shrapnel  with  percussion  fu.se,  in  order  to  fix 
the  distance,  the  batteries  proceeded  to  use  shrapnel  with  time 
fuse.  The  First  battalion  fired  quite  briskly  with  2  batteries, 
about  6  shots  j)er  miinite.  while  the  M^hird   battery,  firitig  on 


Studies  in  teik  Leading  of  Troops.  i8j 

the  infantry,  limited  itself  to  ordinary  tire  (about  4  shots  per 
minute).  The  men  stood  near  the  guns  in  the  First  battalion, 
as  up  to  that  time  they  had  received  no  hostile  fire ;  those  ol 
the  Second  battalion,  on  the  contrary,  who  had  already  been 
for  some  time  under  a  damaging  fire,  kneeled  down  in  order 
to  lessen  their  losses. 

Firing  over  their  own  infantry  could  not  be  avoided. 
However,  this  only  occurred  with  the  left  wing  of  the  Second 
infantry  regiment. 

The  horse  battery  on  the  southern  slope  of  the  Galgen 
Mountain  had  come  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel 
J ,  according  to  orders  issued ;  but  as  it  was  quite  dis- 
tant, and  had  a  separate  task,  and  as  the  commander  of  the 
Sixteenth  regiment  of  field  artillery  might  arrive  there  at  any 
moment,  it  was  left  independent.  It  was  no  easy  matter  for 
the  horse  battery  to  hold  its  own  against  the  hostile  battery 
standing  under  cover  on  Hill  569,  east  of  Sorge.  The  former 
was  completely  in  the  open,  aslant  on  the  hill,  and  considerably 
lower. 

The  important  question  of  replenishing  the  ammunition 
was  easy  of  solution  for  the  Second  battalion.  The  battery 
commanders  had  brought  3  ammunition-wagons  up  to  each 
battery.  The  first  echelon  was  placed  under  cover  on  the 
right  wing  behind  Hill  500,  next  to  its  limbers,  which  had 
been  sent  back.  The  battalion  commander  had  the  caissons 
halt  in  the  ravine  north  of  Hill  504,  and  brought  3  ammuni- 
tion-wagons for  each  battery  up  to  the  first  echelon.  The  dis- 
positions of  the  First  battalion  in  this  connection  have  already 
been  described. 

From  the  above  it  is  seen  that  a  special  support  Is  just 
as  rarely  attached  to  artillery  in  action  as  on  the  march.  ( See 
Part  L,'  page  28.)  While  in  the  act  of  preparing  and  sup- 
porting an  attack  to  be  undertaken  by  the  other  arms,  bat- 
teries will  generally  take  position  in  the  vicinity ;  but  it  is  the 
duty  of  all  arms  to  hasten  to  the  assistance  of  a  battery  when 
the  latter  is  endangered.  One  of  Blücher's  general  orders 
threatened  with  court-martial  any  battalion  or  regiment  of  cav- 
alry that  did  not  hasten  to  the  defense  of  a  threatened  battery 
and  thereby  lose  at  least  half  its  men.  This  feeling  of  true 
brotherhood  in  arms  must  prevail  in  any  army,  and  the  Ger- 


i82  StudiI'S  in  Tin-:  Leadixc,  of  Troops. 

man  troops  have  given  splendid  evidence  of  it  in  the  last  cam- 
paign. It  was  this  spirit  that  prompted  Von  Hindenbur^'s 
aquadron  of  the  Second  regiment  of  dragoons  of  the  (luard 
to  throw  itself  upon  far  superior  cavalry  at  Vionville  and 
Mars  la  Tour  on  the  i6th  of  August.  1870,  in  order  to  save 
Von.^er  Planitz's  horse  battery  of  the  Guard.  The  same  spirit 
also'  led  the  fusilier  battalion  of  the  Eighty-fifth  regiment  to 
ailvance  past  the  batteries  of  the  Ninth  corps  on  the  i8th  of 
Aup^ust,  1870,  but  it  left  its  commander  (Major  Wolff  von 
GOTtentow),   10  officers,  and  370  men  lying  on  the  field. 

Many  such  instances  may  be  cited  both  on  our  own  side 
cind  that  of  our  opponents  during  the  campaigns  of  1866  and 
of  1870-71. 

It  will  therefore  only  be  necessary  to  send  special  bodies 
of  troops  for  the  temporary  protection  of  batteries  when 
protection  is  not  assured  by  the  general  dispositions.  In  the 
exan^ple  before  us,  bodies  of  troops  w^ere  everywhere  near  the 
various  artillery  battalions,  ready  in  case  of  danger  to  hasten 
to  their  suport  at  the  proper  time.  It  would  have  been  en- 
tirely useless  to  charge  single  companies  especially  with  this 
^ut^,  for  in  case  of  change  of  position  the  accelerated  gait 
of  the  artillery  would  make  it  impossible  for  them  to  follow 
the  batteries  and  they  would  be  lost  also  to  the  infantry  fight. 
But  if  a  battery  comes  into  a  situation  where  it  must  take  a 
|>oßition  apparently  not  sufficiently  secured  by  the  deployment 
of  other  troops,  then  the  commander-in-chief  must  provide  for 
its  safety.  If  the  commander-in-chief  is  not  present,  the  artil- 
lery should  request  the  nearest  body  of  troops  to  provide  its 
cover ;  such  a  request  will  always  be  i)romptly  complied  with — 
at  least  it  is  the  duty  of  troops  to  do  so  as  far  as  they  are  able. 

\n   the  Third   infantry   brigade   Major-General    B 

had  the  regimental  commanders  called  up,  to  give  them  the 
final  order  for  attack  at  a  moment's  notice,  from  a  point  where 
tlie  entire  battle-field  could  be  surveyed.  There  is  more  neces- 
sary to-day  than  ever,  as  the  accuracy  and  long  range  of  fire- 
arms demand  very  cautious  dispositions,  and  especially  a  thor- 
oug1i  utilization  of  the  ground.  This  applies,  however,  not 
only  to  the  superior  commanders,  but  also  to  leaders  of  smaller 
sul>divisions.  In  order  to  issue  orders  in  this  manner,  ample 
time  must  be  allowed,  but  in  the  heat  of  action  the  matter  is, 


Studiks  in  the  LEADiNi^,  of  Troops.  183 

unfortunately,  completely  overlooked.  When  a  superior  com- 
mander has  carefully  considered  everything  and  formed  his 
decisions,  he  usually  desires  to  have  them  executed  at  once, 
and  then  nothing  proceeds  quickly  enough  for  him.  Let  him 
only  consider  how  much  time  he  himself  required  for  mature 
reflection,  and  that  as  much  time  is  needed  by  his  subordi- 
nates. This  applies  even  to  the  simplest  situation,  such  as  an 
advance  over  open  terrane,  and  is  indeed  the  habitual  prac- 
tice on  the  drill-ground.  But  a  battle-field  is  usually  different 
from  a  drill-ground;  here  each  small  undulation,  each  ditch, 
each  bush  possesses  a  special  utility,  and  companies  and  battal- 
ions must  make  use  of  the  advantage  inherent  in  such  feat- 
ures. Therefore  the  more  a  leader  can  study  his  situation  be- 
forehand the  better  able  will  he  be  to  profit  by  the  terrane. 

Our  engagements  of  1870-71  furnish  many  evidences  that 
no  attention  has  been  given  to  this.  Regiments,  even  bri- 
gades, stood  for  a  long  time  in  one  place,  the  commanders 
studying  how  best  to  attack  the  enemy  in  their  front  as  ?b6n 
as  the  order  was  received.  The  order  came,  but  it  was  to 
"wheel  to  the  right  and  advance  at  once  to  the  attack,"  an 
entirely  different  direction  from  that  prepared  for.  The  corn- 
niander  then  immediately  went  about  instructing  his  subordi- 
nate leaders,  but  at  the  same  moment  a  second  aid  arrived 
from  headquarters,  then  a  third,  saying:  ''The  brigade  must 
hurry ;  the  brigade  must  move  without  delay.  His  Excellency 
directs  me  to  ask  why  the  brigade  has  not  yet  attacked." 
Patience  was  then  entirely  lost,  and  every  subdivision  ad- 
vanced against  the  enemy  by  the  shortest  route.  But  the 
shortest  way  is  rarely  the  best.  Tremendous  losses,  the  break- 
ing up  of  the  various  units,  hesitation,  and  failure  of  the  attack 
are  the  consequences  of  an  advance  which,  had  it  been  quietly 
considered  and  calmly  initiated,  might  have  had  a  happy  result 
with  small  sacrifices. 

Doubtless  conditions  will  frequently  necessitate  troops 
going  into  action  as  quickly  as  possible,  but  wherever  it  is  at 
all  practicable  (and  this  zvill  be  the  rule  zvith  larger  masses), 
it  is  better  to  give  time,  so  the  subordinate  commanders  may 
be  instructed  with  regard  to  the  situation,  and  orient  them- 
selves. In  this  way  alone  will  it  be  possible  to  even  partially 
reduce  these  exceedingly  large  losses. 


iS4  Studii:s  in  Tin-:  Lkadixo  of  Troops. 

The  more  a  mass  acts  as  a  unit,  the  more  must  the  in- 
dependence of  subordinate  leaders  naturally  diminish.  So 
here  we  see  the  brigade  commander  not  alone  ordering  the 
direction  to  be  taken  by  the  different  regiments  and  the  lines 
of  connection  and  separation,  but  also  starting  the  infantry 
fire  preparation  in  one  regiment  while  the  other  was  directed 
to  remain  under  cover.  The  order  for  attack  could  be  given 
immediately,  with  the  exception  of  the.  time  for  the  onset,  as 
the  conditions  for  the  brigade  were  simple,  and  for  the  attack 
in  front  different  orders  could  hardly  be  expected.  But  all 
the  more  must  care  be  taken  not  to  allow  the  planned  fire 
preparation  to  turn  into  the  real  attack,  through  the  action  of 
some  over-zealous  and  energetic  subordinate  leader. 

In  the  First  infantry  regiment,  the  Third  battalion  was 
divided  by  the  insertion  of  the  vSecond  battalion.  The 
Tenth  company  remained  isolated  on  the  left  Vv^ing.  This 
mixing  up,  however,  could  not  be  avoided,  unless  the  various 
companies  had  been  forced  to  execute  a  flank  movement  under 
hostile  fire,  which  is  an  exceedingly  hazardous  maneuver. 

The  fire  ])rcparation  for  an  attack  is  mainly  done  by  ar- 
tillery. Infantry  must,  however,  assist  against  smaller  targets 
at  mid  range,  with  its  long-range  rifle  and  good  musketry 
training.  Six  companies  of  the  first  infantry  engaged  in  the 
preparatory  fire  action  on  a  line  about  650  yards  long.  This 
was  done  to  obstruct  the  enemy's  receiving  reinforcements 
and  shifting  his  troops,  and  also  to  gradually  wear  him  out.' 
The  Twelfth  company,  only  800  yards  from  the  hostile  skirm- 
ishers, established  itself  as  v/ell  as  it  could  in  the  most  south- 
erly farm-buildings  of  Ifohcnbruck,  while  the  Ninth  com- 
pany, in  order  to  avoid  the  enemy's  well-placed  shots,  was 
lying  in  a  deep  furrow  on  a  field  a  few  paces  from  the  south- 
ern edge  of  the  village  and  1000  yards  from  the  enemy.  Pur- 
.suant  to  orders,  the  Second  battalion  lay  somewhat  in  rear 
of  the  line,  the  Seventh  company  with  its  skirmishers  in 
the  edge  of  the  woods;  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  comi)anies  came 
out  of  the  timber  and  moved  slightly  forward,  because  the 
i:i\<f]!;Q  of  the  woc^ds  lay  diagonally  to  the  front  and  made  too 
good  a  target  for  the  hostile  skirmishers.  These  companies 
jointly  dei)loye{l  2  ])latoons  of  their  own  accord.  In  view  of 
the  good  musketry  training,  success  depended  ni.iinly  <^u  cor- 


I 


Studies  in  tue  Leading  of  Troops.  185 

rectly  estimating  the  distances  and  accuracy  of  fire.  And  as 
the  enemy's  men  were  invisible,  the  aim  was  directed  upon 
certain  landmarks. 

The  Second  infantry  regiment  had  to  desist  from  a  tire 
preparation,  as  its  most  advanced  line  was  over  1,100  yards 
from  the  enemy's  skirmish  line,  and  the  terrane  covered  them 
from  sight  in  many  places.  The  breadth  of  the  attack  of  the 
Third  brigade  was  in  accordance  with  regulations  (a  little 
over  1,100  yards).  Each  regiment  brought  two  battalions 
into  the  first  line,  the  Second  infantry  regiment  having,  how- 
ever, formed  decidedly  more  deeply. 

The  thing  for  the  Fourth  infantry  brigade  to  do  was  to 
post  its  battalions  as  much  as  possible  out  of  sight  of  the 
enemy,  for  the  flank  attack.  The  more  sudden  a  flank  attack 
is  made,  the  more  effective  will  it  be.  The  sooner  we  show 
our  troops  to  the  enemy  or  allow  him  to  see  them,  the  easier 
it  becomes  for  him  to  concert  counter-measures  and  weaken 
the  eflfect  of  the  assault. 

The  Fourth  brigade  was  in  a  disadvantageous  position, 
«s  it  must  execute  a  flank  march  directly  into  Alt-Rognitz, 
under  the  eyes  of  the  enemy  standing  on  the  heights.  The 
brigade  commander  resolved  to  avoid  the  flank  march  as 
rnuch  as  possible.  According  to  tactical  principles,  the  flank 
march  should  have  been  inaugurated  from  a  distance:  but,  un- 
fortunately, it  was  no  longer  possible  to  bring  about  this  ad- 
vantageous condition.  AJajor-General  C must  there- 
fore help  himself  as  best  he  could.  Consequently  he  did  not 
hesitate  in  making  a  detour  with  the  First  and  Second  bat- 
talions of  the  Third  regiment,  bringing  them  around  behind 
the  Second  battalion  of  artillery.  By  so  doing  he  unconscious- 
ly thwarted  the  intentions  of  the  division  commander  to  at- 
tack quickly.     There  was,  however,  still  plenty  of  time  for  a 

sudden   attack,    for   when   Major-General   C gave    his 

orders,  the  First  battalion  of  artillery  had  not  yet  gone  into 
position,  and  the  latter  would  have  to  be  in  action  for  at 
least  half  an  hour  before  complete  "superiority  could  be  at- 
tained. Long  before  that  time  the  2  battalions  of  the  Third 
regiment  could  have  arrived  upon  the  left  wing. 

Pursuant  to  orders,  the  commander  of  the  Fourth  regi- 
ment did  send  his  Third  and  First  battalions  directly  into  Alt- 


1 86  Studies  in  tiii;  Leading  of  Troops. 

Rognitz  by   the   shortest   route.     The   Third   battaHon   could 
move  into  the  village  under  cover  of  the   sunken  road;  the 
First  battalion  advanced  300  yards  in  the  open,  offering  its 
right  flank  to  the  batteries,  but  without  serious  loss,  as  the 
hostile  artillery  at  that  time  was  hardly  able  to  ward  off  the 
fire  of  the  batteries.     There  was  unquestionably  some  danger 
inherent  in  the  movements  of  the  Fourth  brigade,  in  that  the 
enemy  might  advance  to  a  counter-attack,  which  is  the  best 
measure  to  prevent  a  turning  movement.     In  view  of  the  evi- 
dent weakness  of  the  enemy,  this  danger  was  very  remote,  and 
even  if  he  did  adopt  such  tactics,  he  could  be  opposed  with  a 
sufficient  force.     The  Third  battalion  of  the  Fourth  infantry 
was  in  the  front  line,  ready  to  wheel  in  at  any  moment ;  the 
Second  battalion  was   200  yards   in   rear  of  its   right   wing, 
echeloned  to  the  right ;  the  First  battalion  could  be  drawn  im- 
mediately  into   the   fighting  line   at   any   moment,   while   still 
en  route  to  the  village.     The  best  protection  was,  however,  ' 
afforded  by  the  6  batteries  of  artillery,  whose  shrapnel  could  ' 
nip  any  counter-attack  in  the  bud.     The  security  of  the  entire 
movement  depended  mainly  on  the  fact  that  the  enemy's  ad- 
vance would  not  find  the  brigade  unprepared.     Accordingly 
the  general  selected  a  station  that  afforded  him  a  complete  sur- 
vey of  the  country  in  front.     From  the  eastern  slope  of  Kill 
425  every  offensive  movement  of  the  enemy  could  be  discov- 
ered at  once,  and  the  necessary  orders  to  meet  same  could  he 
given   in  time.       Besides,   this   station  eminently   satisfied   all 
other  demands  upon  it.     From  it  the  movements  of  the  gen- 
eral's own  troops,  as  well  as  the  entire  front  of  the  Third  bri- 
gade, could  be  overlooked,  and  the   Second  battalion,  which 
was  designated  to  advance  at  once  in  case  of  an  emergency, 
stood  at  the  foot  of  the  hill  ready  for  any  call. 

The  enemy  could  be  easily  aroused  to  activity  by  the  fire 
fight  commenced  at  1,100  yards  by  the  2  conipanies  of  the 
Third  battaHon  pushed  out  from  the  village,  and  furthermore, 
the  fire  of  2  companies  at  such  a  distance  could  hardly  accom- 
plish much ;  accordingly  this  movement  would  better  have 
been  omitted. 

It  is  strange  that  the  conimandor  of  the  Fourth  brigade 
gave  only  the  orders  for  the  deployment,  and  not  for  the  at- 
tack.    In  this  he  was  nevertheless  certainly  correct;   for,   in 


Studies  in  thk  Li-adix':.  of  Troops.  iHj 

the  first  place,  the  troops  were  not  yet  in  position  to  attack, 
and,  in  the  second  place,  the  position  of  the  enemy  might 
change  considerably  before  they  got  that  far.  With  a  view  to 
giving  the  order  for  attack,  he  had  directed  that  one  mounted 
officer  report  to  him  from  each  regiment. 

Not  so  satisfactory,  from  a  general  standpoint,  were  the 
arrangements  for  the  care  of  the  wounded.  The  main 
dressing  station  at  the  eastern  end  of  Kriblitz  .vas  too  far  to 
the  rear.  The  wounded  must  drag  themselves  over  the  crest 
of  Ridge  500.  But  the  absolute  necessity  for  having  water 
near  at  hand  admitted  of  no  other  choice.  Contrary  to  gen- 
eral practice,  the  division  surgeon  ordered  that  all  physicians 
should  remain  on  the  fighting  line,  and  he  had  a  large  dressing 
station  established  for  each  brigade,  one  in  Hohenbruck  and 
the  other  under  cover  in  the  western  part  of  Alt-Rognitz  and 
under  the  supervision  of  the  senior  sanitary  officer  of  "the 
brigades.  The  second  field  hospital  found  a  position  in  Krib- 
litz that  satisfied  all  demands  upon  it. 

Attack  or  the  Second  Ini-axtrv  Division. 

(12:45  TO  I  45  P.  M.) 

At  12:15  the  division  commander  reached  Hill  500  on  the 
left  wing  of  the  Second  battalion  of  artillery,  from  which 
point  he  was  able  to  watch  the  movements  of  the  Fourth  in- 
fantry brigade.  Parts  of  the  Second  infantry  regiment  could 
be  seen  in  the  uneven,  covered  ground  east  of  Hill  513.  In- 
fantry fire  was  heard  in  the  direction  of  Hohenbruck,  but  the 
field-glass  revealed  no  troops  on  the  slope  south  of  that  vil- 
lage, though  the  slope  was  plainly  visible.  It  could  be  as- 
sumed from  this  that  the  right  wing  of  the  Third  brigade  was 
engaged  at  long  distance  in  preparing  the  attack  with  infantry 
fire.  This  fire  had  commenced  at  about  12:30,  and  ntnv,  15 
minutes  later,  several  companies  joined  in  the  fire  from  Hill 
361,  near  Alt-Rognitz.  The  division  commander  could  not 
be  sure  that  his  fire  would  prove  a  staggering  blow  to  the 
enemy.  But  the  effect  of  the  artillery  on  the  opponent  was 
far  more  evident.  For  nearly  half  an  hour  5  batteries  01  the 
First  regiment  of  field  artillery  had  shelled  3  hostile  batteries 
near  Neu-Rognitz.     Although  they  still  replied,  their  fire  was 


i88  Studii.s  IX  Tine  Leadint.  of  Troops. 

perceiuibly  slackened,  and  in  the  oi)inion  of  the  artillery 
commander  it  was  only  a  question  of  a  short  time  when  the 
hostile  batteries  would  be  completely  silenced.  Several  of  the 
enemy's  g^uns  were  already  seen  to  be  out  of  the  fight. 

From  what  he  saw,  Lieutenant-General  A was  con- 
firmed in  his  view  that  the  enemy  intended  to  offer  a  stubborn 
resistance  at  Neu-Rognitz  in  spite  of  his  evident  inferiority; 
but  he  considered  the  Second  infantry  division  sufficiently 
strong  to  break  the  resistance.  In  view  of  the  character  of 
the  ground,  so  favorable  to  the  opponent,  an  immediate  attack 
and  assault  by  the  infantry  would  have  been  hazardous;  he 
therefore  resolved  to  further  pre])are  the  enemy's  condition 
for  assault  by  continuous  artillery  fire,  assisted  by  mid-range 
infantry  fire.  The  left  battery  (Third)  of  the  First  battalion 
had  already  directed  its  fire  on  the  center  of  the  infantry  posi- 
tion, in  consequence  of  which  the  hostile  skirmishers  had  dis- 
appeared seeking  shelter;  bodies  in  close  order  had  also  moved 
back  from  the  northern  edge  of  the  large  section  of  woods 
north  of  Neu-Rognitz.  An  evacuation  of  his  position  was, 
however,  out  of  question  with  the  enemy.  On  the  contrary, 
he  had  materially  extended  his  right  wing,  so  that  the  flanking 
attack  planned  was  more  likely  to  turn  into  a  frontal  one. 

A  division  staff"  officer  was  charged  with  the  continuous 
observation  of  the  enemy's  movements  with  a  field-glass.  In 
company  with  him  and  the  general  staff  officer,  the  division 
commander,  having  meanwhile  dismounted,  proceeded  to  view 
the  surrounding  country,  as  it  was  impracticable  to  make  a 
reconnaissance,  on  account  of  the  little  time  available. 

South  of  Hohenbruck  the  country  rose  gradually,  becom- 
mg  suddenly  more  stee])  near  the  village  of  Neu-Rognitz. 
The  narrow  strip  of  woods  along  the  highway  afforded  the 
enemy  a  good  point  of  suj^port.  and  for  this  reason  the  right 
wing  of  the  Third  brigade  would  find  it  difficult  to  advance 
over  rising  ground  without  shelter.  The  ground  east  of  Hill 
527  was,  however,  very  advantageous:  from  the  position  of 
the  Second  regiment  up  to  Ncu-Kognitz  the  ridge  was  cut  up 
by  gullies.  There  all  i)attaHons  could  find  '^heiter,  every  200 
or  300  yards,  behind  undulations  of  the  ground.  The  field 
ol  attack  of  the  Fourth  brigade  was  less  favorable.  .A  long 
mountain  sjnir  cxten«le(l   from   Hill   527  to  the   gap  between 


Studiks  in  the  LiCading  of  Troops.  189 

Alt-Rognitz  and  Rudersclorf.  Although  during  the  first  part 
of  the  ascent  the  spur  would  offer  effective  protection  against 
the  enemy's  fire  by  reason  of  its  sloping  to  the  southeast,  on 
the  top  every  assailant  would  be  exposed  to  a  fire  at  550  to 
750  yards  range  without  any  cover;  besides,  the  deeply  cut 
ravine  extending  from  Rudersdorf  to  Hill  527  must  be  crossed. 

From  his  survey  of  the  ground  the  division  commander 
judged  that  the  left  wing  of  the  Third  brigade  had  the  best 
nrospect  of  bringing  the  attack  rapidly  up  to  the  enemy  and 
thereby  carrying  along  the  extreme  wing ;  in  addition,  the  de- 
sired point  of  penetration  (the  bend  in  the  enemy's  line)  was 
.situated  directly  opposite  this  wing.  For  an  effective  flank 
movement  it  was  necessary  to  let  the  2  battalions  of  the  Thiru 
infantry  regiment  participate  in  the  assault  in  the  first  line, 
which  could  be  done  without  hesitation,  as  so  far  not  the 
slightest  indication  of  any  threatening  of  the  left  wing  had 
been  reported. 

At  12 :45  the  division  commander  called  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  J ,  of  the  artillery,  up  to  him  (he  was  then  near 

by),  and  said:  "I  shall  now  order  the  infantry  to  begin  the 
fire-preparation  and  decisive  attack  on  the  enemy's  position. 
The  point  of  penetration  is  the  northern  edge  of  the  large  sec- 
tion of  woods  over  there  to  the  north  of  Neu-Rognitz."  An 
aid  was  sent  to  the  commander  of  the  Third  brigade,  with 
orders  for  the  brigade  to  open  its  attack  by  fire  and  then 
assault,  taking  the  edge  of  the  above-mentioned  woods  as  the 
l^oint  of  penetration.  The  brigade  commander  was  advise'd 
that  the  Fourth  brigade  would  conform  to  the  movements  of 

the  Third.     After  a  quarter  of  an  hour,  Major-General  B 

Avas  found  near  Hill  513;  he  had  been  obliged  to  dismount  a 
number  of  times  and  lead  his  horse  himself  on  the  abrupt 
slopes,  as  he  had  neglected  to  bring  along  a  mounted  rifleman. 
The  brigade  commander  had  failed  to  advise  the  division  of 
his  station  and  the  dispositions  he  had  made. 

The  ranking  aid  had  been  sent  on  foot  to  the  commander 

of  the  Fourth  infantry  brigade,  Major-General   C ,  on 

Hill  425,  with  orders  to  make  the  decisive  attack  by  extend- 


190  STUDIKS    in    TIIK    LEADINC.    of    Tr(K)PS. 

ing  its  left  wing  to  the  wagon-road,^  after  the  entire  brigade 
had  first  prepared  for  the  attack  by  infantry  fire  on  conjunc- 
tion with  the  left  wing  of  the  Third  brigade,  which  would 
assault  the  eastern  part  of  the  woods  above  mentioned. 

Toward  1:15  the  division  commander  noticed  long  lines 
of  skirmishers  deploying  in  front  of  the  Third  brigade.  They 
lay  down,  right  wing  at  the  southern  exit  of  Hohenbruck,  and 
left  wing  near  the  road.  Mill  527-north\vestern  exit  of  Alt- 
Rognitz.  The  skirmishers  of  the  Fourth  brigade  were  climb- 
ing up  the  slope  south  of  Alt-Kognitz.  Four  batteries  had 
opened  fire  on  the  hostile  infantry.  The  attack  was  therefore 
progressing,  and  the  division  commander  brought  his  single- 
reserve  battalion  into  the  sunken  road  east  of  Hill  460. 

The  Artillery  from  12:45  '^'o  1:45  p-  ^^• 

Drill  Regulations  would  require  the   commander  of  the 

First  artillery  regiment   (Lieutenant-Colonel   J ),  after 

receiving  the  order  to  attack,  to  direct  an  overwhelming  fire 
on  the  part  of  the  enemy's  ])Osition  it  was  proposed  to  assault. 
The  eastern  half  of  the  northern  edge  of  the  large  woods  wa*? 
assigned  him  as  the  line  of  penetration.  Since  the  hostile  pieces 
continued  their  fire,  although  at  longer  intervals,  it  seemed 
necessary  to  leave  2  batteries  to  keep  up  the  artillery  duel :  ac- 
cordingly the  First  battery,  which  was  on  the  right  wing  of  the 
First  battalion  and  using  indirect  fire,  and  the  Fourth  bat- 
tery, which  was  on  the  right  wing  of  the  Second  battalion. 
were  left  to  contend  with  the  enemy's  artillery.  As  regards 
the  enemy's  infantry  line,  the  regimental  commander  concluded 
that  a  flank  attack  would  be  best.  As  the  Third  battery  had 
been  firing  on  the  infantry  for  some  time,  it  was  ]M-oper  that 
it  should  not  be  withdrawn  for  other  employment;  the  ad- 
joining battery  could  engage  with  it,  still  taking  the  hostile 
infantry  as  a  target.  The  Fifth  and  Sixth  batteries  would 
then  best  act  on  the  flank,  as  far  as  practicable.     .\t   1    p.  m. 

iBy  "wagon-road"  will  be  understood  the  road  leading  from 
the  church  of  St.  Paul  and  St.  .lohn  to  the  southern  end  of  Neu- 
Rognitz;  by  ".southern  foot-path,"  the  path  entering  the  village  a 
short  distance  in  front  of  the  wagon-road;  by  "northern  foot-path." 
the  patli  entering  the  center  of  tlie  village  and  passing  the  little 
thicKets. 


Studies  in  the  Le^vdixc  of  TROors.  191 

the  Second,  Third,  Fifth,  and  Sixth  batteries  had  the  range 
of  the  hostile  skirmish  hnes,  which  were  lyint(  down  hetweei» 
Peak  451  and  the  northern  foot-path.  At  least  16  shrapne> 
per  minute  struck  this  900-yard  line.  A  landmark  was  desig- 
nated to  each  battery,  so  that  each  could  shell  a  sei)arate  sec- 
tion of  the  line. 

While   carrying   out   his    dispositions    Lieutenant-Colone> 

J could  not  help  perceiving,  that  an  advance  of  single 

batteries  out  of  this  position  to  accompany  the  attack  would 
be  fraught  w^ith  great  difficulties.  The  slope  of  the  ridge  on 
the  side  toward  the  enemy  was  steep,  and  the  terrane  so  badly 
tangled  that  a  timely  participation  in  the  assault  became  doubt- 
ful.     Lieutenant-Colonel    J consequently    resolved    to 

keep  the  regiment  for  the  time  in  action  in  the  position  it  had 
taken.  However,  he  sent  an  officer  to  the  horse  battery  on 
the  Galgen  Mountain,  requesting  that  it  later  advance  beyond 
Hohenbruck  and  join  in  the  infantry  attack.  The  officer  found 
this  battery  at  about  i  p.  m.,  but  not  in  a  very  encouraging 
condition;  the  opposing  hostile  battery  had  inflicted  consid- 
erable damage  upon  it,  and  it  was  not  advisable  to  abandon  the 
ground  in  front  of  it.  The  officer  thereupon  rode  on  farther 
to  the  advance  guard  of  the  First  infantry  division,  so  as  to 
bring  up  artillery  support  from  there. 

The  Third  Infantry  Brigade  from    12:45  to   1:45  ?•   ^^■ 

Major-General  B ,  commanding  the  Third  brigade. 

had  gone  beyond  the  division  commander's  orders  in  his  dis- 
positions, in  that  he  opened  infantry  fire  at  about  1,100  yards. 
He  had  overstepped  the  order  received  at  11:55  a.  m.,  and 
actually  commenced  the  lire  fight  Avhile  only  preparation  for 
the  attack  was  demanded.  But  the  situation  of  various  parts 
of  the  First  infantry  regiment  at  that  time  was  such  that  they 
must  come  into  fighting  touch  with  the  hostile  infantry;  if 
left  alone,  they  must  suffer  severely  or  be  forced  to  retire. 
The  Ninth  and  Twelfth  companies  could  certainly  not  main- 
tain themselves  under  the  fire  of  strong  hostile  skinuish  lines 
for  any  length  of  time  in  the  southern  edge  of  Hohenbruck. 
neither  could  the  Tenth  company  at  the  edge  of  the  woods 
near  Hill  513.  The  Second  battalion  of  the  same  regiment 
had  been  sent  in  for  their  support. 


H)2 


Studihs  in  the  Lhadtxc;  of  Troops. 


Shortly  after  i  p.  ni.  the  commander  of  the  First  infantry 

rej^iment,  Colonel  D ,  received  from  one  of  the  brigade 

?iids  the  order  to  attack  in  connection  with  the  Second  infantry 
rC^qiment.  Xo  further  instructions  were  «^iven  in  the  order, 
as  the  first  order  to  prepare  for  the  attack  had  exhaustively 
indicated  the  direction  of  the  attack  and  the  line  of  separation 
from  the  Second  infantry  regiment.     All  further  disj^ositions 

vvere  the  concern  of  Colonel  D alone.     The  latter  was 

standing  near  the  eastern  boundary  of  Hohenbruck,  close  to 
(he  Fifth  company,  somewhat  sheltered  from  the  enemy's  fire, 
w'here  he  could  see  how  little  protection  the  regiment  would 
find  in  the  terrane  during  the  attack,  lie  resolved  to  make 
up  for  the  lack  of  cover  by  a  strong  development  of  fire,  and  to 
send  forward  dense  skirmish  lines,  though  the  latter  was  con- 
trary to  custom.  The  connnander  of  the  Third  battalion  was 
near  him,  and  he  turned  and  gave  the  following  verbal  order : 
"1  shall  have  the  regiment  advance  to  the  line  of  the  Twelfth 
company,  for  a  decisive  fire  preparation.  The  center  of  ttie 
Second  battalion,  to  which  the  Tenth  company  w^ill  be  attached, 
will  take  the  point  of  direction  upon  the  ])roiecting  point  of 
tflie  woods  east  of  the  highway."  This  point  of  direction  was 
somewhat  different  from  that  ordered  by  the  brigade  com- 
mander, due  to  the  fact  that  the  northwest  corner  of  the  woods 
was  not  visible  from  Hohenbruck.  The  regimental  adjutant 
was  promptly  sent  to  the  commander  of  the  Second  battalion 
with  the  order  to  advance  the  battalion  in  dense  skirmish  line, 
taking  along  the  Tenth  company,  up  to  the  line  of  the  Twelfth 
company,  and  give  it  the  ])oint  of  direction.  ITe  found  the 
battalion  commander  with  the  Eighth  company,  and  after  de- 
livering his  message,  hastened  away  to  the  First  battalion,  to 
which  he  verbally  transmitted  the  following  order:  "The 
regiment  will  advance  to  the  attack,  the  First  battalion  fol- 
fowinc:  the  right   w  ing  throiigli    1  iohenljruck." 

At  I  :io  p.  m.  these  orders  had  n^ached  the  resi)ective 
commanders,  and  the  Fifth.  Sixth,  and  Seventh  companies 
shnnltaneously  ar  >se  to  advance  200  yards,  after  the  skirmish 
line  had  been  closed  until  man  touched  man.  Although  the 
Ninth  and  Twelfth  companies  poured  in  a  very  brisk  tire,  the 
skirmishers  of  the  3  com{)anics  advancing  without  cover  suf- 
fered heavy  loss,  and  tri.-d  to  get   forward  in  double  time  upon 


Studies  in  thk  Leading  or  Troops.  193 

line  with  the  Twelfth  company.  Tlie  Tenth  company,  on  the 
left  wing-,  hardly  lost  a  man,  as  it  was  protected  by  the  pro- 
jecting Hill  527.  At  1  :i5  the  skirmish  line  of  the  Second  bat- 
talion had  thrown  itself  down,  and  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  com- 
panies each  had  deployed  2  platoons,  while  the  Seventh  com- 
pany, for  want  of  room,  only  i  platoon.  A  line  of  330  yard.-, 
was  available  for  the  skirmishers  of  the  battalion,  and  the  5 
deployed  platoons,  of  70  men  each,  were  about  sufficient  to 
jill  this  interval.  Meanwhile  the  increasing  losses  compelled 
the  companies  to  deploy  new  skirmishers,  so  that  only  half 
a  platoon  each  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  companies  remained  in 
close  order,  and  an  entire  platoon  of  the  Seventh  company. 
These  lay  down  near  the  edge  of  the  woods  200  yards  in  rear 
of  the  skirmishers,  where  they  met  with  only  small  losses,  as 
the  opponent  directed  his  fire  with  considerable  accuracy  on 
the  skirmish  line  itself.  The  Eighth  company  halted  to  take 
proper  distance. 

The  fire  of  the  Second  battalion  skirmishers  became  some- 
what irregular  after  they  had  lain  down.  Casualties  among 
platoon  and  section  leaders  had  a  bad  influence  on  the  trans- 
mission of  orders ;  after  a  rush  the  men  would  have  to  find  the 
range  themselves,  and  then  only  after  they  had  stopped  to 
get  their  breath.  Frequently  platoon  leaders  were  obliged  to 
interfere  for  the  purpose  of  putting  an  end  to  too  rapid  firing. 
With  the  help  of  the  seccion  leaders,  the  men  were  compelled 
to  resort  to  a  slow,  well-aimed  fire,  averaging  for  each  skir- 
niisher  i  cartridge  a  minute.  Even  the  most  excited  man 
would  soon  be  glad  to  moderate  his  unsystematic  fire  when 
his  right  hand  became  tired.  Uniformity  in  raising  sights 
had  been  assured  throughout  the  ranks.  Nearly  all  platoon 
leaders,  with  the  help  of  the  skirmishers  and  section  leaders, 
liad  fixed  distances  at  750  yards ;  only  a  few  platoons  fired  at 
the  projecting  strip  of  v/oods,  with  sights  at  650  yards.  Wher- 
ever sights  were  improperly  fixed  through  the  inexperience  of 
platoon  leaders,  company  commanders  interfered ;  the  latter 
were  generally  in  the  center  of  their  skirmish  line,  lying  prone ; 
only  the  commander  of  the  Seventh  company  remained  with 
his  platoon  that  was  in  close  order. 

It  was  difficult  to  observe  the  effect  of  the  fire.  The  en- 
emy occupied  higlier  ground,  and  the  heads  of  his  skirmish- 


194  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

ers  could  hardly  be  seen,  and,  although  the  ground  was  dry 
in  consequence  of  a  long  spell  of  hot  weather,  ricochets  were 
invisible,  as  they  occurred  in  clover-fields  and  along  the  edge 
of  the  woods,  wlu-re  the  op})onent's  skirmishers  were  located. 
As  the  guns  became  heated,  the  men  fired  at  the  750-yard  dis- 
tances with  sights  at  700  yards.  Part  of  the  men  lying  down 
could  not  see  their  targets.  It  required  much  energ}^  on  the 
part  of  their  superiors  to  induce  them  to  rise  on  their  knees, 
to  obtain  a  good  aim.  Many  fired  lying  down,  without  even 
aiming  or  looking  up,  especially  where  section  leaders  were 
lacking;  l)ut  most  of  these  were  soon  brought  to  their  projK-r 
senses  by  the  examples  of  their  braver  comrades.  Some  in- 
fantrymen started  to  carry  wounded  to  the  rear,  and  as  they 
arose  from  the  skirmish  line  many  of  them  fell  under  the  en- 
emy's missiles;  others  the  file-closers  reminded  of  their  duty 
to  remain  on  the  firing  line. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  action  4  assistant  litter-bearers 
were  detailed  from  each  company,  who,  in  accordance  with 
regulations,  placed  a  red  band  around  their  left  upper  arm; 
this  did  not,  however,  put  them  under  the  protection  of  the 
Geneva  convention.  On  account  of  the  enemy's  fire,  these 
bearers  could  not  reach  the  advanced  skirmish  lines,  and  s*. 
confined  themselves  to  picking  up  wounded  further  to  the  rear. 
When  their  wounds  were  slight,  many  of  the  skirmishers  fight- 
ing in  front  used  the  first-aid  packets  sewed  inside  the  front 
of  the  left  skirt  oi  their  coats. 

The  commander  of  the  vSecond  battalion  of  the  First  regi- 
ment of  infantry  watched  the  brisk  fire  of  the  skirmishers  in 
anxiety.  Although  the  entire  contents  of  the  ammunition- 
wagons  had  been  issued  to  the  men,  a  shortness  of  cartridges 
might  be  apprehended  in  i  or  2  hours,  if  the  present  rate  of 
expenditure  continued.  But,  as  already  stated,  the  fire  soon 
became  more  steady.  Cartridges  were  taken  from  the  numer- 
ous wounded  and  killed.  Xevertheless  the  battahon  com- 
mander, of  his  own  accord,  despatched  a  mounted  rifieman  to 
Trautenau,  to  tlie  advance  guard  of  the  First  infantry  divis- 
ion, recjuesting  that  some  ammimition-wagons  be  sent  forward. 

At  1:15  tile  entire  'I'iiird  battalion  i(^ined  in  the  attack, 
the  vSece)nd  battalion  having  just  begun  the  fight  under  which 
it  suffered  such  heavv  losses.    In  order  to  obtain  better  results 


Studiüs  in  THE  Leading  of  Troops.  195 

from  its  fire,  the  Ninth  company  advanced  on  Une  with  the 
Twelfth,  and  had  to  work  hard  to  resist  the  fire  of  the  enemy. 
The  commander  of  the  Third  battahon  had  arrived  too  late 
to  stop  this  advance,  as  he  had  intended  to  do,  thinking  it 
necessary  to  continue  the  occupation  of  Hohenbruck.     Fortu- 
nately, however,  the  engineer  company  arrived  at  that  village 
from  Trautenau,  to  prepare  it  for  defense.     Several  companies 
of  the  First  battalion  also  entered  the  northern  outskirts  of 
the  place.    The  Tenth  company,  on  the  left  wing  of  the  Second 
battalion,  occupied  the  most  advantageous  position,  as  com- 
pared with  the  others.     The  projecting  Hill  527  limited  the 
l)readth  of  the  field  of  fire  very  much,  and  the  losses  were 
hardly  worth  mentioning.     At  the  command  of  its  leader  the 
company  arose,  in  order  to  occupy  the  little  woods  on  Hill 
527,  but  it  had  to  give  up  the  attempt  after  advancing   100 
\  ards,  as,  under  the  undiminished  hits  of  the  hostile  missiles, 
It  was   followed  by  none  of  the   Second  battalion,  the  com- 
mander of  which  had  positively  prohibited  a  continuance  of 
the  forward  movement  on  account  of  the  peculiar  situation. 
Left  to  itself  at  the  southern  edge  of  thicket  527,  the  Tenth 
company  would  have   been   simply  shot  to  pieces.     If   other 
companies   had    joined    in    this    purposeless    charge,    without 
sufficient  fire  preparation,  the  attack,"  difficult  as  it  already  was, 
vvould  have  failed  in  its  very  inception.     Had  the  Tenth  com- 
pany been  fighting  by  itself,  the  fact  that  it  could  see  nothing 
of  the  enemy  would  naturally  have  been  an  incentive  to  find 
a  better  fire  zone  to  the  front;  as  a  part  of  a  larger  aggre- 
q:ation  of  troops,   however,   it   must   conform   to   the   whole, 
and  must  not,  by  individual  action,  imperil  the  conduct  of  the 
engagement  or  its  success. 

The  First  battalion  had  orders  to  follow  behind  the  right 
^ving.  Later  it  was  directed  to  pass  through  Hohenbruck, 
•and  was  most  favorably  posted  for  this  purpose  in  the  sunken 
road,  formed  in  column  of  march!  In  order  to  establish  a 
<roöd  survey,  the  battalion  commander  had  ridden  ahead  at 
full  speed  to  the  southern  exit  of  the  village;  there  he  had 
lost  his  horse  by  a  shrapnel,  and,  hurrying  back  to  meet  his 
battalion,  ordered  the  companies  to  move  up  to  the  southern 
border  of  the  village  on  four  difi'erent  streets.  The  First  and 
Second   companies',  deployed  as   skirmishers    (see   ^^lap   VI.). 


196  S'lUDII-.S  IN    TIIJC    LK.M)i.\r.  OF  Trooi's. 

joiiiecl  or  extcnilc«!  the  skirmish  line,  as  soon  as  ihcy  ohscrvcfl 
the  Ninth  conij^any  hreak  down  under  the  hostile  fire. 
Through  the  efforts  of  the  platoon  commanders  the  mixed 
platoons  were  rearrani^ed  and  order  established.  Some  men 
left  back  in  the  villai^e  were  assembled  and  led  to  the  front. 

The- regimental  comman.ier  harl  met  the  battalion  com- 
mander on  the  highway  in  the  village  and  received  his  report 
relative  to  the  independent  interference  of  the  First  and  Sec- 
ond companies.  He  could  not  fail  to  see  that  the  situation  of 
the  regiment  was  critical.  Eight  of  the  eleven  companies 
available  were  entirely  deployed  on  the  foremost  line.  The 
right  wing  had  no  natural  support;  it  therefore  appeared 
absolutely  necessary  to  leave  the  Third  and  Fourth  comj^anies 
behind  it  in  close  order.  Although  the  arrival  of  the  leading- 
subdivisions  of  the  First  infantry  division  was  expected  within 
half  an  hour,  the  wing  must  be  protected  in  the  meantime 
against  an  attack  by  the  enemy.  The  Third  and  Fourth  com- 
])anies  were  consequently  posted  in  Hohenbruck  west  of  the 
highway,  and  remained  at  the  disposal  of  the  regimental 
commander. 

This  was  the  situation  of  the  First  infantry  regiment  at 
1  :45  p.  m.  It  became  stiil  more  serious  when  a  hostile  l)at- 
tery  began  to  fire  on  the  skirmish  line  from  the  direction  of  the 
quarry.  By  itself  the  regiment  w^as  hardly  able  to  make  the 
attack.  It  nuist  simply  wait,  under  heavy  losses,  for  the  more 
fortunate  advance  of  the  adjoining  regiment  or  the  interfer- 
ence of  the  First  infantry  division. 

The  commander  of  the  Secoutl  infantry  regiment  re- 
mained in  a  sheltered  position  near  his  brigade  commander  be- 
hind Hill  513.  After  receii)t  of  the  division  order  at  i  p.  m., 
no  further  orders  were  given  to  Colonel  E —  by  Major- 
General  Vi ,  except  the  order  to  start.  The  line  of  pene- 
tration desired  by  division  headquarters  (the  eastern  part  of 
the  northern  edge  of  the  large  woods)  and  the  point  of  direc- 
tion given  the  brigade  (for  the  left  wing  the  northeastern 
corner  of  this  .section  of  woods')  were  in  exact  conformity. 
The  line  of  .separation  for  the  First  regiment  (page  \()())  was 
known.  Further  instructions  were  therefore  unnecessary,  as 
the  Seventh  comi)any  had  already  started  upon  this  jvmiU  of 
direction,  and  the  Third  battalion   had   been   ordered   to   seek 


Studiks  in"  Tin-:  LKADixr.  oi.^  Troops.  197. 

connection  to  the  left.  Each  of  the  four  conii)anies  on  the 
most  advanced  hne  deployed  one  or  two  platoons  sheltered  ni 
the  woods,  as  space  would  permit,  or  reinforced  to  like  extent 
the  weak  skirmish  line  in  front.  This  entire  line  suddenly 
emerged  from  the  woods,  and  up  to  1,100  yards  suffered, 
no  serious  losses.  As  the  losses  increased,  however,  the 
skirmishers  advanced  at  double  time,  reaching  the  gully  in  front 
of  the  declivity,  which  withdrew  the  greater  part  of  them 
from  the  enemy's  sight.  In  order  to  fire,  they  advanced  at  a 
walk  far  enough  to  reach  an  open  field,  which  they  found  at 
about  800  yards  from  the  enemy,  a  portion  stationing  them*, 
selves  in  the  southern  border  of  a  little  fir  plantation.  As 
soon  as  the  skirmishers  lay  down,  the  parts  of  the  companies 
in  front  that  were  in  close  order  followed,  and  suffered  little 
loss,  as  the  enemy  w^as  fully  occupied  by  the  fire  of  the  skir- 
mishers. At  a  sign  from  the  battalion  commanders,  the  sup- 
ports quickly  deployed  forward  and  carried  the  entire  line 
ahead  another  100  yards,  so  that  at  i  :30  p.  m.,  at  a  distance  of 
700  yards,  with  the  right  on  line  with  the  Tenth  company  and 
the  left  on  a  slope  projecting  eastw^ard,  the  line  had  entered 
into  such  a  decisive  fire  with  the  enemy  that  the  actual  attack 
could  break  forth  at  any  moment. 

Meanwhile  such  company  leaders  as  were  not  wounded 
did  their  best  to  restrain  the  fighting  ardor  of  their  men,  so  as 
to  await  the  approach  of  the  companies  of  the  second  line 
(Eleventh,  Sixth,  and  Eighth),  and  the  formation  of  the  First 
battalion  for  attack.  The  latter  had  begun  to  move  at  the 
beginning  of  the  attack,  having  till  that  time  rested  in  column 
of  platoons  near  Hill  460;  it  crossed  the  difiicult  terrane  in 
line  of  companies  in  columns  of  march.  In  this  way  they 
could  get  over  the  ground  much  better;  the  heads  too  could 
be  quickly  turned  in  the  right  direction,  and  at  the  southern 
edge  of  the  patch  of  woods  east  of  Hill  513  it  was  found  that 
the  battalion  had  inclined  too  far  toward  Alt-Rognitz. 

In   the   gully   the   companies    posted   themselves   on    oii-.' 

line.     Alajor-General  ß had  Instructed  the  battalion  to 

advance   only   on  his  order.       Any   pushing   forward   of   the 
closed  bodies,  in  his  opinion,  must  lead  to  the  assault,  which 

he,   together  with  Colonel  E ,   who  was  now   severely 

wounded,  had  aimed  to  delay  until  the   Fourth  infantry  brir 


198  Studies  in  tiii;  Lkading  of  Troops. 

tj^ade  was  ready  for  the  charge.  A  glance  at  the  condition  in 
which  the  First  infantr)^  regiment  was  sitnated  did  not  i)roni- 
ise  an  cftcctive  advance  from  that  (hrection. 

In  a  space  48<:>  yards  wide  and  430  yards  deep,  witii  its 
parts  in  close  order  and  lying-  down  mostly  sheltered,  but  un- 
der a  heavy  skirmish  fire  700  yards  from  the  enemy,  the  Sec- 
ond infantry  regiment  held  itself  in  readiness  for  the  charge 
at  any  moment.  In  the  meantime  the  Tenth  company  had 
come  up  and  attached  itself  to  the  First  battalion. 

After  an  hour's  firing,  the  four  deployed  companies  far- 
thest to  the  front  had  hardly  succeded  in  shaking  the  enemy, 
while  the  artillery  fire  had  accomplished  its  desired  result  in 
a  brief  period,  its  shrapnel  having  wrought  disorder  in  the 
hostile  skirmish  lines  within  45  minutes.     It  was   therefore 

with  confidence  that  AJajor-General  B could  reckon  on 

the  success  of  the  assault  when  he  saw  the  right  wing  of  the 
Fourth  infantry  brigade  ascending  the  slope  of  the  undulation 
near  the  heights  running  along  Alt-Rognitz.     (See  ]\Tap  VI.) 

The  Fourth  Infantry  Brigade  from   12:45  to   i  45- 

At    12:50  p.   m.   the   senior   aid   of   the   division    handed 

Major-General    C ,   commanding   the    Fourth    infantry 

brigade,  the  order  to  make  the  decisive  attack  in  conjunction 
with  the  left  wing  of  the  Third  brigade,  after  preparation  by 
infantry  fire  and  extending  his  own   left  to  the   Avagon-road. 

We  know  that  Major-General  C had  not  yet  given 

the  order  for  attack,  and  had  taken  time  to  understand  per- 
fectly the  intentions  and  positions  of  the  enemy.  From  the  lit- 
tle woods  on  Hill  425,  at  the  northwestern  exit  of  Alt-Rognitz. 
he  could  clearly  overlook  the  right  wing  of  the  enemy,  and 
noticed  that  the  hostile  forces  extended  beyond  the  wagon- 
road.  The  enemy's  skirmishers  lay  close  to  the  ground  and 
fired  with  smokeless  powder,  but  as  far  as  he  could  see  they 
were  occui)ying  the  ])atch  of  woods  east  of  Neu-Rognitz,  es- 
tablishing their  most  advanced  defensive  position  in  a  fir 
thicket  on  the  northern  foot-path.  (See  Maps  V.  and  VI.) 
Against  the  mid-range  fire  from  this  position,  the  right  wing 
fif  tlic  Fourth  infantry  regiment  found  good  protection  behind 
the  extended  undulations  of  the  ground,  but  the  rest,  of  the 


Studies  in  thi:  Lkading  of  Troops.  H)i) 

Fourth  infantry  brigade,  and  especially  those  between  the 
wagon-road  and  the  northern  foot-path,  were  without  shelter. 
The  force  of  an  attack  could  not  be  increased  by  a  depth  for- 
mation on  the  left  wing,  but  the  general  thought  it  best  for 
the  time  being  to  reserve  a  battalion  at  that  point  as  support, 
although  even  no  attack  had  been  threatened  against  the  left 
Hank. 

Major-General  C was  well  aware  of  the  division 

commander's  intention  of  quickly  driving  the  enemy  out  of 
his  position.  The  men  of  the  Fourth  infantry  brigade  were 
tired.  In  spite  of  the  hostile  artillery  fire,  the  parts  of  the 
Fourth  regiment  that  were  in  the  village  had  managed  to  ob- 
tain a  drink  of  water,  as  far  as  considerations  of  tactical  order 
would  permit.  But  the  general  was  not  over-confident  that 
the  attack  would  be  executed  w^ith  the  absolutely  necessary 
briskness  and  rapidity,  particulary  during  the  ascent  of  the 
last  400  yards  in  front  of  the  enemy.  He  accordingly  decided 
to  have  all  knapsacks  removed. 

An  officer  from  each  of  the  regiments  was  stationed  near 
Major-General  C .  Turning  to  one  from  the  Fourth  in- 
fantry, he  said :  "The  Fourth  regiment  must  join  the  Third 
infantry  brigade  in  the  attack,  the  left  wing  of  which  is  sta- 
tioned at  the  corner  of  the  woods  over  there.  Your  front  will 
extend  until  opposite  the  hostile  battery  farthest  to  the  left." 
Turning  to  the  officer  from  the  Third  infantry,  he  said:  "The 
Third  regiment,  less  the  Third  battalion,  will  attack  along  the 
wagon-road,  securing  the  left  flank  and  maintaining  connec- 
tion on  the  right."  He  then  added  so  the  two  officers  could 
hear:     "Both  regiments  will  unsling  knapsacks." 

When  the  officer   from  the   Fourth   regiment    found   his 

commander.  Colonel  G ,  the  latter  was  somwhat  excited. 

The  premature  opening  of  fire  by  the  Tenth  and  E'tven  h 
companies  had  caused  considerable  loss.  The  enemy  had  ev- 
idently estimated  the  distance  correctly  (about  1,100  yards) 
and  found  the  range.  Though  the  skirmishers  covered  them- 
selves skillfully,  their  fire  action  left  much  to  be  desired  ;  a 
great  number  of  the  men  could  be  seen  rising  only  with  great- 
est circumspection  from  behind  cover  in  order  to  get  a  shot. 
The  want  of  fire  discipline  was  especially  noticeable  where  the 
section  leaders  had  been  put  out  of  the  fight.     It  was  utterly 


2()()  Studiks  IX   Tin:  Lkadinc.  oi-  Troops. 

impossible  for  ])latoon  leaders  on  the  skirmish  line  t(»  rise, 
as  they  would  be  immediately  shot  down.  The  rei^imental 
commander,  who,  standing  on  the  left  tiank  of  the  First  com- 
pany, could  survey  the  situation  very  clearly,  found  his  course 
open  to  two  alternatives — either  to  withdraw  the  skirmish  line 
out  of  the  tire,  or  support  it  by  farther  extending  it ;  by  adopt- 
ing the  latter  course  he  would,  however,  commence  the  attack 
without  orders.  Yet  there  was  nothing  gained  by  leaving  the 
skirmishers  remain  at  a  great  distance  from  the  enemy  under 
heavy  losses.  As  he  was  thus  deliberatmg  the  officer  rode  u]) 
bringing  him  the  order  to  attack.  As  he  rode  away  from  Hill 
425   the   officer   had   already   given   the   Second   battalion   the 

order   to    remove    knapsacks.      Colonel    G immediatelv 

despatched  mounted  ritlemen  (on  foot,  however),  to  the  com- 
manders of  the  two  other  battalions  with  directions  to  remove 
kna])sacks.  This  measure  entailed  no  inconvenience  on  the 
troops  in  close  order,  but  the  skirmishers  of  the  Tenth  and 
Eleventh  companies  had  to  get  rid  of  their  sacks  lying  down, 
and  could  not  be  watched  closely  enough  to  see  that  all  cart- 
ridges were  taken  out  of  the  knajxsacks.  as  could  be  done  in 
the  case  of  the  other  companies. 

Colonel  G would  ])referably  have  used  the  Second 

battalion  behind  the  center  of  his  regiment  in  the  attack,  but 
the  Third  battalion  seemed  already  so  much  weakened  that  it 
would  not  do  to  let  it  advance  beyond  Hill  361  without  flank 
su]:)port  and  fully  exposcvl  to  the  hostile  tire.  He  therefore 
decided  to  use  the  Second  battalion  on  the  right  ^ving  and  the 
First  battalion  on  the  left. 

An  officer  was  accordingly  despatched  to  the  Second  bat- 
talion, with  instructions  for  it  to  attack  in  conjunction  with 
the  Third  brigade,  taking  the  corner  of  the  thickets  Ijcfore 
mentioned  as  ])oint  of  direction  for  the  right  wing.  To  the 
commander  of  the  Third  l)attalion,  who  had  been   summoned 

by  a  mounted  ritleman.  Colonel  O said:    "The  regiment 

will  attack  the  enemy's  ])Osition  in  the  direction  of  the  batteries. 
You  will  connect  with  the  Second  l)attalion,  and  advance  upon 
the  battery  at  the  extreme  right.  The  Second  battalion  will 
start  from  Hill  425  within  a  few  minutes."  The  regimental 
adjutant   was   sent   to  the  commander  of   the   l^'irst   battaHi>n. 


Studies  in  thic  Leading  of  Troops.  201 

and  the  battery  on  the  extreme  left  was  designated  t*  >  it  as 
point  of  direction. 

It  was  I  :io  p.  m.  before  the  Second  battalion  could  take 
up  the  forward  movement.  The  transmission  of  orders  had 
occupied  some  time.  As  the  commander  desired  to  bring  his 
companies  forward  under  cover  as  much  as  possible,  and  as 
they  could  not  pass  the  steep  grade  south  of  Hill  425  in  per- 
fect order,  he  let  them  enter  the  ravine  which  runs  past  Height 
361,  in  half  platoon  front.  Upon  debouching  from  the  south- 
western end  of  the  ravine  the  leading  company,  the  Sixth, 
was  met  with  such  a  fire  that  it  at  once  deployed  throughout 
as  skirmishers ;  but  under  support  of  the  fire  of  the  skirmish- 
ers of  the  Second  regiment  and  of  the  Third  battalion  of  its 
own  regiment  it  succeeded  in  advancing  in  two  rushes  almost 
on  line  with  the  skirmishers  of  the  Second  regiment.  Rut 
here  it  found  itself  forced  to  lie  prone,  and  to  meet  the  en- 
emy's fire  with  sights  at  875  yards. 

The  Seventh  company,  near  which  was  the  battalion  com- 
mander, was  halted  by  the  latter  just  south  of  the  ravine  ;  for 
although  there  was  yet  room  for  deployment  to  the  right,  the 
company  during  a  further  advance  might  have  become  mixed 
with  the  Second  regiment.-  The  Fifth  company,  which  was 
behind  it,  halted  in  the  ravine.  The  eighth  company  had 
stepped  out  of  the  ravine  toward  the  east,  but,  finding  skir- 
mishers of  the  Third  battalion  in  its  front,  was  obliged  to  f»^re- 
go  any  active  participation  for  the  time  being. 

^lany  w^ounded  came  back  into  the  ravine  from  the  Sixth 
company,  lying  under  fire  in  front.  Some  men  who  had  not 
been  w^ounded  were  detailed  assistant  litter-bearers  and  took 
])art  in  removing  the  wounded.  Thereupon  the  battalion  com- 
mander most  energetically  interposed,  causing  a  ])latoon  r.f  the 
Seventh  company  to  deploy  into  the  skirmish  line  in  front,  as 
it  became  thinned  out,  and  all  men  of  the  Sixth  company  who 
w^re  not  wounded  were  sent  ahead  with  it.  As  the  com- 
mander of  the  Sixth  company  had  fallen,  the  commander  of 
the  Seventh  went  up  to  the  front  line.  He  especially  directed 
that  the  men  deploying  should  not  carry  the  Sixth  company 
forward  with  them,' and  that  the  signal  for  the  decisive  attack 
must  be  awaited,  which  signal  would  come  from  the  right. 
The  Sixth  company  had  already  ceased  firing  and  Was  prepar- 


202  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

ing  to  make  a  charge,  but  under  the  orders  of  the  commander 
of  the  Seventh  company  it  promptly  resumed  its  fire.  Before 
deploying  into  the  lino  the  platoon  had  fixed  sights  at  875 
yards. 

As  regards  the  Third  battalion  of  the  Fourth  regiment, 
the  Tenth  and  Eleventh  companies  should  really  have  waited 
until  the  skirmishers  of  the  Second  battalion  had  arrived  on 
line  with  them.  But  when  the  Sixth  company,  in  the  lead,  had 
entered  the  ravine,  the  commanders  of  the  Tenth  and  Elev- 
enth companies  considered  that  the  time  had  come  to  carry 
the  fire  (which  had  thus  far  been  somewhat  ineffective)  closer 
10  the  enemy.  The  men  were  in  hopes  of  finding  better  pro- 
tection in  the  depression  of  the  ground  in  their  front,  and 
awaited  anxiously  for  the  order  to  ({uit  the  position  swept  by 
hostile  missiles.  In  the  meantime  the  wild  fire  of  some  of 
the  men  who  hail  lost  their  head  made  it  very  difficult  for  the 
platoon  leaders  to  stop  the  firing.  Their  voices  could  not  reach 
far  enough,  and  only  when  platoon  and  section  leaders  to- 
gether sounded  their  signal  whistles  was  it  jwssible  to  stop 
the  firing. 

Upon    the   command,    "Rise,    double    time,    march  !*'    the 
skirmishers  rushed  to  the  front  over  Hill  361,  rapidly  cross- 
ing to  the  opposite  side  of  the  depression  in  the  ground  in 
order  to  escape  the  hostile  fire,  which  was  causing  heavy  losses. 
During  this  run  of  200  yards,  which  could  be  made  only  with- 
out packs,  some  men  were  left  behind  completely  exhausted. 
After  the  rapid  movement  ceased  and  the  order  to  lie  down 
was  given,  the  skirmishers  were  tmable  to  fire  for  some  tiiue. 
and  not  until  the  excitement  had  somewhat  subsided  was  it 
possible  to  resume  a  regulated  fire  at  from  750  to  800  yards. 
This  hasty  advance  had  demanded  bloody  sacrifices,  but 
it  had  made  the  advance  of  the   Second  battalion  easier,   as 
the  enemy  gave  more  of  his  attention  to  the  Tenth  and  Elev- 
enth companies.     Some  of  their  .skirmishers  could  not  fire,  as 
they  lay  too  low  and  did  not  see  the  enemy,  and  when  several 
.sections  began  to  move  up  farther  on  the  slope,  in  order  to 
.see,  the  movement  was  quickly  stopped  by  the  platoon  lead- 
ers, as  it  might  grow  into  another  premature  attack.      Non- 
commissioned ofiicers  and  lance  corporals  had  assumed  com- 
mand in  place  of  many  platoon  and  section  leaders  wIk^  had 


Studies  in  tjik  Leading  of  Troops.  203 

been  put  out  of  the  tight.  Some  of  the  men,  whcj  had  not  found 
time  to  take  off  knapsacks  and  tried  to  do  so  before  the  rush, 
were  prevented  by  the  file-closers  behind  the  skirmish  line, 
who  drove  the  men  forward,  but  who  could  not  prevent  them 
falling  behind  during  the  run  and  thus  increasing  the  skirmisli 
formations  in  depth.  The  supports,  i  platoon  behind  each 
company,  had  followed  the  skirmishers  pretty  closely,  and  lay 
down  sheltered  in  the  bottom  of  tlie  depression.  The  Twelfth 
company  had  received  the  order  to  advance,  together  with  the 
Tenth  and  Eleventh  companies,  but  as  the  two  latter  did  not 
wait  until  it  came  up,  the  skirmishers  of  the  Twelfth  threw 
themselves  down  at  1,100  yards  from  the  enemy,  in  urder  to 
support  by  their  fire  the  advance  of  the  others,  and  advanced 
over  the  bottoms  in  several  rushes  and  formed  on  the  left  wing 
of  the  Eleventh  company.  Finally,  the  Ninth  company  re- 
mained stationary  behind  Hill  361  in  a  covered  position  in 
the  hands  of  the  battalion  commander.  The  two  foremost 
companies  of  the  First  battalion  of  the  Fourth  regiment  (First 
and  Third)  followed  the  movement  of  the  Twelfth  company. 
The  first  position  gained  (900  and  1,000  yards  from  the 
enemy)  was  not  a  favorable  one,  as  most  of  the  skirmishers 
had  a  field  of  fire  only  when  they  arose  to  their  feet.  During  a 
lengthy  fire  preparation  this  continual  getting  up  and  down 
fatigues  the  men.  The  two  other  companies  of  the  First  bat- 
talion (Second  and  Fourth)  had  still  remained  in  the  village, 
^nd  their  commanders  were  looking  for  exits  allowing  them 
to  go  around  the  houses  in  the  edge  of  the  village,  which  had 
been  set  afire  by  the  percussion  shells  of  the  enemy. 

The  regimental  commander  went  on  foot  to  the  Ninth 
company  and  asked  for  a  trumpeter,  when,  at  i  -45  p.  m.,  a 
glance  to  the  left  wing  of  the  Third  brigade  showed  him  that 
forward  movements  of  the  supports  were  in  progress  there, 
and  a  decision  therefore  close  at  hand.  The  parts  of  the 
Fourth  regiment  that  were  on  the  front  line  had  fired,  with 
varying  success,  for  from  20  to  25  minutes. 

The  order  to  attack  was  received  by  the  commander  of 
the  Third  regiment  shortly  after  i  o'clock,  in  the  southern 
edge  of  the  woods  north  of  Alt-Rognitz.  Until  that  time  no 
attacking  movements  were  observed  in  the  other  regiments 
of  the  brigade  on  the  right,  but  he  did  not  wish  to  lose  time 


I 


204  Studies  in  the  Lkadtng  of  Troops. 

in  ordering^  the  start  of  the  battalions  under  his  command,  as 
they  still  stood  far  to  the  rear.  He  had  still  less  time  by  rea- 
son of  the  fact  that  the  First  and  Second  battalions  of  the 
Third  regiment  had  not  yet  moved  far  enoui^li  to  the  left  for 
the  planned  advance  along  the  wagon-road.  He  therefore 
gave  the  following  order  to  the  two  battalion  commanders, 
who  were  standing  at  his  side :  *'The  First  battalion  will 
move  to  the  first  road  to  the  east  and  secure  the  left  flank.  Tlu- 
Second  battalion  vvill  advance  to  the  attack  from  the  present 
position  of  the  First  battalion,  along  the  wagon-road,  keep- 
ing touch  with  the  Fourth  infantry  regiment.  The  point  of 
penetration  is  the  junction  of  the  wagon-road  with  the  en- 
emy's ])osition.     1  will  accompany  the  first  battalion." 

Column  of  platoons  was  a  very  poor  formation  for  the 
Hank  movement  to  the  left  in  the  woods.  The  First  battal- 
ion, however,  wheeled  to  the  left  by  squads  in  this  formation, 
and  reached  the  road  assigned  it  much  more  slowly,  as  would 
naturally  be  expected.  The  Second  battalion  broke  by  com- 
l»anies  into  squads,  and  formed  columns  of  march  in  the  Alt- 
Rognitz  woods  in  such  a  manner  that  upon  emerging  it  was 
in  double  column  of  march  forn^ation,  the  companies  at  loo 
yards  distances  and  intervals,  a  very  favorable  formation  for 
winding  through  the  streets  and  yards  of  the  village.  Up  to 
the  village  the  battalion  was  not  fired  upon,  but  at  the  soutn- 
ern  edge,  1,300  yards  from  the  enemy,  the  skirmishers  were 
met  with  a  fierce  infantry  fire.  The  battalion  commander, 
seeing  a  glacis-like  slope  before  him,  thought  he  first  ought 
to  oppose  the  unshaken  enemy  by  fire,  and  about  i  130  p.  m. 
he  ha<l  the  edge  of  the  village  and  an  unfinished  building  in 
fn^nt  of  it  occupied  by  3  com])anies.  As  this  fire  was  at  long 
range,  it  produced  no  material  results.  Fifteen  minutes  later 
the  regimental  commander  came  hurrying  along  to  iiujuire 
into  the  cau.se  of  the  delay,  and  saw  tiie  left  wing  of  the  ad- 
joining regiment  far  in  advance  and  no  connectit^n  whatever 
established  with  it.  The  battalion  commander  had  fallen  from 
his  horse  and  the  senior  ea])tain  had  assumed  command;  the 
regimental  commander  ordered  the  latter  to  extend  the  skir- 
mishers to  the  right,  while  he  carried  the  First  battalion  for- 
ward with  the  Second.  Tiie  First  battalion  was  lying  under 
shelter  in  the  northern  vi\i:;v  of  the  village  in  line  of  C(^m]')any 


STUDir:s  IN  rnt  Le:ading  of  Troops.  205 

columns.  At  the  same  time  the  brigade  commander,  who  had 
ridden  up  to  the  left  wing  along  the  sunken  village  street,  ar- 
rived near  the  Second  battalion. 

Termination  of  the  Preparations  for  Attack, 

The  last  instructions  given  to  his  batteries  by.  Lieutenant- 
Colonel   J ,   commander   of   the   division   artillery    regi- 

■/uent,  had  not  since  been  changed,  although  the  enemy's  guns, 
which  had  for  some  time  been  engaged  by  only  two  batteries, 
had  again  awakened  to  considerable  activity,  inflicting  losses 
chiefly  on  the  Second  battalion.  The  Second,  Third,  Fifth, 
and  Sixth  batteries  nevertheless  kept  up  their  fire  upon  the 
hostile  skirmishers  northeast  of  Neu-Rognitz,  and  succeedecl 
in  preventing  the  arrival  of  reinforcements.  At  i  145  the  reg- 
imental commander  directed  the  Second  and  Third  batteries 
10  open  fire  on  the  ground  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  skir- 
mish line,  as  soon  as  the  infantry  attack  should  advance  fur- 
ther. At  the  same  time  the  officer  who  had  been  sent  to  the 
horse  battery  on  the  Galgen  Mountain  returned  with  word 
that  the  artillery  of  the  First  infantry  division  could  be  ex- 
pected to  go  into  action  at  any  moment.  More  severe  artil- 
lery fire  than  heretofore  was  actually  audible  in  the  direction 
of  the  Galgen  Mountain.  The  Sixteenth  regiment  of  field 
artillery  had  gone  into  action.  The  horse  l)attery  made  really 
to  advance  with  5  guns,  in  order  to  accompany  the  infantry 
aitack  beyond  Hohenbruck.  On  account  of  the  great  loss  of 
horses,  it  had  not  yet  been  possible  to  rehorse  a  single  one  of 
the  guns. 

The  squadrons  of  the  First,  regiment  of  hussars  had  re- 
tained the  positions  they  had  heretofore  occupied.  On  the 
right  wing  the  Fourth  scjuadron  had  ascertained  that  the  en- 
emy's left  did  not  extend  beyond  Sorge,  and  had  immediately 
reported  that  fact  to  the  division  commander. 

The  2>4  squadrons  near  the  church  of  St.  Paul  and  St. 
John,  together  with  the  troop  of  the  lliird  squadron  on  patrol 
"duty,  had  found  the  country  east  of  Rudersdorf  completely 
free  (^f  the  enemy.  An  officer's  patrol  sent  toward  Standen/ 
liad   Tiot   vet   returned. 


I 


2ü6  Studii^s  in  tue  Li-ading  of  Troops. 

The  conimander  of  tho  First  cavalry  brigade  had  care- 
fully followed  the  procuress  of  the  infantry  attack,  from  his 
station  on  Hill  414,  southwest  of  Hohenbruck.  The  First  reci- 
iment  of  uhlans  had  been  broui;ht  up  to  this  hill,  througii 
Hohenbruck.  and  stood  under  cover  behind  it  in  line  of  scjuad- 
ron  columns.  The  cuirassier  regiment  halted  in  column  of 
squadrons  between  the  village  and  the  hill. 

The  First  infantry  division  had  continued  the  deployment 
southwest  of  Trautenau,  and  completed  the  same  with  tho 
First  infantry  brigade  at  t  145  p.  m.  The  First  battalion  of 
riflemen  had  been  pushed  forward  to  Hohenbruck. 

The  left  flank  detachment  of  the  Second  infantry  divis- 
ion (Eleventh  company  of  the  First  infantry  regiment  and 
half  a  troop  of  hussars)  had  reached  Raussnitz  from  Welhota. 

CoM>rKNTs  ON  THE  Conduct  of  thf  Division  Commander 
FROM  12:45  '^'^  ^  -45  !'•  ^f- 

The  period  we  have  just  discussed  embraced  the  continu- 
ation of  the  movements  for  attack  and  in  particular  the  prep- 
aration by  artillery  and  *  infantry  tire.  The  latter  lasted  an 
hour  and  a  quarter  on  the  right  wing  of  the  division,  about 
half  an  hour  in  its  center,  and  only  15  to  20  minutes  on  the 
left  wing.  The  artillery  has  thus  been  active  over  an  hour 
and  a  quarter. 

Circumstances  may  arise  where  long-range  preparation  bv 
artillery  is  sufficient  to  allow  the  infantrv  attack  to  follow 
forthwith :  indeed,  conditions  may  be  such  that  the  artillerv 
fire  need  not  even  be  preparatory  alone,  but  also  decisive,  driv- 
ing the  enemy  out  of  his  i^osition.  Tn  general,  however,  we 
must  not  be  misled  into  the  belief  that  the  moment  for  the 
infantry  assault  has  arrived  as  soon  as  some  of  our  shrapnel 
have  driven  the  enemy  from  certain  of  his  advanced  points, 
or  their  effect  is  even  evident  in  his  main  position.  We  will 
do  well  to  abide  by  the  rule  that  prcf^aratory  artillery  /7/r 
sJiouhl  he  folloii'cd  hx  preparatory  infantry  fire.  Our  first 
endeavor  sliould  be  to  advance  our  infantry  within  convenient 
firing  distance  of  (he  enemy. 

///  ///('  iiiitidlion  of  an  attach,  the  artillerv  sIkhiKI  first 
draw  off  the   lire  of  ihr  rii('ni\'s  gnns.   and.  if  possible,  driw 


STUDIKS    IX    THE    LKADING    of    Tr(3<3PS.  207 

them  back ;  then  it  should  direct  its  fire  against  the  enemy's 
infantry.  At  the  same  time  the  infantry  sliould  attempt  to 
bring  its  skirmishers  as  far  forward  as  possible,  so  as  to  carry 
its  fire  up  to  the  enemy.  Both  of  these  obligations  had  been 
performed  by  the  vSecond  infantry  division  at  about  i  145  p.  m., 
and  the  termination  of  the  attack  had  drawn  nearer.  But 
evident  commotion  in  the  ranks  of  the  enemy,  the  gaining  of 
favorable  positions,  confidence  in  our  own  superiority,  the 
grasping  of  the  hostile  flanks,  or  similar  developments  must 
be  awaited  before  an  attempt  is  made  to  effect  the  assault, 
else  we  will  have  no  cause  to  wonder  if  the  attack  does  not 
succeed,  in  spite  of  the  most  careful  preparation.  It  is  evi- 
dent that  if  such  an  attack  is  pursued  with  deliberation,  in  our 
day  it  will  require  more  time  to  carry  it  through  than  ha-s 
been  the  case  heretofore,  or,  if  conducted  without  thorough 
preparation,  will  have  little  prospect  of  success.  It  is  still  more 
certain  that  troops  who  have  already  undertaken  one  attack 
will  not  very  soon  be  available  for  another. 

We  need  not  think  it  strange  that  it  took  the  brigades 
more  than  an  hour  and  three-quarters  to  get  in  position  to 
undertake  the  final  assault,  although  only  a  short  space  had  to 
be  traversed.  Just  as  little  should  we  condemn  the  giving  of 
explicit  orders,  and  say  that  such  orders  cannot  be  given  in 
battle,  as  there  is  not  sufficient  time  for  it.  The  fault  is,  that 
in  war  explicit  orders  are  not  given:  they  are  needed  at  the 
present  day  more  than  ever  before,  and  wherever  possible  we 
should  try  to  find  time  to  issue  them  in  writing,  which  will 
materially  contribute  toward  the  avoidance  of  errors.  It  is  true, 
in  some  cases  explicit  orders  are  impracticable,  as,  for  exan*- 
ple,  when  joining  in  an  engagement  where  troops  have  just 
about  held  their  ov^n  or  have  commenced  to  fall  back.  On  the 
contrary,  we  can  find  many  cases  in  the  past  where  there  was 
ample  lime  for  the  most  explicit  orders  and  explanations,  but 
the  time  was  not  so  utilized.  The  drama  which  is  enacted  at 
the  front  before  the  eyes  of  leaders  not  yet  engaged  is  so  im- 
pressive and  interesting  that  many  a'  one  forgets  in  such  mo- 
ments the  fact  that  he  has  preparations  to  make,  and  in  all 
probability  he  will  shortly  be 'called  on  to  take  part  in  the 
action  himself. 


I 


^2ü8  Studies  in  tiik  Leading  of  Troops. 

•'  ;  In  the  case  before  us,  the  division  commander  had  per- 
sonally maintained  a  calm,  expectant  bearing.  At  12:15  he 
look  station  on  Hill  500  alongside  the  left  vving  of  the  First 
■regiment  of  field  artillery,  and  did  not  quit  that  position  even 
when,  half  an  hoUi-  later,  he  ordered  the  closer  approach  of 
the  infantry  iov  the  fire  preparation  and  decisive  attack.  In- 
•deed,  even  at  1 145,  he  was  at  the  same  spot,  not  having  moved 
from  it  for  an  hour  and  a  half,  and  had  only  once  interfered 
-with  the  action  by  issuing  an  order.  After  the  artillery  had 
been  assigned  its  duty  and  the  infantry  had  been  put  in  posi- 
tion for  the  attack,  he  had  no  further  dispositions  to  make. 
He  could  survey  the  engagement  from  his  elevated  point  of 
observation  better  than  if  lower  down  with  the  troops.  His 
whereabouts  so  selected  were  known  to  all  subordinate  com- 
.manders,  and  every  mounted  orderly  knew  where  to  find  him. 
ilad  he  instead  ridden  around  among  the  troops,  he  would 
c.nly  have  spread  restlessness  and  made  himself  and  those 
about  him  anxious.  The  commander-in-chief's  appearance 
near  fighting  troops  will  never  fail  to  make  a  good  impres- 
sion, while  at  times  in  the  opening  of  a  campaign  it  may  be 
necessary,  but  such  a  step  should  l)e  resorted  to  with  modera- 
tion. When  in  close  touch  with  an  action  the  survey  over 
the  whole  is  lost  and  it  is  more  difficult  to  make  comprehensive 
dispositions  with  the  necessary  calmness.  The'  essential  point 
to  consider  in  the  choice  of  a  station  is  facility  to  oversee  and 
manage  the  engagement. 

Nevertheless  Lieutenant-General    A 's   conduct   seems 

open  to  (juestion  in  two  directions:  he  did  not  carry  through 
the  flank  movement  around  the  right  wing  of  the  opponent. 
and  he  did  not  hasten  the  start  of  the  left  wing  of  the  Fourth 
brigade  after  completing  its  deployment.  Rut  on  both  these 
scores  we  must  not  condemn  too  hastily.  No  matter  how  well 
in  hand  a  leader  may  have  lar^e  masses  of  troo])s.  conditions 
of  time  and  si)ace  make  the  reins  with  whiv^h  he  guides  them 
extraordinarily  long,  and  a  pull  flexes  not  bring  immediate 
response. 

We  have  already  called  .attention  to  the  danger  oi  a 
suj)erior  leader's  causing  precipitate  movements  through  con- 
stant urging.     Such  procedure  is  warranted  only  where  it  is 


I 


Studies  in  the  Leading  or  Troops.  209 

important  to  renew  energies  once  relaxed  by  great  exertion. 
At  other  times  there  is  generally  quite  sufficient  tendency 
among  troops  to  stretch  every  nerve  to  take  part  in  an  action 
at  the  first  possible  moment. 

As  for  the  projected  movement,  sinc6  issuing  the  di^- 
vision  order  at  noon  conditions  had  chäiigecl  on  the  enemy's 
side.  He  had  extended  his  right  wing.  This  contingency  Was 
taken  into  account  in  the  order  of  12:45  P-  ""^v  which  ordered 
the  attack  of  the  left  wing  along  the  wagon-road.  The  divis- 
ion commander  could  not  extend  his  front  farther  than  this. 
If  the  flank  movement  was  not  to  succeed,  then  a  frontal  attack 
must  decide.  Anticipating  this,  the  division  commander  des- 
ignated the  center  of  the  hostile  position  as  the  point  of  pene- 
tration. Furthermore,  some  friction  had  occurred  on  the  left 
wing.  The  First  and  Second  battalions  of  the  Third  regiment 
of  infantry  took  post  too  far  to  the  rear  and  started  for  the 
attack  late ;  moreover,  the  First  battalion  was  held  back  in 
reserve,  whereby  the  attacking  force  upon  the  point  at  first 
regarded  as  decisive  was  much  reduced. 

However,  the  question  here  concerned  was  not  the  urg- 
ing on  of  troops,  but  the  prevention  of  misunderstandings. 
The  Fourth  infantry  brigade  need  not  have  been  anxious  about 
its  left  wing;  the  division  commander  could  have  relieved  it 
of  its  anxiety,  as  he  was  aware  that  the  First  infantry  divis- 
ion of  the  Guard  had  been  requested  to  march  upon  Raussnitz. 

Although  the  position  of  the  division  commander  was 
well  selected,  it  afforded  no  view  of  the  eastern  part  of  Alt- 
Rognitz,  and  an  aid,  accompanied  by  some  mounted  riflemen, 
should  have  been  sent  there  for  the  purpose  of  continually  re- 
porting the  situation.  When  the  division  commander  gave 
the  order  to  attack,  he  thought  the  left  wing  was  in  action 
farther  toward  the  front.  When  none  of  his  troops  were  vis- 
ible on  the  wagon-road  at  i  145  p.  m.,  it  became  plain  to  him 
that  he  could  count  but  little  on  the  action  of  the  Third  in- 
fantry regiment.  Although  it  was  certain  there  was  a  reason 
for  this  delay,  yet  there  was  no  time  to  search  it  out.  It 
should  not  be  forgotten  that  in  executing  an  order  a  leader 
does  his  own  thinking  and  governs  his  action  by  the  move- 
ments of  the  enemy. 


2IO  Studies  in  the  Leading  oe  Troops. 

Had  the  division  commander  wished  to  avoid  losses  and 
a  possible  defeat,  he  could  probably  have  delayed  the  latter 
phase  of  the  attack,  the  assault.  But  the  order  of  the  corps 
commander  to  attack  was  perfectly  plain ;  the  superiority  of 
the  artillery  was  overwhelming,  and  even  if  the  infantry  attack 
should  really  come  to  a  standstill,  the  First  infantry  division 
was  so  near  that  it  could  take  a  iiand  in  tlu-  action  within 
half  an  h<^ur. 

The  general  staff  officer,  with  whom  alone  the  division 
commander  discussed  the  situation,  agreed  with  his  superior 
on  all  points.     After  the  entire  division  had  gone  into  action 

Major  X remained  near  his  commander,  in  pursuance 

of  a  positive  order.  The  latter  desired  to  have  near  him  an 
experienced  officer  to  whom  he  might  express  himself  wath 
perfect  freedom  and  upon  whose  judgment  he  could  depend. 
It  was  for  this  reason  that,  instead  of  sending  away  his  gen- 
eral stafi'  officer,  he  em])loyed  an  aid  to  g(~>  to  the  left  win^-  at 
1 145  p.  m.  and  obtain  information  with  regard  to  conditions 
there. 

CoM.MENTs:     'i'liiv    Third    InEantry    P>R[('..\i)i:    i-ro.m     12:45 
TO  1 :45  p.  M. 

On  account  of  the  terrane.  the  two  regiments  of  the  Third 
infantry  brigade  had  been  compelled  to  deploy  after  (|uite 
divergent  methods.  As  the  First  regiment  could  find  no  shel- 
ter in  the  terrane,  it  must  seek  protection  by  the  development 
of  the  greater  i^art  of  its  firing  ]xnver.  Accordingly  it  had  ex- 
tended its  breadth,  and  kept  only  a  few  companies  in  close 
order.  At  800  yards  from  the  enemy  Its  ])ower  of  attack  from 
out  of  the  depth  was  j^retty  well  exhausted.  The  order  for 
attack  had  been  given.  The  attack  could  not  be  prepared  at 
from  1,100  to  1,300  yards  from  the  village  of  Hohenbruck.  but 
the  enemy  must  be  approached  more  closely,  which  was  cor- 
rectly done.  It  llie  l^irst  regiinent  now  forced  the  enemy 
to  employ  all  his  strength  to  ward  oti  tliis  attack,  then  the 
Second  regiment,  in  action  elsewhere,  and  under  more  fav(^r- 
able  conditions,  might  break  through  his  line  of  defense. 
Kven  with  our  far-carrying  modern  rifies,  we  will  never  be 
able,  by  long-range  fire  alone,  to  induce  an  opponent  on  the 


Studif.s  in  the:  Leadixg  of  Troops.  211 

defensive  to  evacuate  his  position.  The  assailant  must  ap- 
l)roach  nearer  and  nearer.  This  could  be  done  by  a  part  of 
the  First  regiment,  as  several  platoons  and  3  companies  still 
lemained  ready  to  carry  die  skirmishers  forward,  although  the 
Eighth  company  was  certainly  too  far  in  the  rear  to  engage 
in  time.  If  the  regiment  had  worked  up  to  within  400  or  500 
}'ards  of  the  enemy  while  the  other  regiment  executed  the  as- 
sault, the  attack  of  both  regiments  could  coincide,  as  far  as 
effecting  a  decision  was  concerned ;  but  it  would  not  be  a  united 

assault.     Colonel  D could  and  must  lead  the  regiment 

still  farther  to  the  front  after  i  145  p.  m.  by  employing  his 
last  reserves,  for  the  right  wing  of  the  division  was  no  long- 
er in  danger,  and  he  learned  from  a  few  mounted  riflemen 
whom  he  had  sent  out,  that  a  whole  battalion  of  riflemen 
and  a  brigade  of  cavalry  stood  ready  for  support  on  the  right 
wing. 

The  most  difficult  task  was  assigned  the  Second  infantry 
regiment,  to  which  the  point  of  penetration  had  been  given 
with  instructions  to  break  through  the  hostile  lines.  It  was 
fortunate  that  the  solution  of  this  problem  was  favored  by 
the  character  of  the  terrane.  It  was  not  necessary  to  extend 
the  regiment  for  a  copious  development  of  its  fire,  as  the 
action  of  the  artillery  alone  was  already  sufficiently  effective. 
In  view  of  the  point  of  direction  and  line  of  separation  from 
the  other  regiment,  it  need  not  extend  its  front  over  440  yards. 
Such  a  narrow  and  deep  formation  on  an  open  plain  would 
have  led  to  heavy  losses,  but  here  the  ground  afforded  ample 
protection,  so  that  the  companies  in  close  order  could  also 
retain  a  compact  formation. 

Extension  and  formation  in  attack  is  not  dependent  alone 
on  the  terrane,  but  materially  so  upon  the  task  and  the  rela- 
tion to  other  troops.  A  common  formation  for  both  the  Third 
and  Fourth  brigades  here  would  have  been  the  posting  of 
regiments  side  by  side.  Regulations  call  specific  attention  to 
the  advantage  of  such  a  wing  formation.  In  attack  a  de- 
ployed front  of  from  1,100  to  1,300 -yards  is  prescribed  for  a 
brigade ;  a  single  regiment  in  use  as  a  wing  would,  accord- 
ing to  rule,  require  about  half  this  frontas^e.  Consequently 
it  seems  strange  that  in  the  case  of  the  Third  brigade,  the 
First  regiment  occupied  a  frontage  of  800  yards  and  the  Sec- 


212  STUDIKS    in    the    LlvADlNG    OF    TrOOPS. 

ond  regiment  only  450  yards.  The  shortness  of  front  in  the 
case  of  the  Second  regiment  was  due  to  the  fact  that  its  right 
wing  leaned  on  the  First  regiment,  and  the  extension  of  it^^ 
left  wing  was  limited  by  the  designation  of  the  point  ox 
direction. 

It  would  have  sufficed  to  have  sent  a  battalion  to  the  first 
line,  as  a  battalion  has  enough   aggressive   energy   to   carry 
through  an  attack  for  a  considerable  time  on  a  front  of  450 
yards.     Nevertheless  the  Second  infantry  regiment  put  2  bat- 
talions in  the  first  line,  one  beside  the  other.      Even  the  reg- 
iment adopted  a  wing  formation  with  its  battalions  when  it 
formed  up  on  the  fighting  line ;  this  was  especially   for  the 
purpose   of   preserving   the   units   of   command.      It    is    self- 
evident  that  order  can  be  maintained  much  longer  in  actioii 
if  a  battalion  sends  forward  its  own  reinforcements  than  if 
men  from  other  battalions,  whom  the  leader  at  the  front  does 
not  know,  are  deployed  into  the  skirmish  line.     Besides,  the 
battalion  commander  and  his  subordinates  keep  the  battalion 
wholly  in  hand  if  it  fights  by  itself.     When  alone,  it  can  re- 
spond  promptly   to   every   call;   but   when   organizations   are 
mixed,  order  must  first  be  re-established.     In  consequence  of 
its  narrow  front,  the  Second  regiment  also  took  a  depth  forma- 
tion of  about  450  yards.     There  were  therefore  about  3.000 
assailants  in  a  breadth  of  450  yards,  a  little  over  7  men  pcr 
yard,  which  is  not  at  all  too  many  for  a  decisive  attack. 

Colonel  E— ,  commanding  the  Second  regiment,  was 

entirely  correct  in  not  leaving  the  First  battalion  in  reserve, 
but  placing  it  in  the  third  echelon  for  attack.  Losses  in  the 
2  battalions  at  the  front  would  soon  call  the  First  battalion 
forward,  and  portions  of  it  in  close  order  would  effect  the  de- 
cision in  the  final  assault.  When,  as  in  this  case,  a  frontal 
attack  is  to  be  made,  the  assailant  must  be  formed  deeply  in 
order,  to  have  some  reserve  power  for  the  final  rush.  The 
First  infantry  regiment,  however,  was  contending  under  en- 
tirely diflferent  conditions.  It  would  have  been  well  if  it  could 
have  preserved  its  deep  formation,  but  circumstances  did  not 
permit  this.  The  enemy  was  in  front  and  was  widely  extonrl- 
ed,  and,  as  the  regiment  was  not  confined  on  its  right,  it  could 
extend  itself  also:  it  must  do  that,  if  it  would  master  its  op- 
ponent.    'Vhc  dee])    formation   i)rescril)cd   by   Regulatiotis   was 


Studies  in  the;  Li;ading  of  Troops.  2i.j 

to  be  abandoned  on  account  of  the  ground,  the  strength  of  the 
hostile  fire,  and  the  freedom  for  extension,  and  hope  for  s^c-. 
cess  was  based  materially  on  the  govxl  marksmanship  of  tl^ie. 
skirmishers.  The  First  regiment  sent  8  companies  into  the  hrst 
line,  on  a  front  of  800  yards,  keeping  in  rear  only,  i  company,; 
as  2  were  to  cover  the  right  wing.  Forthwith  the.  3  battf^t*- 
ions  considerably  mixed  were  deployed  beside  each,  otber^ 
while  it  would  have  been  better  to  keep  i  battalion;  still  in  clos>e 
order.  The  reason  for  the  early  mixing  of  the  companies 
will  be  considered  later  on.  .    I 

The  number  of  skirmishers  employed  determines  the  dens- 
ity of  the  skirmish  lines.  Colonel  D— ^- — ,  First  infantry,, 
intended  to  subdue  the  enemy  by  the  development  of  a  strong 
fire;  he  therefore  ordered  the  deployment  of  dense  skirmish 
lines,  the  men  elbow  to  elbow.  In  the  case  of  th^  Second; in-; 
fantry  regiment,  which  was  in  the  woods,  only  one  or  t;>vci 
sections  were  deployed  in  front  of  each  of  the  four  companies; 
these  did  not  fire,  but  were  only  to  watch,  or,  in  case  of  needf 
turn  back  isolated  patrols.  When  the  order  to  advance  wa^ 
received,  the  companies  formed  skirmish  lines  as  prescribe 4 
in  Regulations — /.  e.,  with  an  interval  of  one  or  two  paces, be- 
tween skirmishers.  These  intervals  must  be  assumed  unles^ 
otherwise  ordered.  By  them  an  infantryman  enjoys  a  cer- 
tain freedom  in  m.aking  use  of  the  terrane.  But  above  all,, 
it  is  more  difficult  for  the  opponent  to  get  his  aim  or  mak^ 
a  hit,  as  missiles  which  are  deflected  laterally  by ;  errors  of 
the  hostile  skirmishers  or  other  causes  pass  through  the  in- 
tervals, doing  no  harm,  whereas  a  dense  skirmish  line  afford^ 
a  connected  target,  in  which  every  bullet  fired  at  proper  ele^ 
vation  makes  a  hit.  Even  at  mid  range  the  Second,  reginient 
did  not  close  the  skirmish  line,  for  the  artillery  had  already 
done  good  work  and  the  normal  skirmish  line  was  sufficient  to 
overcome  the  hostile  infantry.  Where  supports  deploy  iutQ 
the  line,  it  is  done  to  replace  losses  and  keep  up  an  even  fire^ 

Skirmishers  are  not  required  to  preserve  an  exact  align- 
ment. The  skirmishers  sent  out  by  "both  regiments  were  not 
at  all  on  the  same  line.  Those  of  the  First  regiment  had  .rep 
mained  behind,  with  the  Tenth  company  alone  lying  down 
somewhat  in  advance ;  the  other  regiment  had  worked  for- 
ward over  too  yards  beyond.    A  skirmish  line  is  given  points 


314  Studies  ix  Tin-  Lkadixo  ok  Troops. 

of  direction  within  or  beyond  the  enemy's  line,  and  one  part 
must  keep  in  touch  with  tlie  other.  It  would  have  been  an 
error  if  the  skirmishers  of  the  First  regiment  had  attempted 
to  advance  un(kr  a  heavy  fire  to  within  700  or  800  yards  of 
the  enemy,  simply  for  the  sake  of  keeping  up  the  alignment. 
An  effective  fire  can  be  delivered  just  as  well  with  sights  at 
800  yards  as  at  700  yards.  The  gain  of  the  100  yards'  space 
would  have  been  bought  at  a  great  sacrifice. 

As  already  stated,  the  2  regiments  of  the  Third  infantry 
brigade,  on  account  of  the  formation  of  the  ground,  had  to 
resort  to  very  difierent  measures  in  order  to  properly  initiate 
the  attack.  They  both  had  a  great  advantage  in  that  their 
acfvance  up  to  1,200  or  1,300  yards  could  be  carried  out  un- 
der cover.  At  these  distances  only  the  long-range  fire  of  the 
hostile  infantry  would  be  felt.  On  an  open  plain,  as  at  St. 
Privat  in  1870,  losses  occurred  even  at  1,500  and  1,600  yards, 
and  in  1877,  in  the  Russo-Turkish  War,  the  Turks  lying  be- 
hind intrenchments  inflicted  heavy  losses  on  the  Russians  at 
the  same  distance.  The  task  here  assigned  the  First  infantry 
vegiment  was  certainly  difficult.  While  the  other  regiment 
of  the  brigade  found  shelter  in  the  terrane  at  least  in  some 
places,  the  First  had  to  forcibly  make  its  advance  possible  by 
()I)ening  fire  at  long  range.  In  partially  open  terrane  the  mod- 
ern attack  will  be  divided  into  three  periods:  the  advance  to 
mid-range  distance,  subduing  the  enemy  by  infantry  fire,  and 
the  assault. 

The  First  regiment  had  succeeded  in  working  up  to  with- 
in 800  yards,  where  it  found  that  its  opponent  was  extended 
m  an  equally  broad  front.  It  was.  however,  lacking  in  depth. 
It  was  natural  that  signs  of  crumbling  and  a  certain  dissolu- 
tion shotild  be  observed.  The  slackening  of  individual  en- 
ergy called  for  remedies  and  energetic  measures,  which  were 
immediately  ai)plied.  In  this  case  the  mingling  of  the  com- 
panies was  a  great  drawback.  On  the  right,  in  particular, 
companies  oi  the  First  and  Third  battalions  could  be  found 
lighting  promiscuously.  As  long  as  the  men  were  of  the  same 
regiment,  this,  however,  might  be  allowable.  Such  occasions 
furnish  opportunity  for  brilliant  display  of  cnergv  on  the  part 
frf  platoon  leaders,  who.  in  general,  are  the  soul  of  the  skir- 
ini.sh  action  on  the  most  advanced  line.     When  the  line  sud- 


Studiks  IX  TU)-:  Lt;AüiNG  OF  Troops.  215 

'lenly  comes  to  a  standstill  without  orders,  or  an  ardent  de- 
sire to  fall  back  is  manifested,  then  it  is  that  the  i)ersonality 
of  the  platoon  leader  will  turn  the  ;cale,  and  a  sharp  and  cor- 
rectly given  word  of  command  will  not  be  without  influence 
even  though  the  moment  be  one  of  the  most  trying. 

Very  soon  we  will  again  have  in  our  Army  a  large  num- 
ber of  young  officers  without  experience  in  war.  It  is  well 
to  acquaint  them  with  the  dark  sides  of  it,  for  the  imagina- 
tion will  seldom  paint  these  of  its  own  volition.  The  young 
officer  should  be  taught  war  as  it  is,  so  that  such  incidents  will 
not  take  him  completely  by  surprise,  but  find  him  ready  to  take 
judicious  measures. 

Even  with  the  most  gallant  and  highly  disciplined  troops, 
things  will  occur  in  war  that  we  would  hardly  have  believed 
possible.  In  this  study  we  have  an  opportunity  to  paint  a  scene 
that  no  peace  maneuvers  can  furnish. 

Imagine,  for  an  instant,  that  Hohenbruck's  position  on  the 
great  highway  to  Trautenau  and  the  events  being  enacted  near 
it  brought  many  wounded  men  to  the  village,  in  the  company 
of  attendants.  On  the  main  roads,  wherever  shelter  was  to 
be  found,  large  numbers  of  non-combatants  of  every  sort  as- 
sembled— bands  of  near-by  regiments  and  their  led  horses,  as 
well  as  the  led  horses  of  the  headquarters  staff,  etc.  Add  to 
these  the  cartridge-carts,  medical-wagons,  and  various  vehi- 
cles of  the  ambulance  company. 

For  a  time  this  great  aggregation  of  auxiliary  and  re- 
serve forces  remained  in  comparative  security,  but  when  the 
action  began  to  assume  an  uncertain  mien  the  conditions 
changed.  The  infantry  at  the  front  fell  back  slightly,  fugi- 
tives rushed  into  the  village,  and  amidst  the  houses  a  hail  of 
bullets  fell.  Then  all  of  a  sudden  this  entire  hitherto  motion- 
less mass  began  to  surge  Such  of  the  wounded  as  were  able 
to  walk  tried  to  get  under  shelter.  Men  with  led  horses  and 
various  vehicles  tried  to  save  themselves  and  get  into  motion 
again.  North  of  the  village,  on  the  Trautenau  highway  and 
along  its  side,  there  rolled  along  a  disorderly  crowd,  slowly 
at  first,  then  faster  and  faster,  and  finally  on  a  dead  run.  If 
it  should  have  happened  at  just  that  moment  that  the  squad- 
ron of  hussars  posted  there  should  wheel  about  and  retire  a 
few  hundred  paces  in  order  to  open  an  adequate  field  of  attack 


21 J  Studies  in  ti-ie  Leading  of  Troops. 

for  themselves,  then  the  picture  of  a  perfect  rout  would  have 
been  Hfted  before  the  troops.  And  we  know  that  such  a  pict- 
ure does  not  in  the  least  tend  to  raise  the  morale  of  men,  a 
thing  so  desirable  in  like  situations. 

To  obliterate  this  idea  of  a  rout,  it  is  necessary  to  prompt- 
ly lead  the  troops  forward  whenever  terrane  and  conditions 
will  permit.  At  the  same  time  we  must  endeavor  to  check  the 
stream  of  fugitives,  else  they  will  cause  all  manner  of  mis- 
chief; they  will  induce  trains  that  have  been  ordered  to  the 
front  to  turn  about  again;  they  will  spread  alarming  news, 
which  may  even  reach  home  itself.  Such  a  stream  can  only 
be  arrested  by  halting  those  in  the  lead,  and  officers  and  men 
sent  out  on  such  an  errand  must  use  all  the  means  at  their 
disposal.  Under  the  circumstances,  this  work  would  have  nat- 
urally fallen  to  the  Fourth  squadron  of  the  hussar  regiment, 
which  would  have  performed  it  by  despatching  an  officer  witli 
a  troop. 

Such  events,  however,  did  not  take  place  during  the  en- 
gagement under  consideration.  A  few  sudden  stops  and  tend- 
ency to  give  way  on  parts  of  the  skirmish  line  of  the  First 
infantry  regiment  were  overcome  by  the  platoon  leaders,  who 
are  not  only  the  life  and  the  impelling  and  directing  t-lenient 
on  the  foremost  line,  but  are  the  ones  upon  whom  devolve  the 
employment  of  the  principal  means  of  combat,  fire  control. 
Even  in  peace  a  company  commander  cannot  by  his  vincc 
direct  a  company  of  lOO  or  120  men  firing  ball  cartridges. 
How  can  he  do  it,  then,  with  a  company  at  war  strength? 
Fire  control  consequently  depends  on  the  character  of  the 
platoon  leader,  and  it  devolves  upon  his  talents  to  show  how 
effectively  the  guns  entrusted  to  his  care  can  be  used.  In  Part 
II.,  paragraph  55,  Regulations  state  specifically:  ''The  sta- 
tion of  the  platoon  leader  must  be  chosen  with  a  view  to  ob- 
serving the  effect  of  the  fire  of  his  platoon.  He  forms  his 
platoon  in  the  position  assigned  it,  and  designates  its  tar- 
get either  independently  or  in  accordance  with  orders.  He 
watches  the  enemy  closely,  and  co-operates  with  adjoining  pla- 
toons on  the  fighting  line  as  far  as  he  is  able." 

In  the  year  1866  the  quick-firing  breech-loader  brought  a 
decision  at  close  range.  A  tolerably  trained  sh(->t,  who  aimed 
linrizontally,  couM  accomplish  great  results  with  the  needle- 


Studies  in  thk  Leading  of  Troops.  ^17 

gun.  The  victory  in  the  infantry  contest  of  1870  was -du^  to 
the  advance  of  the  German  foot  troops  to  the  initial  limit  of 
the  range  of  their  gun  (650  yards),  regardless  of  great  losses, 
although  the  gun  they  carried  was  inferior  to  the  chassepot. 
In  our  day  fire  superiority  will  be  determined  at  ranges  of 
600  to  1,100  yards.  Indispensably  necessary  to  an  advanta- 
geous employment  of  the  gun  is  the  knowledge  how  far  we 
are  from  the  enemy,  the  estimation  of  distances.  The  com- 
pany commander  will  probably  never  be  able  to  fix  the  dis- 
tance to  the  enemy  for  the  entire  deployed  company.  The  tar- 
gets for  the  several  platoons  may  be  quite  different.  The  pla- 
toon leader  is  responsible  for  the  estimate,  and  two  or  three  ex- 
perts at  estimating  distances  are  assigned  him  as  assistants. 
If  in  addition  opportunity  is  found  to  allow  some  of  the  sec- 
tion leaders  to  call  out  their  estimate  of  distance,  then  the  pla- 
toon leader  should  be  able  to  establish  an  approximately  cor- 
rect mean  by  taking  all  the  estimates  into  consideration,  and 
order  sights  fixed  accordingly.  Intercourse  between  platoon 
leader  and  men  is  regulated  in  action  by  the  brief  language 
of  command.  This  terse,  sharp,  and  clear  method  of  expres- 
sion must  be  acquired,  and  calls  for  the  most  laborious  ap- 
plication. Every  unnecessary  word  disturbs  the  skirmisher. 
Wherever  there  is  noise  on  the  skirmish  line,  we  may  expect 
to  find  poor  fire  discipline. 

At  the  close  of  paragraph  55,  Regulations  state:  "It 
often  happens  that  the  one  best  able  to  see  where  advantage 
can  be  taken  of  the  character  of  the  terrane  or  conditions  with 
the  enemy,  is  the  platoon  leader  on  the  skirmish  line ;  but  the 
platoon  leader  must  satisfy  himself  how  far  he  can  take  such 
advantage  on  his  own  responsibility."  To  satisfy  himself,  he 
must  not  only  consider  his  own  fighting  line  and  the  near-by 
enemy,  but  he  must  also  look  back  to  the  rear,  to  see  how  far 
he  is  in  advance  of  bodies  in  close  order,  and  what  such  bodies 
are  doing.  He  cannot,  hov/ever,  accomplish  all  this  in  per- 
son ;  to  assist  him  he  has  expert  estimators,  and  he  cannot  in- 
sist too  strongly  that  one  of  these  turn  his  back  on  the  exciV 
ing  events  in  front,  in  order  to  watch  the  measures  of  troops 
in  the  rear.  How  wrong  it  would  have  been  had  one  of  the 
platoons  of  the  First  regiment  sallied  out  from  the  skirmish 
line  to  ^ain  qround  forward  !     The  enemy  still  possessed  his 


2i8  Stüdiics  in  the  Lkadixg  of  Troops. 

full  fighting-  power,  and  would  have  directed  a  concentrated 
lire  on  the  single  platoon  dashing  ahead.  Besides,  the  pla- 
toon would  have  entered  the  fire  of  the  skirmishers  lying  down 
in  the  rear,  and  thus  have  suffered  from  shots  of  the  men  of 
its  own  regiment.  Nor  was  anybody  in  close  order  at  hand, 
to  quickly  turn  to  account  any  advantage  possibly  gained.  And 
if  several  more  platoons  had  joined  in  such  a  planless  under- 
taking, the  situation  of  the  skirmish  line  of  the  regiment  might 
have  been  critical  indeed.  No  platoon  leader,  therefore,  had 
the  least  intention  of  working  himself  farther  ahead  without 
the  pressure  of  newly  appearing  subdivisions  from  the  rear, 
and  each  one  concentrated  his  entire  experience  and  presence 
of  mind  on  a  correct  fire  control. 

The  advance  of  the  Tenth  company  was  more  excusable, 
for  the  patch  of  w^oods  in  its  front  actually  afforded  advant- 
ages ;  in  reality,  however,  the  seizure  of  the  woods  was  value- 
less, as  at  that  time  the  border  next  to  the  enemy  could  not 
have  been  held  at  a  distance  of  300  yards. 

In  the  skirmish  line  of  the  Second  regiment  every  one 
momentarily  awaited  the  order  to  advance.  The  platoon 
leaders  did  not  advance  of  their  own  accord,  for  they  were 
schooled  so  well  tactically  that  they  awaited  the  start  of  the 
supports  with  perfect  composure.  They  certainly  could  not 
expect  to  receive  an  order  to  go  ahead,  as  messengers  or  bear- 
ers of  orders  could  not  move  about  in  the  hostile  fire.  This 
was  out  of  the  question.  The  human  voice,  too,  is  not  able  to 
shout  orders  for  hundreds  of  yards  amidst  the  crack  of  rifles 
and  swish  of  bullets.  The  platoon  commanders  must  therefore 
depend  upon  sight  for  their  connection ;  as  soon  as  they  should 
see  supports  starting  out,  then  the  time  would  have  come  for 
them  to  move  also. 

In  action  it  is  also  possible  to  communicate  by  means  of 
sii^ns.  On  page  3  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  prescribe  some 
such  signs,  while  ''other  signs  must  be  sj^ecially  invented  by 
the  leader." 

Should  the  skirmish  line  of  the  Second  regiment  advance 
farther,  the  open  ground  would  doubtless  have  compelled  it 
to  do  so  in  double  time.  It  had  advanced  to  the  firing  ])osition 
it  occupied  at  a  run  when  under  fire  and  at  a  walk  when  shel- 
tered  and   in   the  bottoms.       Unnnin«^-  over   ])rotected    ground 


Studies  in  teu-   Luading  of  Troops.  219 

would  have  been  a  gross  violation  of  the  principle  to  pre- 
serve the  strength  of  the  troops.  The  skirmishers  of  the  Sec- 
ond regiment  were  lying  partly  behind  an  undulation  of  the 
ground,  under  cover,  while  those  of  the  other  regiment  had 
thrown  themselves  upon  entirely  open  ground.  The  first  had 
crawled  to  cover  in  a  stooping  position,  while  the  others  had 
rushed  rapidly  forward  under  the  hostile  fire,  so  as  to  shorten 
the  time  of  exposure.  The  skirmisliers  of  the  First  regiment 
could  have  been  brought  forward  out  of  their  unsheltered 
position  very  easily,  for  their  condition  could  hardly  have 
been  more  perilous ;  but  it  would  have  been  difficult  to  induce 
the  skirmishers  of  the  Second  regiment  to  leave  the  protect- 
ing undulation. 

As  long  as  a  portion  of  the  company  and  platoon  leaders 
are  able  to  fight,  the  frictions  in  action  can  be  overcome  by  the 
fire  and  battle  discipline  acquired  in  previous  training.  In 
order  to  exercise  the  necessary  influence  in  this  direction,  ev- 
ery officer  and  non-commissioned  officer  charged  with  these 
duties  must  be  locally  in  the  proper  place.  Ordinarily  the 
platoon  leader  directs  the  fire  of  his  platoon  from  the  center, 
a  point  from  which  his  commands  can  best  be  heard  to  the 
right  and  left.  If  the  wind  blows  from  the  side,  he  goes  to 
the  windward,  so  the  sound  of  his  voice  is  carried   farther. 

No  special  position  is  prescribed  in  Regulations  for  the 
company  commander  when  part  of  his  company  is  deployed 
as  skirmishers.  On  page  95,  Part  IL,  we  find  the  following: 
"The  company  commander  must  keep  the  control  of  his  com- 
pany well  in  hand.  His  instructions  to  the  platoon  com- 
manders should  be  in  the  form  of  brief  and  lucid  orders.  He 
should  post  himself  where  he  believes  he  can  best  exercise  con- 
trol over  all.  He  should  see  that  the  ammunition  ibrought 
from  the  rear  is  properly  distributed  to  the  skirmishers,  using 
for  this  purpose  all  means  on  the  field  at  his  command." 

If  only  I  platoon  is  deployed  as  skirmishers,  the  company 
commander  should  keep  the  other  parts  in  close  order.  So 
he  may  meet  all  demands,  his  position  in  action  will  probably 
be  selected  between  the  skirmishers  and  supports.  In  addi- 
tion to  the   trumpeter,   who   remains  near  him   in   accordance 


2  20  STUDII-S    in    TIIK    LEADING    OF    TrOOPS. 

with  Regulations,  he  will  usually  require  one  or  two  adroit 
men  to  act  as  messengers. 

The  support  is  generally  commanded  by  an  experienced 
Jitnitenant.  Only  a  few  supports  were  left  to  the  First  regi- 
ment; several  companies  were  supported  by  half-platoons  in 
close  order,  and  the  Seventh  and  Tenth  companies  by  a  pla- 
loon  each.  To  keep  out  of  the  shower  of  bullets  the  supports 
very  properly  remained  about  200  yards  in  ihe  rear.  The 
Eighth  company,  however,  kept  back  too  far ;  there  were  very 
few  bodies  in  close  order  behind  the  skirmish  line,  and  there- 
fore the  company  should  not  have  taken  a  distance  of  450 
yards.  Upon  the  principle  that  bodies  of  troops  in  close  order 
must  go  forward  as  soon  as  their  skirmish  line  opens  fire,  the 
Eighth  company  should  have  moved  up  long  ago.  If  it 
thought  it  would  suflfer  severely  in  line  or  platoon  column,  it 
could  have  emerged  from  the  woods  deployed  as  skirmishers, 
and  closed  up  again  upon  halting. 

The  companies  lying  as  support  behind  the  skirmishers 
adopted  the  platoon  colunm  formation.  In  it  the  men  can 
best  be  kept  together  and  battle  discipline  preserved.  Some 
battalions,  however,  remained  in  column  of  march  until 
they  came  under  a  damaging  fire.  The  F'irst  battalion  of 
the  First  regiment  could  assume  no  other  formation  in  the 
sunken  roadnorth.east  of  Hohenbruck.  The  passage  through 
the  village,  moreover,  could  not  be  efifected  except  in  column 
of  march  by  companies.  Upon  coming  out  of  the  southern 
edge  of  the  village  the  First  and  Second  companies  even  de- 
ployed immediately  as  skirmishers,  because  there  was  no  time 
left  to  form  platoon  columns.  The  First  battalion  of  the  Sec- 
ond regiment  still  retained  its  column  of  march  by  companies 
after  passing  through  the  wooils,  because  it  could  not  find 
sufficient  shelter  in  the  tcrranc,  and  could  better  adapt  itself 
to  the  accidents  of  the  terrane. 

In  order  that  second  and  tliird  echelons  may  know  what 
direction  to  follow  during  an  action,  even  when  the  ground 
is  partially  obstructed  from  view,  they  are  given  the  same 
j)oint  of  direction  as  is  assigned  the  skirmishers  in  front.  The 
main  "|)oint  of  direction  is  assii^ned  tc)  one  l)0(l\  ot  troo|>s 
alone,  and  it  is  responsible  that  the  same  is  maintained;  in  this 
case  it  was  the  Socond  battalion  of  the  Second  infantrv,  and 


Studii-is  in  THß  Leading  of  Troops.  221 

in  particular  its  left  wing-.  It  is  evident  that  other  bodies  of 
troops,  like  the  First  infantry  regiment,  who  could  not  see 
the  northeast  corner  of  the  big  woods  north  of  Neu-Rognitz. 
must  select  another  point  of  direction,  but  one  that  shall  bo 
in  accord  with  the  conditions.  The  First  regiment  chose  the 
l^rojecting  point  of  woods  east  of  the  highway,  and  charg:ed 
the  Second  battalion  with  keeping  the  direction.  The  point 
of  direction  was  so  chosen  that  it  assured  connection  with  the 
Second  infantry  regiment,  as  ordered ;  100  yards,  or  even  a 
slightly  greater  distance,  from  the  connecting  regiment,  makes 
no  dift'erence.  Keeping  in  touch  does  not  mean  being  elbow 
to  elbow,  but  concerted  action  for  a  common  purpose.  If 
Neu-Rognitz  had  a  church-steeple,  that  church-steeple  should 
have  been  chosen.  The  corners  of  the  woods  vanished  from 
sight  here  and  there  in  low  parts  of  the  terrane ;  therefore  it 
was  necessary  to  carefullv  choose  intermediate  points  if  the 
designated  direction  would  not  be  lost. 

When  the  brigade  had  come  within  mid-range  distance  of 
the  opponent,  the  brigade  commander  could  do  nothing  more 
toward  maintaining  the  direction  of  march.  His  station  was 
with  the  reserve — in  this  case,  with  the  First  battalion  of  the 
Second  regiment.  Neither  could  he  any  longer  Issue  an  order 
for  the  decisive  advance,  as  no  one,  mounted  or  on  foot,  could 
traverse  the  battle-field  on  orderly  service  under  such  a  fire. 

Major-General  B made  his  Intentions  known  only  by 

sending  the  First  battalion  into  action,  which,  in  the  midst 
of  the  ficht,  he  held  under  his  own  special  disposition,  of  which 
fact  he  duly  informed  Colonel  E .  Indeed,  the  First  bat- 
talion of  the  Second  regiment  did  not  constitute  a  reserve  at 
all,  but  a  bodv  In  close  order,  to  be  saved  until  the  end  for 
use  in  the  final  advance. 

Strictly  soeakinr,  the  final  charge,  the  one  Intended  to 
bring  about  the  decision,  should  never  be  undertaken  until 
the  enemv  Is  seen  to  be  shaken  bv  the  preparatorv  fire.  Nev- 
ertheless, under  certain  conditions,  the  general  situation  may 
compel  us  to  make  It  at  an  earli<"'-  oerlod  :  but  /;/  such  cases  if 
is  always  necessary  to  avoid  undertaking:  it  at  too  orreaf  a  dis- 
tance front  the  ot>Mnent,  and  to  see  that  the  successive  fines 
have  previously  been  closed  ufy  to  the  most  advanced  tio^htinc: 
front,  so  as  to  join  in  the  action  at  the  proper  time.    In  such 


222  Studies  in  the  Lkadinc  or  Troops. 

an  attack,  that  great  impulse  to  seek  a  decision  is  especially 
manifest  in  the  linal  charge,  and  to  crown  it  with  success  we 
must  stake  the  whole  force  at  our  disposal. 

When  such  decisive  attacks  are  undertaken  by  larger 
masses,  they  will  entail  greater  sacrifices  the  less  they  are 
favored  by  the  ground.  We  should  clearly  understand  this 
at  the  outset,  and  undertake  them  only  when  forced  to.  And 
then  we  must  give  them  the  most  careful  preparation,  and. 
when  the  decisive  moment  has  come,  stake  all  upon  a  singk 
throw. 

One  thing  is  certain :  When  attacks  by  larger  masses  arc- 
nowadays  undertaken,  it  is  essential  to  have  the  most  perfect 
accord  among  all  the  commanders,  in  viewing  the  situation 
and  in  conducting  the  action;  and  this  can  only  bj  attai.ied 
by  the  most  careful  training.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  wc 
sJwnld  practice  combat  tactics  of  large  forces  as  iJioroagJily 
as  possible,  not  alone  on  the  drill-ground,  hut  also  on  the  most 
varied  terrane. 

Comments:    The  Fourth  Ineantrv  Brigade  from    12:45 
TO  1 :45  p.  M. 

The  project  of  a  flank  attack  upon  the  enemy's  position 
was  all  right  in  itself.  Experience  shows,  however,  that  it 
is  exceedingly  difficult  to  carry  out  such  an  idea  right  in  front 
of  the  opponent.  According  to  generally  accepted  principles, 
nowadays  a  flank  attack  can  be  made  only  by  marching  upon 
the  flank  from  a  great  distance,  and  at  the  same  time  holdiiiL: 
the  enemy  fast  by  a  threatened  frontal  attack.  Tf  he  is  not 
held  fast  in  the  front,  he  will  change  his  line,  or  extend  it  to- 
ward the  menaced  flank  as  soon  as  he  received  re]iort  of  the 
approach  in  that  direction.  Changes  of  front  and  shifting  of 
troops  can  be  readily  efl'ected  by  the  simple  and  flexible  form 
in  which  armies  move  to-day.  In  the  eighteenth  century  a 
formation  once  established  for  defense  was  almost  immovable. 
It  required  a  long  time  to  concentrate  troops  on  the  threat- 
ened points  in  a  defensive  front.  In  the  battle  o{  Leuthen 
the  clinnsiness  of  tlie  movemi'nts  of  his  opj)onents  gave  tin- 
\  icton-  to  tile  a^^ii'ant.  iMXMlLTJrk  the  (^treat.  At  Austorlitz. 
(.ne  Mt"  his  few  d;'fi'iisi\  e  hatll.'S.  Xapokon  a->sirned  the  otTens- 


vSruDiEs  IN  THE  Leadjnc  oe  Troops.  22.^ 

ive,  advancing  his  left  wing  and  center  in  a  counter-attack, 
thus  scattering  the  clumsy  columns  of  the  Austrians  and  Rus-, 
sians  as  they  marched  past  the  French  to  make  a  flank  attack 
on  the  right  wing.  On  the  other  hand,  a  flank  attack  suc- 
ceeded sixty  years  later,  at  Königgrätz,  which,  although  not, 
consummated  on  the  battle-field,  was  initiated  and  brought  to 
a  finish  by  a  strategical  maneuver.  At  Königgrätz,  and  also 
in  1870  at  Gravelotte  and  St.  Privat,  the  flank  attack  was 
made  possible  only  by  holding  the  opponent  fast  in  front. 

In  the  study  before  us  the  division  commander   was  in. 
the  disagreeable  position  of  being  obliged  to  attempt  a  flank, 
attack  in  sight  of  the  enemy  between  Alt-Rognitz  and  Neu- 
Rognitz.     He  carried  out  his  plan  on  the  supposition  that  the. 
enemy  was  weak  and  could  not  extend  his  front.     This  sup-, 
position  turned  out  to  be  erroneous.     A  flanking  movement 
farther  around  the  hostile  right  wing  might  have  been  success- 
ful,  but  then  the   division's   front   would  become    still   more, 
extended,   and   it   was   already   a   little   short   of   2    miles    in. 
length;    and    by    a    counter-attack    an    enterprising    defender-, 
could  have  torn  asunder  the  line  of  the  assailant,  which  was  . 

thin  enough  in  the  first  place.     Lieutenant-General  A . 

therefore  abandoned  the  hope  of  favorable  results  from  a  flank : 
movement,  and  made  his  calculations  for  success  through  an. 
attack  in  front.  It  was  very  fortunate  for  this  purpose  thatj 
the  Fourth  regiment  had  been  formed  up  at  the  side  of  the. 
Second. 

Major-General  C had  designated  a  point  of  direc- 
tion for  each  wing  of  the  Fourth  regiment,  and  thus  limited "• 
the  front  of  the  regiment  to  550  yards.     Connection  with  tfie 
Third  brigade  was  established  by  giving  the  same  point  of. 
direction  on  the  enemy's  position,  to  the   right  wing  of  the 
Fourth  regiment  and  the  left  wing  of  the  Third  brigade — viz., 
the  northeast  corner  of  the  big  woods.     According  to  custom,- 
the  Fourth   regiment  should  have  placed  2  battalions  in  thc; 
first  line,  and  the  third  in  a  line  behind  ;  but  this  would  have- 
necessitated  a  shifting  of  the  Second  battalion  by  the  flank,' 
under  hostile  fire,  which  could  hardly  be  carried  out.     Coloneh 

G therefore  put  in  his  battalions  side  by  side,  and  this 

narrowed  their  front. 


2  24  Studies  in  thk  Lkadinc  of  Troops. 

•'  The  Second  battalion  had  only  a  single  company  in  front ; 
i>iit  the  First  and  Second  battalions  could  form  in  column  and 
stipport  the  Third  battalion  at  the  center.  Another  guaranty 
ut  the  maintenance  of  the  depth  of  the  attack  was  the  grad- 
irall}-  narrowing  width  of  the  front,  whereby  the  losses  in  the 
skirmish  line  would  be  felt  less  wdien  closing  up  to  gather 
impetus  for  the  assault. 

The  wagon-road  had  been  given  as  general  line  of  march 
direction  to  the  Third  regiment  less  the  Third  battalion.  Such 
a  measure  is  not  to  be  recommended,  and  proved  of  no  ad- 
vantage in  this  case.  Roads  like  this  are  hardly  ever  straight, 
v\m\  give  the  eye  no  support.  So  it  happened  that  at  the 
very  start  the  regiment  lost  connection  to  the  right,  and  was 
not  available  for  the  latter  part  of  the  attack  (which  began 
at  about  i  145  p.  m. )  because  it  was  too  far  away  and  in  rear 
and  had  put  only  i  battalion  into  action,  in  accordance  with 
the  injudicious  order  of  the  brigade  commander.  The  secur- 
ity of  the  Hank  should  have  been  disregarded,  and  everything 
<lisposed  of  for  the  attack.  In  case  of  necessity,  the  division 
commander  should  have  been  requested  to  send  the  reserve 
to  the  left  wing.  The  condition  became  perfectly  clear  to  the 
i^rigade  commander,  who  rode  up  to  the  left  wing  as  it  ap- 
peared to  be  failing,  and  he  could  not  help  approving  the  dis- 

|X)sitions  of  Colonel  F ,  who  had  finally  brought  up  the 

First  battalion  for  the  attack. 

A  few  more  details  in  the  conduct  of  the  Fourth  brigade 
are  worthy  of  mention.  The  commander  of  the  Second  bat- 
talion of  the  Fourth  regiment  at  one  time  interposed  in  the 
sphere  of  authority  of  a  company  commander,  and  ordered  a 
platoon  to  deploy  as  skirmishers.  Although  this  is  totally 
contrary  to  custom  and  an  encroachment  on  the  independence 
of  a  subordinate,  nevertheless  it  is  comprehensible,  excusable, 
and  even  requisite.  Ordinarily  it  is  left  entirely  to  the  com- 
pan\'  (Commander  to  determine  how  many  platoons  or  half- 
platoons  shall  be  deployed  as  skirmishers.  A  suggestion  to 
deploy  a  weak  or  a  strong  skirmish  line  can  at  least  serve  only 
as  a  guide.  Instructions  as  to  how  many  shall  be  deployed  are 
not  given  l)y  the  superior.  However,  as  here  the  falling  back  of 
j>arls  of  the  Sixtli  company  threatened  to  some  extent  to  en- 
dauL^cr  the  whole,  and  as  n(»  time  wa<  to  be  l(^st.  the  battalion 


STUDiii:s  IN  TiiK  Leading  of  Tuoors.  225 

commander   promptly   ordered   a   ]:)latoon   to   deploy    forward 
into  line. 

Platoon  and  -section  leaders  of  the  Third  battalion  of  the 
same  regiment  made  use  of  the  whistle  on  the  skirmish  line 
of  the  Tenth  and  Eleventh  companies,  while  with  other  com- 
panies the  voice  proved  sufficient.  The  use  of  the  whistle^  is 
accompanied  with  the  disadvantage  of  its  sphere  of  effect  being 
limitless.  If  one  platoon  is  to  cease  firing  in  order  to  change 
sights,  and  the  leader  uses  his  whistle,  the  whistling  may  also 
affect  adjoining  platoons.  In  the  case  before  us,  the  entire 
line  should  cease  firing  and  pay  attention,  and  thus  tne  whis- 
tling was  correctly  and  successfully  employed. 

Considering  the  performance  of  the  Fourth  regiment  after 
a  general  manner,  it  was  undoubtedly  necessary  that  the  cen- 
ter and  left  wing  (Third  and  First  battalions)  should  advance 
nearer  to  the  enemy ;  the  left  wing  was  almost  three-quarters 
of  a  mile  from  the  opponent,  and  its  fire  could  not  be  suffi- 
ciently accurate;  besides,  an  advance  was  especially  favored 
by  the  gentle  rise  in  front.  The  detachment  of  a  part  of  the 
regiment  jeopardized  the  uniformity  of  the  attack,  but  still 
more  precarious  was  the  delay  in  the  advance  of  the  Third 
regiment.  The  nestling  of  the  skirmishers  of  the  Second  bat- 
talion in  the  edge  of  the  village,  1,300  yards  from  the  enemy, 
was  tactically  erroneous.  Although  the  battalion  could  not 
undertake  much  against  such  a  strong  position,  it  should  at 
least  have  advanced  to  the  line  of  the  connecting  regiment. 

As  regards  the  removal  of  knapsacks,  we  must  agree  with 
the  brigade  commander;  yet  it  is  a  measure  concerning  which 
views  differ  widely.  It  is  certainly  improbable  that  a  battal- 
ion which  has  once  removed  its  packs  will  ever  see  them^  again- 
if  the  action  goes  amiss,  and  even  if  the  engagement  is  suc- 
cessful, troops  that  continue  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  may 
onlv  get  possession  of  their  knapsacks  after  weeks  have 
passed.  It  is  easy  enough  to  say  either  that  the  knapsack  is 
generally  unnecessary  and  therefore  should  be  gotten  rid  of, 
or  that  it  is  a  necessity  and  therefore  should  never  be  re- 
moved ;  but  neither  of  these  propositions  expresses  the  full 
truth.  Generally  speaking,  the  knapsack  is  a  part  of  the  sol- 
dier; it  should  not,  as  a  rule,  be  removed,  and  only  when  ex- 
tremely  necessary.     We   find   occasions,   however,   when   ex- 


2  26  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

traordinary  exertion  is  likely  to  be  required,  or  strength  has 
already  been  used  up  to  such  an  extent  that  relief  must  be 
granted  if  further  effort  would  be  sought.  Then  all  other  con- 
siderations vanish,  and  in  order  to  accomplish  the  aim  of 
the  moment  we  may  lay  aside  the  thought,  ''What  will  be- 
conje  of  the  knapsacks  that  have  been  unslung?"^  In  mo- 
ments of  extended  rest  it  is  always  advisable  to  unsling  knap- 
sacks, a  measure  that  was  overlooked  by  division  headquar- 
ters at  Parschnitz. 

At  I  145  the  major  portion  of  the  Second  division  was 
ready  to  enter  upon  the  final  phase  of  the  attack.  The  entire 
lour  regiments  had  striven  to  advance  up  to  eft'ective  range 
and  group  themselves  for  joint  action.  The  front  extensions 
differed  according  to  terrane  and  instructions.  The  First 
regiment  had  a  frontage  of  750  yards,  the  Second  of  450,  and 
the  Fourth  of  900.  The  first  was  formed  in  two  battalions, 
intermingled,  side  by  side,  one  echeloned  to  the  right;  the 
Second  of  two  battalions  in  the  first  line  and  one  in  the  sec- 
ond;  the  Fourth  was  able  to  lead  its  battalions  into  the  fire 
side  by  side  and  in  good  order.  It  is  an  established  rule  to 
combine  a  strong  fire  front  with  depth,  but  circumstances  will 
make  either  the  one  or  the  other  more  essential.  The  demands 
of  an  action  vary  so  much  that  rigid  forms  are  not  suitable 
in  every  case. 

Comments:  The  Cavalry  erom  12:45  t«  i -45  p-  ^^^ 
The  First,  Second,  and  half  of  the  Third  squadron  alone 
remained  in  the  hands  of  the  regimental  commander.  For 
the  time  being  this  force  remained  east  of  the  church  of 
St.  Paul  and  St.  John,  in  pursuance  of  Lieutenant-General 
A 's  instructions  (page  169)  to  follow  the  Fourth  infantry 


lAny  man  who  has  ever  witnessed  the  relief  afforded  troops  by 
taking  off  knapsacks  after  a  hard  march,  under  a  hot  sun.  over  dif- 
ficult ground,  and  observed  with  what  new  vim  they  then  enter  the 
action,  will  concur  in  this  view.  I  can  still  see  several  companies 
of  the  Fifth  corps  at  Nachod,  who.  almost  overcome  by  the  heat, 
could  hardly  move,  <'alling  back  in  answer  to  words  of  exhortation. 
"Yes.  Major,  if  we  only  had  these  monkeys  off  our  backs!"  When 
permission  was  given  to  remove  the  knap.sa(  ks.  it  seemed  as  if  the 
men  had  completely  forgotten  nil  the  hardships  of  the  hasty  march 
in  the  mountains  under  a  .lune  sun. 


Stuutes  in  thk  Leadin«,  of  Troops.  237 

brigade.  By  remaining  at  this  place  they  were  less  able  to 
participate  in  the  engagement,  because  they  were  nearly  two- 
thirds  of  a  mile  from  the  foremost  line,  while  their  advance 
would  be  delayed  by  passing  through  the  intervening  village. 
If  cavalry  is  to  take  part  in  an  infantry  action  at  the  proper 
time,  it  must  find  a  sheltered  position  near  the  first  line,  in  ad- 
dition to  a  proper  field  of  attack.  If  the  terrane  does  not  afford 
such  a  position,  then  a  timely  interposition  is  naturally  out  of 
the  question.  Here  the  ground  south  of  Rudersdorf  was  not 
exactly  favorable ;  but  nevertheless  2^  squadrons  could  have 
posted  themselves  under  cover  near  the  southern  edge  of  the 
village.  The  regimental  commander  had  done  too  little 
scouting.  The  movements  of  the  enemy  between  Neu- 
Rognitz  and  Staudcnz  should  have  been  reported  long  before 
they  were. 

Meanwhile  the  Fourth  squadron  of  the  regiment  was  be- 
hind the  right  wing  of  the  Third  infantry  brigade.  Its  leader 
had  previously  taken  pains  to  strengthen  his  weakened  force 
by  calling  up  the  patrols  and  other  detached  hussars.  But 
with  all  this  he  should  not  have  lost  sight  of  the  fact  that  it 
was  specially  important  to  do  all  he  possibly  could  with  what 
troops  he  had  in  hand.  Events  certainly  presented  opportu- 
nity for  advantageous  action. 

Places  where  cavalry  can  be  used  are  easily  recognized. 
Vs  far, as  the  leader  of  the  Fourth  squadron  could  observe 
from  where  he  stood,  his  field  of  attack  could  lie  only 
south  of  the  village.  If  the  opponent  should  appear  in 
that  vicinity,  opportunity  to  employ  the  cavalry  would  soon 
arise.  But  the  squadron  should  not  at  the  outset  have  taken 
i:>ost  south  of  Hohenbruck,  for  it  would  then  have  been  useless- 
ly subjected  to  hostile  fire ;  yet  it  could  have  sought  a  sheltered 
position  out  of  which  it  might  have  suddenly  appeared  at  the 
proper  moment.  The  houses  and  gardens  of  Hohenbruck 
afforded  an  excellent  opportunity  for  this ;  the  squadron  could 
have  debouched  from  the  western. part  of  the  place  in  a  few 
minutes,  particularly  if  the  road  space  had  been  widened  by 
pulling  down  fence's.  The  cavalry  must  hold  itself  in  read- 
iness to  attack  the  enemy  in  flank  should  he  possibly  advance 
for  a  counter-attack,  or  assist  its  own  infantry  in  making  the 
assault. 


228  Studiks  in  the  LivAding  of  Troops. 

In  judging  the  work  of  cavalry  it  is  very  unjust  to 
use  the  terms  "fortunate  attack"  and  "unfortunate  attack" 
in  their  literal  sense;  we  should  rather  say  "useful  attack"  or 
"useless  attack,"  which  will  afford  a  more  just  scale  of  meas- 
uring its  attainments. 

Still  another  point  deserves  consideration.  Whose  duty 
was  it  to  put  the  Fourth  squadron  into  action — Major-General 

B 's,  or  the  squadron  commander's?    In  the  first  place, 

it  would  have  been  the  duty  of  the  brigade  commander  to  give 
it  orders,  for  it  had  been  specially  placed  in  the  position  it 
occupied  by  his  directions.  But  just  here  occurred  what  will 
frequently  happen  in  such  cases :  under  the  excitement  of  the 
principal  infantry  action,  the  general  did  not  think  of  the  one 
squadron.  It  was  then  the  duty  of  its  leader,  the  moment  he 
had  carried  out  any  previous  instructions,  to  report  in  person 
to  his  superior  and  ask  what  he  should  next  do;  he  should 
have  looked  around  of  his  own  accord,  and  seen  if  there  was 
any  opportunity  for  his  employment.  War  requires  every 
commander  to  consider  where  and  how  he  may  be  useful,  and 
to  develop  independent  thought  and  action,  and  not  limit  his 
usefulness  by  waiting  in  every  instance  to  be  prompted  by  his 
superior. 

It  was  on  this  principle  that  the  commander  of  the  First 

cavalry  brigade  acted.     Lieutenant-General  A was  too 

far  away  to  permit  of  Major-General  L 's  going  to  him 

for  orders.  By  chosing  a  position  from  which  he  could  "sur- 
vey the  terrane,  the  enemy,  and  the  status  of  the  engagement, 
and  at  the  same  time  keep  his  troops  in  hand,"  he  found  the 
right  point  (Hill  414),  and  brought  his  troops  together  in 
shelter  behind  the  hill.  From  there  he  threatened  the  left 
wing  of  the  hostile  infantry.  He  had  his  troops  dismount, 
while  his  officers  reconnoitered  the  country  and  watched  tlie 
enenn .  whose  left  wing  was  quickly  IcKated. 

Com  Ml-:. \  IS  :    Tjiic  Division'    Au'imi.i.i.rn'    K  i:(  .  i  m  i:  n  t   i'R(t,M 
12:45  '"'<>  ^  :45- 

The  measures  taken  by  the  First  artillery  regiment  were 
quite  simple,  as  the  character  of  the  terrane  did  not  permit 
much   changing   of   i)osition.      Drill    l\egnlati(^ns    ]>rescribe    in 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Tkoops,  22^ 

detail  the  conduct  of  artillery  in  attack:  in  order  to  silence 
the  hostile  batteries  at  the  order  of  the  commander-in-chief, 
it  must  "concentrate  an  overwhelming  fire  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy's  line  that  is  to  be  attacked,  and  from  a  flanking  posi- 
tion whenever  possible,  while  a  portion  of  the  batteries  are 
devoted  to  silencing  the  hostile  artillery,  and  particularly  so 
much  of  the  hostile  artillery  as  can  direct  an  effective  fire 
upon  the  field  of  attack ;"  further,  '"if,  after  the  infantry  attack 
has  begun,  fresh  hostile  batteries,  or  such  as  have  resumed 
lire,  should  open  upon  the  artillery,  the  latter  must  nevertheless 
continue  to  support  the  infantry  attack  with  its  main  force*" 
This  course  was  adopted,  by  direction  of  the  regimental  com*- 
mander.  The  fire  upon  the  point  of  assault  was  kept  up  from 
a  position  which  furnished  a  good  view  and  which  was-high 
above  the  infantry.  It  was  thus  made  easy  to  distinguisti 
friend  from  foe  and  to  observe  the  effect  of  the  shots.  \Xnien 
the  assailing  infantry  had  approached  within  700  oi"  800  yat-d^ 
from  the  defender,  the  terrane  behind  the  latter  was  also  taken 
under  fire,  in  order  to  render  it  more  diflicult  for  the  enenty 
to  bring  up  reserves.  • 

Lieutenant-Colonel  J was  able  to  make  all  these 

dispositions   in   due   season.      Being  near   Lieutenant-General 

A ,  he  was  quickly  informed  of  the  latter's  intentions, 

and  he  could  clearly  judge  for  himself,  from  his  own  station, 
the  status  of  the  engagement. 

The  advance  of  the  horse  battery  to  accompany  the  in- 
fantry attack  ''at  close  and  most  effective  distance,^'  deserves 
commendation.  The  battery  leader  intended  to  ^'strengthai 
the  attack  morally  by  a  bold  participation,"  and  saW  all  the 
more  occasion  for  this  when  he  recognized  how  trying  the  sit- 
utation  of  the  First  infantry  regiment  had  become. 

The  belated  participation  of  the  Sixteenth  field  artillery 
regiment  must  be  charged  to  the  unfavorable  condition  of  the 
streets  of  Trautenau.  The  battery  of  the  advance  gtiaixl 
should,  however,  have  gone  into  action  independently,  an-d 
Avithout  delay.  ' ' ' .  •  •   « 


230  STL'Dit:s  IN  Tiuc  Lkading  of  Troops. 


Attack  of  the  Second  Infantry  Division  till  the  Capt- 
ure OF  THE  Thickets  North  of  Neu-Rognitz 
:  AND  Entry  into  the  Village. 

(1:45  TO  2:25  p.  M.) 

At  1 :45  Lieutenant-General  A left  Hill  500,  north 

of  Alt-Rognitz,  and  went  to  Hill   513,  between   Hohenbruck 
and  Alt-Rognitz,  nearer  his  foremost  line. 

Before  leaving  his  station  he  received  the  report  of  the 
division  surgeon,  according  to  which  the  latter  had  established 
his  main  dressing  station  in  the  village  of  Alt-Rognitz,  con- 
solidating it  with  the  dressing  station  previously  established 
there.  The  surgeon  also  stated  that  the  advance  guard  of  the 
First  division  had  provided  for  the  right  wing,  and  that  it^ 
ambulance  company  was  already  at  work  north  of  Hohen- 
bruck, also  that  he  had  given  orders  to  the  Second  field  hos- 
pital to  remain  in  Kriblitz,  and  that  the  chief  surgeon  of 
the  corps  would  have  another  field  hospital  established  in 
Trautenau. 

The  division  commander  approved  these  arrangements 
and  directed  that  patrols  be  organized  from  the  field  gen- 
darmes and  orderlies,  who  should  direct  all  wounded  men 
going  to  the  rear  in  the  vicinity  of  Hohenbruck  and  the  north- 
ern extremity  of  Alt-Rognitz  to  the  respective  dressing  sta- 
tions, and  at  the  same  time  send  back  to  the  fighting  line  any 
one  going  to  the  rear  without  good  cause.  •  Prisoners  were  to 
be  sent  to  Trautenau.  Besides,  two  patrols  were  sent  to  Hohen- 
bruck and  Alt-Rognitz  for  the  prevention  of  irregularities  and 
excesses  there  and  returning  any  men  found  absent  from  their 
commands. 

The  general  then  turned  toward  the  sunken  road  east  of 
Hill  460,  where  the  Third  battalion  of  the  Third  infantry  reg- 
iment was  standing  at  his  disposition,  and  directed  its  com- 
mander to  follow  the  attack  behind  the  Fourth  infantry  reg- 
iment.   Next  he  determined  to  seek  out  Major-General  B , 

who  was  with  the  First  battalion  of  the  Second  infantry  reg- 
iment, it  having  Ix'cn  re])orted  that  the  commander  of  the 
other  infantry  brigade  had  ridden  into  Alt-Rognitz  to  the  left 
wing. 


STUDIb:S    IN    Tllli    LEADING   OF    TrOOPS. 


3^1 


As  he  ascended  the  eastern  slope  of  Hill  513  he  canu- 
across  the  commander  of  the  Third  infantry  brigade  at  the 
edge  of  the  woods,  who  reported  the  course  of  action  up  to 
that  moment  on  the  right  wing  and  stated  that  subdivisions 
of  the  First  infantry  division  were  already  approaching 
Hohenbruck,  and  that  their  artillery  had  gone  into  action  on 
the  Galgen  Mountain  and  was  now  under  fire;  he  also  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  the  time  had  come  to  make  the  deci- 
sive attack.  The  division  commander  ordered  him  to  await  for 
a  few  minutes  longer  the  eflfect  of  the  fire  of  the  batteries 
which  had  gone  into  position  near  and  upon  the  Galgen  Moun- 
tain. Upon  being  asked  where  a  good  point  to  observe  the 
engagement  could  be  found,  the  major-general  directed  him 
to  the  southern  corner  of  the  thicket  near  513  as  the  most 
suitable  station. 

Pioth  of  the  general  officers  then  started  out  to  ride  to 

the  point  mentioned  by  Major-General  B ,  and  en  route 

were  met  by  an  officer  from  corps  headquarters,  who  brought 
word  from  the  corps  comm.ander  that  the  First  infantry  bri- 
gade had  received  orders  to  attack  also  via  Hohenbruck,  west 
of  the  highway,  and  that  the  Second  infantry  brigade  would 
be  brought  up  in  reserve  astride  the  highway  north  of  the  vil- 
lage. The  officer  also  stated  that  the  First  division  of  the 
Guard  corps  was  approaching,  and  that  its  point  was  only 
about  a  mile  and  .i  quarter  from  Alt-Rognitz  and  would  turn 
against  the  hostile  right  flank  via  Rudersdorf. 

The  general  stalY  officer  of  the  Second  infantry  division 
was  instructed  to  inform  this  officer  fully  regarding  the  state 
of  the  engagement  and  the  further  intentions  of  the  division 
commander,  for  the  information  of  the  commanding  general. 

Having  arrived  at  Thicket  513.  Lieutenant-General  A 

immediately  repaired  to  its  southwest  edce,  in  order  to  obtain 
a  survey  of  conditions  on  the  extreme  right  wing,  which  had 
hitherto  been  beyond  his  observation.  From  that  point  he 
observed  a  lively  engagement  taking  place  on  both  sides  of 
the  highway  on  a  line  with  the  southern  portion  of  Hohen- 
bruck, and  also  a  few  isolated  smaller  columns  farther  back 
near  the  edge  of  the  thickets.  Cavalry  was  visible  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  highway  near  Hill  414.  Upon  inquiry  as 
to  whether  the  bodies  in  close  order  visible  on  the  southern 


Qy2  Studies  in  the  Leading  oe  Troops. 

edge  of  Plohenbriick  belonged  to  the  First  division,  Lieutenant- 
General  A was  advised  that  they  constituted  a  battalion 

of  the  Third  brigade ;  which  occupied  Hohenbruck,  and  which 
would  now  doubtless  advance  with  the  First  division  as  it 
joined  in  the  action. 

Although  the  firing  had  increased  considerably  within  the 
last  quarter  of  an  hour,  at  that  moment  (1:58  p.  m.)  it  ap- 
peared to  be  growing  all  the  more  intense  toward  the  south- 
east ;  the  thunder  of  cannon  and  rattle  of  small-arms  was  ac- 
companied by  a  continuous  roll  of  volleys.  Both  generals 
proceeded  quickly  to  the  southern  corner  of  Thicket  513,  from 
which  point  they  noticed  that  the  Fourth  brigade  had  already 
commenced  the  attack,  the  leading  troops  of  which  were  cross- 
ing the  stri])  of  meadows  at  the  foot  of  the  ridge  and  rush- 
ing up  the  slope.  The  extreme  left  wing  of  the  Third  brigade 
seemed  to  have  joined  in  this  movement. 

The    division    commander    immediately    ordered    Major- 

(}eneral  B to  join  with  the  entire  Third  infantry  W\- 

gade  in  the  final  attack  (2  p.  m.). 

The  picture  now  being  gradually  unrolled  before  the 
eyes  of  the  division  commander  afforded  little  opportunity  f(^r 
the  observation  of  details,  but  in  general  it  could  be  described 
as  follows: 

In  his  front  the  Second  infantry  regiment  disappeared 
from  view  in  the  depression  near  Saddle  45  1  ;  it  was  therefore 
doubtless  making  some  progress.  At  2\2-^  hurrahs  and  the 
sound  of  signals  were  heard  from  that  direction,  while  parties 
of  the  enemy  were  seen  hurriedly  falling  back  into  the  wo<xls 
north  of  Neu-Rognitz.  The  rolling  terrane  made  it  impossible 
to  see  to  what  extent  the  Fourth  infantry  regiment  partici- 
pated in  this  assault ;  at  all  events,  none  of  the  troops  were 
coming  back  over  Ridge  527. 

The  advance  of  the  First  infantry  regiment  on  the  right 
wing  was  decidedly  difficult,  and  more  lingering  than  in  the 
center  of  the  attack.  At  450  yards  from  the  enemy  the  regi- 
ment came  to  a  halt,  when  it  seemed  almost  as  if  it  wouUl 
succumb  to  a  counter-attack  that  was  seen  being  prepared : 
but  at  the  .same  moment  infantry  and  artillery  debouched  from 
Hohcnbruck  and   cavalry   moved   out   from    ITill   414,   and   as 


SxuDircs  IN  TitE  Leading  of  Troops. 


33 


well  as  could  be  seen  amidst  the  clouds  of  rising  dust  the  en- 
emy was  falling  back  on  Sorge. 

On  the  left  flank  of  the  division  affairs  took  a  different 
shape.  The  troops  of  the  Fourth  brigade,  which  at  the  start 
had  rushed  along  the  wagon-road  with  great  intrepidity,  when 
on  line  with  the  rolling  ground  running  southeast  from  Mill 
527,  came  under  the  fire  of  troops  occupying  the  thickets  and 
intermediate  positions,  and  fell  back  in  the  direction  in  which 
they  had  advanced,  to  the  meadow-ground  near  Alt-Rognitz. 
The  view  to  the  south  of  the  wagon-road  was  obstructed,  al- 
though just  there  the  engagement  appeared  to  have  reached 
the  utmost  intensity.  Suddenly  the  action  at  that  point  as- 
sumed a  decidedly  retrograde  character  also,  and  even  hos- 
tile cavalry  could  be  recognized  coming  on  to  the  open  ground 
north  of  the  wagon-road,  against  which  the  hussar  regiment 
advanced  riding  up  the  slope,  but  the  distance  prevented  fur- 
ther details  from  being  seen ;  this  much,  however,  was  certain : 
the  attack  of  the  left  wing  had  utterly  failed  and  the  troops 
were  falling  back  in  the  utmost  confusion. 

Lieutenant-General  A at  once  galloped  over  to  the 

left  flank  to  restore  the  action  there  by  his  presence  (2:25), 
taking  a  route  north  of  Ridge  527. 

Comments  on  the;  Conduct  of  the  Division  Commander. 

While  issuing  orders  to  his  troops  in  action  and  observing 
their  movements,  the  division  commander  must  not  lose  sight 
of  other  necessary  dispositions. 

One  of  these  is  the  care  of  the  wounded.  While  the  divis- 
ion surgeon  attends  to  details,  at  the  same  time  it  is  his  duty 
to  initiate  or  propose  necessary  measures.  The  commander 
is  always  responsible  for  the  successful  carrying  out  of  such 
measures.  In  view  of  the  character  of  the  engagement,  it  is 
apparent  that  the  dressing  station  established  at  Kriblitz  was 
too  far  away  to  serve  its  purpose ;  moreover,  one  dressing 
station  hardly  seemed  sufficient,  on  account  of  the  dispersion 
cf  the  division. 

The  following  principle  should  govern  in  the  choice  of 
location  for  a  dressing  station:  that  the  station  should  1)c 
located  as  near  the  troops  as  safety  will  permit,  and  with  water 


2,^.4 


SiTDiiis   IN   'IHK   Kkadinc  (ji*  Tk()()i»s. 


I 


and  a  few  suitable  buildings  available.  If  buildings  are  not 
near  by,  then  tents  should  be  taken  from  the  portable  equip- 
ment of  wounded  or  fallen. 

Considering  the  probable  extent  of  the  engagement,  the 
necessity  of  a  field  hospital  could  be  foreseen  quite  early ;  it 
was  therefore  correct  to  erect  at  the  outset  the  first  one  avail- 
able, and  under  circumstances  then  existing  Kriblitz  was  the 
proper  place  for  it.  When  another  field  hos]:)ital  could  h^ 
brought  up,  Trautenau  was  the  place  in  which  to  establish 
it,  as  was  actually  done. 

When  the  dressing  station  near  Kriblitz  was  to  be  dis- 
continued, all  the  wounded  who  could  be  transported  should 
be  taken  to  the  field  hospital  in  Kriblitz,  while  the  necessary 
medical  attendants  and  nurses  for  those  not  transportable 
should  be  left  back.  The  rest  of  the  personnel  and  materiel 
should  be  sent  to  the  new  dressing  station  in  Alt-Rognitz, 
where  all  the  medical  ofticers  of  the  troops,  previously  detailed 
for  such  duty,  should  also  assemble.  This  could  have  been 
very  easily  done,  as  the  main  dressing  station  was  combined 
with  that  of  the  troops. 

The  accompanying  or  transportation  of  the  wounded  to 
the  dressing  station  by  men  who  are  able  to  fight  must  be 
forbidden  under  all  circumstances  as  long  as  fighting  is  in 
l)rogress;  otherwise  men  would  be  too  easily  induced  to  with- 
draw from  danger  on  such  pretext.  Not  a  single  man  able 
to  bear  arms  can  be  spared  before  a  decision  is  reached. 
Those  who  are  but  slightly  wounded  must  drag  themselves, 
imassisted,  to  the  dressing  station;  those  who  are  severely 
injured  arc  carried  there  during  an  action  by  the  litter-bearers 
and  assistant  bearers  detailed  for  the  duty  ;  only  when  the  fight 
is  over  should  troops  assist  in  this  work. 

To  see  that  these  injunctions  are  carried  out,  as  well  as 
to  prevent  similar  disorders,  it  is  recommended  to  provide  for 
special  supervision.  Field  i^endarmcs  could  be  used  for  this 
jairposc. 

Near  t  130  ]).  m.  the  h'irst  division  ordered  its  ambu- 
lance company  to  take  station  north  of  lTohenl)ruck,  and  the 
wounded  were  well  cared  for  by  it.  The  German  flag  and 
the  (icneva  cross  were  displayed  at  both  dressing  stations. 
Tile   division    surgeon    directed    affairs    in    Alt-Rognitz,    while 


Studies  in  thc  Leading  of  Troops.  235 

the  surgeon  of  the  First  infantry  regiment  was  in  charge  of 
the  troop  dressing  station  in  Uohenbruck. 

Prisoners  must  be  assembled  in  large  bodies  as  soon  as 
possible,  and  the  escorts  relieved  and  returned  to  their  organi- 
zations. Orders  must  therefore  be  issued  designating  a  com- 
mon place  of  assemblage  for  all  bodies  of  prisoners  sent  to  the 
rear  from  the  fighting  line. 

The  change  of  station  by  the  division  commander  was 
necessary  to  enable  him  to  better  overlook  the  ground  on 
which  the  decisive  assault  must  be  made.  He  delayed  the  ad- 
vance of  the  Third  brigade  for  a  few  moments,  as  a  few  broad- 
sides from  the  Sixteenth  field  artillery  regiment  would  mate- 
rially contribute  to  facilitating  the  assault.  But  when  in  the 
meantime  the  right  wing  of  the  Fourth  brigade  began  its 
advance,  he  then  gave  orders  for  the  Third  brigade  to  start 
without  further  delay,  so  as  to  assure  the  simultaneous  onset 
of  all  the  forces  of  the  division.  It  would  have  been  easier, 
at  that  critical  moment,  to  induce  the  division  to  advance  si- 
multaneously, by  trumpet  calls.  But  in  action  these  signals  are 
prohibited,  with  the  exception  of  "Forward,  double  time," 
"Fix  bayonets,"  and  "Attention,"  which,  however,  would  not 
have  been  suited  to  this  particular  occasion.  The  other  sig- 
nals are  prohibited,  for  the  reason  that  they  might  erroneously 
be  taken  up, by  troops  they  do  not  concern. 

The  unfavorable  turn  of  events  with  the  Fourth  brigade 
presents  one  of  those  occasions  where  the  superior  leader  feels 
it  his  duty  to  interfere  personally.  For  this  it  is  first  of  all 
requisite  that  he  go  to  the  spot.  Yet  he  must  also  take  meas- 
ures to  meet  the  consequences  of  the  local  misfortune,  em- 
ploying for  such  purpose  the  troops  nearest  at  hand. 

The  Third  Infantry  Brigade  from  i  45  To  2  :25. 

Shortly  before  1 145  Major-General  B had  received 

a  message  stating  thai  the  First  battalion  of  riflemen  was 
advancing  upon  Hohenbruck,  and  at  the  same  time  he  noticed 
the  effect  of  the  artillery  of  the  First  infantry  division  upon 
the  tongue-shaped  piece  of  woods  near  the  highway.  Under 
these  circumstances  he  considered  cover  for  the  right  wing 
no   lono^er   necessarv,   and    directed    Colonel    D to    put 


236  Studies  in  thjv  Leading  of  Troops. 

llic    First   battalion   into   action.      Colonel   D used   the 

'lliird  and  Fourth  companies,  all  he  had  left  in  close  order,  to 
strengthen  his  right  wing  at  the  moment  when  the  attack  was 
to  he  carried  farther  forward. 

Soon  after   i  145  p.  m.   Major-General   B believed 

thai  the  moment  for  the  decisive  assault  had  arrived,  as  at  that 
time  the  whole  of  the  Fourth  brigade's  most  advanced  line,  as 
far  as  he  could  judge,  had  gone  into  action.  He  was  just 
about  to  give  the  order  to  advance  when  his  attention  was 
called  to  the  division  commander  who  was  approaching,   so 

he  first  went  to  join  Lieutenant-General  A .     The  actions 

of  the  two  generals  and  events  up  to  the  issuance  of  the  order 
for  assault  liave  already  been  described. 

Tiie  assault  of  the  brigade  was  after  the  following 
maimer : 

At  2  :o5  Major-General  B gave  an  order  to  ad- 
vance to  the  senior  captain  of  the  First  battalion  of  the  Sec- 
ond regiment,  whose  commander  had  taken  charge  of  the 
regiment  in  place  of  the  regimental  commander,  the  latter  hav- 
ing been  wounded.  The  four  companies,  which  had  not  yet 
been  fired  on,  began  to  move  in  column  of  march  at  route 
step.  As  soon  as  this  v/as  noticed  by  the  Eleventh,  Sixth,  and 
Eighth  companies,  which  were  in  the  second  line,  they  ad- 
vanced to  the  attack,  with  drums  beating,  and  thereby  induced 
the  entire  skirmish  line  of  four  companies  to  rise  and  rush 
forward.  This  took  place  under  the  protecting  fire  of  the 
I'ourth  regiment,  whose  skirmishers  had  thrown  themselves 
down  after  the  first  dash  forward,  and  were  firing. 

Thi.s  alternate  advancing  and  firing  by  the  two  regiments 
took  place  without  previous  understanding.  Upon  the  second 
rush  the  Ninth  company  of  the  Second  regiment  got  into  the 
thickets  near  Hill  527,  and  advanced  at  a  walk  to  the  southern 
edge,  unseen  by  the  enemy,  ^'he  Fifth  and  Seventh  companies 
reached  »he  bottom  of  a  deep  hollow,  which  took  them  out  of 
tlu'  opponent's  fire,  but  prevented  their  firing.  The  skirmish- 
irs  of  the  Twelfth  comi)any  had  therefore  to  bear  the  brunt 
of  the  defender's  fire,  and  would  conse(|uently  have  remained 
lying  down  on  Hill  527  had  not  tho  leader  of  the  Eleventh 
(•omf)anv,  which  was  immediately  in  rear,  observed  this,  and, 
.K'pIo\:Ti'^    liis    w  hoK-   c-oiiip:niv    forw.'ird.    carrird    tlu'    Twelfth 


Studies  in  thiv  Leading  of  Troops.  237 

company  with  it.  The  Tenth  company,  coming  up,  made 
use  of  this  opportunity  to  take  the  place  of  the  Eleventh  and 
to  connect  with  the  battalion  again.  When  the  Fifth  and 
Seventh  companies  had  rushed  up  the  slope  and  gone  into 
action  again,  the  enemy  appeared  to  be  completely  shaken  by 
the  fire  of  six  companies,  as  the  Sixth  company  had  in  the 
meantime  also  deployed  on  the  line. 

It  is  true  that  the  First  field  artillery  regiment  had  ceased 
its  fire  upon  the  hostile  skirmishers,  the  Second  infantry  regi- 
ment having  approached  too  close ;  the  enemy's  skirmish  line, 
however,  showed  great  gaps,  and  the  fire  of  the  division  artil- 
lery regiment,  directed  upon  the  ground  behind  it,  prevented 
reinforcements  being  brought  up.  Meanwhile  the  firing  effi- 
ciency of  the  Second  infantry  regiment  had  been  greatly  re- 
duced. The  severe  exertion  incident  to  running  and  throw- 
ing themselves  upon  the  ground  had,  unfortunately,  affected 
the  pointing  and  aiming.  A  number  of  men  who  were  not 
watched  fired  with  sights  at  mid-range  distance. 

A  large  number  of  men  who  were  exhausted  were  left 
l>ehind  lying  down,  besides  the  killed  and  wounded.  In  the 
meantime,  when  the  skirmishers  of  the  Second  regiment 
noticed  on  the  left  the  foremost  line  of  the  Fourth  regiment 
crossing  the  last  rise  in  the  ground  separating  them  from  the 
enemy,  and  when  the  Tenth  and  Eighth  companies,  formed 
into  line,  approached  tlie  skirmish  line,  the  entire  line  crossed 
the  space  to  within  150  yards  of  the  enemy,  in  three  rushes, 
and  the  men  threw  themselves  down ;  platoon  and  company 
leaders  had  drawn  swords,  while  trumpeters  and  drummers 
were  sounding  the  advance  upon  the  hostile  position,  which 
they  reached  amidst  loud  hurrahs. 

Only  slight  resistance  was  met  in  the  enemy's  line,  which 
was  marked  by  dead  and  wounded.  In  the  large  woods  near 
\eu-Kognitz  the  fire  of  several  hostile  platoons  was  encoun- 
tered. But  the  woods  were  also  quickly  evacuated  as  soon  as 
they  were  entered  by  parts  of  the  Second  and  Fourth  regi- 
ments, completely  mixed.  The  leader  of- the  First  battalion  of 
the  Second  regiment,  now  regimental  commander,  who  had 
joined  in  the  assault  on  foot  in  the  absence  of  his  own  horse, 
which  was  left  back  with  the  train,  mounted  the  animal  of  a 
wounded  rifleman  and  rode  to  the  southern  edge  of  the  big 


?:;S  STUDU-S    IX    TIIK    I J-ADI  .\(;    ( n-    TkOOI'S. 

thickets,  and  halted  the  troops  there  so  as  to  re-estabUsh  order 
and  obtain  a  good  view  of  what  was  further  required.  Very 
soon  (about  2:25  p.  m.)  Major-General  B also  ap- 
peared, who,  when  advised  of  the  fortunate  result  of  the  tii?ht 
on  the  right  wing,  ordered  the  Second  regiment,  to  take  Neu- 
Rognitz.  The  commander  of  the  Fourth  regiment.  Colonel 
C ,  then  came  up,  and  wanted  to  put  in  his  entire  regi- 
ment to  change  the  unfavorable  situation  of  the  fight  on  the 
left  wing  of  the  division. 

On  the  division's  right  wing,  the  First  infantry  regiment 
had  not  been  able  to  seize  the  long  stretch  of  thickets  near 
the  highway  between  Hohenbruck  and  Neu-Rognitz,  with  the 
same  ease  that  characterized  the  successful  advance  of  its 
sister  regiment  upon  the  big  woods.  To  be  sure,  the  long 
skirmish"  line  formed  by  the  eight  companies  had  willingly 
followed  the  imixnus  for  the  assault  given,  according  to  orders, 
by  the  adjoining  regiment  on  the  left.  But  in  the  meantime 
the  Sixteenth  field  artillery  regiment  on  the  Galgen  Moun- 
tain had  made  an  impression  upon  the  enemy  for  a  short  time 
onlv.  and  as  soon  as  the  First  regiment  arose  it  >vas  compelled 
to  cease  its  firing.  With  the  latter  every  condition  was  ripe 
for  an  attack  upon  an  unshaken  enemy  of  greater  frontage. 
Although  the  deployment  of  the  few  remaining  troops  in  sup- 
])ort,  and  of  the  fourth  company,  carried  the  line  forward 
twice,  and  the  eighth  company  followed  behind  the  center  and 
the  third  upon  the  right,  both  in  close  order,  yet  when  three 
or  four  hostile  battalions  advanced  from  the  quarry  for  a 
counter-attack,  it  appeared  doubtful  10  the  regimental  com- 
mander, who  was  (^n  the  right  wing,  whether  such  an  attack 
could  be  repulsed. 

fust  at  that  moment  (2:10  p.  m.),  however,  the  matter 
assumed  a  different  aspect,  for  the  ever-watchful  batteries  of 
the  Sixteenth  field  artillery  regiment  directed  their  fire  upon^ 
the  assailing  op])onent.  and  the  horse  battery,  hurrying  out  of 
Hohenbruck,  opened  upon  the  hostile  battalions  at  i.ooo  yards. 
They  hesitated,  threw  themselves  down,  and  fired,  while  at 
the  .same  time  the  First  cavalry  brigade  and  the  Fourth  squad- 
ron of  the  l-'irst  regiment  of  hussars  attacked  the  hostile  in- 
fantry on  thr  left  wing  and  Unnk.  Simultaneously  the  First 
b.'ittalion  oi  ritliMiu-.i  rani'.-  int«»  ih«-  <>])fn  L:r<>nn'l  tn  the  soiuh  (Uil 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  239 

of  the  western  part  of  Hohenbruck.  The  gallant  forces  of  the 
enemy  were  completely  overthrown,  and  though  several  com- 
panies resisted  the  attack  of  the  cavalry,  finally  the  entire 
mass,  some  in  order  and  some  dispersed,  streamed  back  in  the 
direction  of  the  quarry  and  highway. 

The  leaders  in  the  skirmish  line  of  the  First  regiment 
availed  themselves  of  the  opportunity  thus  afforded  to  aj)- 
proach  nearer  to  the  thickets  on  the  highway,  and  when  they 
arose,  at  a  distance  of  about  500  yards,  for  a  fresh  advance, 
the  hostile  skirmish  and  artillery  fire  became  silent  and  the 
opponent  was  seen  leaving  his  position.  Shortly  afterwards 
a  hurrah  was  heard  on  the  left,  which  indicated  that  a  decis- 
ion had  been  reached  in  the  center  too.  At  2:25  the  right 
wing  of  the  First  regiment  reached  the  quarry,  and  its  left 
wing  came  up  to  the  southern  point  of  the  tongue-shaped  piece 
of  woods ;  the  mounted  battery  had  also  arrived,  and  the  First 
cavalry  brigade  and  the  Fourth  squadron  of  the  First  hus- 
sars were  assembling  near  the  thickets  north  of  the  quarry. 
The  enemy's  infantry  was  seen  disappearing  in  the  ravine  and 
woods  west  of  Neu-Rognitz. 

Comments  on  the  Attack  by  the  Third  Ineantrv 
Brigade  (1:45  to  2:25). 

The  success  of  the  attack  is  to  be  attributed  principally 
to  the  complete  fire  preparation  by  the  infantry  and  artillery 
and  by  issuing  of  orders  to  the  assaulting  troops.  The  hos- 
tile artillery  was  almost  completely  put  out  of  action,  and  the 
enemy's  counter-attack  was  neutralized  by  the  co-operation  of 
all  three  arms  on  the  extreme  right  wing,  the  cross-fire  of  42 
guns  making  their  position  almost  untenable.  In  spite  of  this, 
the  defenders  not  only  held  out  until  assaulted,  but  even 
checked  the  frontal  attack  for  some  moments.  The  decision 
was  finallv  secured  by  the  flanking  movement  of  the  cavalry 
and  horse  battery  upon  the  right  wing  of  the  brigade. 

It  cannot  be  determined  who  gave  the   impetus  for  the 

latter  part  of  the   assault.     Major-General   B labored 

under  the  erroneous  impression  that  the  First  infantry  regi- 
ment still  had  a  battalion  in  close  order  at  its  disposal  on  the 
right   wing.     As   it   was,   only   2  companies   were   thus   avail- 


240  Studies  in  the  Leadixi.  oe  Tkoops. 

able,  and  it  would  have  been  advisable  to  have  asked  the  bat- 
talion of  riflemen  to  take  part  in  the  action  at  an  early  mo- 
ment.    Major-General  B can,  however,  hardly  be  held 

responsible  for  this  incomplete  knowledge  of  conditions  on  the 
right  wing;  it  was  rather  the  duty  of  the  commander  of  the 
First  infantry  rcj^nment  to  keep  him  informed  with  regard  to 
the  situation  there.  For  delivering  such  information  mounted 
riflemen  should  be  employed. 

The  regimental  commander  and  his  adjutant  dismounted 
in  the  midst  of  the  heavy  fire  from  the  opponent.  The  con- 
trol and  observation  of  the  fight  demanded  their  entire  atten- 
tion. In  such  cases  it  is  a  great  help  if  every  half-hour  a 
mounted  rifleman  inquires  whether  there  are  any  messages  to 
be  sent.     A  more  exact  knowledge  of  the  difficulties  on  the 

right  wing  on  the  part  of  Major-General  B ,  even  if  it 

did  exist,  could  not  have  delayed  the  initiation  of  the  decisive 
advance,  as  in  the  center  the  time  was  so  ripe  that  only  an 
order  forbidding  assault  could  have  prevented  an  attempt  to 
storm  the  hostile  position.  The  skirmishers  of  the  Fourth 
regiment  ascended  the  undulation  in  the  terrane,  and  inde- 
[)endently,  without  awaiting  orders,  the  foremost  line  of  the 
Second  regiment  joined  them.  Here  the  leaders  of  the  skir- 
mish line  of  this  regiment  gave  proof  of  their  training  for 
tactically  regulated  independence.  The  regiment  could  neither 
expect  nor  receive  orders.  There  was  no  general  leader  for 
the  line,  which  was  divided  into  small  subdivisions  of  vary- 
ing strength,  and  if  one  or  more  of  these  should  remain 
back,  the  advance  would  lack  its  united  character  and  might 
miscarry. 

The  beating  of  drums  made  it  plain  to  all  that  this  indc- 
f»endent  but  united  assault  of  the  skirmish  line  was  in  accord- 
ance with  the  ])lan  of  the  combat,  but  it  is  questionable  whether 
the  beating  by  all  the  companies  of  the  Second  and  Third  bat- 
talions of  the  Second  regiment  that  were  yet  in  close  order, 
was  seasonable.  Regulations  state  on  this  point:  "With  bod- 
ies in  close  order  drmns  will  sound  from  the  moment  the  as- 
saulting movement  can  no  longer  be  hidden  from  the  enemy.'' 
The  Sixth  and  l^leventh  companies  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge 
were  visible  to  the  enemy,  wliile  the  other  company  was  shel- 
tered bv  a  rise  \n  the  grotmd.     The  somewhat  premature  beat- 


Studies  in  thi$  Leading  of  Troops.  241 

iiiij^  was,  however,  immaterial  in  this  case,  as  the  commence- 
ment of  the  attack  could  no  longer  be  concealed.  In  covered 
terrane  or  woods  a  premature  heating  of  drums  would  have 
certainly  been  a  mistake. 

The  companies  of  the  First  battalion  of  the  Second  regi- 
ment remained  in  column  of  march.  For  disciplinary  reasons 
we  will  generally  form  platoon  column  as  soon  as  a  company 
enters  the  enemy's  fire.  Here,  however,  the  troops  were  no 
longer  exposed  to  the  subdued  artillery  fire,  and  the  narrow 
squad  front  furnished  only  a  small  target  for  infantry  fire. 
The  Tenth  company,  which  had  returned  from  its  detached 
mission,  made  its  way  in  platoon  column  to  the  second  line, 
and  this  rightly,  too,  so  as  to  be  with  its  battalion  during  the 
assault.  Some  of  the  companies  of  the  second  line  deployed, 
while  others  formed  into  line,  so  that  at  the  most  the  enemy's 
missiles  would  take  effect  on  two  men  (one  behind  the  other) 
instead  of  six. 

These  examples  illustrate  how  subordinate  leaders  may 
resort  to  the  most  varied  measures  when  handling  a  body  of 
troops  during  an  attack;  they  also  illustrate  what  demands 
must  be  made  upon  their  circumspection  and  dexterity.  Bri- 
gade and  regimental  commanders  cannot  trouble  themselves 
with  such  details;  they  must  concern  themselves  with  giving 
the  direction  of  march  and  maintaining  cohesion,  and  even 
cohesion  cannot  be  assured  unless  the  subordinate  leaders  are 
fully  convinced  that  it  is  their  duty  also  to  strive  at  all  times  to 
keep  their  troops  well  connected  with  the  mass  of  the  organi- 
zation, for  the  accomplishment  of  wdiich  it  is  necessary  when- 
ever practicable  to  concentrate  the  men  in  the  most  suitable 
formation  and  re-establish  the  connections  between  echelons 
where  the  same  has  been  disturbed. 

As  for  the  skirmish  line  on  the  side  of  the  aggressor,  reg- 
ulations prescribe  that  it  must  be  divided  into  strong  swarms 
of  skirmishers,  and  must  gradually  work  up  to  the  position  of 
the  enemy.  No  rules  are  laid  down  as  to  whether,  in  the  de- 
ciscive  charge,  the  rushes  shall  be  made  by  platoons,  compa- 
nies, or  battalions.  But  in  this  engagement,  \vhere  the  oppo- 
nent appeared  to  be  subdued  for  the  time  being,  the  action  of 
the  Second  regiment  in  advancing  its  whole  skirmish  line  si- 
inultaneouslv  must  be  approved,  the  more  so  as  the  regiment 


242  St  emus  ix  thk  LKAOixr,  of  Troops. 

on  its  left  was  lying  down  firing,  though  later,  when  the  de- 
fensive fire  partially  revived,  it  would  have  been  advisable  to 
make  the  rushes  by  battalions.  According  to  Drill  Regula- 
tions, the  length  of  a  rush  should  seldom  exceed  lOO  paces. 
Here  the  skirmish  line  w^as  650  yards  from  the  enemy,  and 
yet  it  tCKjk  about  15  mnuites  to  change  to  assault  at  close  dis- 
tance. Over  this  undulating  ground,  100  paces  could  not  have 
been  covered  in  a  single  rush,  for  in  places  the  advance  could 
only  be  made  at  a  walk.  Besides,  on  account  of  the  heat,  as 
well  as  the  character  of  the  terrane,  a  long  pause  was  needed 
after  each  dash  to  get  breath,  and  during  the  pauses  it  was 
necessary  to  keep  the  enemy  quieted  by  continuous  fire. 

A  mutual  fire  support  w^as  especially  favored  by  the  fact 
that  in  closing  up  toward  the  front  fhe  Second  and  Fourtii 
regiments  were  advancing  upon  the  salient  point  of  the  hos- 
tile position.  The  diagonally  sweeping  fire  before  the  front 
of  each  regiment  made  up  for  the  absence  of  cover  and  did 
not  allow  the  opponent  calmly  to  reply.  The  strengthening 
of  the  skirmish  line  on  the  part  of  the  defenders  by  bringing 
up  reinforcements  led  to  severe  losses  for  the  enemy,  and  ex- 
emplifies the  ])rinci])le  that  a  ])osition  once  selected  must  Ik- 
occupied  densely  with  skirmishers  when  attacked,  as  the  grad- 
ual filling  in  with  troops  when  under  the  assailants'  fire  de- 
prives the  defense  of  the  advantage  of  a  calm  and  superior 
fire-development. 

In  the  case  of  the  First  infantry  regiment  the  attack  was 
made  more  decidedly  difiicult  by  the  regiment's  lacking  the 
necessary  depth.  In  order  to  carry  forw^ard  at  least  a  part 
of  the  skirmish  line,  a  few  bodies  in  close  order  had  to  be 
brought  up  and  deployed.  The  two  companies  (Third  and 
ICighth)  lliat  were  available  to  the  last  C(Hdd  hardly  have  ex- 
erted any  animating  influence  upon  the  assault,  and  it  wa^ 
therefore  very  fortunate  that  the  other  arms  were  attentive 
and  took  jxirf  pronii)tly  and  with(nit  liesitation.  When  their 
own  i-a\;ilr\  ap])r()ache(l.  the  skirmishers  took  a<l vantage  01 
tlieir  opportmntv  to  get  nearer  to  the  enemy,  and  were  entirely 
right  in  doing  so. 

As  already  remarked,  tlie  interposition  of  the  cavalry  and 
hor.sc  ])atterv  was  very  fortunate.  As  regards  the  battery, 
it    mav   si-e]n   strange   tliat    it    "^houkl    iake   lialf   an   hour    for   it 


Studiks  r.\  TU  IC  Leadi.\(.  of  Troops.  243 

to  appear  south  of  Hohenbruck  after  leaving  its  position  at 
the  Galgen  Mountain  ( i  145  p.  m.),  a  distance  of  i  mile,  includ- 
ing its  detour.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  high- 
way was  encumbered  with  all  kinds  of  vehicles,  and  north  of 
the  village  the  sunken  road  was  blocked  with  cartridge- 
wagons  which  had  been  sent  ahead  from  the  advance  guard 
of  the  First  infantry  division.  Frightened  villagers  were  try- 
ing to  reach  Trautenau,  and  in  their  midst  requisitioned  wag- 
ons were  carrying  wounded  to  the  hospital.  The  battery  was 
therefore  much  delayed  in  crossing  the  highway.  Next,  a  suit- 
able road  must  be  found  through  the  western  part  of  the  vill- 
age, and  with  the  help  of  the  squadron  of  the  Fourth  hussars 
.>uch  a  road  was  finally  opened.  At  any  rate,  the  battery  leader 
is  deserving  of  commendation  for  his  attempt  to  accompany 
the  infantry  attack  at  close  distance. 

On  this  point  Drill  Regulations  for  Field  Artillery  are 
very  clear,  and  prescribe  as  follows:  **To  facilitate  an  in- 
fantry assault,  the  advance  should  be  accompanied  by  single 
batteries  up  to  the  nearest  effective  distance.  The  strengthen- 
ing which  an  attack  receives,  especially  in  its  moral  relations, 
by  such  accompaniment,  will  richly  balance  the  losses  of  any 
artillery  connected  therewith."  The  horse  battery  w^as  nat- 
urally in  considerable  danger,  and  could  have  been  lost  had 
the  hostile  counter-attack  succeeded.  But  even  in  such  a  case 
"a  fearless  stand  must  be  made  until  the  last  moment ;  and  if 
this  should  lead  to  the  loss  of  the  guns,  it  will  be  considered 
as  meriting  the  highest  honor." 

At  all  events,  the  battery  would  have  found  reliable  sup- 
port from  the  First  cavalry  brigade,  of  whose  presence  it  had 
been  informed  by  the  Fourth  squadron  of  hussars. 

In  accordance  with  the  injunction  never  to  wait  for  an 
order  to  attack,  Major-General  L (First  cavalry  bri- 
gade) resolved  to  make  an  assault  as  soon  as  he  saw  the  hos- 
tile infantry  move  out  from  the  direction  of  the  quarry :  he 
also  advised  the  Fourth  squadron  of  this  move.  The  more 
room  he  allowed  the  enemy  to  gain  toward  Hohenbruck,  the 
more  securely  could  he  grasp  his  flank.  The  boundary  for 
the  left  wing  of  the  attack  was,  however,  the  sunken  part  of 
the  Hohenbruck-Sorge  road,  midway  between  the  two  vil- 
lages.   Although  the  brigade  had  been  posted  in  hiding  behind 


244 


Studies  i>:  ttik  I.kading  or  Troops. 


Hill  414,  when  its  leading  squadrons  crossed  the  height  they 
could  be  seen  a  little  less  than  a  mile  from  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion.  Still  less  could  the  brigade  avail  itself  of  an  opportunity 
for  surprising  its  opponent  on  account  of  the  steepness  of  the 
hill,  which  made  it  necessary  to  go  part  of  the  distance  at  a 
walk.  Three  squadrons  of  uhlans  attacked  in  the  first  line, 
with  one  squadron  following  at  150  paces  as  second  echelon: 
the  cuirassier  regiment  made  up  the  third  line,  giving  the  at- 
tack the  requisite  depth.  It  succeeded  completely,  the  left 
wing  of  the  hostile  skirmish  line  being  turned  and  some  closed 
platoons  even  cut  down.  The  incapacitating  of  some  of  the 
uhlans  by  the  fire  of  the  infantry  on  their  own  side  was  un- 
avoidable; in  the  heat  of  the  action  the  foot  soldiers  simply 
failed  to  notice  the  charge,  and  continued  their  fire.  The 
pursuit  by  the  First  cavalry  brigade  naturally  came  to  a  halt 
at  the  big  woods,  and  upon  the  sounding  of  recall  the  uhlans 
and  cuirassiers  assembled  behind  their  squadron  leaders. 

It  was  not  alone  the  cavalry  who  paused  the  moment  the 
enemy's  position  was  taken.  The  First  infantry  regiment  was 
so  exhausted,  had  suffered  so  severely,  and  was  in  such  con- 
fusion, that  before  penetrating  the  woods  west  of  Neu- 
Rognitz  a  halt  for  the  purpose  of  reorganizing  w^as  indispens- 
able. Likewise  the  Second  infantry  regiment,  wdiich  also  re- 
established order  before  entering  the  village.  A  pursuit  l)y 
fire  was  soon  brought  to  an  end  by  the  covered  condition  of 
the  terrane. 

The  Fourth  Infantry  Brigade  i?ro^[  i  45  to  2:25. 

Howsoever  ardent  the  desire  exhibited  by  the  Third  bat- 
talion of  the  Fourth  infantry  regiment  to  push  forward,  it  had 
not  greatly  distinguished  itself  by  making  its  fire  felt  by  the 
opponent.  It  was  this  battalion,  standing  in  the  bottoms  un- 
der infantry  fire  at  i  -45.  that  attempted  to  reach  the  crest  of 
the  rising  ground  in  front,  so  as  to  develop  the  full  power  of 
its  own  guns.  The  battalion  w^as  able  to  make  this  forward 
move  without  serious  loss,  as  the  men  upon  the  projecting 
slope  were  covered  at  least  breast  high,  although  the  skirmish- 
ers of  the  Sixth  company,  who  advanced  at  the  same  time, 
suffered  .severely,  as  they  found  only  slight  cover  in  the  ter- 
rane,  and   although   the   men   of   the   Seventh   company,   who 


Studies  in  the  Leadixc.  of  Trooi's.  245 

had  previously  deployed,  were  very  soon  obliged  to  lie  down 
(a  measure  very  sensibly  resorted  to  also  by  the  deployed 
Tenth,  Eleventh,  and  Twelfth  companies).  What  rendered 
this  lying  down  more  particularly  opportune,  however,  wa«; 
the  fact  that  at  the  same  moment  the  Second  regiment  also 
began  to  advance,  and  needed  fire  support.  The  leading  line 
of  the  First  battalion  likewise  availed  itself  of  this  sup})ort, 
moving  forward  on  line  with  the  other  battalions,  either  stoop- 
ing or  crawling.  Although  the  Fourth  regiment  had  com- 
menced the  decisive  assaulting  movement  earlier  than  the  reg- 
iment on  its  right,  and  had  removed  knapsacks,  later  it  be- 
came possible  to  join  the  final  assault  with  the  Second.  At 
I  .-45  the  Fourth  regiment  was  about  200  yards  farther  from 
the  enemy  than  was  the  Second,  but  yet  the  assault  took  place 
elbow  to  elbow.  At  the  finish  only  one  company  of  the  Sec- 
and  battalion  (the  Eighth)  and  one  of  the  Third  (the  Ninth) 
were  in  close  order,  and  with  these  the  battalion  commanders 
remained.  When  the  depleted  skirmish  line  descended  into 
the  last  depression  before  the  enemy,  and  could  make  the  ascent 
for  the  assault  only  at  a  walk  on  account  of  the  steepness  of 
the  slope,  the  Eighth  and  Ninth  companies  delivered  volleys 
across  the  depression  to  keep  down  the  defenders.  Upon 
breaking  through  the  hostile  line  the  companies  of  the  Second 
and  Fourth  regiments  became  badly  mixed ;  everybody  rushed 
into  the  big  woods ;  the  Third  battalion  had  lost  the  direction 
of  march,  as  the  hostile  batteries,  upon  which  the  left  wing 
had  been  directed,  had  moved  away.  At  2:25  p.  m.  the 
regimental  and  battalion  commanders,  assisted  by  their  sub- 
ordinates, were  engaged   in  unraveling  this  confusion    when 

Colonel  G was  called  away  to  the  First  battalion  of  the 

Fourth  regiment,  which  was  apparently  falling  back. 

The  First  and  Second  battalions  of  the  Third  regiment 
had  not  met  with  much  success.  As  already  stated,  thp 
commander  of  the  Second  battalion  had  a  very  severe  fall, 
and  soon  after  i  145  the  regimental  commander  had  been 
wounded  while  he  was  in  the  outskirts  of  Alt-Eognitz.  At 
the  most  trying  moment,  therefore,  the  battalions  were  witli- 
out  a  common  leader.  The  First  battalion  had  just  received 
orders  to  carry  the  other  forward  to  the  attack,  and  as  its 
commander  had  no  idea  of  the  state  of  the  engagement,  he 


j^G  Sti:i)ii:s  i.v  thk  Lkadixg  or  Troops. 

I>rc)ceeclc(l  to  deploy  ail  tour  companies  into  those  of  the  Sec- 
ond battalion,  thereby  forming  a  mixed,  almost  unmanageable 
line,  which  advanced  by  companies  to  within  900  or  1,000 
yards  of  the  enemy,  suffering  from  the  fire  of  the  troops 
that  remained  behind  lying  down,  and  finally,  after  using  up 
their  aggressive  force  and  finding  little  cover  in  the  terrane, 
entered  upon  a  containing  fire  fight  astride  the  wagon-road 
and  about  on  a  line  with  the  farm-yards  near  the  sunken  way. 

On  his  right  wing  the  enemy  confined  himself  wholly 
k)  defense,  except  that  some  companies  of  riflemen  singly 
entered  the  covered  region  near  the  creek  which  runs  toward 
Rudersdorf,  and  annoyed  the  left  wing  of  the  Third  infantry 
regiment  most  severely  by  their  accurate  fire  at  short  range ; 
and  about  2  :20  p.  m.  from  3  to  4  squadrons  of  hostile  uhlans 
were  seen  farther  to  the  east  along  the  creek,  which  they 
crossed  and  then  seemed  to  form  themselves  for  attack.  The 
left  wing  of  the  Third  regiment,  which  was  now  partially 
without  leaders,  rallied  in  groups,  and,  unable  to  stand  the 
iosses  by  rifle-fire  incident  to  such  a  formation,  slowly  fell 
back  upon  Alt-Rognitz.  Gradually  the  entire  skirmish  line 
joined  in  this  retrograde  movement,  since  bodies  in  close  order 
were  not  at  hand.  Most  of  the  leaders  had  been  put  hors  de 
combat,  and  in  the  turmoil  of  the  fight  the  few  who  still  re- 
«nained  were  able  to  control  only  the  men  in  their  immediate 
vicinity. 

The  commander  of  the  First  battalion  of  the  Fourth  regi- 
-tnent,  while  pushing  forward  against  the  hostile  position  out 
(}f  the  woods  farthest  to  the  north  between  the  two  foot- 
paths, noticed  this  retrograde  movement  and  the  heavy  loss 
caused  by  the  enemy's  pursuing  fire.  He  accordingly  directed 
fiis  skirmishers  to  open  fire  upon  the  enemy's  right  wing,  add- 
ing the  lM)urth  company  to  the  foremost  line  for  this  purpose: 
but  noticing  the  Fourth  c(Mn])any  forming  a  hook  to  the  rear 
and  apparently  falling  back,  he  dashed  out  of  the  big  woods 
aheady  captured  and  hastened  up  to  the  company  to  start  it 
forward  again,  when  he  received  a  shot  from  the  hostile  skir- 
mishers lying  along  the  southern  foot-path,  and  w^as  killed. 
And  as  the  brigade  commander  was  wounded  while  vainly 
altemi)ting  to  give  the  pro])er  f(^rmation  to  the  two  battalions 
«•f  the  Third   regiment,  the   wing  was  deprived  of  all   higher 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  247 

conimand,  and  a  complete  repulse  would  probably  have  re- 
sulted had  not  the  Third  battalion  of  the  Third  regiment  come 
to  its  assistance  of  its  own  accord.  This  battalion  had  been 
ordered  to  follow  behind  the  center  of  the  Fourth  regiment, 
])ut  after  marching  for  a  time  in  the  shelter  of  the  street  of 
Alt-Rognitz,  it  had  gone  a  little  too  far  beyond  the  north- 
ern foot-path,  and  was  fortunately  behind  the  left  .wing  of  the 
leading  regiment.  When  the  leader  of  the  Third  battalion 
perceived  the  dangerous  situation  of  the  two  other  battalions 
of  his  regiment  (Third),  without  hesitating  he  deployed  3 
companies  between  the  left  wing  of  the  Fourth  regiment  and 
the  retreating  skirmish  line  of  the  Third  regiment,  in  posi- 
tion for  support,  and  so  kept  off  the  opposing  troops  that 
were  advancing  from  the  creek.  This  measure  met  with  the 
full  approval  of  the  division  commander,  who  galloped  up 
at  the  same  moment,  being  there  rejoined  by  the  aid  sent  to 

the  left  wing.     Lieutenant-General  A then  ordered  the 

First  battalion  of  the  Fourth  regiment  and  the  Third  battal- 
ion of  the  Third  regiment  immediately  to  resume  the  advance, 
and  a  large  portion  of  the  two  other  retreating  battalions  also 
joined  in  this  renewed  forward  movement. 

The  division  commander  directed  that  other  troops  which 
were  listlessly  going  to  the  rear  be  stopped  by  a  squadron  of 
hussars  in  line,  collected,  and  led  back  into  action.  The  hos- 
tile uhlans  abandoned  their  attack  when  they  saw  2V^  squad- 
rons of  hussars  riding  out  of  Alt-Rognitz.  At  2  :25  p.  m.  the 
entire  left  wing  was  on  the  advance,  and  as  in  the  meantime 
the  big  woods  north  of  Neu-Rognitz  had  been  seized  by  the 
center^  and  the  counter-attack  instituted  by  the  enemy  on  his 
own  left  had  been  repulsed,  the  thickets  between  the  north- 
ern and  southern  foot-paths  were  also  deliberately  evacuated. 

COivIMENTS  ON  THE  ATTACK  OF  THE  Foi.^RTH    InEANTRV 

Brigade   (1:45  To  2:25). 

The  attack  covered  a  period  of  40  minutes,  during  which 
all  the  battalions  were  engaged.  In  view  of  the  course  the 
contest  took  and  the  character  of  the  ground  it  covered,  we 
will  hardly  be  too  high  in  estimating  the  loss  at  from  1,000 
to  1,500  men. 


24S  Studij-s  in  TiiK  Lkadixg  of  Troops. 

Yet  wc  must  be  prepared  for  such  losses  as  these,  for  of 
far  greater  consequence  would  have  been  the  failure  of  the 
attack  by  the  left  wing.  We  must  also  clearly  understand 
the  causes  that  led  to  this  unfavorable  result. 

Considering  the  position  occupied  by  the  enemy  opposite 
the  left  wing  of  the  Fourth  brigade,  we  are  justified  in  assert- 
ing that  an  attack  carried  out  in  the  manner  here  adopted  had 
little  prospect  of  success.  We  only  enter  a  field  of  attack 
similar  to  this,  when  there  is  no  possibility  of  getting  at  the 
enemy  in  any  other  way,  or  the  general  conditions  absolutely 
require  it.  It  furnished  scarcely  any  cover;  toward  the  east 
and  in  front  of  the  left  wing  of  the  Third  regiment  it  termi- 
nated in  meadow  thickets  that  were  sufficiently  high  to  ob- 
struct the  view,  and  during  the  final  stage  of  the  assault  it 
necessitated  a  movement  of  550  yards  up  a  glacis-like  slope. 
The  blame  for  having  undertaken  the  attack  over  this  terrane 
with  such  limited  means,  does  not  rest  upon  the  regimental 
commander  alone,  but  especially  upon  the  commander  of  the 
Fourth  brigade,  who  had  drawn  the  regiment  too  far  to  the 
left  and  then  failed  to  provide  connection  to  the  right  with 
the  Fourth  infantry,  regiment ;  and  without  sufficient  depth, 
and  isolated,  the  First  and  Second  battalions  of  the  Third 
regiment  went  to  pieces. 

The  leading  was  also  very  unfortunate  in  miner  details. 
The  battalions  initiated  their  attacks  almost  without  any  fire 
preparation,  and  as  the  division  artillery  could  not  play  upon 
that  part  of  the  field,  it  was  all  the  more  the  duty  of  the  in- 
fantry commander  to  develop  his  whole  fire  power  from  a  dis- 
tance. But  instead  of  this,  a  planless  frontal  attack  was  be- 
gun, which,  although  demonstrating  the  gallantry  of  the 
troops,  could  never  lead  to  the  goal.  At  the  very  outset  two 
battalions  were  intermingled,  a  measure  that  made  leading  an 
impossibility.  Advancing  in  densely  crowded  skirmish  line, 
the  attack  was  without  depth,  and  offered  the  opponent  an  ex- 
cellent target  at  long  range.  The  gallantry  of  single  com- 
])anies  rushing  forward  could  not  prevent  the  failure  of  the 
attack,  which,  robbed  of  all  support  from  the  rear  and  of  all 
higher  supervision,  required  but  a  slight  check  to  throw  it  into 
utter  disorder. 


Studihs  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  249 

To  this  must  be  added,  that  the  point  of  march  direction 
was  estabHshed  too  far  to  the  left,  and  thereby  disrupted  all 
connection  with  the  Fourth  regiment. 

The  responsibility  for  deficiency  in  depth  rests  also  in 
part  on  the  division  commander.  If  the  latter  had  desired  to 
retain  a  battalion  at  his  disposal,  it  ought  not  to  have  been 
taken  from  the  regiment  which  should  outflank  the  enemy, 
but  from  a  regiment  in  the  center;  and  if  a  reserve  battalion 
was  also  necessary  for  the  frontal  attack,  it  would  have  been 
better  to  have  selected  the  First  battalion  of  the  Second  regi- 
ment, while  the  Third  battalion  of  the  Third  regiment  would 
in  all  probability  have  given  an  entirely  different  effect  on  the 
left  wing  as  it  followed  long  after  the  other  parts  of  the  reg- 
iment. 

The  shock  that  turned  the  advance  of  the  First  and  Sec- 
ond battalions  of  the  Third  regiment  into  a  retreat  was  very 
slight,  merely  the  appearance  of  a  few  hostile  squadrons  on 
the  left  flank.  But  as  no  bodies  in  close  order  were  at  hand 
to  protect  the  flank,  the  skirmish  line  was  certainly  greatly 
menaced.  To  seek  protection  against  the  threatened  cavalry 
attack  by  rallying  in  compact  groups  was,  however,  a  griev- 
ous error,  to  be  ascribed  to  the  absence  of  leaders,  and  could 
only  result  in  serious  losses,  as  these  groups  were  exposed  to 
the  relentless  fire  of  the  hostile  infantry.  All  that  could  have 
been  done  under  the  most  unfavorable  circumstances  would 
have  been  to  wheel  the  extreme  left  of  the  skirmish  line  back- 
ward, and  permit  threatened  skirmishers  to  face  about  and 
fire.  The  appearance  of  the  2^  squadrons  of  husars  along  the 
southern  edge  of  Alt-Rognitz  was  timely,  and  warded  off  the 
attack. 

The  retreat  of  the  First  and  Second  battalions  of  the 
Third  infantry  was  checked  solely  by  the  independent  inter- 
ference of  the  Third  battalion.  It  had  been  instructed  to  fol- 
low as  reserve  in  the  center  of  the  Fourth  regiment.  Its 
leader  nevertheless  independently  led  it  to  the  point  where 
its  help  was  required.  In  such  contingencies  we  must  not  wait 
for  orders.  The  first  deployment  of  the  battalion  was  con- 
ceived as  a  movement  in  support,  and  the  commander  was 
consequently  entirely  right  in  employing  a  large  force  (3  com- 
panies) at  the  outset.     The  supporting  position  was  intended 


250  Studihs  in  Till-:  Lkadinc.  of  Troops. 

to  facilitate  the  retreat  and  effect  a  gradual  disengagement 
from  the  enemy.  In  this  case,  however,  that  purpose  was 
hnally  abandoned  and  the  attack  resumed,  as  it  was  seen  that 
the  enemy  did  not  follow.  Every  means  possible  were  to  be  em- 
ployed to  induce  the  other  parts  of  the  Third  regiment  to  face 
again  to  the  front  and  take  part  in  the  assault.  Crises  such 
as  these  are  the  most  difficult  that  we  encounter,  and  can  be 
met  only  by  the  examples  and  energetic  interference  of  officers ; 
.ind  even  these  will  indeed  be  valueless  if  losses  and  events 
have  so  blunted  the  spirit  of  the  troops  that  only  physical  re- 
sistance, such  as  the  riding  of  cavalry  against  them,  can  bring 
them  to  a  halt. 

But  little  need  be  said  regarding  the  Fourth  infantry'  reg- 
iment; in  it  nearly  everything  passed  smoothly.  The  pre- 
mature start  to  attack,  however,  resembled  a  runaway  to 
the  front.  Such  a  breaking  away  out  of  the  general  position 
at  an  improper  moment  is  a  gross  error;  but  here  it  occurred 
at  the  moment  for  the  general  attack,  the  commencement  of 
which  was  intended  to  be  marked  by  the  Second  regiment,  and 
so  did  no  harm.  The  Third  battalion  of  the  Fourth  regiment 
committed  another  error  when  it  cast  aside  the  direction  given 
it  and  crowded  too  far  to  the  right.  The  faulty  designation  of 
the  point  of  direction  w^as,  however,  to  a  great  extent  re- 
sponsible for  this,  as  it  was  given  upon  the  enemy's  batteries 
nt  the  extreme  right ;  but  the  hostile  artillery  withdrew  while 
the  attack  was  progressing:,  and  the  point  of  direction  thus 
disappeared,  so  that  the  Third  battalion  inclined  toward  the 
big  woods,  instead  of  the  center  of  Neu-Rognitz  as  it  should 
liave  done.  The  subsequent  mingling  with  the  Second  bat- 
talion and  the  Second  regiment  was  in  itself  no  great  mistake  : 
such  mingling  can  never  be  completely  avoided  when  closing 
up  for  an  assault.  Nevertheless  it  delayed  the  restoration  of 
order  and  made  the  leading  more  difficult. 

One  of  the  dispositions  made  by  the  Kigiuh  and  Ninth 
companies  deserves  especial  attention.  We  refer  to  the  vol- 
leys fired  over  the  heads  of  their  own  skirmishers  in  the  de- 
pression ill  front.  [Tnless  leaders  have  firm  control  of  their 
troops,  this  is  a  hazardous  measure.  But  skirmish  fire  would 
have  been  too  dangerous,  as  it  is  often  difficult  to  stop  it  in 
the  heat  of  action,  which  was  to  be  (l(^ne  when   the  skirmish- 


I 


Studies  in  thk  Lkading  of  Troops.  251 

ers  in  front  began  to  ascend  the  slope  toward  the  enemy.  The 
only  advantage  of  volley  fire  in  this  case  lay  in  the  assurance 
it  gave  that  the  fire  could  be  discontinued  at  any  moment.  It 
was  also  applicable  in  the  sense  conveyed  by  regulations,  be- 
cause the  Eighth  and  Ninth  companies  were  not  under  elfect- 
ive  hostile  fire.  Except  for  such  situations  as  these  occurring 
while  a  battle  is  actually  in  progress,  the  Regulations  recom- 
mend volleys  only  at  the  beginning  of  a  fight. 

General  Retrospect. 

The  Second  infantry  division  attacked  under  favorable 
conditions;  the  ground  in  part  facilitated  the  .assault,  and  the 
defenders  were  inferior  in  number.  Yet  it  was  not  achieved 
without  reverses. 

As  for  the  defenders,  it  must  be  admitted  that  their  con- 
duct in  accepting  the  attack  while  isolated  was  extraordinary. 
But  such  situations  occur  in  every  campaign,  and  may  be  ex- 
plained when  the  weak  opponent,  while  standing  his  ground, 
expects  help  at  every  moment,  or  has  erroneously  estimated 
the  relative  strength.  Weissenburg  and  Spicheren  are  prom- 
inent examples  of  this  in  the  campaign  of  1870-71.  In  the 
former  General  Douay  stood  his  ground  because  he  under- 
estimated the  numbers  of  the  German  forces,  and  when  he 
wanted  to  withdraw,  he  could  no  longer  disengage  his  troops : 
in  the  latter  engagement  General  Krossard  counted  positively 
on  the  assistance  of  four  divisions.  Both  these  leaders  acted 
upon  the  basis  of  erroneous  suppositions,  and  both  were  beat- 
en. WHiy  should  not  a  strong  mixed  brigade  therefore  accept 
attack  when  it  mav  soon  be  reinforced?  Only  a  few  minutes 
may  be  calculated  as  necessary  before  help  will  arrive,  and 
still,  in  this  case,  the  defenders  may  have  made  a  mistake. 

At  all  events,  the  prompt  and  resolute  action  of  the  Sec- 
ond infantry  division  found  its  reward,  in  that  the  opponent 
was  overthrown  before  the  expected  help  arrived. 

Several  general  rules  may  be  deduced  from  this  attack  by 
an  isolated  division.  The  division  did  strive  to  outflank,  but 
it  did  not  succeed.  The  frontal  extent  of  an  attacking  divis- 
ion is  reckoned  at  i  mile;  here  it  was  over  13/2  miles,  for  the 
sake  of  a  flank  movement.     In  anv  case,  even  the  front  in  a 


252  Studies  in  thk  Leading  of  Troops. 

Iiank  attack  must  be  governed  by  the  fact  that  in  some  places 
the  attack  must  be  formed  in  depth.  In  this  case  the  ques- 
tion as  to  where  the  depth  formation  should  be  established,  in 
the  center  or  on  one  of  the  wings,  was  determined  by  the 
character  of  the  terrane  over  which  the  main  attack  was  to 
be  conducted.  The  artillery  must  always  act  against  the  point 
of  penetration,  and  the  division  commander  is  responsible  for 
seeing  that  this  is  done.  In  brief,  his  duty  embraces  the  fol- 
lowing general  points:  deploying  the  advance  guard  for  the 
protection  of  the  artillery;  taking  of  position  by  the  artillerj^; 
reconnoitering  for  the  infantry  attack;  posting  of  the  maili 
body  of  the  infantry;  issuing  the  orders  for  the  attack. 

If  in  this  case  everything  did  not  proceed  according  to 
rule,  it  was  because  an  unpremeditated  engagement  developed 
into  an  attack  against  a  position. 

Long-range  firearms  require  that  the  attack  be  formed 
and  initiated  from  afar,  but  after  the  attack  is  once  started,  it 
goes  straight  ahead.  If  a  formation  is  once  neglected,  it  can- 
not be  restored  later  on  (as,  for  example,  with  the  Third  reg- 
iment nf  infantry).  The  decision  itself  lies  at  mid  range,  and 
all  that  the  order  for  approach  can  have  in  view  is  the  post- 
ing of  the  infantry  as  propitiously  as  possible  at  mid-range 
distance,  to  subdue  the  opponent  by  infantry  fire.  But  when 
artillery  and  infantry  fire  is  combined  to  break  up  the  hostile 
line  of  defense,  the  main  body  of  the  assailing  troops  must 
also  be  led  against  that  line.  The  latter  part  of  the  assault, 
the  advance  at  close  range,  may  be  made  without  serious  loss 
if  the  enemy  has  been  subdued,  and  may  be  facilitated  by 
fire  from  neighboring  troops.  Should,  however,  the  losses 
begin  to  increase  by  reason  of  a  renewal  of  energy  on  the 
opj)onent's  side,  then  the  attack  must  be  kept  up  by  the  de- 
I)loyment  forward  of  the  troops  hitherto  following  in  close 
onkr.  Standing  still  at  close  range  is  a  sign  of  the  Immi- 
nent defeat  of  the  assailants.  The  defenders  are  not  shaken 
l)y  fire  alone,  but  also  by  the  threatened  advance  of  the  assail- 
ants while  they  are  being  steadily  reinforced.  When  the  hos- 
tile j)()sitinn  has  once  been  taken  and  the  pursuing  fire  is  over, 
the  main  issue  then  becomes  the  assembling  and  iv-l'nnnation 
of  the  victorious  troops. 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  25;, 

It  is  much  easier  to  lead  an  attack  if  the  parts  are  formed 
up  by  wings — i.  e.,  when  men  in  the  rear  striving  to  reach  the 
front  belong  to  the  same  regiment  as  those  on  the  firing  line. 
The  simultaneity  of  an  assault  is  not  indicated  by  hurrahs  re- 
sounding simultaneously  from  all  parts  engaged,  but  on  their 
synchronous  action  for  the  common  purpose.  In  the  engage- 
ment just  described  all  the  troops  were  in  action  either  during 
the  assault  or  in  the  warding  off  of  the  counter-attack.  The 
entire  division  was  engaged,  no  part  being  held  back. 

In  the  end  it  is  important  to  put  in  every  man  without 
reservation ;  in  this  the  will  to  conquer  manifests  itself.  The 
necessity  for  the  support  of  the  commander  by  a  multitude  of 
independent  resolutions  and  actions  by  subordinate  leaders 
arises  out  of  the  impossibility  of  making  inquiries,  the  de- 
manding or  awaiting  orders  for  every  eventuality,  the  dis- 
tances, the  sweep  of  bullets,  and  the  unavoidableness  of  the 
commander's  remaining  permanently  in  a  certain  place,  where- 
by he  cannot  be  in  every  place.  On  this  point  the  introduc- 
tion to  F'ield  Service  Regulations  says  distinctly :  "Without 
thought  of  responsibility,  every  officer,  under  all  circumstances, 
even  the  most  extraordinary,  must  let  his  individuality  be  felt 
in  the  highest  degree  in  whatever  he  attempts  to  do,  and  even 
without  awaiting  specific  orders;"  also,  "every  one,  from  the 
commander-in-chief  down  to  the  lowest-ranking  private,  must 
always  remember  that  omissions  or  neglect  constitute  a  more 
serious  fault  than  errors  in  judgment." 

Events  till  the  Retreat  oe  the  Enemy. 
(2:20^  TO  4  p.  M.) 

As  Lieutenant-General  A accompanied  the  left  wing 

of  the  division  he  was  struck  by  the  complete  intermingling 
of  the  men  of  the  Eirst  and  Second  battalions  of  the  Third 
infantry  regiment.  These  troops  he  stopped  near  the  farm- 
houses along  the  wagon-road,  and,  meeting  the  commander  of 
the  Eirst  battalion,  directed  him  to  restore  order. 

When  the  general  had  convinced  himself  that  the  enemv 
had  abandoned  all  resistance  in  the  position  hitherto  occupied 


iThe  period  from  2:20  to  2:2.5  has  been  anticipated  in  the  pre- 
ceding chapters  for  the  pnrpose  of  preserving  connection  in  the 
nnrrative. 


254  Sruui'is  IN  THE  Lkadin«".  ok  Troops. 

by  liini,  except  in  the  woods  south  of  the  wagon-road,  and  no 
new  hostile  forces  appeared,  and  also  saw  that  the  measures 
he  had  taken  to  restore  order  were  progressing,  he  began  to 
consider  what  furtlier  dispositions  were  needed. 

After  brief  rejection,  he  (lesi)atched  his  second-rankin- 
aid  to  the  commander  of  the  Third  infantry  brigade,  after 
giving  him  the   following  instructions:     "Tell   Major-General 

B to  follow  up  the  advantages  gained  and  make  every 

eiYort  to  obtain  possession  of  Neu-Rognitz ;  then  find  the 
corps  commander  and  report  to  him  the  state  of  the  engage- 
ment on  the  left  wing.  I  shall  again  direct  the  Fourth  bri- 
gade against  the  thickets  south  of  the  wagon-road  when  order 
is  finally  restored." 

Next  he  sent  another  stafif  officer  to  the  north  of  Alt- 
Rognitz,  via  the  church  of  St.  Paul  and  St.  John,  to  find  the 
Ouard  division  and  report  the  following  to  its  commander: 
"The  right  wing  of  the  Second  infantry  division  has  defeated 
its  opponent  and  advanced  along  the  highway,  but  an  attack 
of  the  left  wing  against  the  thickets  along  the  wagon-road 
has  been  repulsed.  I  am  about  to  initiate  a  new  attack,  i 
\\(»uld  be  pleased  to  have  the  support  of  the  Guard  division  on 
mv  left  wing,  which  could  be  best  accomplished  if  it  would 
push  forward  upon  Staudenz  via  Rudersdorf."   (2:45  p.  m.  i 

After  this,  Lieutenant-General  A proceeded  to  re- 
organize the  command  of  the  Fourth  brigade.  It  was  found 
that  its  commander,  as  well  as  the  commander  of  the  Third 
regiment,  was  unable  to  take  part  in  the  fight  again,  and  that 
the  commander  of  the  Fourth  regiment  had  fallen.  The  com- 
mand of  the  brigade  therefore  devolved  on  the  senior  field  of- 
ficer. Major  Z (Third  battalion  of  the  Third   regiment). 

with  wiiom  the  general  had  just  been  talking  near  the  little 
thicket,  and  who  was  readily  found  and  brought  u]).     1  le  gave 

Major  Z the  following  instructions  at  3  p.  m. :  '*V(ni  will 

take  command  of  the  brigade  until  further  orders.  I'ush  for- 
ward the  two  battalions  of  the  Third  regiment  now  assembling. 
in  a  Hanking  position  toward  the  northeastern  point  of  the 
most  advanced  thicket  near  the  wagon-road,  for  the  further 
execution  <.f  the  attack.  ila\e  the  other  battalions  advance- 
pn»>ii)>tl\    iiprHi    \\  n-i\<>;'nit/." 


I 


Studii'S  in  tde  Lkading  of  Troops.  255 

The  general  then  repaired  to  the  point  where  the  south- 
ern foot-path  crosses  the  ridge  coming  down  from  Hill  527, 
but  the  numerous  shots  of  the  enemy  reaching  there  forced 
him  to  retire  behind  the  line  of  the  crest  of  the  ridge.  From 
that  position  he  was  able  to  clearly  observe  the  slowly  pro- 
gressing engagement  of  the  Third  brigade  and  the  field  of  at- 
tack of  the  Fourth  brigade,  and  at  the  same  time  assist  in  re- 
storing order  in  the  latter.  The  fact  that  this  took  place  in 
his  own  presence  exerted  of  itself  a  beneficial  influence. 

Even  at  the  outset  the  First  battalion  of  the  Third  regi- 
ment was  certainly  a  very  small  force,  not  many  more  than 
300  men;  the  Second  and  Third  battalions  had  also  melted 
down  considerably;  nevertheless,  they  still  formed  three  units 
of  command,  of  a  total  strength  of  1,600  to  1,700  men. 

The  further  progress  of  the  engagement  as  it  was  enacted 
before  the  eyes  of  the  division  commander  was  as  follow^s : 

While  these  dispositions  were  being  made  in  the  Fourth 
brigade,  the  fight  at  Neu-Rognitz  did  not  at  the  start  progress 
very  well.  A  struggle  was  still  going  on  for  the  possession 
of  the  northern  portion  of  the  village,  and  apparently  also  on 
its  west  side.  Hostile  troops  did  not  re-enter  the  terrane  east 
of  the  village,  and  the  fire  which  had  started  in  one  of  the 
farm-houses  was  rapidly  spreading,  and  a  part  of  the  south- 
ern portion  of  the  place  was  already  in  flames. 

The  First  battalion  of  tlie  Fourth  and  the  Third  battalion 
of  the  Third  regiment  advanced  between  the  northern  and 
southern  foot-paths,  towards  the  eastern  boundry  of  Neu- 
Rognitz,  while  the  two  other  battalions  of  the  Third  regi- 
ment turned  toward  the  woods  near  the  wagon-road.  A  gen- 
eral staff  ofiicer  coming  from  corps  headquarters  announced 
that  in  view  of  the  victorious  advance  along  the  highway  the 
corps  commander  had  halted  the  First  infantry  brigade,  which 
was  already  engaged  in  an  advance  south  of  Hohenbruck,  in 
order  not  to  involve  too  many  troops  in  the  fight. 

He  was  directed  to  recommend  to  -the  corps  commander 
that  an  advance  of  a  fresh  force  west  of  the  highway  would 
probably  facilitate  the  engagement  very  much,  and  that  it  was 
all  the  more  desirable  to  make  rapid  progress  there  by  rea- 
son of  the  fact  that  the  left  wing  had  so  far  gained  little 
ground,  and  had  alreadv  suffered  severe  losses.     An  immedi- 


256  Studiks  IX  THK  Lkadinc.  of  Troops. 

utt*  sni)|K)rt  of  that  wiiii^-  did  not  seem  necessary,  in  view  of 
tlic  api)n)acii  of  tlic  division  of  the  Gnard  corps. 
.....  Äleanwhilc  the  hat^eries  of  the  First  regiment  of  field 
artillery  had  left  their  position  between  Kriblitz  and  Alt- 
KoK'i'i^^.  »n^^l  the  I'irst  battalion  was  about  to  issue  from  the 
sunkeii  road  east  of  Hill  460  while  the  Second  was  trying  to 
find  its  way  through  the  northern  ])art  of  Alt-Ivognitz.  The 
regimental  commander  had  ridden  ahead  and  met  Lieutenant- 
General  A —  at  3:10  p.  m.,  who  ordered  him  to  occupy 

a  -iK^sitioU:  in  readiness  upon  Hill  527,  because  the  pursuing 
fire  could  not  be  initiated  before  Neu-Rognitz  was  completely 
(►ccui)ied.  The  Fourth  and  Fifth  batteries,  wdiich  had  arrived 
first,  were  directed  to  fire  for  some  time  upon  the  thickets  near 
the  wagon-road. 

'riiere.  upon  the  extreme  left  wing,  the  engagement  had 
meanwhile  become  more  fierce.  ^lajor  Z was  accord- 
ingly directed  to  employ  niore  of  the  brigade  at  that  point. 
He  even  succeeded  in  turning  the  Third  battalion  of  the  Third 
regiment  in  that  direction,  while  the  First  battalion  of  the 
iMuirth  regiment  ])enetrated  the  eastern  boundary  of  Xeu- 
•Rognitz.  Tow^ard  the  southeast  artillery  fire  was  audible, 
'.'ortions  of  the  Guard  must  already  be  there  and  participat- 
ing in  the  action,  although  it  api)eareil  strange  that  no  officer 
iiad  arrived  from  the  Guard  division  for  the  purpose  of  ar- 
ranging details.  In  this  connection  it  had,  however,  been  ru- 
mored among  the  staff  that  a  short  time  before  several  red 
hussars  had  been  seen  in  the  vicinity,  w^lio  could  only  belong 
U»  the  patrols  of  the  Guard  division.  As  the  aid  previously 
sent  had  not  yet  returned,  the  general  despatched  his  senior 
aid,  with  .some  UK/unted  riHemen,  in  the  direction  of  the  artil- 
lery fire,  to  obtain  information  w  ith  regard  to  conditions  there. 

Soon  the  Third  regiment  succeeded  in  forcing  its  way 
into  the  woods  ^outh  of  the  wagon-road,  and  at  ^^:2=^  p.  m.  the 
iMrsl  battalion  of  the  h'ourth  regiment  rushed  into  the  \illage 
near  the  spot  where  the  southern  foot-])ath  enters. 
'  'I'lie  fighting  was  now  fierce  only  in  the  furthest  portion 
<»f  the  \illage.  In  order  to  ha\-e  a  reserxe  on  the  outside,  the 
division  commander,  who  had  Mersonally  assisted  in  assem- 
bling the  Second  and  Third  battalions  of  the  I'ourth  regiment, 
directed  both  hatli'ions  to  move  np  to  the  eastern  boundary 
of  the   bii;    wood^   n<»rth   o'    \en-l\ognit/. 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.,  257 

At  3  .-25  he  rode  across  the  southern  foot-path  to  the 
wagon- road  near  the  edge  of  the  village,  where  he  met  the 
chief  of  staff  of  the  corps,  whom  the  corps  commander,  who 
had  meanwhile  taken  post  near  Hill  527,  had  sent  to  discuss 
the  situation  and  communicate  his  wishes. 

This  officer  first  of  all  informed  the  division  commander 
that  corps  headquarters  had  already  received  a  message 
showing  that  the  First  infantry  division  of  the  Guard,  advanc- 
ing from  Rudersdorf  upon  Staudenz,  had  encountered  only 
weak  hostile  forces.;  further,  that  the  corps  commander  there- 
fore intended  to  discontinue  the  frontal  engagement  as  soon 
as  a  proper  position  was  reached,  unless  an  especially  favor- 
able opportunity  should  present  itself,  as  otherwise,  in  consid- 
eration of  the  general  situation  of  the  army  and  the  possibility 
of  a  march  upon  Arnau,  he  would  not  extend  the  attack  be- 
yond the  line  of  Neu-Rognitz.  The  First  infantry  division 
and  the  corps  artillery  occupied  a  position  north  and  south  of 
Hohenbruck. 

It  was  finally  agreed  that  as  soon  as  Lieutenant-General 

A had  completely  cleared  Neu-Rognitz  of  the  enemy, 

he  should  content  himself  with  holding  that  point.  He  also 
considered  it  necessary  to  obtain  possession  of  the  big  woods 
southeast  of  the  village,  but  in  order  to  avoid  needlessly  heavy 
losses  he  would  delay  the  attack  until  the  influence  of  the 
Guard  could  be  perceptible.  The  assistance  of  the  entire  divis- 
ion of  the  Guard  could,  however,  not  be  counted  upon,  as 
just  at  that  moment  the  aid  who  had  been  despatched  to  the 
Guard  division  returned,  reporting  that  only  its  advance  guard, 
consisting  of  4  battalions  of  infantry,  3  batteries,  and  3  squad- 
rons of  cavalry,  had  deployed  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile 
south  of  Rudersdorf,  while  the  main  body  was  yet  far  be- 
hind ;  but  that  all  of  its  parts  had  taken  up  direction  toward 
Staudenz. 

Hardly  had  the  chief  'jf  staff  left,  when  it  could  be  plainly 
seen  (3:45  p.  m. )  that  the  hostile  forces  opposite  the  Third 
regiment  were  abandoning  the  wooded  terrane   south  of  the 

wagon-road.     Major  Z — ^^^ was  at  once   directed  to  start 

in  pursuit,  inflicting  all  damage  possible  on  the  enemy;  he 
was,  however,  cautioned  not  to  advance  beyond  the  southern 
edge  of  the  woods  lying  in  front. 


258  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

Jicforc  llic  ülTensivc  advance  ccjuld  be  contiiuied  upon  this 
wing,  the  op])onent  also  left  the  hitherto  stubbornly-held  south- 
ern portion  of  Neu-Rognitz.  The  division  commander,  as  we 
have  seen,  had  a])proached  the  village,  and  w^as  met  there  by 

Major-(icneral  J] .     The  latter  reported  that  his  brigade 

had  exi)erienced  a  hard  figlit  and  lost  heavily,  but  that  it  had 
succec(led  in  forcing  the  enemy  into  a  decisive  retreat,  and 
that  the  last  resistance  in  the  village  had  finally  been  overcome 
by  the  Second  regiment  and  the  First  battalion  of  the  Fourth 
regiment;  he  furthermore  expressed  the  opinion  that  an  ad- 
vance beyond  Neu-Rognitz  was  at  that  time  impracticable,  as 
the  enemy  occupied  IJill  635,  lying  to  the  southwest,  with  a 
strong  force  of  artillery,  and  as  the  wood  west  of  the  vil- 
lage was  not  yet  completely  in  the  hands  of  the  brigade.  In 
conseciucncc  the  brigade  commander  was  instructed  to  firmly 
establish  himself  in  the  village,  first  of  all  restoring  order  in 
his  command.  (3:52  p.  m.)  At  the  same  time  the  horse  bat- 
tery was  observed  firing  in  a  southerly  direction  from  the 
quarry. 

At  4  p.  m.  the  main  object  of  the  engagement  seemed  to 
have  been  accomplished.  On  the  whole,  it  was  a  victory  for 
the  Second  division,  the  only  question  yet  unsettled  being  how- 
far  the  pursuit  should  extend. 

Comments  on  the  Att/vck  oe  the   Second   Infantry 
Division  from  2:20  to  4  p.  m. 

The  necessity  of  Lieutenant-General  A *s  hasten- 
ing to  the  left  wing  and  assuming  command  in  person  there 
has  already  been  carefully  dwelt  upon.  In  such  a  decisive  mo- 
ment the  following  points  must  generally  be  observed:  Ar- 
rest of  retreating  troops  and  taking  of  steps  to  avoid  further, 
disadvantages  incident  to  defeat,  especially  if  the  enemy  is  inj 
hot  pursuit;  re-establishment  of  order  and  of  the  relations  of 
command,  possiblv  disarranged  by  losses;  measures  regard- 
ing resr.m])tion  of  the  i)revious  objects  of  the  engagement, 
or  the  pursuance  of  other  intentions. 

On  the  whole,  Lieutenant-General  A performed  all 

these  duties.  I  le  was  therefore  correct,  after  the  repulse  of 
the  few  j)ursning  hostile  bodies,  in  ordering  the  First  battalion 


Studies  in  the  Le^vdino  of  Troops.  259 

of  the  Fourth  regiment  and  the  Third  battahon  of  the  Third 
regiment  to  go  forward  again,  and  the  two  shaken  battahons 
of  the  Third  regiment  to  go  to  the  front  again  in  connection 
with  tkem.  It  was  nevertheless  a  venturesome  move,  for  if 
this  united  attack  of  the  left  also  went  to  pieces,  the  brigade 
could  hardly  have  looked  upon  its  day's  work  as  successful. 

A  fresh  advance  must  take  place  as  soon  as  possible ;  this 
was  necessary,  if  it  was  intended  to  utilize  the  force  at  hand. 
The  division  commander  had  quickly  recognized  the  correct 
point  for  the  attack;  he  discovered  it  in  the  foremost  thicket 
near  the  wagon-road.  iJefore  this  was  seized  an  advance 
against  the  east  front  of  Neu-Rognitz  could  not  be  carried  out. 
Unfortunately,  no  artillery  preparation  had  been  considered, 
as  the  difficult  terrane  had  seemed  to  make  it  impossible  for  the 
batteries  to  come  up.  But  the  capture  of  Neu-Rognitz  would 
soon  menace  the  flank  of  the  enemy  at  the  wagon-road,  and 
force  him  to  abandon  the  woods. 

Although  the  division  commander  interposed  in  the  lead- 
ing of  the  brigade  to  a  greater  extent  than  would  have  ap- 
peared proper  under  other  circumstances,  he  was  justified  in 
so  doing  by  reason  of  the  disturbance  in  the  relations  of  com- 
mand occasioned  by  the  losses  suffered,  as  well  as  by  reason 
of  the  fact  that  an  independent  issue  was  being  fought  out  by 
Major-General  B on  the  right  wing.  Further,  the  divi- 
sion commander  was  contented  with  giving  only  general  direc- 
tions to  Major  Z ,  in  the  various  phases  of  the  attack, 

without  allowing  his  attention  to  be  diverted  from  events  in 
the  other  brigade. 

It   is   a   question   whether   Lieutenant-General    A 

should  have  more  carefully  considered  the  dispositions  to  be 
made  by  the  Fourth  brigade,  before  the  first  attack  was  made ; 
its  advance  would  certainly  then  have  taken  a  different  course. 
But  we  must  not  judge  by  events  alone.  The  general  was 
concerned  in  leading  the  entire  division,  and  he  could  not  tell 
beforehand  where  his  presence  would  be,  most  needed.  Both 
brigades  had  dangerous  obstacles  to  overcome.  At  any  rate, 
the  incident  shows  that  we  should  not  confine  ourselves  mere- 
ly to  the  issuing  of  orders  and  general  supervision  of  their 
execution  ;  but,  under  certain  circumstances  and  where  time 
and  conditions  permit,  the  manner  of  carrying  out  these  in- 


«6o  Studiks  jn  Tin;  Lkading  of  Troops. 

striictioiis  should  be  discussed  with  suborchuate  commanders. 
For  instance,  if  the  division  commander  had  been  with  IMajor- 

General  C before  the  beginning-  of  the  first  attack,  he 

could  have  issued  positive  instructions  for  taking  the  furth- 
est thicket  near  the  northern  foot-path  as  point  of  direction 
for  the  center  of  the  brigade,  and  the  extension  south  of  the 
wagon-road  would  have  been  avoided. 

But  such  an  interference  on  the  ])art  of  the  division  com- 
mander in  proper  time  and  at  all  important  points  was  im- 
])OssibIe.  The  space  occupied  by  the  division  was  much  too 
large  for  this.  In  F^art  II.  we  have  called  attention  to  the  fact 
that  in  an  attack  a  division's  frontal  development  should  not 
be  much  over  a  mile,  if  we  would  assure  orderly  direction  and 
energetic  co-operation  ;  but  in  this  case  the  division's  line  of 
fire  was  over  a  mile  and  a  half  long,  measuring  from  the  farm- 
houses near  the  wagon-road  westward  to  the  highway  near 
Hohenbruck.  Mutual  support  in  a  concentric  advance,  it  is 
true,  might  have  been  possible ;  nevertheless  the  Third  bri- 
gade was  not  in  position  for  the  iuuucdiatc  support  of  the 
Fourth.  Therefore  the  division  commander,  as  soon  as  the 
thicket  near  the  wagon-road  was  taken,  moved  two  battal- 
ions (Second  and  Third  of  the  Fourth  regiment)  of  the  Fourth 
brigade,  as  a  reserve,  to  the  eastern  boundary  of  Neu-Rognitz, 
where  they  were  in  a  position  to  give  timely  support  in  any 
direction,  as  the  extension  of  the  division  was  then  reduced  to 
I  mile;  furthermore,  on  a  covered  terrane  over  which  the 
fight  is  still  progressing,  decisions  are  not  reached  as  quickly 
as  u])on  a  plain. 

The  first  thing  the  division  commander  directed  Major 
Z to  do,  as  he  made  his  further  dispositions,  was  to  ad- 
vance with  a  strong  force  against  the  position  the  enemy  had 
occupied  south  of  the  wagon-road,  l^ndisputed  possession  of 
Ncu-Kognitz  would  certainly  not  have  been  secured  until  the 
enemy  was  forced  from  the  woods  southeast  of  the  village.  Thisi 
might  have  been  accomplished  more  certainly  and  with  smallei 
loss  if  the  attack  had  been  brought  into  intimate  relation  with 
the  expected  Hanking  of  the  opj^onent  by  the  Guard  corps. 
But  as  soon  as  the  withdrawal  of  the  enemy  became  apparent, 
there  was  no  further  reason  to  delay  the  advance;  on  the  con- 
trary, a  shar])  ])ursuit  over  ground  that  was  obstructed  from 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  -261 

view  might  have  inflicted  considerable  damage  upon  the  re- 
treating opponent. 

A  general  survey  of  the  course  pursued  by  the  Fourth 
brigade  shows  at  once  that  final  success  was  rendered  possible 
only  by  the  fact  that  the  division  commander,  upon  reaching 
it,  found  two  battalions  of  the  Fourth  brigade  (First  of  the 
Fourth  and  Third  of  the  Third  regiment)  comparatively  un- 
touched. Hut  he  could  only  count  on  one  of  these ;  and  as  the 
reserve  battalion  (Third)  had  participated  in  the  action  inde- 
pendently, he  was  no  longer  able  to  exercise  any  influence  other 
than  that  of  a  purely  personal  character.  When  we  consider, 
however,  how  the  situation  could  have  developed,  especially  if 
the  enemy  had  begun  a  hot  pursuit,  we  have  grounds  for  se- 
rious doubt  whether  Lieutenant-General  A 's  plan   for 

attack  was  a  judicious  one. 

According  to  our  view,  the  course  pursued  by  the  divis- 
ion commander  would  have  been  justifiable  only  if  there  had 
been  a  body  of  troops  in  close  order,  at  least  two  or  three  bat- 
talions, disposable  behind  the  center  of  his  extended  line  of 
battle.  The  general  seems  to  have  counted  too  much  on  the 
assistance  promised  him  by  the  First  division.  Its  nearest 
brigade,  however,  at  Hohenbruck,  was  too  far  away  to  ren- 
der any  assistance  whatever  upon  the  left  wing  of  the  Second 
division  during  the  decisive  attack. 

Under  these  circumstances  we  believe  it  would  have  been 

better  had  Lieutenant-General  A arranged  his  attack 

along  different  lines,  particularly  if  he  had  dispensed  with  the 
distant  flank  movement  during  the  engagement.  In  the  first 
place,  the  enemy  offered  a  frontal  resistance  only  near  the 
highway  and  south  of  Saddle  451.  The  deployed  Third  bri- 
gade sufficed  to  hold  him  fast  in  front  and  to  engage  him, 
while  the  Fourth  brigade  could  have  remained  in  reserve  in 
close  order  and  assembled  behind  the  left  wing  of  the  former. 
The  first  problem  was  to  drive  off  the  foremost  fighting  line 
of  the  opponent.  This  included  the  seizure  of  the  little  thick- 
ets near  the  northern  foot-path,  from'  which  point  the  out- 
flanking of  that  part  of  the  line  of  battle  would  then  have 
been  possible,  and  at  the  same  time  the  swarms  of  skirmish- 
ers south  of  the  saddle  might  probably  have  been  dislodged. 
If  the  extreme  left  wing  of  the  Third  brigade  should  prove  un- 


262  Studies  :x  tiik  Lkadinc,  ok  Troops. 

able  of  itself  to  eapturc  the  tliickets,  then  the  Fourth  brigade 
could  have  assisted  by  deploying  several  of  its  battalions. 

Jn  case  the  enemy  should  fall  back,  but  still  hold  his  ground 
tn  the  little  woods  northeast  of  Neu-Kognitz,  the  Third  bri- 
gade should  attack  in  flank,  with  the  Fourth  brigade  still  cov- 
ering its  left  at  that  point,  and  only  putting  as  many  battal- 
ions into  action  as  were  needed  to  support  the  attack.  On 
no  account  should  the  division  have  staked  its  entire  force 
ii\K)n  a  single  throw  unless  other  troo])s  furnished  a  depend- 
able reserve. 

As  regards  losses,  we  must  call  attention  to  the  peculiar 
fact  that  they  are  general!}-  overestimated  by  troops  and  un- 
derestimated by  commanders.  After  a  fierce  engagement,  the 
reassembling  battalions  at  first  glance  look  like  diminutive 
clusters,  or  the  report  is  received  from  the  one  or  two  officers 
fjresent  that  all  that  remains  of  a  battalion  is,  say,  250  men, 
though  frequently,  but  not  always,  we  may  console  ourselves 
with  the  thought  that  the  following  morriing  the  battalion  will 
be  somewhat  nearer  its  proper  strength.  We  must  be  careful 
in  sunmiing  up  losses  immediately  after  an  actio:;;  it  requires 
a  special  faculty  to  judge  them  even  approximately  correct. 
To  do  so,  one  shoidd  have  carefully  observed  the  stubborn- 
ness of  the  fight  at  each  pomt  se])arately.  and  should  take  into 
consideration  how  much  the  terrane  itself  favors  losses  by  fire. 
The  dead  seen  on  the  ground  are  only  a  guide  for  one  par- 
ticular point,  and  it  is  impossible  to  observe  the  effect  on  other 
parts  of  the  field;  furthermore,  if  we  wait  until  the  next  morn- 
ing, a  large  portion  of  the  killed  may  be  buried. 

Another  cjuestion  is.  When  should  a  mounted  officer  dis- 
mount? A  battalion  on  the  line  or  a  deployed  regiment  can 
f)e  managed  only  if  the  commander  remains  on  his  horse,  so 
that  he  can  hasten  at  any  moment  to  the  si)ot  where  he  must 
give  an  order  or  where,  for  other  reasons,  his  presence  is  de- 
manded. IJut  there  is  a  limit  to  this.  If  the  entire  l)ody  of 
ti-oo))s  finds  itself  in  an  infantry  fire  fight,  and  has  deployed 
all  its  subdivisions,  a  commander  halting  mounted  in  their 
midst  w(»i!ld  be  soon  put  out  of  the  fight.  We  can  therefore 
eslablisli  only  the  following  rule:  that  leaders  should  remain 
tnounled  until  the  troops  under  their  command  are  deployed, 
when  thev  shotild  rfismount  and  remain  with  that  subdivision 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  263 

which  is  retained  in  close  order  and  available  for  the  fight. 

If  the  assistance  of  one  adjutant  which  regulations  allow 
a  brigade,  regimental,  and  battalion  commander  is  not  suffi- 
cient, then  the  leader  must  resort  to  mounted  ritiemen  and 
orderlies  on  foot.  We  are  not  rich  enough  in  officers  to  meet 
the  certainly  justihable  wish  for  a  second  adjutant.  Nothing 
is  left,  therefore,  but  to  detail  permanent  orderlies  from  the 
division  cavalry,  when  mounted  ritiemen  are  not  available. 
Though  this  may  not  be  pleasant  for  the  cavalry  commander. 
It  is  something  that  cannot  be  helped. 

A  great  deal  can  be  said  on  the  subject  of  the  use  of  cav- 
alry patrols — since  it  has  been  alluded  to  here.  We  really  do 
meet  with  some  peculiar  views  relative  to  the  comprehension 
of  their  duties.  A  patrol  was  here  designated  to  keep  up  com- 
munication between  two  divisions ;  it  rode  from  one  division 
to  tlie  other,  kept  track  of  movements  made,  watched  now  the 
columns  of  one  and  now  the  columns  of  the  other  division, 
and  when  it  had  done  this,  safely  returned  to  the  bivouac  of 
its  regiment  in  the  afternoon.  There  was  no  need  of  des- 
patching patrols  for  such  a  purpose  as  this ;  large  bodies  of 
the  enemy  attempting  to  move  forward  between  the  divis- 
ions would  have  been  discovered  without  their  assistance ; 
their  employment  should  therefore  have  had  another  object 
in  view.  Of  what  use  was  the  sending  of  a  troop  to  scout  the 
country  between  Rudersdorf  and  the  Aupa  by  the  commander 
of  the  First  regiment  of  hussars,  when  he  learned  nothing 
whatever  of  what  was  going  on  there  ?  On  such  a  mission  the 
30  or  40  horses  would  be  utterly  useless,  since  for  hours  the 
commander  and  also  Ivieutenant-General  A were  with- 
out knowledge  of  the  important  movements  of  the  Guard  in 
that  region,  and  the  division  commander  was  finally  obliged  to 
send  a  staff  officer,  and  later  his  senior  aid,  to  find  the  Guard 
division  and  bring  information  of  its  whereabouts. 

This  troop  of  hussars  should  have  sent  in  frequent  mes- 
sages, reading  about  in  the  following  manner : 

1.  Arrived  at  x  o'clock  on  the  line  n-n.  Only  weak 
uhlan  patrols  in  front  of  us,  which  are  turning  off  in  the 
direction  of  3'. 

2.  Advanced  to  x.  A  squadron  of  hussars  from  the 
First  infantry  division  of  the  Guard  corps  arrived  here  from 


264  Studies  in  the  Leading  oe  Troops. 

;;,  and  states  that  its  division  is  api)r.)achini;  from  p  to  q,  and 
is  now  about  2i/4  miles  from  q. 

3.  Tried  to  s^et  around  the  left  tiank  of  the  opponent 
while  he  was  engaged.  Found  the  edge  of  the  woods  occupied 
by  infantry.  Troops  were  visible  near  Staudenz,  probably  3 
battalions.  The  advance  guard  of  the  Guard  division,  con- 
sisting of  4  battalions  of  infantry,  3  squadrons  of  cavalry,  and 
3  batteries,  has  already  arrived  near  x. 

4.  The  advance  guard  batteries  of  the  Guard  have  just 
opened  fire  from  y  against  a  hostile  battery  near  Staudenz. 
The  infantry  of  the  Guarvd  is  deploying  for  action  at  y,  and 
intends  to  move  toward  v. 

5.  The  advance  guar.l  infantry  of  the  Guard  division  ha? 
gone  into  action  against  the  woods  northeast  of  Staudenz. 
which  the  enemy  has  occupied  from  the  direction  of  the  vil- 
lage. Three  more  batteries  have  also  gone  into  action.  The 
main  body  is  approaching,  its  point  having  already  arrived 
at  .r.  As  the  country  between  Rudersdorf  and  the  Aupa  is 
sufficiently  .secured  and  watched  by  the  presence  of  the  Guard, 
I  shall  leave  a  non-commissioned  ofificer  with  some  messengers 
here  to  observe  the  progress  of  the  engagement,  and  shall 
lead  the  troo])  back  to  the  regiment. 

As  a  matter  of  course,  place,  time,  signature,  etc..  should 
appear  on  the  messages. 

In  this  or  similar  manner  sliould  cavalry  detachments  con- 
ceive their  task,  and  not  ride  about  and  let  nothing  be  heard 
from  them.  ''But  what  should  T  have  reported?  There  was 
nothing  to  report,"  is  frequently  heard.  Even  the  report  that 
nothing  is  going  on  is  of  great  benefit  to  the  superior  leader, 
aside  from  the  fact  that  he  is  thereby  assured  that  the  patn^l 
is  where  it  ought  to  be,  and  is  not  f<;»rgotting  tlic  task  it  was 
sent  out  to  accomplish. 

l{qually  at  fault  was  the  conduct  of  the  hussars  of  the 
Guard  division,  who  were  seen  on  the  battle-field  of  the  Fourth 
infantry  brigade,  but  failed  to  report  to  any  of  the  higher  com- 
manders. If  we  desire  to  bring  a  correct  report  from  a 
battle-field,  we  cannot  do  .so  without  first  having  interviewed 
its  commander,  to  whom  it  is  also  of  vast  importance  to  get 
information  from  the  strange  body  of  troops  that  has  sent  out 
the  patrol. 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  265 

This  faulty  conduct  of  the  hussars  of  both  divisions  may 

explain  why  Lieutenant-General   A became   impatient, 

and,  after  once  despatching  a  staff  officer,  also  sent  his  senior 
aid  on  the  same  errand.  This  seems  quite  superfluous,  as 
the  staff  officer  would  certainly  have  soon  returned,  and  it  is 
not  well,  either,  to  take  the  senior  aid  from  duty  on  a  battle- 
field for  such  a  purpose. 

Let  us  caution  here,  that  any  officer  (like  the  staff"  officer 
in  this  case)  who  has  just  been  present  in  an  unfortunate  en- 
gagement, must  be  very  careful  of  his  personal  deportment 
when  sent  to  a  strange  staff.  Let  him  deliver  his  message 
there,  and  give  such  explanations  as  may  be  called  for,  but 
let  him  beware  of  adding  in  an  excited  manner  and  by  his 
own  descriptions,  how  badly  things  have  gone,  or  how  dan- 
gerous the  situation  has  become.  He  will  either  communi- 
cate this  unrest  to  others,  or  will  cut  a  very  comical  figure  if 
a  spirit  of  calm  deliberation  prevails  in  the  staff  to  which  he 
is  sent,  as  is  usually  the  case. 

The  first  regiment  of  field  artillery  had  done  all  it  could 
in  opening  up  the  pursuing  fire.  It  had  left  its  first  position 
of  its  own  accord,  after  the  assailing  infantry  had  penetrated 
the  woods  north  of  Neu-Rognitz.  At  first  it  found  no  posi- 
tion for  its  pursuing  fire,  but  held  in  readiness  on  Hill  527  to 
meet  a  setback  at  any  moment,  while  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  bat- 
teries had  a  chance  to  take  part  in  the  capture  of  the  thickets 
near  the  wagon-road.  The  zeal  displa}'ed  by  the  horse  battery 
in  reopening  fire  against  superior  artillery,  in  the  justifiable  ex- 
pectation that  the  vSixteenth  regiment  of  field  artillery  would 
hasten  up,  deserves  especial  commendation.  It  would  have 
been  the  duty  of  the  corps  commander  to  urge  it  to  do  so,  if 
necessary. 

The  Several  Parts  of  the  Division  from  2  :20  to  4  p.  m. 

Details  in  the  Fourth  infantry  brigade  have  already  been 
considered,  in  connection  with  the  interference  of  the  division 
commander.     This  much,  however,  remains  to  be  added : 

The  advance  of  the  Third  regiment  against  the  patch 
of  woods  south  of  the  wagon -road  was  intended  to  mark  the 
commencement  of  a  new  period  in  the  engagement.  On  the 
left  wing  the  Second  company  of  the  First  battalion  cleared 


266  Studiks  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

the  bushes  along  the  creek  of  hostile  skirmishers,  while 
the  three  other  companies  of  this  battalion  finally  crossed 
the  meadow-bottom  south  of  the  wagon-road  and  gained 
ground  against  a  diminishing  fire.  The  Sixth  and  Seventh 
companies  of  the  Second  battalion  deployed  as  skirmishers 
north  of  the  wagon -road,  while  the  Fifth  and  Eighth  companies 
followed  in  a  second  line  across  the  strip  of  meadow.  A  little 
later  the  Third  battalion  was  led  in  support  of  the  attack, 
over  the  southern  foot-path,  against  the  northern  edge  of  the 
woods,  which  was  occupied  by  hostile  skirmishers,  who  had 
fallen  back  from  their  main  position.  While  9  or  10  platoons 
kept  the  thickets  so  occupied  by  the  enemy  under  a  flanking 
fire  at  a  distance  of  650  yards,  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  batteries 
of  the  division  artillery  regiment,  which  had  arrived  on  the 
center  of  Ridge  ^2-],  swept  the  interior  of  the  thickets  with 
shrapnel  at  a  distance  of  1,400  to  1,500  yards.  Very  soon  un- 
usual commotion  was  perceived  among  the  defenders  in  the 
northeastern  corner  of  the  woods,  which  gave  the  First,  Third, 
and  Fourth  companies  opportunity  for  a  sudden  charge,  which 
they    successfully   accomplished,    landing   within    the    timber. 

The  Second  battalion  joined  this  advance,  also  reaching 
the  woods;  its  Fifth  company,  however,  being  held  back  as 
reserve  by  the  battalion  commander. 

In  the  meantime  the  Second  company  had  gone  farthest 
to  the  left,  against  the  triangular  pine  plantation  near  the 
source  of  the  creek,  which  the  opponent  had  evacuated  when 
it  reached  there.  Gradually  the  hostile  infantry  was  forced 
back  over  the  dry  run  and  the  meadows  lying  to  the  west  of 

it.     In  accordance  with  the  instructions  given  Major  Z 

by  the  division  commander,  not  to  attack  the  strong  position 
here,  but  first  to  await  the  action  of  the  Guard,  the  pursuing 
skirmishers  and  bodies  behind  them  in  close  order  were  halted 
in  the  captured  ])atches  of  woods  upon  the  order  of  the  com- 
mander of  the  First  battalion  of  the  Third  regiment,  who  was 
then  in  charge  of  the  regiment,  and  only  patrols,  some  under 
lieutenants,  were  sent  out  to  follow  the  enemy. 

By  their  advance  south  of  Alt-Rognitz  toward  Ruders- 
dorf  the  2j/^  squadrons  of  the  First  regiment  of  hussars  had 
caused  the  hostile  uhlans  to  fall  back  in  the  direction  of 
Staudcnz. 


Studies  in  thk  Leading  of  Troops.  267 

The  commander  did  not  care  to  follow  farther,  as  the 
entry  of  the  Guard  in  the  engagement  made  it  unnecessary 
to  work  around  the  hostile  right. 

The  position  of  the  various  subdivisions  of  the  Fourth 
infantry  brigade  at  about  4  p.  m.  was  consequently  as  follows : 

The  First  battalion  of  the  Fourth  regiment  was  in  the 
patch  of  meadows  in  and  east  of  the  southern  end  of  Neu- 
Rognitz,  engaged  in  a  skirmish  fight ;  behind  them  and  north 
of  the  thickets  at  the  wagon-road  were  the  Second  and 
Third  battalions  of  the  same  regiment,  brought  up  as  division 
reserve. 

On  the  left  wing  v/ere  the  Second  and  First  battalions  of 
the  Third  regiment,  in  the  patch  of  woods  south  of  the  wagon- 
road,  with  a  thin  skirmish  line  ahead  and  the  Third  battal- 
ion in  rear  in  close  order. 

The  2-J  squadrons  of  the  hussar  regiment  were  east  of 
the  creek  near  Hill  401. 

Turning  now  to  the  Third  infantry  brigade,  we  find  that 
at  2  :20  p.  m.  the  victorious  fight  of  its  parts  engaged  in  front 
had  given  them  possession  of  the  northern  end  of  Neu- 
Rognitz,  as  well  as  the  woods  west  of  the  village  on  the  road 
from  Sorge  to  Neu-Rognitz ;  but,  in  spite  of  the  comparatively 
short  combat  and  the  previous  restoration  of  order,  all  of  the 
parts  of  the  brigade  had  again  become  mixed  in  the  covered 
terrane.  Companies  of  the"  First  and  Third  battalions  of  the 
First  regiment,  and  very  soon  also  parts  of  the  Third  bat- 
talion of  the  Second  regiment,  which  had  turned  out  of 
the  village  into  the  forest,  were  fighting  in  the  woods  to 
the  west.  In  the  northern  part  of  Neu-Rognitz  the  re- 
mainder of  the  latter  battalion,  and  also  the  First  battalion  of 
the  Second  regiment,  were  engaged.  The  other  battalions  of 
these  regiments  (Second  of  the  First  and  Second  of  the  Sec- 
ond) had  remained  respectively  near  the  quarry  and  in  the 
little  woods  northwest  of  the  village. 

The  failure  of  the  Fourth  brigade's  attack  on  the  left 
wing  could  not  help  but  itifiuence  the  left  wing  of  the  Third 
brigade.  In  the  expectation  of  a  further  attack  by  the  enemy 
against  the  repulsed  part  of  the  division,  the  deployment  of  the 
reserves  in  continuing  the  struggle  for  the  village  could  not 
be  risked.  Onlv  whenit  was  evident  that  the  enemy  did  not  fol- 


268  Studiks  Ix\  thk  Lkading  of  Trooi's. 

low,  bin  was  detained  and  would  be  attacked  anew,  did  Major- 
General  1> turn  his  attention  again  to  his  own  object  in 

the  fight.     In  the  meantime  he  had  carefully  examined  the  ter- 

rane  and  situation  in  his  front,  and  he  directed  Colonel  D 

to  push  ahead  with  his  regiment  (the  First)  into  the  woods 
west  of  the  main  highway,  and  to  flank  from  there,  as  far  as 
possible,    the    middle    and    southern    parts    of    Neu-Rognitz. 

Colonel  E (Second  regiment)    was  on  the  other  hand 

instructed  to  advance  into  the  village. 

West  of  the  main  highway  the  action  soon  started  off  at 

a  lively  pace,  Colonel  D putting  in  the  entire  First  and 

Third  battalions  of  his  regiment.  By  this  renewal  of  the 
fight  the  troops  succeeded  in  gradually  forcing  the  opponent 
out  of  the  forest  south  of  the  Sorge-Neu-Rognitz  road,  from 
which  point  the  central  part  of  the  village  could  also  be  sub- 
jected to  a  heavy  fire. 

An  advance  from  the  forest  against  tiie  southern  part  of 
the  village  was  prohibited  by  the  hostile  artillery,  which  again 
went  into  action  from  a  point  on  the  southern  slope  of  Ilill 
635,  southwest  of  Neu-Rognitz,  6  batteries  strong,  while  the 
little  thickets  near  this  hill  were  occupied  in  force  by  fresh 
infantry.  The  overthrown  hostile  infantry  withdrew,  covered 
by  a  very  fierce  fire  from  that  i)Osition,  while  the  infantry 
of  the  attackers  su fleered  considerable  loss  by  the  shrapnel 
thrown  into  the  forest.  .Vnd  when  a  dash  on  the  part  of  the 
Nnith  and  Twelfth  companies  against  the  southern  part  of  the 
village  miscarried.  Colonel  T) was  finally  obliged  to  for- 
bid any  further  charging  out  of  the  woods;  he  held  the  edge 
of  the  woods  with  troops  at  the  front,  and  brought  all  tlie 
rest  of  his  force  into  the  open  ground  at  the  (juarry. 

The  bodies  that  had  penetrated  into  Neu-R(\gnitz  had 
failed  I0  make  any  headway  against  a  strongly  barricaded  por- 
tion of  tJK'  road  from  Sorge,  and  it  became  necessary  to  enter 
the  village  from  tho  cast,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  was  accom- 
jilished  1)\-  ilk-  I'^irst  l)attalioii  of  the  I'ourtli  regiment.  The 
assistanc«.-  of  the  lattei    was  all   tlu*   more  welcome  to  Major- 

Ocneral    li when,  at   J  :45   p.   m..  the  junior  aid  of  the 

division  came  up  with  an  order  to  energetically  follow  up  the 
advantages  gained.  .\s  the  engineer  com]')any,  which  was  no 
kjiiLrer  needed  in  Ilohenbrnck.  .'irrived  at  the  s.'ime  time,  it  was 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  269 

placed  under  the  orders  of  Colonel  E (Second  regi- 
ment)  to  support  the  attack.  The  latter  directed  the  Second 
battalion,  located  in  the  little  woods  northeast  of  Neu-Rognitz, 
to  assail  the  northeastern  boundary  of  the  village  from  there, 
and  soon  after  3  o'clock  he  again  led  the  Third  battalion  and 
parts  of  the  First  battalion  upon  and  alongside  the  village 
street,  against  the  barricade.  The  attack  succeeded  perfectly, 
and  all  the  more  easily  because  it  was  supported  by  a  brisk 
fire  from  the  right  wing  out  of  the  forest  west  of  the  village. 
The  engineers  cleared  away  the  barricade  while  still  un- 
der fire,  and  some  of  them  took  part  in  storming  the  adjoin- 
ing farm-houses ;  the  most  important  of  the  farm-houses  at 
the  point  where  the  road  entered  was  prepared  for  defense  and 
occupied  by  one  platoon  of  engineers.  Next  the  Ninth  and 
Twelfth  companies  were  halted  by  the  regimental  command- 
er, and  assembled,  and,  after  consulting  with  Major-General 

P) ,  the  regimental  commander  posted  them  as  reserve 

in  the  northern  part  of  the  village,  while  the  rest  of  the  troops 
that  had  been  engaged  there  were  instructed  not  to  advance 
beyond  the  southern  part  of  the  village.  By  this  time  the  com- 
panies of  the  First  and  Second  battalions,  together  with  the 
company  of  engineers,  had  succeeded  in  driving  the  enemy 
from  the  southern  part  of  Neu-Rognitz  and  capturing  many 
prisoners ;  several  groups  of  the  opponents  had  tried  to  defend 
themselves  in  the  houses  up  to  the  last  moment.  An  advance 
beyond  the  southern  boundary  of  the  village  was  prevented  by 
the  strong  artillery  fire.  In  spite  of  this,  the  engineers  tried 
to  prepare  the  village  enclosure  for  defense ;  they  also  made 
efforts  to  put  out  the  fires  that  had  started  in  some  of  the 
buildings.  The  houses  on  the  west  side  were  occupied  by  the 
First  company  of  the  Second  infantry,  wliile  the  Second  com- 
pany held  those  east  of  the  highway,  the  Third  and  Fourth 
companies  being  retained  at  the  junction  of  the  highway  with 
the  wagon-road,  where  one  platoon  of  the  Fourth  was  ordered 
to  stack  arms  and  carry  to  safety  a  number  of  the  enemy's 
wounded  that  were  in  the  burning  houses,  and  the  other  pla- 
toon to  defend  the  fortified  farm  premises.  The  Second  bat- 
talion was  assembled  outside  of  the  village  near  the  wagon- 
road  ;  west  of  the  village  the  Tenth  and  Eleventh  companies 
were   min^led  with   the   men   of  the   First   infanrrv   regiment. 


270  Studiks  in  thk  Leading  of  Troops. 

Accordingly  three  bodies  of  the  Third  brigade  still  re- 
mained disposable — viz.,  the  Second  battalion  of  the  First 
regiment,  which  was  near  the  quarry ;  two  companies  each  of 
the  Third  and  First  battalions  of  the  Second  regiment,  which 
were  posted  in  Neu-Rognitz  in  clo'^e  order ;  and  the  Second 
battalion  of  the  Second  regiment,  which  had  assembled  near 
the  wagon-road  after  successfully  su])])(»rting  tlic  attack  upon 
the  village. 

All  other  parts  of  the  Second  regiment  were  in  the  vil- 
lage mingled  with  the  First  battalion  of  the  Fourth  regiment, 
or  west  of  the  village  with  parts  of  the  First  and  Third  bat- 
talions of  the  First  regiment,  or  dissolved  into  separate  frac- 
tions. The  enemy's  retreat  was  decisive,  but  further  jnirsuit 
was  forbidden,  as  it  was  impossible  at  that  time  for  the  artil- 
lery to  render  support.     Major-General   B accordingly 

turned  his  attention  again  to  the  prompt  assembling  of  the 
troops.  Shortly  before  4  o'clock  he  saw  the  division  com- 
mander ap]:>roaching,  and  went  to  join  him. 

The  Fourth  scjuadron,  which  found  no  opi)(^rtunity  for 
action  during  the  last  period  of  the  combat,  had  meanwhile 
endeavored  to  find  its  regiment.  It  met  it  on  the  left  wing 
of  the  Fourth  brigade  east  of  the  wagon-road  and  near   Hill 

401,  and  then  reported  to  Major-Gen cral  I> that  it  had 

passed  under  the  orders  of  regimental  headquarters.  Thus 
the  regiment  again  had  about  250  horses  assembled. 

The  First  cavalry  brigade  had  remained  north  of  the  lit- 
tle woods  at  the  (|uarry. 

The  First  field  artillery  regiment,  irnder  the  command  of 
l.ieutenant-Colonel  J .  ^vas  directed  by  the  division  com- 
mander to  open  fire  ujmmi  the  hostile  artillery  on  Hill  635. 
This  task  the  colonel  assigned  to  the  First  battalion,  which 
had  hastened  uj)  to  Hill  ^2-]  (southeast  of  Hohenbruck),  and 
the  battalion  fulfilled  its  commission  in  a  very  creditable  man- 
ner. Tn  the  meantime  thv  Second  battalion  had  opened  fire 
ni)on  the  country  north  of  liurkersdorf,  while  the  Sixteenth 
field  artillery  regiment  finally  went  into  action  between  Sorge 
and  the  (juarry.  'I'he  cross-fire  of  these  7«S  guns  completely 
demoralized  the  iiostile  infantrv.  So<^n  afterwards  the  en- 
emy's batteries  withdrew  from  Hill  r)35,  and  the  only  field  of 
fire  available  for  the  artillerv  of  the  Second  division  was  still 


Studies  in  thj^  Lkading  o^  Troops.  271 

farther  to  the  front ;  accordini^ly  the  guns  of  the  First  bat- 
tahon  of  the  First  regiment  hmbered  up,  and  then  those  of 
the  Sixteenth  regiment,  to  seek  a  suitable  field  for  their  work, 
but  none  could  be   found.      At  the  same   moment,   however, 

Lieutenant-Colonel   J sent  instructions   to   the    Second 

battalion  to  advance  to  the  wagon-road. 

Comments  on  the  Engagement  of  the  Several  Parts  oe 
THE  Division  from  2:20  to  4  p.  m. 

During  this  period  the  character  of  the  engagement 
changed  considerably.  The  infantry  had  exhausted  the  greater 
part  of  its  offensive  energy,  and,  after  order  had  been  some- 
what restored  subsequent  to  the  capture  of  the  hostile  posi- 
tion, contented  itself  with  gathering  in  the  immediate  fruits 
of  its  victory  by  ]>ursuing  the  enemy  as  far  as  the  southern 
boundary  of  the  village  and  the  patcJies  of  woods.  There  the 
])ursuit  must,  however,  be  checked,  at  all  events,  if  it  was  de- 
sired not  to  engage  in  another  combat  during  the  afternoon, 
which  would  again  have  t<:>  be  undertaken  without  waiting  for 
the  arrival  of  the  divisions  following  behind  the  wings. 

The  various  parts  of  the  Second  infantry  division  had 
become  too  cautious,  by  reason  of  the  very  damaging  fire  of 
the  enemy  and  their  own  ..'xperience,  to  risk  entering  the  open 
country  south  of  Neu-Rognitz.  in  the  face  of  a  strong  sup- 
porting position  on  the  part  of  the  opponent,  without  orders 
or  a  mutual  understanding.  Only  troops  who  have  witnessed 
nothing  but  success  and  have  not  as  yet  been  called  into  action 
will  allow  themselves  to  be  misled  into  making  an  attack  with- 
out due  deliberation.  On  the  contrary,  troops  who  have  wit-, 
nessed  a  fierce  fight  will  enter  an  engagement  with  a  great 
deal  of  anxiety. 

The  brief  description  we  have  just  given  of  the  last 
periods  of  the  engagement  has  casually  shown  the  dissolving 
tendency  of  a  fight  for  a  position ;  it  has,  however,  particularly 
shown  the  extraordinary  mdustry  necessary  on  the  part  of 
leaders  in  re-establishing  order  among  their  troops  in  spite 
of  this  tendency  toward  dissolution.  Without  order  judicious 
control  is  impossible.  It  is  indeed  strange  that  after  a  ore- 
carious  militar}^  situation  everything  else  will  be   thought  of 


i-]2  Studiks  in  TiiL-:  Li-ADixG  or  Troops. 

except  the  re-cstahlishiiicnt  of  severed  connections  between 
tfbops  and  the  collecting  of  masses  for  further  efficient  em- 
ployment. To  keep  this  purpose  in  \ievv,  not  alone  after  the 
engagement,  but  at  all  times  during  its  course,  is  one  of  the 
chief  problems  in  the  leading  of  troops.  In  the  case  in  hand 
its  labor  was  materially  lightened,  for  although  the  defense 
had  been  obstinate  in  some  places  during  the  last  hour  and 
a  half;  in  general  it  was  absolutely  lacking  in  energy,  and  the 
reserves  had  made  no  attempt  to  support  it  by  a  single 
counter-blow,  or  to  restore  the  combat,  as  had  been  done  in 
the  earlv  stages  of  the  fight.  The  defense  had  either  reached 
the  limit  of  endurance,  or,  as  is  more  probable,  the  situa- 
tion outside  of  the  battle-fteld  demanded  an  immediate  with- 
drawal from  the  ])osition  that  had  been  occupied. 

The  artillery  had  done  all  it  could  do  by  hastening  up  to 
join  in  the  pursuit,  but  on  account  of  the  unfavorable  terrane 
it  (ould  be  of  little  assistance.  The  First  cavalry  brigade 
seems  to  have  expended  its  energy  rather  early,  for  it  failed 
to  continue  its  scouting  on  the  right  wing.  In  accordance 
with  Regulations  it  should  have  quickly  formed  some  of  the 
available  men  into  double -rank  bodies,  regardless  of  their 
former  connection,  and  pressed  the  hostile  left;  the  proper 
formation  of  the  various  organizations  could  have  l^een  at- 
tended to  later  oti. 

rROlUJ'.MS. 

Page  151:  The  Second  infantry  division  could  count  o\\ 
iio  further  supi)ort. 

vShould  it  again  attack  the  enemy  at  Xeu-Rognitz  after 
leaving  taken  possession  of  the  region  between  Trautenau, 
llohenbrnck.  and  Alt-Rognitz.  or  should  it  confine  its  efforts 
t(»  defiiise? 

If  the   former,  what  dispositions  must   he  made? 

If  the  latter,  what  dispositions  must  the  commander  make 
as  soon  as  he  rcsv)lves  to  assmne  the  defensive? 

Page  163:  What  dispositions  for  attack  must  Ik-  made  if 
the  corps  artillery  had  been  present  and  passed  under  the  or- 
ders of  TJeutenant-General  \ ? 

Ifow  must  the  attack  be  led  if  the  division  had  marched 
lip  throu-h  'i'raut"nau  an^l  stood  astride  the  Trautenau-Neu- 
IsOL-nitz  hi''hwav? 


Studiks  in  tijk  leading  of  Troops.  273 

Was  the  intended  turning  of  the  opponent's  flank  by  an 
advance  of  the  Fourth  brigade  via  the  church  of  St.  Paul  and 
St.  John  judicious  or  not? 

Should  such  a  turning  movement  be  ordered  if  the  coun- 
try between  Alt-Rognitz  and  Neu-Rognitz  was  covered  with 
connected  woods? 

Pagei68:  Were  Major-General  C 's  orders  judicious? 

Could  he  have  issued  different  orders? 

Page  190:  The  initial  movements  were  not  executed 
in  accordance  with  the  desires  of  the  division  commander; 
the  Third  brigade  went  into  action  too  soon  and  the  Fourth 
brigade  too  late.  Could  the  general  have  avoided  this  by  his 
personal  conduct  or  by  issuing  his  orders  differently? 

Page  191  :  Suppose  the  Third  brigade  was  alone  in  posi- 
tion. The  enemy  held  the  tongue  of  woods  along  the  highway 
and  the  thickets  northeast  of  Neu-Rognitz.  How  should  the 
attack  be  started? 

Page  198:  In  what  particulars  were  the  detailed  dispo- 
sitions for  attack  made  by  the  Fourth  brigade  faulty? 

Could  they  have  been  made  in  a  different  manner? 

Page  205  :  How^  could  the  various  parts  of  the  First  in- 
fantry division  co-operate  most  effectively  ? 

Issue  orders  for  such  co-operation. 


PART  IV. 

Thk  End  of  the:  Battle. 

(4  TO  5  p.  M.) 

The  situation  at  4  p.  m.  was  as  follows : 

The  position  the  enemy  had  so  obstinately  contested  was 
in  the  hands  of  the  division.  The  Third  brigade  held  Neu- 
Rognitz  and  the  woods  west  of  the  village.  A  continuation 
of  the  advance  against  Hill  635,  northwest  of  Burkersdorf, 
which  was  crowned  with  a  strong  force  of  artillery,  was  hardly 
practicable,  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  batteries  of  the  divi- 
sion would  have  to  fight  from  lower  ground.  The  portions 
of  the  brigade  not  in  the  first  line  were  assembled  south  of 
the  quarry  of  Sorge,  also  in  Neu-Rognitz.  The  foremost  line 
of  the  Fourth  brigade  (Third  regiment)  followed  the  enemy 
through  the  woods  southeast  of  the  village,  while  the  Fourth 
regiment  was  engaged  in  disentangling  itself  from  the  Sec- 
ond, the  Second  and  Third  battalions  of  the  Fourth  being 
in  reserve  along  the  northern  border  of  these  woods  and 
the  First  battalion  being  in  the  village.  The  First  regiment 
of  hussars  was  halted  near  Hill  40 1,  midway  between  Neu- 
Rognitz  and  Rudersdorf.  The  First  regiment  of  field  artil- 
lery was  in  position,  under  fire,  on  the  ridge  running  in  a 
southeasterly  direction  from  Peak  527,  north  of  Neu-Rognitz, 
while  the  horse  battery,  also  under  fir£,  was  near  the  Sorge 
quarry.  Alongside  the  latter  the  Sixteenth  regiment  of  field 
artillery  was  about  to  go  into  action.  Towards  the  southeast 
the  artillery  of  the  Guard  could  be  heard.  It  was  known  that 
other  portions  of  the  First  army  corps  had  taken  up  positions 
south  and  north  of  Hohenbruck. 

In  view  of  these  conditions  Lieutenant-General  A 

placed  special  importance  on  a  rapid  assembling  and  orderly 
formation  of  his  troops.  It  seemed  hardly  possible  to  gam 
any  further  benefit  from  the  advantages  already  obtained,  on 

275 


276  StudiivS  in  TTiK  Lkadi.nx  OF  Troops. 

account  of  the  complete  exhaustion  of  the  men.  The  troops 
had  been  on  the  move  since  4  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  in 
action  since  9  o'clock.  The  position  the  enemy  now  held  could 
not  be  successfully  assailed  without  comprehensive  prepara- 
tion, so  for  the  present  the  division  commander  must  be  con- 
tent with  holding  the  ground  already  gained. 

Moreover,  the  retreat  of  the  enemy's  right  wing  was  de- 
cisive, the  junior  aid  having  returned  at  4:30  from  the  south- 
eastern corner  of  Neu-Rognitz,  whither  he  had  been  sent  for 
observation,  and  reported  that  the  batteries  on  the  enemy's 
left    were    withdrawing   from    the    hill    northwest   of    Burk- 

ersdorf.    Immediately,  therefore,  Lieutenant-General  A 

sent  orders  to  the  division  artillery  regiment  to  proceed  to 
that  hill  and  fire  upon  the  retreating  forces.  The  hussar  regi- 
ment was  brought  to  the  southern  end  of  Neu-Rognitz  by  a 
non-commissioned  officer  of  mounted  riflemen  to  escort  the 
artillery. 

The  division  commander  accompanied  this  advance,  as  the 
formation  of  the  ground  and  the  state  of  the  engagement  had 
theretofore  prevented  his  obtaining  a  perfect  view  of  the  oppo- 
nent. It  was  very  probable  that  a  survey  for  a  great  distance 
might  be  obtained  from  this  very  prominent  peak  (635).  The 
hussars  took  the  lead,  passing  at  a  trot  in  column  of  troops 
over  the  narrow  open  terrane  between  the  end  of  the  village 
and  the  thickets  to  the  south,  then  crossing  the  highway,  and 
riding  up  the  mountain  slope  under  cover  of  the  First  squad- 
ron about  450  yards  in  advance.  The  First  regiment  of  field 
artillery  had  been  led  through  Neu-Rognitz,  and  followed  the 
hussars.  The  horse  battery  was  in  rear  of  the  artillery  regi- 
ment. Parts  of  the  Third  infantry  brigade  had  already  occu- 
pied the  tongue  of  woods  crossing  the  highway  near  its  forks, 
while  to  the  west  the  leading  bodies  of  the  brigade  had  aban- 
doned the  border  of  the  woods  and  were  marching  up  the 
height. 

At  4:45  the  division  commander  reached  the  summit  of 
the  peak,  and  soon  afterwards  the  7  batteries  opened  fire  from 

the  same  point  on  the   retreating  enemy.      Colonel   D 

(First  regiment),  who  arrived  at  about  that  time,  received 
orders  to  assemble  his  regiment  there,  the  skirmishers  of 
which  were  just  coming  uj). 


Studies  in  the  Leading  oe  Troops.  277 

The  view  to  the  south  was  cut  off  at  a  distance  of  about 
2;!/2  miles  by  a  ridge,  at  the  base  of  which  arose  the  numerous 
farm-houses  and  barns  of  the  combined  and  compactly-built 
villages  of  Deutsch-Praussnitz  and  Kaile,  with  their  tiled 
roofs  plainly  visible  amidst  the  groups  of  trees  in  the  gardens. 
Toward  the  west  and  as  far  as  these  villages  the  country 
seemed  to  be  bounded  by  a  series  of  peaks  and  declivities  of 
tolerably  uniform  height,  over  which  the  Königinhof  road 
passed.  This  road  could  be  distinctly  traced-  in  places  as  it 
crossed  the  heights.  The  hills  sloped  gently  toward  the  east 
into  an  almost  perfect  plain,  in  which  lay  the  village  of  Staud- 
enz,  while  still  further  to  the  left  the  nearest  farm-houses 
of  Ober-Raatsch  could  be  seen,  beyond  which  the  peaks  be- 
came more  numerous  and  the  view  more  obstructed,  the  hori- 
zon finally  being  bounded  in  that  direction  by  still  higher 
elevations. 

The  ground  from  Hill  635  to  the  old  quarry  northwest  of 
Staudenz  which  was  occupied  by  the  division's  most  advanced 
line  formed  an  abrupt  edge  to  the  depression  in  front,  and 
on  the  whole,  the  entire  region  up  to  tieutsch-Praussnitz  and 
Kaile  might  be  compared  to  an  elongated  kettle. 

At  the  foot  of  the  hill  was  the  compact  village  of  Burk- 
ersdorf,  to  the  south  of  which,  and  also  to  the  east  in  the 
direction  of   Staudenz,  were  well-defined  patches  of  timber. 

As  already  stated,  the  terrane  was  so  open  that  it  could 
be  surveyed  at  a  glance,  and  any  movements  of  the  enemy  in 
it  could  be  observed  at  least  in  their  outline.  South  of  Burk- 
ersdorf  hostile  infantry  was  still  visible,  having  evidently  just 
evacuated  that  place.  The  thickets  farthest  to  the  east,  as  well 
as  Staudenz,  were  still  occupied.  A  hostile  battery  in  the  west 
end  of  Staudenz  was  in  action  against  Hill  635.  An  infantry 
engagement  could  also  be  seen  northeast  of  that  village. 

In  addition,  hostile  columns  were  visible  upon  and  along- 
side the  highway  to  Kaile,  as  well  as  upon  the  country  road 
from  Burkersdorf  to  Deutsch-f  raussnitz,  the  rearmost  bodies 
being  about  midway  between  Burkersdorf,  Kaile,  and  Deutsch- 
Praussnitz.  A  large  force  of  cavalry,  perhaps  3  regiments, 
was  visible  south  of  the  thickets  between  Burkersdorf^  and 
Staudenz,  headed  toward  the  latter  place.  The  highway  to 
Königinhof,  on  the  contrary,  seemed  to  be  used  only  by  a.  few 


278  STüDifc:s  IN  Tnic  L.KADixc  OF  Trcx>ps. 

of  the  retreating-  subdivisions.  The  hostile  artillery  that  had 
been  in  action  on  Hill  6^^  could  be  seen  withdrawing  by  this 
highway  at  a  trot,  its  rear  battalion  having  just  approached 
the  two  ^lills  capped  with  windmills  east  of  Ober-Soor. 

The  division  commander  readily  perceived  that  under 
these  circumstances  no  damage  could  be  inflicted  upon  the 
enemy,  who  had  been  able  to  collect  his  forces  and  retire  in 
good  order  by  posting  fresh  artillery  and  infantry  on  Hill 
635.  Moreover,  the  occupation  of  Staudenz  and  the  patches 
of  \#)od  afiorded  good  su])port  for  a  continuation  of  the  re- 
treat The  evacuation  of  Burkersdorf,  just  completed,  and  the 
evidently  good  start  which  the  masses  in  sight  had  obtained, 
justified  tlie  inference  that  the  retreat  was  progressing  in  good 
ordef. 

An   opportunity    to  emj)loy   the   cavalry    regiment   of   the 

division  could  hardly  be  expected.     Lieutenant-General  A 

therefore  contented  himself  with  directing   Colonel  D . 

First  infantry  regiment,  to  send  a  battalion  to  Burkersdorf, 
and  instructing  the  commander  of  the  First  regiment  of  field 
artillery  to  pursue  the  enemy  as  far  as  practicable  with  fire. 
The  hussar  regiment  was  ordered  to  keep  at  the  heels  of  the 
oi»i)onent,  and  at  all  events  to  ascertain  his  whereabouts. 

These  orders  had  been  given  by  5  p.  m.,  and  the  divis- 
ion commander  then  turned  his  attention  to  further  necessary 
dispositions. 

Comments  on  the  Dispositions  Madk  in  Bringing 
THß   Fight  to   an   End. 

(4  TO  5  p.   M.) 

II1C  division  brought  its  offensive  advance  to  an  end  after 
it  had  taken  Neu-Rognitz  and  reached  the  little  meadow  val- 
ley cast  of  the  village.  An  attack  on  the  hill  northwest  of 
!Uirkers(k)rf  opposite  the  right  wing  and  occupied  by  the  en- 
emy in  force  offered  no  prospect  of  success,  and  the  division 
coniniander  did  not  care  to  enter  into  a  difficult  engagement 
in  the  woods  on  the  left  wing  when  that  i^art  of  the  field  would 
soon  be  evacuated  i)y  the  ai)i)roach  of  the  Guard.  It  is  pos- 
sible that  the  halt  was  also  prompted  by  the  fatigue  of  the 
troops,  which  was  in  no  sense  slight,  as  well  as  the  fact  that 


STUDIJvS   in    THK   L^eADING   öF    TrüOPS.  279 

the  Fourth  brigade,  which  had  already  suffered  a  great  deal, 
would  have  to  carry  on  the  engagement  in  the  woods. 

Yet  all  these  reasons  are  useless  unless  troops  are  ex- 
hausted to  such  an  extent  tliat  a  continuation  of  the  fight  be- 
comes an  absolute  impossibility.  It  is  a  leader's  duty  to 
utilize  every  opportunity  offered,  to  its  fullest  extent,  and  his 
energy  is  best  displayed  when  he  overcomes  all  the  obstacles 
that  present  themselves  in  such  cases. 

If  the  help  of  the  Guard  had  not  been  expected,  then  only 
complete  exhaustion  and  dissolution  should  have  prevented 
the  continuation  of  the  attack.  Under  no  circumstances  should 
the  opponent  be  left  in  possession  of  the  woods  over  night ; 
the  engagement  at  the  strip  of  meadow  could  not  be  continued 
indefinitely,  nor  was  it  practicable  to  hold  Neu-Rognitz  for 
hours  under  hostile  artillery  fire.  Only  two  courses  were  open : 
either  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  his  position,  or  relinquish  part 
of  the  ground  already  gained  and  seek  a  more  favorable 
position  further  to  the  rear. 

As  it  happened,  however,  the  Guard  had  already  become 
engaged,  and  every  minute  their  influence  should  become  more 
annoying  to  the  enemy ;  a  fact  which  should  have  induced  the 
Second  infantry  division  to  continue  the  fight  with  the  utmost 
energy,  for  by  so  doing  the  opponent  would  not  only  have 
been  prevented  from  turning  part  of  his  forces  against  the 
Guard,  but  he  would  have  been  beaten  more  thoroughly  and 
lastingly  the  more  closely  he  w^as  held  in  front  and  the  more 
difficult  it  w^as  made  for  him  to  break  off  the  action.  The 
flanking  movement  of  the  Guard  w^ould  then  have  been  more 
effective  and  the  enemy's  defeat  more  severe. 

The  division's  suspension  of  its  offensive  advance  before 
4  p.  m.  cannot,  therefore,  be  accepted  as  correct.  It  is  true, 
the  general  aspect  of  affairs  made  it  appear  probable  that  the 
enemy  would  soon  abandon  the  ground  which  the  division 
should  occupy  to  secure  the  advantages  already  gained,  but  as 

Lieutenant-General  A had  not  sufficient  knowledge  of 

the  strength  and  situation  of  the  enemy,  he  could  hardly  feel 
assured  on  this  point.  Far  more  important,  however,  than 
simply  gaining  a  piece  of  ground  was  the  opportunity  here 
offered  of  inflicting  more  serious  loss  upon  the  opponent,  and 


28o  Studies  in  thic  Lkadinc  of  Troops. 

this  the  division  commander  should  not  permit  to  sHp  out  of 
his  grasp.  In  war  one  cannot  accomphsh  enough :  neverthe- 
less not  every  man  possesses  the  faculty  of  drawing  the  ut- 
most advantage  from  a  favorable  situation.  Tension  of  the 
mind  and  bodily  fatigue  will  in  the  end  asse'rt  themselves  even 
in  the  person  of  the  leader.  Great  losses,  the  feeling  that 
great  things  have  already  been  accomplished,  fear  of  a  pos- 
sible setback  if  the  troops  are  subjected  to  too  great  a  strain, 
all  combine  to  put  a  limit  to  his  energy,  and  all  that  can  enable 
him  to  surmount  this  difficulty  is  a  realization  of  the  necessity 
for  reviving  the  failing  powers  of  his  troops  and  giving  a 
fresh  impetus  to  the  weaker  elements,  coupled  with  an  iron 
will. 

When,  however,  the  heights  northwest  of  Burkersdorf  and 
the  old  quarry  were  finally  abandoned  by  the  opponents,  the 
conditions  relative  to  a  continuation  of  the  engagement  as- 
sumed an  entirely  different  aspect,  for  it  was  then  evident  that 
the  enemy  had  marched  off  in  good  order,  after  having  also 
occupied  the  village  of  Staudenz  and  the  woods,  which  were 
very  favorably  situated  to  cover  his  retreat.  These  points 
furnished  him  excellcTit  positions  for  supports  and  rear  guards, 
and  to  have  attacked  the?n  would  have  caused  the  division 
greater  sacrifices  than  could  have  resulted  from  the  defender 
holding  them  in  his  own  possession  for  a  time.  Moreover,  it 
was  plainly  visible  that  the  flanking  movement  of  the  Guard 
had  accomplished  all  that  could  be  expected  of  it,  and  a  more 
far-reaching  influence  on  its  part  was  improbable  after  the 
enemy  had  once  shaken  it  off  by  his  withdrawal. 

When  events  had  reached  this  point,  attention  was  to  be 
turned  toward  the  division's  own  condition,  and  this  led  to  a 
])rcaking  off  of  the  engagement. 

r)nc  further  remark  must  be  made,  however,  and  this  has 
reference  to  the  leading  of  the  army  corps.  The  unjustifiable 
cessation  in  the  division's  combat,  which,  as  above  stated,  oc- 
curred .shortly  before  4  p.  m.,  was  in  no  small  degree  the  fault 
of  the  corps  commander.  Even  before  2  ]).  m.  the  leading 
brigade  of  the  First  infantry  division  had  deployed  north  of 
Hohenbruck  ^nd  about  that  hour  received  the  order  to  pro- 
ceed to  the  attack  also,  via  Hohenbruck  and  west  of  the  high- 
way.    (See  Part  TIT.,  page  231.)     lender  the  conditions  that 


Studies  in  thk  Lkading  of  Troops.  281 

then  prevailed,  this  order  was  eminently  correct.  Sufficient 
forces  were  at  hand  to  extend  the  fighting  line  without  the 
necessity  of  depriving  the  parts  of  the  corps  previously  en- 
gaged of  their  necessary  reserves.  An  advance  of  this  bri- 
gade via  Sorge  must  in  any  event  draw  off  from  the  Second 
division  some  of  the  enemy's  forces  which  would  otherwise 
be  employed  agaii\st  it.  If,  however,  the  enemy  had  not  suffi- 
cient troops  in  readiness,  then  the  advance  of  the  First  infantry 
brigade  would  flank  the  position  the  opponent  had  occupied 
near  Neu-Rognitz  and  put  him  in  a  most  precarious  situation, 
unless  he  should  evade  the  movement  by  a  hasty  retreat.  Fur- 
thermore, a  continuation  of  this  flank  maneuver  would  in  all 
probability  have  prevented  the  enemy  from  making  a  new 
stand  on  the  hill  before  Burkersdorf.  In  any  event,  a  timely 
interposition  by  the  First  brigade  would  have  lightened  the 
labors  of  the  Second  division,  reduced  its  losses,  and  brought 
the  decision  an  hour  or  more  earlier. 

The  brigade  actually  moved  off,  and  had  advanced  a  short 
distance  south  of  Hohenbruck,  when  it  was  retained  by  the 
corps  commander  on  account  of  the  forward  progress  of  the 
action  along  the  highway,  "in  order  not  to  involve  too  many 
troops  in  the  fight."  (See  Part  III.,  page  255.)  Lieutenant- 
General  A was  advised  of  this  shortly  after  3  o'clock; 

he  immediately  perceived  the  mistake,  and  made  recommenda- 
tions to  the  corps  commander  that  an  advance  of  fresh  forces 
west  of  the  highway  would  presumably  lighten  the  action  very 
much.     His  recommendations  were  of  no  avail. 

Regarding  such  a  course  we  can  only  say,  that  consider- 
ation for  troops  should  never  be  carried  so  far  as  not  to  use 
them  at  all.  And  whoever  counts  on  every  eventuality  that 
an  uncertain  future  may  bring  forth,  and  tries  to  save  his 
troops,  in  the  end  is  bound  to  miss  many  favorable  oppor- 
tunities. In  the  case  before  us  it  was  not  a  question  of  a 
slight  skirmish  by  parts  of  the  leading  division,  but  the  entire 
division  was  engaged  in  a  serious  and  decisive  action,  and  it 
should  therefore  have  been  supported  as  much  as  possible. 
The  corps  commander  was  in  a  position  to  do  this  most  effect- 
ively, and  his  failure  to  do  so  was  an  unpardonable  error.  It 
is  in  just  such  ways  that  troops  are  annihilated  and  losses  mul- 
tiplied.    Had  Lieutenant-General  A been  able  to  know 


282  Studies  in  thk  Leading  oe  Troops. 


U 


M0 

^^M 
'#i: 
J^ 

M 

'ß 


in  advance  that  his  conimandiniJ:  general  would  leave  him  en 
tirely  dependent  ui)on  his  own  forces,  in  all  probability  h 
would  not  have  employed  his  entire  Fourth  brigade  at  the  star 
in  the  flank  attack  from  Alt-Rognitz.  but  would  certainly  hav« 
held  back  one  of  its  regiments  at  his  disposition  as  reserve. 

The  inactivity  of  the  First  brigade  exercised  no  small  in 
lluence  on  the  results  of  the  victory.  We  have  seen  that  then 
was  no  pursuit,  though  by  pursuit  the  most  important  fruit:  ^ 
of  victory  are  gathered  and  demoralization  spread  in  the  rankr^^^jj, 
of  the  enemy  far  beyond  i:he  battle-field.  On  the  other  handj  yif, 
theory  certainly  demands  of  pursuit  more  than  troops  caij  \^^^ 
often  accomplish.  How  else  can  we  explain  the  fact  tha  Uju 
since  the  memorable  i8th  of  June,  1815,  our  war  history,  S(j  1^ 
replete  with  battles,  cannot  show  a  second  Waterloo,  althougll  'y 
it  has  since  become  proverbial  in  our  Army  that  when  a  vict|jjj 
tory  has  been  gained,  the  last  breath  of  man  and  horse  musj^  ] 
be  devoted  to  gathering  in  the  fruits,  a  principle  w^hich  ha»|, 
been  instilled  into  us  from  our  earliest  training  and  the  validly 
ity  of  which  neither  the  youngest  lieutenant  nor  the  oldes)  j^^^ 
general  is  ready  to  doubt?  Ijjti 

In  explanation,  let  us  first  call  to  mind  the  condition  of  '.  ^g 
large  mass  of  troops  after  a  hotly  contested  action.  When  thd  U^ 
force  has  once  been  extended  and  gotten  more  or  less  out  o  L^j 
the  leader's  hand,  it  is  of  little  value,  even  though  some  smal,  J  ^^^ 
separated  bodies  may  still  be  capable  of  further  activity.  Wha.f'^yj 
is  needed  are  large  closed  masses  under  a  connected  leader 
ship;  but  these,  as  a  rule,  are  no  longer  to  be  found  in  theii 
proper  places.  And  if  in  the  meantime  the  enemy  has  sue.  ^^j 
ceeded  in  restoring  order  in  his  own  lines,  and  thus  covering  1 1^ 
the  deployed  masses  by  bodies  of  troops  in  close  order,  thet  1  ^^^ 
the  reckless  pursuit  of  the  victor's  isolated  forces  will  onlv  leac  ^^  ^^^ 
to  their  sufl'ering  losses  heavier  than  those  of  the  vanquishedl'j 
Rut  such  bodies  generally  perceive  the  isolation  of  their  posi)  ^ 
tion  and  the  massing  of  the  enemy's  forces,  and  stop  at  th(  1  j^' 
right  moment.  u  '^ 

T.est  we  be  misunderstood,  we  will  here  repeat  that  we  an  I  ^ 
fully  convinced  that  "under  certain  circumstances"  great  thing«  1 
may  be  accomnlished  bv  a  pursuit,  and  that  we  hold  in  hijrl'^  | 
esteem  the  injunction  to  emplov  the  last  bit  of  strength   ir^  | 
taking  advantage  of  a  victory.    But,  on  the  other  hand,  a  pur- 


Studies  in  thk  Leading  of  Troops.  283 

suit  is  not  always  so  easily  undertaken  as  the  critic  imagines 
when  he  says,  *It  is  reprehensible  that  the  enemy  was  not  pur- 
sued." In  war  conditions  do  not  always  assume  such  an  easy 
and  simple  course. 

Let  us  pause  to  consider  the  example  before  us. 

Anybody  will  at  once  understand  that  after  marching  and 
fighting  for  12  hours,  in  oppressive  heat,  the.  troops'  fighting 
powers  had  so  closely  approached  their  limit  that  they  were 
no  longer  in  condition  to  overcome  the  resistance  of  even  small 
bodies  of  the  enemy,  with  the  same  dash  as  would  have  been 
the  case  4  or  6  hours  earlier.  Just  as  little  were  they  fitted 
for  movements  needing  considerable  time,  such  as  a  flanking 
operation ;  and  it  is  certain  that,  in  view  of  the  severe  lessons 
they  had  already  learned  that  day,  they  were  in  no  condition 
to  dash  upon  the  hostile  front. 

Furthermore,  an  advance  upon  the  strong  artillery  posi- 
tion on  the  Burkersdorf  Hill  would  be  extremely  difficult ;  in- 
deed, a  frontal  attack  would  have  hardly  been  practicable  when 
we  consider  the  condition  of  the  intermingled  troops  at  4  p.  m. 
in  the  edge  of  the  woods  opposite  Burkersdorf  and  to  the  west 
of  Neu-Rognitz,  especially  since  the  terrane  made  support  by 
the  division's  own  batteries  very  difficult.  A  turning  move- 
ment would  have  had  to  extend  for  quite  a  distance,  which 
would  only  increase  the  fatigue  of  the  troops,  nor  were  tlife 
bodies  that  must  initiate  this  from  the  rear  in  good  order, 
since  the  foremost  line,  in  the  woods,  could,  considering  the 
confusion,  only  be  put  into  motion  for  a  general  frontal  dash, 
and  not  for  a  difficull;  turning  maneuver.  A  pursuit  from 
that  point  was  therefore  not  feasible ;  the  question  was  rather 
one  of  a  fresh  attack,  for  which  the  troops  at  that  moment 
were  in  no  wise  prepared. 

Similar  conditions  prevailed  on  the  left.  Though  the  en- 
emy could  probably  be  followed  up  to  the  foot  of  tlie  moun- 
tains extending  from  the  highway  to  the  old  quarry,  it  was 
impossible  to  advance  beyond  that  position,  which  was  further- 
more one  not  easily  to  be  taken  in  front. 

Let  us  remember  that  the  assailant  would  have  to  go 
through  a  forest  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  wide,  and  un- 
der hostile  fire,  and  that  with  the  view  completely  obstructed 
all  cohesion  would  be  lost  bevond  recoverv,  as  well  as  all  direc- 


284  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

tioii  for  the  individual  bodies.  The  opponent,  on  the  othei 
hand,  was  in  close  order,  perfectly  free  in  his  movements,  anc 
able  to  see  the  approaching^  assailant  while  he  himself  was  com 
pletely  obscured. 

By  pursuit  we  understand,  in  general,  the  gathering  of 
the  fruits  of  a  victory  after  a  decision  has  been  attained.  As 
a  rule,  we  picture  this  as  an  uninterrupted  pressing  after  tht 
opponent  until  the  limit  of  our  strength  is  reached. 

In  the  case  of  the  Second  infantry  division  the  decisior 
came  at  a  moment  when  the  enemy  began  his  retreat ;  he  could 
therefore  be  followed  as  far  as  practicable.  But  the  pursuit 
first  struck  a  barrier  after  Neu-Rognitz  and  the  woods  west 
and  southeast  of  it  had  been  taken,  and  this  barrier  was  drawn 
up  by  the  opponent,  who,  with  bodies  in  close  order  in  a 
strong  position,  turned  and  faced  the  victor. 

After  a  time,  the  enemy  left  his  position  northwest  of 
Burkersdorf ;  but  even  then  the  assailant  was  in  no  condition 
to  reap  full  benefit  of  the  situation. 

Yet  it  is  certain  that  if  the  corps  commander  had  not 
put  a  stop  to  the  projected  movement  of  the  First  brigade 
beyond  Sorge,  this  brigade  itself  could  have  undertaken  the 
pursuit,  which  would  probably  have  been  done.  On  the  other 
iiand,  it  was  out  of  the  question  to  detail  the  First  brigade  for 
pursuit,  howsoever  commendable  it  would  have  been  to  em 
ploy  it  in  rcacliiui^  a  decision.  The  first  thing  to  be  thought 
of  is  to  gain  a  victory,  and  trooi:>s  needed  for  this  cannot  be 
put  in  motion  with  a  view  to  subsequent  conditions  which  can- 
not be  foreseen ;  it  cannot  be  perceived  beforehand  how  mat 
ters  will  stand  when  the  decision  falls. 

It  might  further  be  asked  why  the  cavalry,  and  i)articular- 
ly  the  First  cavalry  brigade,  was  not  employed.  It  is  the  spe- 
cial (hity  of  tliis  arm  to  keep  at  the  enemy's  heels;  it  shall  (so, 
at  least,  says  the  theory  of  combat)  gather  the  trophies,  and 
spread  panic  far  and  wide. 

It  will  be  interesting  here  to  examine  more  closely  how 
far  the  inlluence  of  cavalry  may  extend. 

In  the  first  ]>lace,  the  larger  bodies  of  cavalry  should  re- 
main as  near  as  possil)le  to  the  fighting  line.     Wlien  the  bat 
tie   was  raging  around   Neu-Rognitz   and   in   the  woods   west 
of  the  village  and  along  tlie  wagon-road,  the  nearest  infantry 


Jill 
,'  111 

JÖI 

it 


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Its  I 

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I  'f 
]  * 
/  i 


Studies  in  th^  Leading  of  Troops.  285 

reserve,  the  First  infantry  brigade,  was  south  of  Hohenbruck, 
and  in  front  of  this  the  First  cavalry  brigade  had  finally  as- 
sembled in  such  manner  that  its  left  was  not  far  from  the 
northern  point  of  the  tongue  of  woods  at  the  highway  between 
Neu-Rognitz  and  Hohenbruck.  Even  after  the  fighting  had 
come  to  a  standstill  in  front  of  the  heights  northwest  of  Burk- 
ersdorf,  the  cavalry  was  standing  still  in  the  same  position. 
The  nearest  open  ground  to  which  it  could  have  gone  would 
have  been  that  east  of  Neu-Rognitz;  but  several  battalions  of 
the  Fourdi  infantry  brigade  were  already  there  and  would 
have  left  little  room  for  anything  else. 

It  was  4:32  p.  m.  when  the  report  of  the  withdrawal  of 

the  enemy   reached  Lieutenant-General  A .     Assuming 

The  most '  favorable  conditions  and  that  the  cavalry  brigade 
could  be  summoned  by  the  shortest  route,  a  distance  of  over 
a  mile  would  still  have  to  be  covered  in  riding  from  the  gen- 
eral's station  to  the  cavalry.  Considering  the  fact  that  the 
aid's  horse  was  already  tired,  and  counting  the  time  needed  to 
give  the  order,  the  aid  could  not  have  delivered  the  necessary 
instructions  to  the  commander  of  the  cavalry  brigade  before 
4 :38.  The  brigade  would  then  start  off  at  a  trot,  and  it  would 
be  immateriarwhether  it  took  the  road  via  Neu-Rognitz  or 
Sorge.  Let  us  assume  that  it  chose  the  former;  it  would  first 
take"  the  highway,  then  pass  around  the  village  on  the  east 
(a  region  difficult  to  traverse  on  account  of  the  engagement 
i;-oing  on),  and  after  crossing  the  highway,  would  take  up  a 
covered  i)osition  near  Hill  635.  Thus  it  would  have  to  pass 
over  a  distance  of  about  2;4  miles,  frequently  hindered  in  its 
journey  by  other  troops.  Its  point  could  hardly  have  reached 
its  destination  before  4 150.  The  length  of  its  column  of  march 
can  be  taken  at  about  1,300  yards;  but  in  all  probability  this 
would  have  been  prolonged  so  that  its  deployment  could  hard- 
ly be  completed  before  4:56  p.  m. 

The  last  subdivisions  of  the  enemy  had  a  start  of  at  least 
24  minutes,  the  rear  of  which  was  already  about  ^  of  a  mile 
south  of  Burke rsdorf.  The  cavalry  would  require  12  minutes, 
or  more,  before  it  could  charge,  so  that  it  could  not  reach  the 
enemy  in  less  than  36  minutes  after  his  withdrawal,  during 
which  time  the  latter,  even  if  in  disorder  at  the  start,  could 
fully  prepare  himself  for  effective  resistance. 


286  Studies  in  thi;  Li:ai)ix<-.  oi-  Troops. 

Furthermore,  when  we  remember  that  "the  opponent  was 
in  no  need  of  hurrying,  that  he  occupied  the  country  south 
of  Burkersdorf  and  the  thickets  to  the  east  in  order  to  cover 
his  retreat,  evacuating-  them  only  gracUially,  also  that  the  pur- 
suit bv  infantry  ended  even  before  this,  it  is  evident  that  the 
cavalry  which  would  follow  would  on  the  whole  not  be  in 
position  to  achieve  very  great  success. 

But  it  might  be  argued  that  the  example  before  us  was 
selected  for  the  especial  purpose  of  illustrating  unfavorable 
conditions  of  jnirsuit.  This  is  not  at  all  the  case.  The  descrip- 
tion of  the  conditions  follows  from  the  very  dispositions  that 
were  made,  and  the  situation  was  the  natural  sequence  of  the 
course  the  engagement  had  taken. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  similar  result  will  be  observed  in 
the  majority  of  battles  and  engagements.  Pursuit  will  al- 
ways depend  upon  conditions  on  both  sides,  after  the  decision 
has  come.  The  degree  of  dissolution  on  the  side  of  the  victor 
is  taken  into  account  as  much  as  on  the  side  of  the  van- 
quished, and  exce]»t  the  defeat  degenerate  into  a  rout,  the  one 
who  has  been  beaten  will  always  be  able  to  Dfifer  resistance 
in  various  positions.  Defense  is  so  powerful  that  we  do 
not  attack  without  hesitation.  It  takes  time  to  restore  order 
among  ])ursuers,  and  all  this  accrues  to  the  benefit  of  the  van- 
quished. After  we  have  driven  the  enemy  out  of  his  position 
by  employing  our  entire  strength,  and  so  brought  about  a 
decision,  we  will  not  always  be  in  condition  to  undertake  new 
and  costly  partial  attacks  with  our  tired  and  intermingled 
forces,  against  the  positions  which  the  enemy  lias  occupied 
during  his  retreat.  An  instructive  example  of  this  is  found 
in  the  retreat  of  the  French  from  Le  Mans  in  187 1. 

in  general,  an  exhaustive  utilization  of  a  victory  will  be 
governecl  by  the  number  of  fresh  reserves  available  to  break 
the  resistance  of  the  enemy  in  a  new  light. 

lUit  it  is  LMitirely  diffident  when  the  retreat  degenerates 
into  a  com])lete  rout,  when  the  fleeing  swarms  have  given  up 
all  thought  of  further  resistance.  Then  isolated  bodies  of  the 
victor  may  follow,  and  hundreds  will  often  throw  down  their 
arms  before  a  few  horsemen. 

The  ])ursuit  after  Waterloo  was  inaugurated  under  the 
most  favorable  conditions,  a  repetition  of  which  will  not  easily 


Studiks  in  thk  Leadix\g  of  Troops.  287 

occur  again.  The  French  army  numbered  about  60,000  men, 
which  was  approximately  the  strength  of  two  Prussian  army 
corps,  and  its  retreat  must  consequently  be  regarded  in  a  dif- 
ferent light,  as  far  as  space  is  concerned,  than  the  maneuvers 
of  our  tremendous  masses  in  the  late  campaigns.  The  extent 
of  the  field  makes  a  difference  in  the  estimate  of  the  situation, 
in  the  issuing  of  orders,  and  in  the  participation  of  individual 
units.  In  addition  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  French 
army  had  struggled  up  to  the  last  moment  for  victory  and  had 
employed  its  full  strength,  so  that  when  Fortune  decided 
against  it,  its  forces  were  shattered,  with  a  few  exceptions  not 
worthy  of  mention.  Under  such  conditions  the  Prussian  at- 
tack in  the  rear  of  the  right  wing  was  bound  to  be  of  moment- 
ous consequence,  and  when  the  opponent  saw  battalions  of 
F'russians  behind  him  instead  of  the  long-expected  columns 
of  Grouchy,  he  gave  no  thought  to  resistance,  but  broke  down 
completely,  becoming  an  easy  prey  to  the  victors.  Gneisen- 
au's  memorable  pursuit  continued  without  interruption  for 
more  than  8  miles  from  the  battle-field,  which  had  never  been 
entered  by  the  mass  of  the  victorious  troops.  It  zvas  con- 
ducted with  I  battalion  and  2  platoons  of  infantry  and  6  squad- 
rons of  cavalry,  and  it  was  not  until  the  next  iiorning  that  a 
larger  number  of  squadrons  reached  the  bivouac  of  these  ad- 
vanced forces.  This  is  proof  of  what  even  small  bodies  may 
accomplish  against  disordered  and  demoralized  masses. 

VVe  trus^  we  have  here  reduced  the  idea  of  "the  last 
breath  of  man  and  horse"  to  its  true  merit,  m  opposition  to 
the  so  frequently  appearing  unjustifiable  criticism.  The  prin- 
ciple that  we  must  achieve  the  utmost  possible  benefit  from 
every  victory  remains  uncontested,  but  how  far  this  is  prac- 
ticable can  be  determined  only  at  the  station  of  the  com- 
manding general  and  with  a  view  of  the  entire  i:ituation.  As 
a  rule,  this  decision  is  rendered  afterwards,  when  a  full  knowl- 
edge of  conditions  on  both  sides  has  been  gained,  and  under 
the  most  varied  assumptions  as  to  what  the  commanding  gen- 
eral must  have  known,  etc.  But  there  is  a  tremendous  dif- 
ference between  must  have  known  and  actually  did  know,  a 
difference  which  v/e  are  too  often  led  to  ignore. 

Thus  the  "neglected  pursuits"  may  be  founded  more  upon 
actual  conditions  than  would  generally  be  admitted,  and  the 


2.88  Studies  in  thk  Lkaoixo  of  Troops. 

frequently  criticised  neglected  pursuits  in  hundreds  of  battles 
might  furnish  proof  that  war  throws  other  considerations  in 
the  scale  than  those  generally  considered  in  battle  theories. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  must  call  attention  to  another  con- 
dition of  frequent  occurrence,  but  which,  in  our  opinion,  might 
always  be  avoided — viz.,  that  after  many  a  victorious  battle 
touch  ccith  the  enemy  has  been  lost  almost  completely. 

In  the  campaign  of  1866.  during  the  last  days  of  June  we 
had  an  almost  uninterrupted  series  of  very  serious  engage- 
ments in  widely  separated  places  with  6  hostile  corps,  and  on 
July  2  we  were  absolutely  hi- the  dark  regarding  the  enemy's 
whereabouts.  The  first  order  issued  by  the  commander-in- 
chief  on  July  3  (but  which  was  not  executed)  began  as  fol- 
lows: "As  touch  with  the  enemy  has  been  lost,  in  spite  of 
an  uninterrupted  series  of  engagements,"'  etc.,  and  the  official 
report  shows  that  on  the  evening  of  the  2d  the  entirely  erro- 
neous impression  i)revailed  that  the  Austrian  army  had  re- 
treated across  the  Elbe  and  was  on  the  point  of  inaugurating 
an  advance  over  the  river  anew. 

To  kee])  touch  with  the  enemy,  when  once  gained,  is  the 
duty  of  the  cavalry  ;  but  to  accomplish  this,  it  must  be  given 
the  correct  direction  of  march  by  superior  headquarters.  If 
this  cannot  be  determined  immediately,  parties  should  Ix:  sent 
out  on  all  the  roads  to  be  considered.  Otherwise  it  can  eas- 
ily happen  that  a  squadron  following  a  certain  road  will  send 
word  back  after  12  hours  that  it  has  found  only  scattered 
parties  of  the  enemy,  and  it  will  then  be  too  late  to  search 
anew  on  other  roads.  Anyone  at  all  familiar  with  military 
history  can  readily  recall  examples  illustrating  'his  same  point. 

But  in  most  cases  it  will  he  alleged  that  the  cavalry  is  too 
greatly  exhausted.  This  is  frequently  the  case  when  we  are 
only  considering  the  strength  of  the  horses  and  are  of  the 
opinion  that  they  wil!  not  be  able  io  do  any  more  work  for 
several  da\s.  Such  notions  are  entirely  erroneous.  When 
eaz'alry  can  he  used,  it  must  be  used,  rei:;ardless  of  lehether 
the  mounts  may  he  ruined  thereby  or  not.  Vet  there  are 
times  when  at  the  end  of  a  fight  the  cavalry  is  no  longer  able 
to  acc(3mplish  anxthing;  bvit  it  can  tre(|uen'tl\'  be  fcnind  that 
the   reason   foi    thi.   is   that   the  cavalrv    was    ruined  bv   being 


Studies  in  tri;  F^icxniN«;  of  Troops.  289 

needlessly  shifted  about  durino-  the  course  of  the  entire 
engagement. 

Thk  Third  Ixfantrv  IJrioadi:  from  4  to  5   p.   m. 

We  have  seen  that  shortly  before  4  o'clock  Major-General 

i; received  orders  to  occupy  the  southern  border  of  the 

woods  west  of  Neu-Rognitz,  and  also  the  village  itself,  where 
he  would  re-assenible  his  brigade. 

Accordingly  he  instructed  Colonel  E (Second  reg- 
iment),  who  was  on  the  spot,  to  assemble  and  form  up  again 
in  and  west  of  Neu-Rognitz  all  parts  of  his  regiment  not  re- 
quired in  holding  the  village.  He  despatched  one  of  his  aids 
to  Colonel  D — ^^^ —  (of  the  First  regiment)  with  similar  in- 
structions, directing  him  to  hold  the  woods  west  of  Neu- 
Rognitz.  posting  such  troops  as  were  necessary  in  and  north 
of  the  woods. 

Turning  first  to  the  right  wing  of  the  brigade,  we  have 
seen  that  before  4  p.  m.  (Part  III.,  page  174)  Colonel  D — -- 
had  already  made  dispositions  which  were  in  full  accord  with 
the  intentions  of  brigade  headquarters.  After  the  capture  of 
the  woods  west  of  the  village,  he  was  in  the  thickets  near 
where  the  foot-path  enters  coming  down  from  Hill  635,  and 
there  he  gave  his  adjutant  these  instructions:  "Ride  east 
along  the  border  of  the  timber  to  the  corner  projecting  to- 
ward Neu-Rognitz.  and  tell  all  officers  that  for  the  present  I 
forbid  the  crossmg  of  the  edge  of  the  woods.     Instruct  iNIajor 

^' ,  commanding  the  Third  battalion,  to  take  charge  of 

all  troops  on  that  side  of  this  path,  occupying  the  border  of 
the  woods  with  such  force  as  is  absolutely  necessary,  and 
assembling  the  remainder  further  to  the  rear.  Then  return 
and  wait  for  me  here." 

After  giving  these  directions.  Colonel  D rode  off 

toward  the  west  along  the  Qdi^c  of  the  woods.  He  soon  met 
isolated  skirmishers  of  the  First  battalion,  and  iihmediately 
instructed  a  junior  officer  found  there  to  occupy  the  line 
up  to  a  well-marked  tree  (about  400  yards  distant)  with 
these  .skirmishers.  In  the  southern  extremity  of  the  woods, 
which  ]>rojects  out  some  distance  toward  Hill  635,  he  found 
large  bodies  still  contending  with  the  enemy's  skirmishers  in 


290  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

a  strip  of  timber  opposite,  while  a  little  further  to  the  rear 
he  noticed  a  body  in  close  order,  also  a  mounted  officer.  He 
joined  this  officer,  whom  he  found  to  be  the  commander  of 
the  Fourth  company  of  the  First  regiment,  and  who  reported 
that  he  had  with  him  2>4  platoons  of  his  company,  i  platoon 
of  which  was  deployed  as  skirmishers  and  the  remainder 
forming  the  supports  the  colonel  had  noticed.  To  the  right 
the  colonel  saw  another  officer  with  a  few  men  of  the  First 
battalion,  and  also  quite  a  number  of  men,  from  different 
companies  of  the  First  regiment,  in  the  firing  line.  He  was 
satisfied  that  this  force  was  fully  sufficient  to  hold  the  point 
of  woods,  and  so  he  ordered  the  captain  to  take  command  of 
it,  but  not  to  go  beyond  it  unless  he  received  specific  orders 
to  that  effect.  If  other  men  belonging  to  the  regiment  should 
come  up,  he  was  ordered  to  form  them  into  small  squads  and 
send  them  back  to  it,  as  all  troops  not  needed  in  action  would 
be  assembled  in  and  north  of  the  woods. 

Thereupon  the  colonel  returned  to  his  former  station, 
where  he  was  joined  by  his  adjutant,  who  reported  that  he 

had  executed  the  orders  given;  adding  that  Major  Y —— 

was  present.  The  regimental  commander  proceeded  to  join 
the  latter,  from  whom  he  learned  that  he  had  ample  force 
from  his  own  (Third)  battalion  on  the  spot  to  hold  the  edge 
of  the  woods,  and  that,  pursuant  to  orders,  he  was  sending 
back  all  men  of  other  organizations.  The  colonel  advised 
him  of  the  state  of  afi'airs  on  the  right,  and  then  rode  on  into 
the  open  ground  near  Sorge  to  expedite  the  assembling  there. 

Near  Sorge  he  found  as  a  nucleus  the  Fifth  and  Eighth 
companies  in  close  order.  Squads  of  men  from  dift'erent  or- 
ganizations came  pouring  in  from  all  sides.  These  were 
grouped  first  by  regiments,  and  then  fell  in  again  by  com- 
panies. Several  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  were 
sent  out  to  direct  to  Sorge  any  men  who  might  be  easily  led 
in  the  direction  of  the  quarry  by  reason  of  the  shape  of  the 
forest. 

Gradually  five  bodies  of  varying  strength  formed  not  far 
from  Sorge.  The  first  consisted  of  men  from  nearly  all  com- 
l^anies  of  the  lurst  battalion  of  the  First  regiment,  in  all  about 
150:  the  .second  comprised  the  Second  battalion,  which  was  in 
tolerably  good  order;  the  third  was  made  up  of  about  200 
men  of  the  Third  ])attalion ;  the  fourth  numbered   about   80 


Studiks  in  thk  leading  of  Troops.  291 

men  of  the  Third  battalion  of  the  Second  regiment;  the  fifth 
included  about  70  men  of  the  Fourth  regiment  who  had  be- 
come separated  from  their  organization  during  the  assault 
upon  Neu-Rognitz. 

Before  Colonel  D reached  this  spot,  he  was  met  by 

a  staff  officer  from  brigade  headquarters,  who  delivered  the 
order  above  mentioned.  About  15  minutes  later  the  staff 
officer  returned  and  informed  the  colonel  that  a  considerable 
number  of  his  regiment  had  been  collected  east  of  the  high- 
way and  directed  to  the  vicinity  of  Sorge,  and  that  the  bri- 
gade commander  had  instructed  him  to  lead  back  to  their 
proper  battalions  any  parts  of  the  Second  regiment  found  near 

Sorge.      Colonel   D replied  that  only  80  men   of   the 

Third  battalion  of  that  regiment  had  so  far  come  in;  adding 
that  he   would   send  them   to   Neu-Rognitz   immediately. 

Colonel  D then  entrusted  Major  N ,  the  com- 
mander of  the  Second  battalion,  with  the  distribution  of  the 
bodies  approaching  from  the  east  of  the  highway,  which  con- 
sisted of  parts  of  the  Sixth,  Seventh,  and  Eighth  companies, 
as  well  as  a  few  men  each  from  the  Tenths  Eleventh,  and 
Twelfth  companies.  He  directed  the  major  to  send  the  as- 
sembled men  of  the  First  battalion  into  the  woods  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Hill  635,  as  soon  as  order  was  restored,  where  they 
would  come  upon  their  battalion.  Men  of  the  Third  battal- 
ion, on  the  other  hand,  were  sent  by  the  colonel  to  the  left  of 
the  regiment,  where  he  knew  the  remainder  of  their  battalion 
wa's  in  action.  He  directed  the  Second  battalion  of  the  First 
regiment  to  remain  for  the  present  in  reserve  east  of  Sorge; 
however,  he  did  not  await  the  complete  restoration  of  order  in 
this  battalion,  but  again  went  to  the  most  advanced  firing 
line,  where  the  artillery  had  just  then  (4:30  p.  m.)  ceased  fire. 

Fifteen  minutes  later  Major  N was  in  position  to 

send  over  about  J  50  men  to  the  First  battalion  ;  he  had  560 
men  of  his  Second  battalion  on  the  spot.  Later  50  or  60  men 
of  the  Third  battalion  arrived.  The  Second  was  still  short 
nearly  400  men,  who,  considering  the  short  space  of  time  the 
fight  consumed,  could  hardly  all  have  been  killed  or  wounded ; 
it  was  reasonable  to  suppose  that  probably  100  of  these  had 
either  joined  other  troops  or  were  still  wandering  over  the 
battle-field. 


292 


SiUDiKb  IN   TiiK   Lkadinc.  Ol-   Troops!' 


Directly  after  he  bad  sent  forward  the  men  of  the  First 

battahon,  Major  N received  orders  from  Colonel  D 

to  form  up  all  subdivisions  remainini^  with  him,  and  advance. 

Shortly  after  4:30  Colonel  D approached  the  south- 
ern boundary  of  the  forest.  The  troops  who  had  hitherto 
occupied  this  line  had  left  it  and  were  advancing  upon  the 
opposite  height,  which  the  enemy's  artillery  had  already  aban- 
doned. Soon  afterwards  he  also  saw  the  artillery  of  his  own 
side,  with  the  hussars,  advancing  from  the  direction  of  the 
highway.  He  met  the  division  and  brigade  commanders  up- 
on Hill  635.     Accordingly  he  sent  the  above-men:ioned  order 

back  to  Alajor  N .     A  little  before  5  o'clock  he  received 

instructions  from  the  division  commander  to  occupy  Burkers- 
dorf  with  i  battalion. 

At  that  time  (5  ]).  m. )  the  infantry  of  the  right  wing  was 
distributed  as  follows :    In  the  first  line,  which  had  been  joined 

by  the  detachments  sent  up,  was  Major  X with  700  men 

of  the  First  battalion  on  Hill  635.  The  greater  part  of  the  Third 
battalion  (500  men)  was  niarching  across  the  open  ground  to- 
ward the  peak,  the  Eleventh  company  being  detached.  The 
Second  battalion  of  the  First  regiment,  with  560  men,^  was 
coming  through  the  forest  south  of  Sorge. 

Turning  now  to  the  Second  regiment,  in  ])ursuance  of  the 
brigade  commander's  order  to  occupy  Neu-Rognitz  and  assem- 
ble the  troops  in  the  village  directly  west  of  it.  Colonel  E 

called  his  adjutant  and  several  mounted  officers  to  his  assist- 
ance and  directed  the  scattered  bodies  of  the  Third  battalion 
to  the  open  ground  wTst  of  the  village,  whither  parts  of  the 
First  battalion  of  the  Fourth  regiment  had  also  moved.  The 
First  and  Second  battalions  of  the  Second  regiment,  also  the 
company  of  engineers,  remained  in  the  village. 

The  troops  were  assembled  in  the  same  manner  as  upon 
the  right  wing,  and  it  was  found  that  every  company  was  ac- 
counted for.  A  few  men  were  there  from  the  First  regiment. 
The  First  battalion  of  the  Fourth  regiment  was  still  dis- 
persed in  the  soutlicrn  part  of  the  village,  and  was  gradually 
extricated  from  the  ranks  of  the  Second  regiment.     By  direc- 

'Over  100  men  were  later  led  ui)  by  the  officers  and  non-com- 
missioned officers  sent  lo  the  qnarry. 


. 


Studies  in  thi:  Leading  of  Troops.  293 

tion  of  the  brigade  commander,  the  men  of  the  First  regiment 

were  sent  toward  Sorge.     In  addition,  Colonel  E sent 

all  men  of  tlje  Fourth  regiment  to  the  eastern  boundary  of 
the  village. 

When  report  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  enemy  arrived^ 
Colonel  E ^- —  hastened  to  the  southern  point  of  the  vil- 
lage and  prevented  a  further  pursuit  on  the  part  of  the  corn; 
panics  of  the  First  battalion  stationed  there.  Soon  afterwards 
he  brought  the  Second  battalion  up  to  the  entrance  of  the  Aft- 
Rognitz  wagon-road. 

Order  had  been  generally  established  in  both  regiments 
of  the  brigade,  although  the  several  battalions  of  the  Second.- 
res'iment  were  still  short  a  considerable  number  of  men. 


The  Fourth  Infantry  Brigade  from  4  to  5  p.  m.       - 

When,  before  4  p.  m.,  the  withdrawal  of  the  enemy  from 
in  front  of  the  Fourth  brigade  could  be  observed,  the  division 
commander  directed  Major  Z ,  acting  brigade  com- 
mander, to  advance  still  further,  but  instructed  him  not  to 
extend  the  pursuit  beyond  the  southern  edge  of  the  woods  in 
front.  The  companies  of  the  First  and  Second  battalions  of 
the  Third  regiment,  which  were  deployed  on  the  foremost 
line,  had  already  crossed  the  gully  and  followed  the  retreat- 
ing forces,  though  without  specific  instructions  to  do  so.  Ma- 
jor Z— instructed  the  bodies  in  close  order  to  follow  in 

such  a  manner  that  the  company  on  the  left  wing  would  ad- 
vance along  the  western  bank  of  the  creek  coming  down  from 
the  old  quarry,  while  two  companies  moved  on  the  right  wing 
outside  of  the  forest  and  along  its  western  border,  so  as  to 
cut  off  the  retreat  of  any  hostile  parties  who  might  remain 
too  long  in  the  thickets.  The  Third  battalion  of  the  Third 
regiment,  in  reserve,  was  ordered  to  advance  to  the  next  gully. 

It  was  not  necessary  to  support  the  troops  fighting  in  the 
woods,  as  the  enemy  retreated  hurriedly  and  without  oflfering 
serious  resistance,  some  of  his  troops  even  losing  their  direc- 
tion by  so  doing ;  and  when  the  skirmishers  of  the  Third  reg- 
iment also  lost  connection,  a  considerable  body  of  the  enemy 
suddenly  appeared  on  the  northern  edge  of  the  forest  in  front 
of  the  Second  and  Third  battalions  of  the  Fourth  regiment 


294  Studies  ix  thf.  Leading  of  Troops. 

which  were  there  posted.  On  this  occasion  some  platoons  of 
the  Second  hattaHon  whicli  (|iiickly  deployed  captured  about 
60  men. 

The  comjKinv  of  the  Third  rei^iment  advancing  on  the 
ieft  winj^  in  the  direction  of  the  old  quarry  very  soon  found 
opportunity  to  take  part  in  the  action,  but  after  a  few  shots 
were  fired,  the  enemy  fell  back  toward  the  south.  On  the 
right,  liowever,  the  flank  movement  could  not  be  executed, 
as  the  two  companies  of  the  Second  battalion  came  under  the 
fire  of  the  hostile  artillery  on  the  hill  northwest  of  Burkers- 
dorf,  in  consequence  of  which  they  rushed  into  the  strip  of 
woods  projecting-  westward  and  crossing  the  highway,  and 
from  there  opened  fire  upon  the  guns  and  their  infantry  es- 
cort. In  the  meantime  the  remaining  parts  of  the  regiment 
advanced  farther  into  the  thickets,  until  some  of  them  reached 
the  southern  edge,  but  in  complete  dissolution.  Several  par- 
ties, stepping  out  of  the  border,  attempted  to  climb  the  quarry 
hill  and  the  mountain  crest  running  along  the  Staudenz  road, 
but  were  turned  back  by  the  fire  of  the  hostile  reserves  who 
occupied  these  positions  in  support  of  the  retreating  troops. 
Although  it  was  not  intended  to  advance  further,  these 
attempts  would  probably  have  been  continued  had  not  the 
fight  and  the  laborious  march  across  the  difficult  ground  com- 
pletely exhausted  the  troops.  But  such  was  the  situation 
when  at  4:30  p.  m.  the  enemy  abandoned  the  heights  of 
Staudenz   and    Burkersdorf.      The    Third    regiment   occupies 

the  old  quarry  hill  at  4:45,  and  Major  Z directed  the 

First  and  Third  battalions  to  remain  there  while  the  Second 
battalion  was  sent  tow^ard  the  highway. 

At  5  p.  m.  order  had  not  yet  been  fully  restored.  The 
greater  part  of  the  .First  and  Third  battalions  of  the  Third 
regiment  were,  however,  at  the  quarry,  whither  during  the 
latter  phase  of  the  action  the  Eleventh  company  of  the  First 
regiment  and  also  half  a  troop  of  the  Third  squadron  had  ar- 
rived, having  marched  across  the  country  in  the  direction  of 
the  engagement  after  they  had  been  relieved  from  duty  in 
the  vallev  of  the  Aupa  by  portions  of  the  Guard  division.  The 
Second  {»altalion  was  in  the  act  of  taking  up  position  at  the 
fork  of  the  two  In'ghways. 


Studi£:s  in  THt:  Leadinc  01^  Troops.  295 

The  fourth  regiment,  now  fairly  well  re-assembled  by  the 
arrival  of  the  First  battalion,  was  stationed  in  reserve  on  the 
wagon-road  east  of  Neu-Rognitz. 

Comments  on  the  Dispositions  oe  the  Third  and  Fourth 
Infantry  Bric.ades  from  4  to  5  p.  m. 

The  situation  on  the  right  wing  of  the  Third  infantry  bri- 
gade, and  particularly  with  the  First  regiment,  was  one  which 
readily  leads  to  hasty,  isolated  attacks.  The  troops,  having 
cleared  the  woods  west  of  Neu-Rognitz,  felt  that  they  were 
going  ahead  victoriously,  and  did  not  like  to  be  checked  in 
their  advance  as  long  as  an  enemy  was  in  sight.  This  tend- 
ency, howsoever  praiseworthy  in  itself,  must  be  curbed,  for 
the  fight  carried  on  in  the  woods  had  played  havoc  with  order : 
organizations  were  intermingled,  and  bodies  in  close  order 
wandered  about  in  the  woods  without  any  fixed  direction  of 
march,  and  were  generally  missed  at  the  very  places  where 
they  were  most  urgently  needed;  had  it  been  desired  to  con- 
tinue the  attack,  the  fighting  should  have  been  carried  beyond 
the  edge  of  the  forest. 

It  is,  however,  difficult  to  exercise  such  restraint  in  front 
of  an  enemy  in  close  order.  On  account  of  the  obstructed 
view  in  timber,  it  is  hardly  practicable  to  lead  from  a  posi- 
tion in  rear,  and  from  a  position  in  front  of  the  woods  it  is 
even  impossible.  It  thus  happens  that  a  leader,  carried  away 
by  his  eagerness  for  battle  and  animated  by  previous  victory, 
will  frequently  push  forward  out  of  a  forest,  with  his  pla- 
toons, companies,  or  other  troops  he  may  have  gathered  to- 
gether, to  attack  the  opponent  anew,  as  was  done  during  the 
action  in  the  woods  of  Sadowa.  But  they  are  dependent  upon 
themselves  alone,  are  not  seen  by  adjoining  bodies  and  conse- 
quently not  supported  by  them,  and  are  not  followed  up  by 
supporting  troops,  so  that  such  maneuvers  will  rarely  lead  to 
success,  but  will  rather  help  only  to  Increase  the  unneces- 
sary sacrifices.  These  are  conditions  in  which  the  superior 
officers  find  it  difficult  to  interfere.  All  the  more,  therefore, 
should  platoon  and  company  leaders  appreciate  the  fact  that 
after  they  have  advanced   through  a   wood   and   reached   its 


296  Studil.s  in  the  leading  of  Troops. 

edge,  they  should  not,  \vith(jut  great  caution,  dash  out  against 
any  enemy  who  may  be  seen  on  the  outside. 

Accordingly,  as   we  have   seen,   Colonel    1) busied 

himself  in  trying  to  prevent  a  breaking  forth  out  of  the  for- 
est, by  first  having  the  cöge  of  the  woods  occupied  by  the 
foremost  subdivisions,  and  then  bringing  the  remainder  of 
the  troops  into  the  open  ground  near  the  Sorge  quarry,  there 
to  re-establish  order.  Such  a  novement  is,  however,  fraught 
with  great  obstacles,  and  to  execute  it  properly,  one  cannot 
be  content  with  alone  complying  with  the  instructions  word 
for  word,  but  must  let  his  good  judgment  have  ^ull  sway. 

The  Third  brigade  was  favored  by  a  cessation  of  hos- 
tilities just  at  the  beginning  of  the  period  under  consideration, 
and  this  was  sucii  an  occasion  as  generally  permits  a  com- 
plete re-assembling.  But  the  main  point  is  to  think  of  doing- 
it  at  the  proper  time,  a  precaution  that  experience  shows  is 
taken  only  in  the  rarest  cases. 

The  cause  of  this  is  readily  ascertained.  No  one  can 
perceive  that  a  fight  has  ended  at  the  exact  moment  it  comes 
to  pass ;  all  that  the  assailant  can  know  is  that  for  the  time 
being  he  does  not  intend  to  continue  the  i)ursuit ;  all  further 
action  depends  particularly  upon  the  intentions  and  measures 
of  the  enemy.  Every  leader  halts,  and  awaits  what  will  really 
happen ;  he  thinks  he  will  be  called  upOn  to  make  a  quick 
decision,  and  consequently  does  not  like  to  leave  his  place 
of  observation,  which  he  must  do  if  he  would  re-assemble 
his  forces.  Or  in  time  he  will  conclude  that  he  can  leave 
for  a  moment,  but  has  hardly  gone  a  few  paces  when  he  gets 
a  new  view  of  the  hostile  position  or  discovers  some  new 
movement  on  the  enemy's  part,  and  again  he  halts  to  observe. 
Minute  is  added  to  minute;  a  quarter  of  an  hour  has  passed, 
half  an  hour,  an  entire  hour,  and  the  troops  are  still  as  much 
disordered  as  before,  and  therefore  not  fit  for  energetic  work. 

lUit  if  the  importance  of  re-assembling  is  called  to  mind 
at  the  projier  time,  then  the  right  moment  will  be  made  use 
of;  and  even  if  the  further  progress  of  the  engagement  com- 
pels us  to  suspend  the  movement  before  it  is  fully  carried  out, 
we  shall  nevertheless  have  brought  our  forces  into  a  better 
condition  by  a  partial  assemblage. 


STUDtJ-,S    IN    THK    LEADING    OF    TrOOPS.  2<)  i 

A  higher  leader  Hke  a  division  commander  has  the  ad- 
vantage in  that  more  assistants  are  at  his  disposal,  who  can 
observe  for  him  and  issue  his  orders ;  it  is  not  so  with  a  bat- 
talion or  regimental  commander:  furthermore,  the  former 
need  not  stop  observing  the  progress  of  the  engagement  to 
put  troops  in  order  again,  which  at  times  a  regimental  com- 
mander must  do,  as  happened  with  Colonel  D- . 

With  proper  attention,  however,  order  can  be  re-estab- 
lished in  the  first  line  during  pauses  in  an  action,  for  as  long 
as  the  leader  is  at  the  front  the  enemy  cannot  escape  his  ob- 
servation. How  order  shall  be  restored  depends  in  each  case 
on  circumstances.  We  have  attempted  to  show  this  in  the  case 
of  the  right  wing  of  the  division.  After  the  front  line  has 
been  put  in  order  again,  the  troops  must  first  be  collected  be- 
hind i,t.  Much  depends  upon  the  choice  of  location.  Theoret- 
ically the  small  farm  of  Sorge  did  not  fill  all  the  requirements, 
as  some  of  the  troops,  especially  those  who  had  advanced 
near  the  highway,  had  not  the  slightest  idea  of  its  existence. 
Therefore  it  was  necessary  to  make  arrangements  whereby 
the  men  coming  out  of  the  forest  farther  to  the  north  could 
be  conducted  to  the  rendezvous. 

Where  practicable,  it  is  recommended  that  men  be  directed 
to  follow  one  particular  road.  This  tends  to  start  a  single 
stream,  which  can  be  stemmed  easier  at  any  point  than  if  the 
men  swarm  in  from  every  part  of  the  field. 

At  all  events,  it  is  of  paramount  importance  to  collect  the 
men  at  the  rendezvous  in  bodies  corresponding  with  the 
higher  units  For  example,  if  a  division  has  been  broken  up 
in  an  action,  separate  rendezvous  must  be  chosen  by  the  bri- 
gades, or  be  assigned  them.  At  each  of  these  points  the 
troops  of  both  brigades  are  first  separated,  and  again  sorted 
into  regiments  and  battalions  as  soon  as  the  number  present 
permits.  It  is  always  preferable  that  the  highest  headquar- 
ters designate  the  rendezvous  in  advance,  so  that  an  exchange 

between  the  points  can  be  inaugurated.     Colonel  D 's 

steps  in  this  direction  have  been  described  in  such  minuteness 
because  they  best  illustrate  how  this  problem  can  be  solved. 
The  whole  situation  of  the  Third  brigade  in  this  case  also 
illustrates  how  a  lively  engagement  will  mix  troops.  Indeed, 
such  mixing  may  proceed  to  a  still  greater  etxent.     We  dis- 


298  Studies  in  riiit  Leading  of  Troops. 

tinctly  remember  once  when,  at  the  close  of  a  battle  and  when 
darkness  was  setting  in,  the  bodies  of  an  army  corps  were 
sent  back  in  such  a  mixed  condition  that  it  bei:ame  necessary 
to  station  officers  upon  the  main  road,  over  which  all  must 
pass,  who  called  out  continually,  "X  division  to  the  right,  Y 
division  to  the  left" ;  the  rendezvous  in  this  case  were  accord- 
ingly to  both  sides  of  the  road. 

Wherever  practicable,  we  should  let  troops  assemble  for- 
ward, as  was  done  with  the  forces  in  the  thickets  northeast 
of  Neu-Rognitz. 

The  illustration  further  shows  that,  on  account  of  the  in- 
terruption caused  by  the  forward  movement  which  took  place 
during  the  restoration  of  order  on  the  right  wing,  the  as- 
sembling continued  for  over  an  hour,  at  the  end  of  which  time 
the  troops  were  not  even  in  proper  formation.  Nevertheless 
they  were  in  such  condition  that  it  was  possible  to  correctly 
lead  them  during  an  action.  Except  for  the  dead  and  wound- 
ed, all  still  missing  would  gradually  come  up  with  their 
battalions  again,  though  it  could  hardly  be  counted  on  that 
they  would  all  return  before  midnight;  and  even  if  the  troops 
should  not  remain  in  the  same  place  the  subsequent  forenoon, 
the  end  of  the  next  day  might  not  see  all  with  their  colors. 

The  foregoing  illustrates  how  difficult  it  is  to  assemble. 
It  also  admonishes  us  at  the  same  time  to  keep  in  mind  at 
every  moment  the  importance  of  re-establishing  order  when 
once  lost.  Yet  even  when  a  victory  that  has  been  dearly 
gained  is  over  with,  we  do  not  always  immediately  call  to 
mind  this  injunction,  still  less  during,  short  pauses  in  the 
midst  of  an  engagement;  a  fact  that  is  fully  borne  out  by 
experience. 

In  the  case  of  the  First  regiment,  the  occupation  of  the 
woods  west  of  Neu-Rognitz  afforded  the  protection  neces- 
sary for  re-assembling  the  other  parts ;  with  the  Second  reg- 
iment  the   same   was   accomplished   by   holding    the    village. 

The  commander  of  the   Second   regiment.   Colonel   E , 

was  enabled  to  collect  his  troops  without  much  delay.  He, 
however,  occasioned  a  great  deal  of  trouble  by  intermingling 
the  First  battalion  of  the  Fourth  regiment;  there  was  not  the 
least   necessity   for   kcc])ing   parts   of   that   regiment    with   his 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  299 

troops  any  longer;  he  was  aware  their  regiment  was  near  by, 
and  he  should  have  sent  them  to  it  at  once. 

It  is  easy  to  understand  the  reason  for  the  pursuit  be- 
gun on  the  left  wing  of  the  division  by  the  companies  of  the 
Third  regiment  deployed  toward  the  edge  of  the  forest,  as 
soon  as  the  enemy  withdrew  from  that  point;  the  only  ques- 
tion was,  Should  Major  Z cause  the  second  line  of  the 

regiment  to  follow  also?  Under  such  circumstances,  deployed 
bodies  in  touch  with  the  enemy  must  always  be  supported, 
and  in  no  case  should  they  be  allowed  to  advance  1,000  yards 
or  a  mile  unsupported.  As  a  rule,  small  bodies  will  follow 
such  a  line,  but  in  this  instance  it  was  necessary  for  the  whole 
Third  battalion  to  follow,  as  the  woods  had  to  be  seized;  the 
previous  halt  in  front  of  the  woods  was  only  temporary  and 
demanded  by  other  circumstances. 

A  leader  must  be  cautious  in  regard  to  details  when  as- 
signing direction  of  march  to  supports.  It  is  not  enough  that 
the  company  commanders  order  them  to  follow.  The  woods 
in  front  were  over  a  mile  wide  and  almost  three-quarters  of 
a  mile  deep.  Even  in  maneuvers  conducted  in  time  of  peace 
we  will  notice  that  when  a  deployed  brigade  is  led  through 
a  dense  forest  of  this  size,  frequently  all  cohesion  will  be  lost 
and  it  will  be  necessary  to  form  the  brigade  up  again  on  the 
other  side  of  the  woods.  In  war  we  will  therefore  do  well 
in  such  cases  to  conduct  the  several  parts  so  they  will  not 
readily  lose  direction.  Roads  are  then  a  great  help.  In  this 
case,  however,  there  were  no  roads  running  north  and  south 
in  the  woods ;  a  difficulty  which  was  overcome  by  sending  the 
companies  on  the  left  wing  along  the  gully  coming  from  the 
old  quarry,  and  those  on  the  right  along  the  western  edge 
of  the  woods.  The  result  of  this  movement  was  that  hos- 
tile parties  which  had  lost  their  direction  suddenly  appeared 
again  on  the  northern  edge,  in  view  of  the  Fourth  regiment, 
which  was  stationed  there  in  reserve. 

Such  events  are  indeed  characteristic  of  every  fight  within 
woods,  and  can  always  be  expected,  as  the  view  is  completely 
obstructed.  We  need  only  recall  the  Austrian  battalion  at 
Königgrätz  that  nnarched  out  of  the  Maslowed  woods  and 
stumbled  on  the  Prussian  line  of  battle  instead  of  its  own,  and 


300  Studiks  in  THit  Leading  of  Troops. 

fell  into  the  hands  of  Humbert's  squadron  of  the  Magdeburg 
hussars. 

Accordingly  it  is  all  the  more  necessary  to  remember  that 
when  entering  woods  all  parts  should  not  be  sent  in  at  the 
start,  but  at  least  a  few  companies  held  in  front  of  the  border. 

Neither  must  we  neglect  to  shorten  distances.  On  this 
jjoint  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  specify  distinctly:  **A  nar- 
row front,  close  order,  and  strong  flank  reserves  must  be  pro- 
vided. This  is  particularly  necessary  when  the  fight  is  en- 
tirely within  the  woods,  the  movements  of  bodies  in  close  or- 
der being  then  confined  to  roads." 

The  compass  is  another  thing  that  must  not  be  overlooked 
for  use  in  a  forest. 

OlSPOSlTIOXS    FROM    THE   EnD   OF    THE    BaTTLE    (S    P.    M.) 

UNTIL  Nightfall. 

We  left  Lieutenant -General  A on  Hill  635  just  after 

he  had  given  Colonel  D orders  to  occupy  Burke rsdorf 

with   I  battalion. 

The  left  wing  was  made  up  of  parts  of  the  regiment  that 
were  on  the  spot,  and  started  off  immediately  toward  the 
northwestern  part  of  the  village. 

The  batteries  on  Hill  635  considered  it  necessary  to  re- 
open fire  on  the  hostile  artillery,  2  batteries  of  which  had 
again  gone  into  position  on  the  higiiway  near  Hill  603  and 
Hill  609,  close  to  the  mill. 

Meanwhile  the  division  commander  had  instructed  one  of 
his  aids  to  find  the  corps  commander  and  report  that  the  en- 
emy held  the  country  south  of  lUirkersdorf  and  Staudenz  with 
only  a  sniall  force,  all  of  his  other  troops  having  withdrawn 
to  the  line  Oeutsch-IVaussnitz-Kaile,  and  that  the  division 
would  bivouac  south  of  Meu-Rognitz.  on  both  sides  of  die 
highway,  and  would  establish  outposts,  keeping  the  enemy  all 
ihe  while  steadily  in  view. 

He  then  directed  Major-General   W to  assemble  his 

brigade  east  of  Hill  (')^S,  -^'aving  out  the  Third  battalion  of 
the  First  regiment,  which  was  detached  at   Burkersdorf. 

At  the  same  time  the  senior  aid  returned  from  his  trip 
tn   the   di\i'-ion   of   the    (aiard.   and    reported    as    follows :       "I 


SruDiRs  IN  THiC  Lkading  of  Troops.  301 

came  across  the  advance  guard  of  the  division  of  the  Guard 
as  it  was  going  through  woods  south  of  Rudersdorf.  The 
division  artillery  had  been  brought  to  the  front  to  support  it. 
Only  a  weak  force  opposed  it.  J  also  found  the  division  com- 
mander, Lieutenant-General   M .      He   intends — " 

At  that  point  the  aid  was  interrupted  by  a  staff  officer's 
announcing  that  the  corps  commander  was  riding  up  with  his 
staff  along  the  highway,  coming  from  Neu-Rognitz.  Lieu- 
tenant-General   A hurried    to    meet    his    commanding 

general,  to  whom  he  reported  what  he  had  previously  directed 
his  aid  to  report,  but  the  aid  had  already  delivered  the  mes- 
sage in  Neu-Rognitz. 

After  the  corps  commander  had  said  a  few  words  in 
commendation  of  the  work  accomplished  by  the  division  dur- 
ing the  day,  both  generals  repaired  to  the  top  of  Hill  635, 
from  which  point  it  was  seen  that  the  only  changes  in  the 
situation  were  the  entrance  of  the  Third  battalion  of  the  First 
regiment  into  Burkersdorf  and  a  further  lengthening  of  the 
distance  between  the  opposing  forces.  It  was  also  noticed 
that  the  enemy  was  oft'ering  no  resistance  near  Staudenz,  and 
that  the  village  was  on  the  point  of  being  occupied  by  other 
troops.     In  answer  to  the  corps  commander's   inquiry  as   to 

what  troops  were  near  Staudenz,  Lieutenant-General  A 

replied  that  a  part  of  the  division  of  the  Guard  had  advanced 
to  that  point,  from  which  his  senior  aid  had  just  returned. 
The  aid  was  then  called  up  to  complete  his  report,  and  stated 
in  addition  to  the  above,  that  the  Guard  intended  to  take  pos- 
session of  Staudenz,  but  not  to  advance  beyond  it  that  day ; 
also,  that  he  had  been  informed  that  the  Second  division  of 
the  Guard  had  already  reached  Eypel. 

The  corps  commander  then  resumed  his  observation  of 
the  enemy's  retreat.  It  seems  as  if  the  opponent  was  occupy- 
ing Deutsch-Praussnitz  and  Kaile  with  only  his  rear  guard 
while  he  withdrevv^  his  main  force  into  the  mountains  further 
to  the  south.  All  that  remained  north  of  the  villages  was  a 
strong  body  of  cavalry,  estimated  at  about  4  regiments,  for 
the  purpose  of  covering  the  retreat  of  smaller  detachments  and 
the  withdrawal  of  troops  from   Staudenz. 

The  artillery  of  both  sides,  near  the  highway,  kept  up  a 
slow    fire    at    a    distance    of    2    miles.    Init    as    some    shrapnel 


^o2  Studies  ix  tdic  Lkadixc.  of  Troops. 

went  too  far  and  fell  among-  the  infantry  of  the  Third  bri- 
gade at  Hill  035,  it  was  planned  to  send  the  batteries  there 
united  further  forward  west  of  Burkcrsdorf  under  a  hussar 
escort,  to  drive  away  the  2  batteries  of  the  enemy ;  but  before 
the  order  could  be  given,  the  latter  limbered  up  and  disap- 
peared behind  an  undulation  of  the  ground. 

Lieutenant-General  A ventured  to  disturb  the  corps 

commander's  observations,  asking  that  the  troops  be  permit- 
ted to  go  at  once  into  bivouac.  His  request  was  granted,  the 
corps  commander  adding:  "JUit  if  the  enemy  is  still  in  his 
position  to-morrow,  T  shall  be  unable  to  continue  the  march 
upon  Arnau,  and  must  attack  him.  I  w^ill  therefore  put  my- 
self in  communication  with  the  Guard  corps.  However, 
should  the  enemy  have  received  reinforcements  and  himself 
advance  to  attack,  your  Excellency  w^ill  hold  your  position  on 
the  heights  here  north  of  Burkersdorf,  and  later  you  will  re- 
ceive a  written  order.  The  First  infantry  divjsion  will  biv- 
ouac around  Hohenbruck." 

The  corps  commander  then  went  over  to  the  battalions 
of  the  Third  infantry  brigade,  which  had  in  the  meantime 
come  up. 

Colonel   D had    returned    from    Burkersdorf,    and 

reported  to  the  division  commander  as  follow^s:  "The  village 
is  occupied  by  the  Third  battalion.  All  that  was  found  there 
of  the  enemy  w^as  a  large  number  of  stragglers,  and  so  many 
W'Ounded  as  to  overcrowd  the  farm-houses.  The  thickets  south 
of  the  village  have  also  been  evacuated." 

Majors  X and  Y ,  of  the  First  and  Third  bat- 
talions respectively  of  the  First  infantry  regiment,  had  been 
ordered  up,  and  in  their  presence,  as  well  as  the  presence  of 
Major-General  B and  Colonel  D ,  the  division  com- 
mander issued  the  following  order  establishing  his  outposts: 

Hill  635,  northwest  of  Burkersdorf, 
Division  (  )nkT  Xo.  2.  i-J  Jnne,   5:20  p.   m. 

The  enemy  has  retreated  upon  Königinhof  and  beyond 
1  )eulsch-Praussnitz. 

The  Second  inf<'intr\-  di\ision  will  go  into  bivouac  near 
Xeu-l\ognitz. 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Tr(x>ps.  303 

The  First  and  Third  battaHons  of  the  First  infantry  regi- 
ment, together  with  the  First  squadron  of  the  hussars  regi- 
ment, will  hold  the  line  eastern  exit  of  Ober-Altenbuch-Hill 
592  (south  of  Burkersdorf)-Staudenz  (exelusive),  the  First 
battalion  and  2  troops  covering  as  far  as  and  including  the 
Burkersdorf-Deutsch-Praussnitz  road,  and  the  Third  battal- 
ion and  2  troops  from  there  on  to  Staudenz  (exclusive). 

Connection  will  be  kept  up  with  the  Guard  at  Staudenz. 

Scouts  will  be  sent  out  in  the  directions  of  Königinhof 
and  Chwalkowitz. 

In  case  of  hostile  attack,  Burkersdorf  and  the  heights  on 
its  west  and  east  will  be  held. 

As  the  division  commander  then  looked  around  for  the 
commander  of  the  hussar  regiment,  to  give  him  the  orders 
for  the  First  squadron,  his  general  staff  officer  informed  him 
that  the  regiment  had  folknved  the  enemy  and  could  be  seen 

south  of   Burkersdorf.     Lieutenant-General  A was  fullv 

satisfied  with  this,  but  he  directed  a  staff  officer  to  go  and 
fetch  the  First  squadron  back  immediate^. 

Then  he  turned  to  the  commander  of  the  Third  infantry 
brigade,  and  assigned  him  the  region  at  the  fork  of  the  high- 
ways as  bivouac  for  the  4  battalions  (the  Second  battalion  of 
the  First  regiment  and  the  entire  Second  regiment)  remain- 
ing under  his  command,  cautioning  him  to  leave  room  for 
the  hussar  and  artillery  regiments  between  his  brigade  and 
Neu-Rognitz. 

Then  the  division  commander  despatched  his  senior  aid  to 
the  Fourth  brigade,  with  instructions  for  its  putting  the  Third 
regiment  into  bivouac  southeast  of  Neu-Rognitz,  while  the 
Fourth  regiment  remained  wdiere  it  was  then  located,  the  en- 
gineers attaching  themselves  to  the  latter  regiment,  and  knap- 
sacks being  brought  up,  throughout  the  brigade,  on  requisi- 
tioned wagons. 

In  the  meantime  the  adjutants  of  all  independent  sub- 
divisions had  gradually  arrived.  They  were  referred  to  the 
general  staff  officer,  to  whom  the  division  commander  had 
commimicated  his  further  wishes  after  charging  him  with  the 
preparation  of  the  order,  and  instructing  liim  to  repair  to 
Neu-Rognitz,   with   the   officers,    for   such    purpose.      Among 


3Ö4  Studies  in  thii:  Lkadinc;  of  Troops. 

other  things,  the  general  stafl'  officer  was  told  to  bring  up  the 
signal  corps  detachment  and  division  bridge  train,  and  to 
take  especial  care  that  the  subsistence-wagons  were  brought 
up  also. 

•    Having    issued    these     instructions     Lieutenant  -  General 

A '  rode  up  to  the  First  fiel . I  artillery  regiment,  where 

the  corps  commander  met  him  with  the  inquiry  whether  all 
orders  had  been  given.  Upon  replying  that  it  had  not  yet 
been  done  in  the  case  of  the  artillery,  the  corps  commander 
told  him  not  to  let  his  presence  interfere  with  the  issuance 
of  orders. 

Lieutenant-General   A thereui)on   told   Lieutenant- 
Colonel  J to  let  his  regiment  go  into  bivouac  west  of 

tiie  highway  and  southwest  of  Neu-Rognitz,  behind  the  Third 
infantry  brigade. 

After  that  Lieutenant-General  A isked  permission 

to  turn  over  the  command  of  the  Fourth  infantry  brigade  to 

Colonel  1) ,  commander  of  the  First  regiment;  this  re- 

(jucst  was  approved  by  the  corps  commander,  Colonel  D 

being  the   senior   regimental   commander  in   the   army   corps. 

The  wounding  of  Major-Gcneral  C and  the  death  of 

Colonel  G- were  mentioned,  when  a  lengthy  discussion 

ensued  concerning  the  losses  and  the  course  the  engagement 
had  taken ;  during  this  discussion,  however,  the  two  generals 
continued  their  observation  of  the  enemy,  .vhose  last  subdi- 
visions were  withdrawing  via  Kaile.  In  course  of  conversa- 
tion the  question  of  the  enemy's  strength  came  up  and  to 
what  army  corps  he  belonged.  The  task  of  :ollecting  such 
data  had  been  interrupted  when  the  general  staff  officer  was 
sent  away,  but  it  was  recalled  that  the  first  reports  compiled 
had  shown  that  the  First  brigade  of  the  Tenth  hostile  army 
corps  had  occupied  the  heights  south  of  Trautenau,  and  the 
strong  resistance  which  the  enemy  developed  near  Neu- 
Kognit/,  as  well  as  to  the  east  of  that  village,  taken  in  con- 
nection with  the  fact  that  still  other  forces  had  opposed  the 
Guard,  led  to  tlie  surmise  that  two  other  brigades  liad  joined 
in.  the  action:  further,  it  was  assumed  that  a  fourth  brigade 
had  been  in  reserve,  and  the  conclusion  was  reached  that  the 
entir'-  Tenth  arm\'  c<>^l)>^  had  been  met  an-l  (N)n(iuered. 


Studies  in  thi^  Li:ading  of  Troops.  305 

Although  no  summary  of  the  division's  losses  had  been 
compiled,  it  was  certain  they  were  quite  large.  Neither  could 
the  number  of  prisoners  be  ascertained.  Of  other  trophies  It 
was  said  that  2  guns  had  been  taken  by  a  battalion  of  the 
First  regiment,  and  there  were  also  rumors  of  a  color  hav- 
ing been  captured  by  the  Fourth  regiment.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  however,  no  one  could  be  found  who  had  seen  either 
the  guns  or  the  colors,  and  no  report  thereof  had  come  in; 
all  that  the  party  there  assembled  could  see  was  a  shattered 
limber  lying  on  the  southern  slope  of  Peak  635. 

The  corps  commander  stated  that  during  the  night  he 
would  have  an  artillery  and  an  infantry  ammunition  column, 
togetlier  with  two  subsistence  columns,  brought  up,  to  be 
ready  for  distribution  at  6  o'clock  in  the  morning  south  of 
Hohenbruck. 

The  following  telegram  was  then  sent  from  corps  head- 
quarters to  the  headquarters  of  the  Second  Army: 

Neu-Rognitz,  south  of  Trautenau, 
Telegram  No.   i.  27  June,  5:45  p.  m. 

Victorious  action  of  the  Second  infantry  division  against 
the  enemy's  Tenth  army  corps,  which  was  driven  from  its 
strong  position  near  Neu-Rognitz  and  pursued  beyond  Burk- 
ersdorf.  Numerous  prisoners.  Our  losses  quite  large.  Colo- 
nel G killed.  General  C- wounded.  First  in- 
fantry division  arrived  near  Hohenbruck.  Communication 
with  the  First  division  of  the  Guard  established  near  Staud- 
enz.     Corps  headquarters  to-day  at  Trautenau. 

Headquarters  First  Army  Corps. 

This  despatch  was  taken  to  Liebau.  Although  the  exten- 
sion of  the  telegraph  line  from  Liebau  to  Trautenau  had  been 
commenced  as  soon  as  the  First  division  advanced,  it  had 
not  yet  been  completed. 

The  division  commander  stated  that  he  would  quarter 
himself  in  Neu-Rognitz,  and  requested  permission  to  go  there 
in  order  to  attend  to  the  issuance  of  orders.  This  request  was 
granted,  and  the  corps  commander  thereupon  went  to  inspect 
the  Third  and  Fourth  regiments,  who  were  getting  settled  in 
their  bivouacs;  from  there  he  returned  to  Trautenau. 


3o6  SruDiiis  IX  TiiK  Leading  of  Troops. 

Lieutenant-General  A found  that  quarters  had  been 

prepared  for  him  in  one  of  the  largest  farm-houses  in  Neu- 
Rognitz.  Except  for  this,  everything  was  in  great  commo- 
tion. In  nearly  all  the  dwellings  wounded  were  to  be  found, 
while  still  more  were  being  brought  in.  Soldiers  of  niany 
different  organizations  were  wandering  promiscuously,  de- 
manding supplies  on  their  own  responsibility.  Squads  in 
close  order  from  troops  near  by  came  in  to  get  water.  The 
engineers  were  tearing  down  a  couple  of  walls  of  a  building 
that  had  been  fired  and  threatened  to  fall.  Timbers  and  doors 
were  carried  off  by  infantrymen  for  firewood.  The  wagons 
of  an  ambulance  company  were  on  the  highway,  having  been 
sent  ahead  by  the  First  division;  but  not  without  colliding 
with  ammunition-wagons  of  the  infantry  and  artillery.  Among 
all  these  vehicles  were  several  sutler  wagons,  strange  as  it 
may  seem,  while  in  some  of  the  farm-yards  not  too  thickly 
occupied  by  wounded  the  bands  of  three  regiments  have  as- 
sembled. 

All  this  confusion  disappeared  shortly  after  the  division 
commander  arrived.  The  ambulance  company  and  wagons 
were  sent  into  the  open  ground  east  of  the  village.  The  com- 
mander of  the  First  battalion  of  the  Fourth  infantry  regiment 
was  sent  for  and  instructed  to  quickly  establish  order.  All 
stragglers  were  to  be  assembled  and  sent  to  their  proper 
organizations.  Those  not  seriously  wounded  and  able  to 
walk  were  to  be  sent  back  to  Hohenbruck.  The  batt&lion  com- 
mander was  further  instructed  to  rigidly  insist  on  tehicles 
moving  only  in  single  file  in  any  one  direction  upon  the  high- 
way, and  on  the  immediate  vacating  of  the  road  by  wagons 
obliged  to  halt. 

After  he  had  given  these  preliminary  instructions,  the 
division  commander  dismounted,  and  the  general  staff  officer 
read  to  him  the  division  order  which  had  been  ])rcpared.  and 
whicli  was  as  follows : 

Division    I  ica(l(|uartcrs,   Ncu-Rognitz. 
Division  Order  No.  3.  27  June,  1866,  6  p.  m. 

I.  The  outposts,  consisting  of  the  First  and  Third  bat- 
talions of  the  First  infantry  regiment,  with  the  First  squad- 
ron of  hussars,  will  be  placed  on  the  line  eastern  exit  of  Ober- 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  307 

Altenbuch-Burkersdorf-Staiidenz,  connecting  with  the   Guard 
at  Staudenz. 

2.  The  division  will  bivouac  near  Neu-Rognitz  as  fol- 
lows :  4  battalions  of  the  Third  brigade  near  the  road  fork 
south  of  the  village ;  north  of  these,  the  First  field  artillery 
regiment  and  the  regiment  of  hussars  (less  the  First  squad- 
ron) ;  the  Fourth  brigade  with  the  Third  regiment  southeast 
of  the  village,  and  with  the  Fourth  regiment  (to  which  the 
company  of  engineers  will  be  attached)    east  of  the  village. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  J ,  First  field  artillery  regiment,  will 

command  the  bivouac. 

3.  The  staffs  of  the  division  and  brigades  will  be  quar- 
tered in  Neu-Rognitz,  the  remainder  of  the  village  being  re- 
served for  wounded. 

4.  The  heavy  baggage  will  be  brought  to  Neu-Rognitz. 
The  emergency  ration  will  be  issued  to-day. 

5.  At  9  p.  m.  orders  will  be  issued  at  the  quarters  of  the 
division  staff.  (Signed)     A , 

Lieutenant-General . 

The  division  commander  approved  this  draft,  but  in- 
structed that  in  addition  columns  and  trains  for  the  replen- 
ishing of  ammunition  and  subsistence  stores  would  be  ordered 
to  report  near  Hohenbruck  the  following  norning  at  5  o'clock, 
and  that  statements  of  losses  and  ammunition  needed,  also 
reports  of  the  engagement,  should  be  handed  in  without  delay. 

The  order  was  then  dictated  to  the  adjutants,  who  imme- 
diately returned  to  their  organizations. 

The  next  half-hour  the  division  commander  spent  in 
resting-  and  taking  refreshments. 

When  all  necessary  orders  had  been  issued,  conversa- 
tion drifted  to  whether  anything  had  been  overlooked.  The 
events  of  the  day  were  discussed,  and  opinions  ventured  on 
what  the  enemy  would  likely  do  the  next  day,  also  the  tasks 
that  mischt  fall  to  the  division  and  how  they  couW  best  be 
accomplished. 

Before  7  o'clock  that  evening  the  general  was  again  in 
his  saddle,  and  took  one  of  his  aids  and  rode  over  to  the  out- 
posts, where  we  will  find  him  later. 


3o8  vStudiks  IX  TiiK  Lkadixc  op  Troops. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  J ,  the  bivouac  commander,  found 

the  greater  part  of  such  troops  as  had  previously  been  in- 
structed with  regard  to  bivouacs  already  occupied  in  mak- 
ing themselves  comfortable  and  pitching  tents.  The  Third 
brigade  was  at  work  preparing  the  emergency  ration.  The 
Fourth   brigade   was   awaiting   the   arrival   of   its   knapsacks. 

Major  N ,  commander  of  the  Second  battalion  of  the 

First  regiment  of  infantry,  was  detailed  as  bivouac  officer 
of  the  day.  He  posted  a  guard  south  of  the  fork  of  the 
highways,  another  near  Hill  635,  and  a  third  south  of  the 
quarry  near  Sorge;  also  a  special  interior  guard  in  Neu- 
Rognitz-  These  measures  met  the  approval  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  J ,  who  directed  the  troops  nearest  the  village 

to  post  sentries  at  the  entrances  to  control  the  intercourse 
of  individual  soldiers  with  the  village.  He  designated  Ober- 
Altenbuch  as  the  source  of  water,  wood,  and  straw  for  the  4 
battalions  of  the  Third  brigade,  and  Neu-Rognitz  and  Sorge 
for  the  remainder  of  the  troops;  the  latter  were  permitted 
to  send  officers'  horses  into  these  villages. 

Comments  on  the  Dispositions  erom  the  Conclusion  oE 
THE  Engagement  (5  p.  m.)  until  Nightfall. 

The  division  commander's  order  to  send  only  i  battalion 
to  occupy  Burkersdorf  appears  to  be  based  on  the  fact  that 
the  enemy's  retreat  was  a  decided  one.  It  is  recommended  in 
such  cases  to  generally  do  too  much  rather  than  too  little,  and 
to  put  the  nearest  adjoining  troops  in  readiness  for  support, 
even  though  the  advance  may  seem  devoid  of  danger.  We 
can  never  foresee  what  counter-measures,  the  enemy  may 
undertake. 

Lieutenant-General    A did    right    in    advising    the 

corps  commander  of  the  enemy's  retreat,  and  of  the  measures 
he  intended  to  adopt.  In  the  rush  of  events  this  is  often 
overlooked,  for  one  is  inclined  to  speculate  instead  on  what 
orders  he  himself  is  likely  to  receive.  It  is  therefore  all  the 
more  recommended,  as  we  have  previously  remarked,  for 
higher  headquarters  to  furnish  troops  in  action  with  an  officer 
and  some  mounted  orderlies  or  mounted  riflemen  and  cyclists, 
a  thing  that  corps  headquarters  here  failed  to  do. 


Studies  in  tke  Licading  of  Troops.  ,309 

It  may  also  be  asked,  **Why  did  the  corps  commander 
not  remain  near  the  division  commander  after  his  arrival-  on 
the  battle-field?" 

We  answer,  "He  acted  very  properly  in  not  doing  so." 

The  division  received  its  first  orders  while  on  the  heights 
of  Trautenau.  If  the  corps  commander  had  entered  the  fight 
and  remained  continually  at  the  side  of  the  division  com- 
mander, he  would  have  been  greatly  tempted  to  interfere  in 
the    latter's   orders,    and   he,    instead    of    Lieutenant-General 

A ,  would  finally  be  leading  the  division.    In  so  doing  he 

would  lose  a  conception  of  the  general  situation.  A  corps  com.- 
mander  must  think  of  other  things  than  his  division  com- 
manders, who  have  been  placed  in  their  respective  positions 
because  the  commander-in-chief  felt  they  would,  do  all  they 
were  called  upon  to  do.  Different  people  may  handle  a  prob- 
lem after  diflferent  methods,  but  yet  all  arrive  at  its  solution. 
Above  everything  else  must  a  leader  hold  fast  to  a  resolution 
that  he  has  once  made  and  made  in  a  logical  manner,  for  noth- 
ing is  so  pernicious  as  the  attempting  of  two  persons  to  lead 
the  same  body  of  troops  after  they  have  started  out  from 
different  premises.  The  division  commander  is  responsible 
for  the  execution  of  orders  given  him ;  all  that  the  corps  com- 
mander should  do  is  to  carefully  watch  them.  Any ,  carps 
commander  who  cannot  resist  the  inclination  to  interfere  in 
the  execution  of  movements  assigned  to  one  of  his  divisions 
had  better  have  been  left  with  his  own  division  and  never 
been  given  command  of  a  corps. 

An  effort  to  avoid  this  peril  is  responsible  for  the  sepa- 
ration of  higher  staff's,  as  is  so  often  witnessed  on  the  battle- 
field. 

We  come  now  to  another  evil,  which,  unfortunately,  can- 
not be  altogether  avoided.  As  soon  as  an  engagement  comes 
to  an  end,  it  is  desirable  for  the  corps  commander  to  com- 
municate personally  with  the  division  commander  in  touch 
with  the  enemy  in  front.  By  so  doing  the  situation  will -be- 
come perfectly  clear  to  him,  and  he  will  be  able  to  sufficiently 
Inform  himself  with  regard  to  the  enemy  and  the  terrane. 
But  this  involves  a  considerable  loss  of  time.  We  know  from 
experience  that  many  things  are  then  discussed  which,  while 
no  doubt  interesting,  are  hardly  suitable,  in  view  of  the  urgency 


310  Stitdiks  ii\  THK  Lkadixg  Ol-  Troops. 

of  the  iiKMiK'nt.  Ivcl  us  inKii;iiU'  the  ec^nsecjuenees  of  such  de- 
lays. The  troops  have  observed  that  the  engageuient  is  ended. 
Naturally  every  one  wants  to  rest  after  the  great  exertions 
and  the  dangers  encountered.  A  bivouac  cannot  be  estab- 
lished, as  no  place  has  been  designated  for  one.  No  l3ody  of 
troops  knows  where  to  go,  nor  can  tell  whether  it  may  not  be 
detailed  for  the  outposts.  If  patience  becomes  exhausted  and 
an  organization  commences  to  establish  a  bivouac  of  its  own 
accord,  it  runs  the  risk  of  being  ordered  elsewhere.  We  there- 
fore insist  that  as  soon  as  all  measures  regarding  the  enemy 
have  been  taken,  under  all  circumstances,  the  first  concern  be 
the  security  and  rest  of  the  troops.  Their  strength  is  so  often 
and  so  greatly  tried  that  we  cannot  do  too  much  to  spare  them. 

In  the  case  before  us  the  appearance  of  the  corps  com- 
mander at  5:10  p.  m.  so  disturbed  the  arrangements  that  they 
were  not  finished  until  5  :25.  a  quarter  of  an  hour  later  than 
vvcndd  otherwise  have  been  the  case.  And  when  one  has  been 
cm  his  feet  for  more  than  12  hours,  under  oppressive  heat 
and  in  a  lon^-,  stubborn  engagement,  every  minute  of  unnec- 
essary delay  before  he  can  rest  appears  Hke  an  liour. 

The  narrative  states  chat  the  corps  commander  expressed 
to  Lvieutenant-General  A and  the  troops  his  apprecia- 
tion of  their  performances.  We  should  certainlv  advise  no 
sujK'rior  to  neglect  this,  but,  on  the  other  han(r,  we  would 
warn  against  excessive  praise.  When  troops  have  done  their 
best  and  suffered  great  losses,  and  the  general  rides  past  them 
without  a  word,  a  bitter  feeHng  is  aroused.  INlen  of  no  class 
will  stand  being  treated  as  if  they  were  only  chess-men,  to  be 
Ihrown  back  into  the  box  when  the  game  is  over.  It  may  in- 
deed l)e  true  that  every  man  has  simply  done  his  duty ;  but 
duty  can  be  performed  either  well  or  poorly,  and  if  we  con- 
demn for  the  latter,  we  niust  give  praise  for  the  former. 

On  the  other  hand,  do  not  give  excessive  praise  under 
(he  inspiration  of  the  moment.  The  higher  leader  does  not 
go  everywhere  during  an  action,  knows  nothing  of  the  de- 
tails, and  may  be  easily  led  to  bestowing  merit  where  it  has 
not  t>een  earned.  The  rule  already  laid  down  shoidd  suffice 
U>  check  any  tendency  to  excessive  praising,  and  the  limit 
(•f  co'umendation  should  l)e,  "You  have  done  your  full  duty." 
After  a  word  of  satisfaction  has  been  spoken  as  to  the 


Studies  in  tiii-:  Leading  of  Troops.  311 

work  periormed.  the  safety  and  bivouac  of  the  troops  must 
be  provided  for. 

The  service  of  security  was  assigned  to  the  First  afid 
Third  battahons  of  the  First  regiment  of  infantry  and  the 
First  squadron  of  the  hussar  regiment.  When  the  engage- 
ment began  the  advance  guard  was  abandoned,  and  there  was 
no  occasion  for  making  up  a  new  one  for  the  evening.  The 
First  and  Third  battalions  were  selected  not  until  their  bri- 
gade commander  had  been  consulted,  and  the  First  squadron, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  division  commander,  had  hitherto  been 
called  on  for  the  least  labor. 

In  this  case  the  infantry  nearest  the  front  had  been  select- 
ed, for  in  all  probability  it  was  still  in  closest  touch  with  the 
enemy,  and  at  the  same  time  was  in  a  position  to  assure  secur- 
ity at  the  earliest  moment.  Furthermore,  it  had  been  best 
able  to  take  advantage  of  the  last  stages  of  the  action  for  re- 
storing order.  These  three  reasons  (touch  with  the  enemy, 
ability  to  promptly  afford  security,  and  well-ordered  troops) 
must  always  be  considered  in  selecting  the  outpost.  It  fre- 
quently happens,  however,  that  the  most  advanced  forces 
have  suffered  most  and  are  in  the  worst  order;  in  such  cases 
other  troops  must  be  selected. 

For  keeping  touch  with  the  enemy,  cavalry  must  be  em- 
ployed. But,  on  the  other  side,  the  enemy  will  do  all  he  can 
to  keep  it  at  a  distance,  for  which  purpose  he  will  use  his  own 
cavalry.  Therefore  the  First  army  corps  must  bring  up  all 
the  cavalry  it  possessed  to  push  the  hostile  squadrons  back 
and  obtain  a  good  view  of  the  real  location  of  the  opponent. 
The  hussar  regiment  of  the  Second  infantry  division  had  very 
properly  followed  the  enemy,  and  according  to  regulations 
must  unquestionably  remain  at  his  heels  until  the  cavalry  out- 
posts were  established.  But  to  establish  outposts  the  First 
squadron  had  to  be  ordered  back.  The  loss  of  time  involved 
in  this  counter-marching  could  indeed  not  very  well  have  been 
avoided,  as  the  commander  of  the  hussars  did  not  care  to  de- 
lay his  pursuit ;  and  if  he  waited  to  learn  which  of  his  squad- 
rons was  to  go  on  outpost,  before  starting  after  the  retreat- 
ing enemy,  his  pursuit  would  have  little  value  and  touch  would 
be  lost.     The  First  cavalry  brigade  also  should  have  been  em- 


312  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

ployed  in  the  pursuit,  and  that  this  was  not  done  must  be 
considered  an  error  on  the  part  of  corps  headquarters : 

The  First  cavalry  bri^^ade  had  undertaken  a  daring  and 
successful  attack,  but  by  so  doini;'  exhausted  its  energy  for 
the  day  of  the  27th.  Although  it  might  not  have  been 
formed  up  again  for  a  well-ordered  pursuit,  yet  of  its  own  ac- 
cord it  should  have  initiated  measures  for  keeping  in  touch 
with  the  enemy.  Its  ambition  to  accomplish  great  deeds  should 
not  have  died  with  one  successful  attack.  The  horse  l)attery 
had  certainly  set  it  a  worthy  example,  in  that  it  had  returned 
to  the  brigade  after  5  o'clock. 

In  this  case  security  for  the  division  was  provided  by 
the  outposts  of  the  Third  brigade.  This  might  have  been 
accomplished  in  still  another  way.  When  we  consider  the 
proximity  of  the  enemy  and  also  that  the  foremost  troops  were 
in  a  position  which  they  had  been  ordered  to  defend  in  case 
of  hostile  attack,  then  each  of  the  two  infantry  brigades  might 
have  covered  them.selves  by  outposts  in  their  immediate  front. 

vSuch  a  course  would  have  to  be  pursued  if  the  engage- 
ment had  not  ended  until  darkness  set  in  and  both  parties 
had  remained  closely  opposite  each  other,  whether  because 
they  had  no  strength  left  to  crowd  the  opponents  back  or  for 
other  reasons.  Then  there  would  have  been  no  room  for  es- 
tablishing outposts  far  to  the  front  in  the  regular  manner, 
and  the  forces  would  have  to  be  content  with  pusing  forward 
separate  companies  or  battalions  at  short  distances.  These 
would  cover  themselves  by  skirmish  lines,  and  maintain  con- 
nection with  adjoining  bodies  by  so-called  halting  patrols,  or, 
as  Field  Service  Regulations  express  it,  standing  facing  the 
enemy  ready  for  action. 

The  nearer  we  are  to  the  enemy  the  more  must  we  make 
use  of  this  form  of  security,  and  at  short  distances  nothin)«: 
remains  but  to  let  troops  rest  on  their  arms  in  the  position 
they  occupy  and  have  them  bivouac  in  rigidly  tactical  battle 
formation.  Many  examples  of  this  may  be  found,  especially 
when  a  decision  has  not  been  reached  at  nightfall.  Such  meas- 
ures should,  however,  be  resorted  to  only  when  absolutely  nec- 
essary, for  it  is  plain  that  the  nearer  the  covering  trops  are 
to  those  who  are  resting  tlie  more  will  the  latter  be  disturbed 
and  tlu'  greater  tlu'lr  ininiiiuMit  danger.     Therefore,  wherever 


Studiks  in  Tili,  Le:ading  Ol«  Troops.  313 

practicable,  as  in  the  case  before  us,  outposts  will  be  formed 
well  in  advance.  These  must  be  strong  enough  to  repulse 
an  assault  by  any  small  hostile  parties,  and  delay  the  advance 
of  larger  masses  long  enough  to  enable  the  main  body  to  pre- 
pare for  action. 

The  details  in  the  establishment  of  outposts  is  no  concern 
of  a  division  commander;  they  belong  to  the  duties  of  the 
outpost  commander.  There  were  two  outpost  commanders  in 
this  case,  as  two  outpost  sections  had  been  formed.  All  the 
division  commander  has  to  do  is  to  designate  the  positions  to 
be  held,  approximately  the  line  on  which  the  outposts  shall  be 
placed,  the  location  of  the  wings,  and  the  connection  with  ad- 
jacent bodies.  Instructions  for  outposts  should  also  include 
such  points  as  pertain  in  particular  to  reconnaissance;  such 

was  done  in  Lieutenant-General  A 's  order  of  5  :20  p.  m. 

At  any  rate,  only  the  simplest  measures  were  necessary  in  this 
case,  as  the  enemy  had  been  beaten  and  a  night  attack  was 
certainly  not  to  be  expected.  Therefore  2  battalions  and  i 
squadron  were  sufficient  for  the  entire  corps.  If  it  should 
come  to  the  worst,  the  troops  in  bivouac  would  soon  be  ready 
for  action.  The  division  commander  could  also  be  promptly 
on  hand  to  order  up  supports,  should  the  outposts  be  attacked. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  the  division  must  cover  the 
flanks  as  well  as  the  front;  but  to  do  so,  it  was  not  neces- 
sary to  scrupulously  guard  the  entire  field,  as  it  would  suffice 
if  only  the  main  points  were  held.  The  right  flank  was  cov- 
ered by  the  detachment  sent  to  Ober- Altenbuch,  and  the  pres- 
ence of  the  Guard  made  support  on  the  left  unnecessary.  The 
First  infantry  division,  camped  near  the  main  road  to  Arnau, 
should  provide  for  its  own  security. 

After  these  orders  had  been  issued,  the  division  com- 
mander's next  duty  was  the  assignment  of  bivouacs. 

In  grouping  bivouacs  it  is  well  to  bear  in  mind  what  it  Is 
proposed  to  do  the  following  day.  For  the  time  being  no  one 
knew  whether  the  enemy  would  again  be  attacked  in  the 
morning,  or  the  corps  would  take  up  Its  original  task  of  gain- 
ing the  Arnau  road  by  marching  to  the  right.  This  much 
.  was  certain,  however,  that  until  the  situation  cleared^  up,  a 
formation  would  be  adopted  that  would  successfully  resist  any 
attack  the  enemy  might  make.     Yet  the  grouping  of  the  blv- 


314  Studies  i\  thk  Lk mmnc  ok  Troops. 

ouacs  should  provide  for  both  contingencies.  Were  a  frontal 
advance  to  be  made  the  fol'owing  morning-,  the  commander  of 
the  First  regiment  would  form  up  the  advance  guard  with  his 
own  regiment,  sui)])orted  by  the  Second  regiment  of  the  same 
brigade.  But  should  it  be  decided  to  go  to  the  west,  then  the 
First  regiment  would  find  itself  charged  with  forming  a  left 
Hank  covering,  while  the  rest  of  the  Third  brigade  would  be 
ready  to  furnish  the  advance  guard,  and  the  Fourth  brigade, 
which  had  been  kept  close  together,  the  main  body. 

In  case  the  enemy  should  attack,  first  the  line  of  hills 
north  of  Burkersdorf  would  be  held,  and  the  troops  were  so 
situated  that  the  Second  regiment  and  the  Second  battalion 
of  the  First  regiment  could  defend  the  heights  west  of  the 
Neu-Rognitz-Kaile  road,  and  the  Third  regiment  the  ridges 
cast  of  the  road. 

It  may  seem  strange  that  the  first  line  of  defense  should 
be  held  by  regiments  of  two  different  brigades,  while  we  have 
time  and  again  insisted  that  the  management  of  an  engage- 
ment should  be  left  in  one  hand.  So  far,  in  these  studies,  we 
have  confined  ourselves  exclusively  to  the  offensive.  It  will 
be  permissible  here  to  devote  a  few  words  to  the  defensive. 
Hitherto  we  have  pointed  out  repeatedly  that  connected  lead- 
ing can  only  be  assured  by  deepening  the  formation,  and 
never  by  lateral  extension.  Troops  fighting  in  front  must  re- 
ceive their  immediate  support  from  troops  belonging  to  the 
same  organization,  else  co-operation  cannot  well  be  secured. 
Just  remember  that  in  defense  also  the  troops  on  the  first  line 
are  weakened  by  losses  and  fatigue,  and. that  it  becomes  evi- 
dent that  in  time  they  will  need  immediate  support,  and  that 
the  troops  on  the  entire  line  alongside  of  them  will  be  in  the 
same  condition.  It  is  therefore  recommended  in  defense  never 
to  assign  to  a  body  of  troops  any  section  the  holding  of  which 
necessitates  their  entire  strength  to  be  developed  at  the  start, 
but  rather,  as  was  done  in  this  instance,  in  the  case  of  a  divis- 
ion, to  assign  to  each  brigade  at  once  a  portion  of  the  first 
line  of  defense,  and  to  hold  back  in  reserve  and  at  the  dispo- 
sition of  the  division  commander,  such  battalions  as  are  not 
required  for  this  pu.rpose.  The  commander  can  reinforce  the 
line  of  defense,  or  initiate  a  C(^unter-attack,  if  necessary,  with 
these  reserve  batt  dions. 


Studiks  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  315 

Where  this  principle  was  neglected  in  the  campaign  of 
1870,  a  connected  direction  of  the  action  was  not  possible,  and 
in  almost  every  case  injurious  results  can  be  pointed  out. 

In  the  defense  of  the  position  north  of  Burkersdorf,  the 
Second  division,  strengthened  by  a  part  of  the  corps  artillery, 
was  sufficient  to  hold  the  hills  from  Peak  635  (west  of  the 
highway)  to  the  old  quarry  at  591,  against  any  frontal  attack. 
The  hills  could  be  held  by  the  Second  regiment  and  the  Sec- 
ond battalion  of  the  First  regiment,  and  the  ground  from  the 
Kaile  road  up  to  the  old  quarry  by  the  Third  regiment,  while 
east  of  the  quarry  the  Guard  could  be  depended  on.  After 
leaving  their  outpost  positions,  the  First  and  Third  battalions 
of  the  First  regiment  could  pass  along  the  highway  behind 
the  right  wing,  where  they  should  remain  in  close  order  to 
secure  that  wing.  The  Fourth  regiment  could  remain  in  re- 
serve near  Neu-Rognitz,  from  which  position  5  or  6  battal- 
ions could  go  out  around  the  right  wing  and  easily  advance 
to  a  counter-attack  with  5  to  6  battalions. 

The  division  artillery  regiment  could  take  station  on  Hill 
635,  while  part  of  the  corps  artillery  could  reinforce  the  left 
wing.  The  hussar  regiment  could  establish  itself  behind  the 
right  wing,  and  at  once  send  out  patrols  to  secure  the  right 
flank. 

From  this  it  is  evident  that  a  division  on  the  defense  can 
secure  a  stretch  of  about  a  mile  and  a  half  against  any  frontal 
attack,  when  it  is  formed  up  so  as  to  afford  itself  some  sup- 
port; in  the  offensive,  on  the  other  hand,  we  can  expect  it  to 
make  a  successful  attack  only  when  its  front  does  not  extend 
more  than  a  mile.  We  hardly  need  add,  however,  that  these 
figures  can  serve  only  for  general  guidance. 

Including  in  this  scheme  the  entire  army  corps,  we  might 
imagine  that  at  the  opening  of  the  action  the  First  infantry 
division  would  be  assembled  near  Sorge  with  the  remainder 
of  the  corps  artillery  and  the  cavalry  brigade,  where  it  could 
be  ready  to  extend  the  fighting  line  on  the  right  wing  by  a  bri- 
gade, or  to  undertake  a  counter-attack  against  the  x^nemy^s 
left  with  its  entire  force,  especially  in  the  direction  of  the 
Königinhof  highway,  which  was  an  important  point  in  the 
problem. 


31 6  Studies  ix  the  Leading  oi^  Troops. 

But  let  us  return  from  this  digression  to  the  bivouacs.  It 
may  seem  strange  that,  in  spite  of  verbal  instructions  given  on 
the'  spot,  a  written  order  should  later  be  issued  at  Neu- 
Rognit?.  This  was,  however,  entirely  proper.  In  the  first 
place,  it.  is  necessary  that  after  the  close  of  an  engagement 
every  superior  commander  not  only  await  what  may  be  or- 
dered, but  on  his  part  also  do  what  he  can  to  learn  the  in- 
tentions of  his  next  superior  as  quickly  as  possible.  This  re- 
quired that  the  adjutants  of  the  infantry  brigades,  the  artil- 
lery, and  the  cavalry  regiment,  also  an  officer  from  the  en- 
gineer company,  should  try  to  find  the  division  stafif.  These 
officers  would  at  the  same  time  be  in  position  to  give  the  divis- 
ion commander  the  necessary  information  concerning  the  mo- 
mentary positions  of  their  subdivisions,  and  what  they  had 
last  seen  of  the  enemy,  all  of  which  he  had  not  yet  been  able 
to  survey  perfectly  from  his  station.  There  they  would  re- 
ceive the  first  necessary  orders,  in  case  the  same  had  not  al- 
ready been  despatched.  It  is  evident,  however,  that  such  or- 
ders would  be  given  under  pressure  of  the  moment  and  con- 
tain only  the  most  urgent  directions,  and  mistakes  could  very 
likely  arise  in  their  comprehension.  Besides,  when  one  adju- 
tant goes  and  comes  by  himself,  only  .such  knowledge  is  gained 
as  pertains  to  his  particular  body  of  troops.  It  is  therefore 
wise,  after  quiet  is  restored,  to  embody  these  separate  or- 
ders into  a  written  one.  Then  errors  will  be  avoided,  each 
party  will  obtain  the  needed  survey  of  the  whole,  and  the 
troops  put  in  order  agahi  more  promptly,  since  each  body  will 
l)e  able  to  direct  at  once  to  their  proper  organizations  strag- 
glers who  have  joined.  Furthermore,  after  a  short  time  other 
matters  must  be  considered,  such  as  the  issue  of  rations  and 
ammunition,  regarding  which  the  general  staflf  officer  cannot 
give  the  necessary  directions  immediately  after  the  engage- 
ment, but  must  wait  perhaps  an  hour  before  he  can  know 
where  the  ammunition  columns  are  stationed  and  what  ar- 
rangements may  have  been  made  by  the  field  quartermaster. 

The  assignment  of  new  commanders,  made  necessary  by 
losses  in  action,  was  here  arranged  after  the  engagement. 
Circum.^tances  will  largely  determine  the  time  for  making 
such  r!'.:tails,  as  often  command  must  be  assigned  during  action. 
It  v.'ould  ordinardv  be  Ix.'st  to  let  a  commander  continue  lead- 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  317 

ing  his  own  troops  when  once  engaged,  unless  it  should  be- 
come necessary  for  him  to  take  the  place  of  his  immediate 

superior.     If  Major-General  B- had  been  disabled,  Colonel 

D- should   have    immediately   assumed    command   of    the 

Third  infantry  brigade,  as  ß.  matter  of  course. 

Despatching  a  telegram  after  an  action  has  in  view  the 
advising  of  superior  headquarters,  when  these  can  only-  be 
reached  by  wire,  and  also  the  sending  of  news  home.  The 
justice  in  promptly  advising  those  at  home  regarding  events 
in  the  field  has  ahvays  been  recognized.  When  the  fate  of  the 
country  is  at  stake,  when  the  entire  populace  are  making  great 
sacrifices,  when  members  of  every  family  are  in  the  field,  it 
is  certainly  the  duty  of  superior  headquarters  to  send  news 
home  as  quickly  and  as  exactly  as  circumstances  will  permit. 
Although  conditions  usually  prohibit  the  telling  of  everything 
that  has  liappened,  what  is  told  must  be  based  on  the  truth. 
This  would  seem  to  be  a  foregone  conclusion;  nevertheless 
experience  has  shown  that  all  armies  do  not  pursue  such  a 
course,  and  history  furnishes  proof  of  misrepresentation,  ex- 
aggeration, and  even  lies  being  found  in  official  telegrams. 
Such  is  indeed  deplorable,  and  injurious  effects  will  never 
fail  to  follow,  for  the  truth  will  in  the  end  be  learned,  and 
its  depressing  effect  will  be  more  severe  than  otherwise. 

Now  the  questions  arise.  What  should  a  telegram  intend- 
ed for  publication  contain?  and.  Who  has  authority  to  send 
such  a  message  ?  As  for  the  first,  the  public's  desire  for  news, 
although  in  itself  justifiable,  sometimes  exceeds  all  proper 
bounds,  and  headquarters  should  not  allow  itself  to  be  car- 
ried away  by  relentless  displays  in  newspapers.  It  is  evident 
that  people  at  home  like  to  know  as  much  as  possible,  that 
news  from  the  seat  of  war  is  expected  daily,  and  that  if  noth- 
ing is  received,  the  public  becomes  impatient.  But  news  ?s 
not  made  every  day,  and  communication  is  often  disturbed 
when  the  theater  of  war  is  much  extended  and  is  in  the  en- 
emy's country,  and  headquarters  itself  is  not  always  in  pos- 
session of  advice  from  the  widely  separated  armies.  Head- 
quarters in  such  cases  can  only  report  what  occurs  within  its 
own  sphere  of  vision,  and  if  nothing  happens,  no  news  can 
be  sent  home.     But  if  there  is  still  an  unrest  which  must  be 


3i8      StlüuvS  IX  the:  Lkadint,  of  Tkooi'S. 

satisfied,  all  that  remains  to  do  is  to  wire  back,  "Nothing  new 
to-day." 

Moreover,  too  much  care  cannot  be  exercised    regarding 
the  contents  of  despatches. 

Just  remember  that  news  pubhslied  in  the  capital  of  our 
own  country  to-day  is  known  on  the  same  day  in  the  capitals 
of  neutrals,  and  may  be  sent  from  there  to  the  hostile  camp. 
Such  telegrams  must  therefore  contain  nothing  that  the  en- 
emy is  unable  to  learn  through  other  channels,  nor  anything 
from    which   he    can   benefit.      Even    the    dating    of    a    des- 
patch may  be  dangerous,  as  the  opponent  may  thereby  eas- 
ily draw  important  conclusions  concerning  your  position.     At 
the  (Hitbreak  of  the  war  of   1866  the  Second  Army  did  not    ! 
know  whether  the  main  Austrian  army  was  still  around  Ol-    , 
mutz  or  had  started  for  Bohemia,  and  would  have   given   a    i 
trreat  deal  to  learn  the  location  of  Field  ^Marshal    r>enedek's 
headquarters. 

An  exact  statement  of  the  positions  of  the  various  army    - 
corps  must  also  be  avoided;  the  enemy  would  certainly  have 
cause  for  thanks  if  this  w^ere  done.   In  the  same  manner  also  we   « 
must  avoid  disclosing  our  intentions,  else  we  turn  traitors  to 
ourselves.    Care  must  also  be  taken  in  stating  losses  and  num- 
ber of  prisoners  taken ;  this  cannot  be  accurately  done  imme-  ^ 
diately  at  the  close  of  an  engagement,  and  at  first  w^e  had  bet- 
ter resort  to  the  general  expressions  "losses  heavy"  or  "very 
considerable."     Caution  is  advisable,  too,  in  stating  the  num- 
ber of  colors  or  guns  captured;  commanders  must  await  offi- 
cial reports  on  these  points,  or  should  have  personal  knowl- 
edge;  else  errors  will  arise,  which  will  later  cause  the  reliabil- 
ity of  all  telegrams  to  be  questioned. 

Telegraphic  news,  as  far  as  it  relates  to  the  war  situa- 
tion, should  emanate  only  from  the  headquarters  of  armies 
or  other  independent  forces;  in  this  way  alone  can   the  pub-   , 
lishing  of  dangerous  statements  be  avoided.  . 

Sending  telegrams  from  detached  army  or  corps  head-  'I 
quarters  to  sujierior  headquarters  is  governed  b\  different  ( 
principles.  In  such  case  it  is  important,  after  narrating-» 
events,  to  give  ex.-ictiy  the  final  ])()<ition  of  tro.ips.  as  well  as 
news  about  tlu'  enemy  and  whnt  we  intend  to  do  the  next 
(lav       r.nt    all   this   is   information    wliieh   must   be   ke])t    out   of 


i 


Studies  in  the  Leadinc.  oe  Troops.  319 

unauthorized  hands,  and  should  be  sent  only  by  cipher.  .  Ac- 
cordingly when  all  members  of  a  staff  accompany  the  comr 
manding  general  on  a  ride,  the  cipher  key  must  not  be  left 
behind.  This  is  especially  necessary  in  the  case  of  telegrams 
sent  to  the  front,  which  often  contain  instructions  that  re- 
quire immediate  attention. 

The  Outposts  of  the  Division  from  5  p.  m.  until 

Nightfall. 

(See  Map  VII.) 

We  saw  that  the  Third  battalion  of  the  First  regiment 
advanced  to  Burkersdorf  at  about  5  o'clock  and  occupied  that 
village.  '  . 

The  hussars  followed  the  enemy,  who  was  withdrawing  in 
a  southerly  direction.  On  the  right  wing  the  Fourth  squadron 
advanced  to  the  thickets  near  the  Königinhof  highway  and 
southwest  of  Burkersdorf,  the  remainder  of  the  regiment  tak- 
ing position  north  of  the  woods  which  crown  Peak  540.  From 
both  points  troops  were  sent  forward  singly,  one  into  the  coun- 
try west  of  the  Königinhof  road,  another  on  the  Burkersdorf- 
Deutsch-Praussnitz  road  to  a  line  with  the  next  rise  in  the 
ground,  and  another  along  the  Neu-Rognitz-Kaile  road  to  the 
large  strip  of  meadows.  Some  officers  rode  in  advance  of  the 
troop  scouts,  followed  by  two  or  three  selected  horses.  They 
made  no  headway  to  the  front  in  the  face  of  the  enemy's  caval- 
ry ;  they  nevertheless  learned  that  it  consisted  of  4  regiments 
— I  of  uhlans,  i  of  dragoons,  and  2  of  cuirassiers.  On  the  left 
communication  was  established  with  hussars  of  the  Guard 
division,  from  wdiom  it  was  learned  that  Kaile  had  been  occu- 
pied by  hostile  infantry,  which  had  fallen  back  in  a  southerly 
direction,  and  that  there  were  a  few  battalions  and  a  squad- 
ron southeast  of  Kaile  apparently  engaged  in  posting  out- 
posts toward  the  Kaile-Ober-Raatsch  road. 

One  of  the  officers  sent  out  on  the  right  wing  had  mean- 
while succeeded  in  getting  a  tolerably  fair  view  from  the 
heights  near  Soor,  into  the  opponent's  position  at  that  point. 
At  6:30  he  returned  and  reported  that  a  hostile  rear  guard 
of  about  3  battalions  and  2  batteries  had  kept  possession  of 
the  windmill  hills  (603  and  609),  and  had  later  sent  a  battal- 
ion beyond  Ober-Soor:  further,  that  this  rear  guard  was  evi- 
dently   preparing    to    go    into   bivouac    south    of    Ober-Soor; 


320  Studii^s  IX  THE  Lkadixg  of  Troops. 

also,  that  no  other  hostile  bodies  were  seen  in  that  region, 
nor  any  columns  niarchin"-  further  beyond  or  any  on  the  high- 
way to  the  south. 

Shortly  afterwards  messages  were  received  from  other 
points  wlierc  officers  were  in  observation,  to  the  efifect  that 
the  hostile  cavalrv  was  withdrawing  via  Kaile  on  Chwalkowitz, 
but  the  oftker  who  had  advanced  farthest  on  the  Burkersdorf- 
Deutsch-Praussnitz  road  reported  that  there  were  still  strong 
hostile  j)atrols  in  the  latter  village. 

In  the  meantime  the  troops  had  taken  up  the  two  out- 
post ])o^itions  under  protection  of  the  cavalry,  and  had  been 
joined  by  the  sqiiadrons  of  hussars.  The  information  de- 
rived from  the  personal  reconnaissance  of  the  commander  of 
the  hussar  regiment  and  other  re])orts  received  concerning  the 
enemy  were  considered  (juite  sufficient,  and  until  darkness 
should  set  in  only  slight  changes  could  occur,  which  a  few 
horsemen  could  observe  very  well.  This  regiment  was  ac- 
cordingly placed  in  bivouac  by  its  commander  southwest  of 
Neu-Rognitz,  having  dismounted  about  three-quarters  of  an 
hour  before  and  watered,  by  sections,  in  Burkersdorf.  Pur- 
suant to  orders,  the  First  squadron  remained  with  the  out- 
posts. The  officers  in  front  were  instructed  to  continue  their 
obsen-ation  of  the  enemy  as  long  as  daylight  permitted,  and 
then  to  return. 

A  survey  of  the  ground  from  the  outpost  position  showed 
that  lUirkersdorf  lay  in  a  depression  almost  completely  en- 
circled by  heights,  and  although  it  was  still  necessary  to  hold 
the  village  as  a  point  of  support  on  the  main  road,  it  was  evi- 
dent that  the  outposts  must  be  pushed  forward  on  the  sur- 
rounding hills  far  enough  to  obtain  a  sufficiently  good  view 
ahead. 

The  enemy  had  long  ago  abandoned  the  thickets  lying  in 
front,  to  which  the  hussar  regiment  had  advanced,  securing 
the  infantry  against  surprise  by  detachments  sent  forward. 
(t  was  now  im|)ortant  to  occupy  first  the  prominent  ]')oints, 
under  cover  of  cavalry. 

About  5:30  Major  X assembled  his  battalion   (First 

of  the  First  regiment)  near  Hill  635,  and  about  the  same  time 
is.sued  the  following  outpost  order  to  his  4  companies  (there 
being  also   i)resent   a   n(^n-commissioned   officer   of   hussars)  : 


Studies  in  th^  Leading  of  Troops.  321 

Hill  635,  27  June,  5  130  p.  m. 

1.  The  enemy  has  fallen  back  via  Ober  -  Soor  and 
Deutsch-Praussnitz.  The  main  body  of  the  division  will  biv- 
ouac near  Neu-Rognitz.  The  division  staff  will  be  quartered 
in  Neu-Rognitz. 

2.  The  First  battalion  of  the  First  regiment,  with  the 
First  and  Second  troops  of  the  First  squadron  of  the  First 
regiment  of  hussars,  will  secure  the  line  eastern  exit  of  Ober- 
Altenbuch — Hill  592 — Burkersdorf-Deutsch-Praussnitz  road, 
inclusive. 

The  First  company,  with  6  mounted  orderlies  and  2  cy- 
clists, will  secure  the  line  from  the  eastern  exit  of  Ober- 
Altenbuch  to  the  wooded  meadow,  inclusive.  The  Second 
company,  with  6  mounted  orderlies  and  2  cyclists,  will  take 
position  in  the  thickets  north  of  Hill  628  on  the  Königinhof 
highway,  and  secure  the  line  from  the  wooded  meadow  to  the 
Burkersdorf-Deutsch-Praussnitz  road,  inclusive.  Until  7:30 
p.  m.,  the  First  troop  of  the  First  squadron  will  be  responsi- 
ble for  security  in  front  of  the  Second  company,  and  will 
reconnoiter  via  Ober-Soor  and  Deutsch-Praussnitz. 

The  outpost  reserve  will  bivouac  at  the  southern  exit  of 
Burkersdorf.  During  the  night  the  hussars  will  occupy  alarm 
quarters  in  Burkersdorf,  i  officer  and  10  hussars  remaining 
with  the  reserve. 

3.  In  case  of  attack,  Hill  602  and  Burkersdorf  will  be 
held. 

4.  I  will  be  with  the  outpost  reserve. 

After  this  order  had  been  issued,  the  commander  of  the 
First  company  had  his  troops  fall  in  and  started  them  at  once 
toward  Ober-Altenbuch  on  the  road  from  Burkersdorf,  while 
he  himself  rode  ahead  to  the  mountain  spur  383.  He  coä- 
sidered  that  he  would  be  better  able  to  oppose  an  enemy  ad- 
vancing from  Ober-Altenbuch  at  that  point  than  in  the  vil- 
lage itself.  He  left  the  company  at  the  fork  of  the  roads 
southeast  of  the  village,  only  establishing  a  non-commissioned 
officer's  post  on  the  village  street.  He  took  only  a  lieu- 
tenant and  half  a  platoon  to  the  wooded  meadow,  where  he 
established  a  picket  maintaining  connection  on  both  sides  by 
patrols.    Returning  to  the  company  at  6:30,  he  found  that  the 


322  Studies  in  thk  Leahinc  of  Troops. 

6  mounted  orderlies  had  at  last  arrived  ;  two  of  these  he  im- 
mediately sent  to  the  second  picket  (at  the  wooded  meadow), 
and  one  to  the  bivouac  of  the  main  body  to  obtain  informa- 
tion regarding  the  measures  of  security  ordered.  A  cyclist 
was  assigned  to  the  non-commissioner's  post  in  the  village, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  post  was  designated  as  an  ex- 
amination post.  After  the  captain  had  seen  to  it  person- 
ally that  the  men  of  the  outpost  company  (still  about  twc» 
platoons)  had  taken  oft*  accouterments  and  started  cooking, 
he  sat  down,  before  he  himself  partook  of  any  refresh- 
ments, and,  using  a  message  card,  addressed  a  communica- 
tion to  the  outpost  commander,  containing  information  relative 
to  the  posting  of  his  own  company,  and  on  the  back  of  the 
card  hastily  added  a  sketch  in  pencil.  It  was  not  until  7  o'clock 
that  he  could  find  time  for  a  short  rest. 

Shortly  after  this  a  message  was  received  from  the  com- 
mander of  the  Second  company,  containing  information  as 
to  how  the  latter  company  had  covered  itself,  and  the  com- 
mander of  the  First  company  gave  the  mounted  orderly  who 
brought  the  message  a  short  account  of  his  own  position.     At 

the  same  time  Lieutenant-General  A arrived,  to  whom  the 

captain  also  reported.  The  former  found  no  fault  with  the 
dispositions  made,  and  only  inquired  whether  regular  patrols 
in  the  village  of  Ober-Altenbuch  had  been  established,  and 
whether  a  double  post  had  been  sent  out  on  the  road  to  the 
wooded  meadow.  To  both  of  these  questions  he  received  an 
affirmative  answer.  By  that  time  the  men  had  finished  their 
cooking,  the  victuals  for  the  non-commissioned  otTicer's  post 
having  been  sent  out  to  it. 

As  for  the  Second  com])any.  it  >vas  preceded  by  a  point, 
and  went  west  of  Burkersdorf  to  the  little  woods  north  of 
Hill  628,  and  when  the  company  commander  observed  that 
the  outpost  cavalry  had  already  taken  station  further  to  the 
south  near  the  highway,  he  contented  himself  with  putting  a 
<l(»ul)le  post  only  in  the  southern  border  of  the  little  woods. 
In  close  order  the  company  prepared  at  once  for  cooking  in 
the  woods,  whither  a  non-commissioned  officer  fetched  water 
out  of  the  village  by  a  wagon.  The  outjiost  cavalry  had  mack- 
no  efforts  to  establish  comnumication  with  the  company,  not 
even  sending  in  :i  niouiitcd  orderly;  the  com])any  commander 


Studies  in  the:  Lkading  of  Troops.  323 

therefore  himself  rode  forward  to  the  cavah'y  picket  to  learn 
what  dispositions  it  had  made.  The  mounted  orderlies  in  this 
case  had  erroneously  ridden  to  the  outpost  reserve,  and  were 
brought  back  by  a  cyclist.  After  infantry  patrols  had  mean- 
while established  communication  with  the  Second  picket  (at  the 
wooded  meadow^  of  the  First  company,  the  commander  of  the 
Second  company  ordered  that  for  the  night  a  First  picket 
should  take  post  at  the  southern  boundary  of  the  little  woods, 
and  a  Second  picket  on  the  same  line,  on  the  Burkersdorf- 
Deutsch-Praussnitz  road.  On  account  of  the  proximity  of  the 
enemy,  the  pickets,  each  half  a  platoon,  were  forbidden  to 
pitch  tents ;  the  company,  however,  pitched  tents  in  the  little 
woods,  with  the  doors  facing  the  enemy,  so  that  the  men 
could  fall  in  without  loss  of  time. 

The  First  and  Second  troops  of  the  First  squadron  of  the 
First  hussars  received  the  outpost  order  at  5  45  at  the  south- 
ern exit  of  Burkersdorf;  the  squadron  commander  was  pres- 
ent. Immediately  the  First  troop  started  at  a  trot  down  the 
Königinhof  road,  halting  at  the  point  of  woods  extending  east 
from  Nieder-Soor,  and  sending  forward  a  vedette  of  2  men, 
who  were  ordered  to  remain  mounted.  A  dismounted  vedette 
of  3  men  was  posted  on  the  Burkersdorf-Deutsch-Praussnitz 
road.  Patrols  of  2  men  were  sent  forward  to  Hill  610,  east  of 
Ober-Soor,  and  toward  Deutsch-Praussnitz,  who  learned  that 
nearly  a  mile  south  of  these  villages  the  enemy  had  established 
a  cavalry  outpost  line.  Tlie  squadron  commander  had  gone 
over  to  the  left  division  of  the  outposts,  to  supervise  the  cav- 
alry on  that  wing.  The  remainder  of  the  Second  troop  had 
remained  halted  south  of  Burkersdorf,  and  at  6  o'clock  were 
permitted  by  the  outpost  commander  to  put  their  horses  in 
stables. 

As  for  the  outpost  reserve.  Major  X (First  battal- 
ion of  the  First  infantry  regiment)  led  it  up  to  the  southern 
exit  of  Burkersdorf  and  sheltered  it  there  in  barns.  On  ac- 
count of  the  proximity  of  the  enemy,  soldiers  who  had  re- 
moved their  accouterments  were  directed  to  remain  close  by 
them ;  this  was  in  accordance  with  regulations.  Men  trained 
in  field  fortification  prepared  the  southern  boundary  of  the 
village  for  defense,  under  the  supervision  of  a  lieutenant. 
Major  X had  ridden  out  to  the  Second  company,  on 


324  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

the  Königinhof  hi?^h\vay,  hnt  as  soon  as  he  detected  large  biv- 
ouac fires  on  the  liorizon  south  of  the  villages  lying  in  front, 
he  returned  to  the  reserve,  where  he  found  reports  regard- 
ing the  positions  of  the  First  and  Second  companies,  also  a 
report  prepared  by  his  adjutant  embodying  these ;  and  the  lat- 
ter he  signed  and  forwarded  by  a  cyclist  to  the  division  com- 
mander in  Neu-Rognitz,  with  information  in  addition  that  the 
main  body  of  the  enemy  was  in  bivouac  3  to  4  miles  south  of 
Deutsch-Praussnitz.  At  7  p.  m.  he  had  received  no  advice 
from  the  outpost  on  his  left;  he  accordingly  sent  a  mounted 
rifleman  thither  with  a  sketch  of  his  own  position.  Shortly 
afterwards  the  First  troop  of  hussars  returned,  and  the  horses, 
which  were  considerably  worn  out,  were  sheltered  in  Burkers- 
dorf.  A  very  large  number  of  these  hussars  had  not  yet  been 
supplied  with  warm  victuals,  so  the  outpost  reserve  promptly 
furnished  them  some  canned  food  they  had  prepared.  A  cav- 
alry patrol  still  remained  north  of  Deutsch-Praussnitz.  At 
7:30  an  officer  and  10  hussars  of  the  Second  troop  reported 
to  the  outpost  commander,  who  directed  that  a  patrol  should 
remain  permanently  during  the  night  north  of  Deutsch- 
Praussnitz;  he  also  directed  that  the  mounted  men  of  the 
Second  company  should  patrol  on  the  Königinhof  highway. 
The  officer  of  hussars  was  to  report  at  daybreak  for  special 
instructions. 

Major  X dispensed  with  supports  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  reserve,  as  the  pickets  appeared  sufficient ;  but.  be- 
sides the  double  posts  established  to  the  north,  he  also  placed 
double  posts  at  the  exits  of  Burkersdorf.  He  quartered  him- 
self on  the  village  street  in  a  tent  improvised  with  pieces  of 
shelter  tents,  the  spot  being  marked  by  a  large  stable  lan- 
tern. Close  by  him  were  trum])cters,  cyclists,  and  2  mounted 
riflemen. 

The  Third  battalion  of  the  First  regiment,  under  Major 

Y ,  had  reached  Burkersdorf  when  the  order  was  issued 

establishing  the  outposts.  The  commander  had  received  the 
order  on  füll  635,  whence  he  galloped  back  to  his  battalion, 
but  issued  no  outpost  order,  only  directing  the  Ninth  com- 
pany to  march  to  the  little  woods  which  lay  on  the  Neu- 
Rognitz-Kaile  highway  close  by  and  north  of  the  creek  run- 
ning to  Staudenz,  and  the  other  three  companies  to  take  posi- 


Studies  in  the  Leading  o?  Troops.  t^2s 

tion  as  reserve  in  the  thickets  east  of  Burkersdorf.      Major 

Y then  rode  out  of  the  village  in  a  southerly  direction,  to 

hunt  up  the  outpost  cavalry  assigned  to  him.  The  Third  and 
Fourth  troops  of  the  First  squadron  he  met  close  to  the  south- 
ern edge  of  the  village,  and  proceeded  with  them  toward  th(j 
little  woods  to  which  the  Ninth  company  had  been  sent,  where 
the  company  commander  and  senior  officer  of  hussars  were 
given  the  necessary  information  regarding  the  retreat  of  the 
enemy,  the  location  of  bivouacs,  and  the  boundaries  of  the 

two  outposts.     Major  Y ordered  a  non-commissioned 

officer's  cavalry  post  to  establish  itself  in  advance  half-way 
to  Kaile,  but  otherwise  left  the  hussars  and  Ninth  Company 
remain  as  picket.  The  picket  infantry  at  once  started  its 
cooking,    and    placed    a    double    post    at    each    of    the    two 

crossings  of  the  creek.    Major  Y was  satisfied  that  the 

creek  could  be  crossed  only  by  infantrymen  in  single  file, 
as  it  was  very  swampy,  and  he  therefore  approved  of  the 
proposition  of  the  company  commander  to  establish  only  a 
post  under  a  non-commissioned  officer  in  the  thickets  west  of 
Staudenz,  for  the  purpose  of  effecting  communication  with 
the  outposts  of  the  Guard  corps.  He  ordered  scouting  to 
be  kept  up  continually  during  the  night  in  the  direction  of 
Kaile,  leaving  lo  hussars  with  the  company  for  that  purpose. 
At  dark  the  remainder  of  the  cavalry  should  go  to  the  out- 
post reserve,  and  the  double  post  on  the  highway  should  aläo 
assume  the  duties  of  an  examination  post.  In  case  of  attack, 
the  Ninth  company  was  to  oppose  the  enemy  in  its  position, 
while  Hill  540  would  be  occupied  by  the  reserve. 

When  Major  Y returned  to  the  reserve  he  found 

Lieutenant-General  A there,  who  received  a  report  on 

the  dispositions  made,  and,  as  they  seemed  to  be  absolutely 
correct  according  to  the  map,  the  division  commander  left  for 

the  outpost  on  the  right.     Major  Y then  reduced  his 

report  to  writing  in  the  form  of  a  message  without  waiting 
for  a  report  from  the  Ninth  company,  as  he  knew  its  loca- 
tion exactly. 

Meanwhile  a  message  came  in  from  Major  X rela- 
tive  to   the   position   of   the    right   outpost.      But   as    Major 

Y 's  mind  was  not  fully  clear  as  to  the  connection  of  his 

defensive  line  with  the  First  battalion  of  the  First  regiment. 


326  StuOIKS    IX    TKt:    LKAUING    uV     ri<(JOi'S. 

he  rkIc  iij»  to  Hill  54')  before  it  was  yet  -lark,  ind  sent  word 
k)  Mnjor  X ,  by  a  mounted  rifleman,  that  in  case  of  neces- 
sity-lie would  occu])y  the  wtxxls  on  that  heic^ht. 

••  When  the  outpost  comtnander  did  Anally  sit  down  near 
the  bivouac  fire  at  the  outpost  reserve,  he  was  accosted  by  the 
battalion  (|uartermaster.  who  came  ridin«-  up  on  a  wheel  to 
report  tliat  the  baggage  could  not  possibly  arrive  before  mid- 
night.     Major  Y accordingly   had   shelter  provided   for 

himself  out  of  pieces  of  tents  belonging  to  the  troops,  and 
sent  his  horses  to  Burkersdorf,  to  which  place  he  also  per- 
mitted all  but  4  hussars  to  repair,  on  the  request  of  the  senior 
hcissar  officer. 

'COMMKXTS    OX    TTTK    EsTAi'.LISUM  KN  T    OF    TllK.    Ol'TPoSTS. 

The  hussar  regiment  acted  very  p^roperly  in  following  the 
enemy  and  keeping  touch  with  him,  and  thus  covering  the 
establishment  of  the  outposts. 

The  movements  of  the  regiment  illustrate  the  manner  in 
which  the  first  of  these  measures  should  be  performed.  Had 
itS'  forces  been  sufficient  to  engage  the  hostile  troopers  in  the 
plain  before  Kaile,  under  all  circumstances  an  attempt  should 
have  been  made  to  throw  them  back  upon  their  retiring  in- 
fantry ;  for  if  they  should  succeed  in  this,  it  would  then  be 
an  easy  matter  to  obtain  information  of  the  enemy's  where- 
abouts, which  would  be  useful  not  alone  in  planning  the  move- 
ments of  the  army  corps  for  the  following  day,  but  also  in 
establishing  outposts. 

liut  the  hus.sar  regiment  found  itself  opposed  to  a  force 
four  times  its  own  strength,  and  as  long  as  this  remained  on 
the  ground  it  was  not  in  ]-)osition  to  advance  nt  will.  There- 
fore all  that  could  be  done  was  to  push  out  scouts  tor  ob- 
.sf'rvation,  and  to  try  to  send  expert  officers  into  the  flanks  of 
the  hostile  position.  At  the  same  time  the  regiment  must  not 
neglect  to  provide  cover  for  the  outposts  while  they  marched 
into  j)osition.  The  positions  the  outposts  were  directed  to  oc- 
cupy could  not  be  reached  by  the  several  detachments  simul- 
tanexmsly,  only  at  different  times.  And  until  the  extended 
(►tft|K>st  line  (nearly  3  miles  long),  which  was  in  itself  to  be 
the  means  of  .security,  was  established,  protection  must  be 
provided  farther  to  the  front;  this  duty  is  explicitly  enjoined 


StuDIKS    IX    IHK    LK ADING   OF    TrOOPS.  327 

on  cavalry  by  Field  Service  Regulations  (paragraph  132). 
But  the  space  to  be  covered  was  so  broad  that  the  regiment 
could  not  perform  it  from  a  single  position ;  its  squadrons  could 
not  reach  a  point  soon  enough  to  prevent  any  sudden  dash  of 
bold  reconnoitering  parties  of  the  enemy.  Therefore  it  was 
necessary  to  divide  the  regiment.  The  bulk  of  the  regiment 
was  posted  opposite  the  enemy's  principal  force,  at  the  thicket 
near  Peak  540,  and  on  the  Königinhof  highway  only  i  squad- 
ron was  employed.  This  single  squadron  would  doubtless  be 
adequate  for  protection  at  the  place  it  was  assigned,  as  the 
enemy's  main  forces  had  evidently  not  withdrawn  over  that 
road. 

Finally,  after  darkness  came  on  the  hostile  cavalry  could 
not  remain  longer  in  close  proximity,  and  as  soon  as  its  in- 
fantry had  established  itself  near  by  it  could  withdraw  behind 
the  latter  and  go  into  bivouac.  If,  however,  by  that  time  the 
hussars  had  not  been  able  to  get  a  good  look  at  the  enemy's 
foremost  line,  they  must  still  keep  at  the  heels  of  the  hostile 
cavalry,  and  not  turn  back  until  they  had  seen  the  infantry 
outposts  and  been  fired  upon  by  them,  unless  they  had  succeed- 
ed in  obtaining  an  adequate  view  of  the  enemy's  position  on 
other  roads. 

The  commander  of  the  regiment  of  hussars,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  H ,  led  his  force  into  bivouac  after  the  outposts 

were  established,  having  first  detached  the  outpost  squadron. 
Under  existing  conditions  this  appears  correct,  as  cavalry  is 
not  able  to  operate  successfully  in  large  masses  during  the 
night.  The  one  squadron  which  remained  at  the  front  was 
sufficient  for  any  duty  that  may  be  demanded  of  the  cavalry 
later  in  the  evening  or  during  the  night.  We  must  not  for- 
get that  the  closer  a  body  of  troops  bivouacs  to  an  enemy  the 
less  rest  will  it  obtain  during  the  night,  and  such  cavalry  as 
is  not  needed  at  the  front  must  therefore  be  sent  to  the  rear, 
but  not  so  far  to  the  rear  that  they  cannot  be  on  hand  prompt- 
ly the  next  morning. 

The  duty  of  reconnaissance  and  protection  was  taken  up 
by  the  infantry  of  the  outpost  after  the  cavalry  withdrew.  As 
the  day  advanced  it  became  especially  necessary  to  guard  the 
bivouac  of  the  division  against  surprise,  and  to  accomplish 
this   result   the   advanced   bodies    must   be   so   connected   and 


328  Studiics  in  Tue  Lkaiuxg  of  Troops. 

sheltered  by  the  ground  lliat  they  would  be  able  to  defend 
themselves  successfully  against  small  hostile  parties,  and  offer 
resistance  in  case  of  more  extended  attacks  during  the  night 
or  in  the  early  morning  long  enough  to  give  the  main  body  time 
to  form  for  action.  This  requires  that  they  be  posted  as  near 
together  as  possible,  which  explains  the  manner  in  which  the 
heights  surrounding  Burkersdorf  were  occupied. 

According  to  Field  Service  Regulations  (paragraphs  128 
and  129),  it  was  not  necessary  to  provide  for  readiness  for 
action,  as  the  engagement  had  ended  with  the  retreat  of  the 
enemy,  and  the  simplest  measures  of  security  would  suffice. 
To  detail  an  advance  guard  after  the  fight  would  only  have 
given  rise  to  unnecessary  intermediate  commands,  and  under 
the  circumstances  it  was  entirely  right  in  the  division  com- 
mander's giving  the  orders  for  the  outposts  direct  to  the  com- 
manders concerned.  In  time  it  was  learned  that  the  enemy 
had  established  outposts  about  3  miles  away,  and  i  battalion 
might  have  sufficed  for  providing  the  division's  security,  if 
a  special  detachment  had  been  sent  from  the  main  body  to- 
ward Ober-Altenbuch ;  but  the  location  of  the  two  roads  lead- 
ing toward  the  enemy  and  the  proximity  of  the  latter  made  it 
advisable  to  put  2  battalions  on  the  outpost  line,  assigning  to 
each  the  defense  of  a  particular  road.  Night  was  approach- 
ing, and  in  the  night  troops  move  only  on  established  roads. 
If,  therefore,  the  two  highways  and  the  wagon-road  between 
them  were  occupied,  no  surprise  need  be  feared.  On  the  left 
was  the  Guard  division,  and  on  the  right  (toward  Ober- 
Altenbuch)  the  outposts  were  covered  by  an  almost  impassa- 
ble stretch  of  wooded  mountains,  which  an  enemy  would  hard- 
ly dare  to  enter  during  the  night.  Surprise  from  the  west  of 
Ober-Altenbuch  was  practically  out  of  the  question,  as  the  pa- 
trols had  not  seen  a  sign  of  the  enemy  in  that  direction  dur- 
ing the  entire  day.  By  2  battalions  the  division  was  amply 
secured. 

As  for  division  order  No.  2,  issued  at  5  :20  p.  m.,  estab- 
lishing the  outposts,  it  contained  all  that  was  worth  stating. 
excei)t  that  the  defensive  positions  of  the  outposts  were  not 
distinctly  indicated,  l^ut  on  this  latter  point  the  division  com- 
mander was  again  obliged  to 'interfere  in  the  dispositions  of 
his  sulx)rdinates,   this  being  during  his   ride   in  the   evening, 


Studijss  in  the:  leading  of  Troops.  329 

when  he  ordered  that  the  First  battalion  of  the  First  regiment 
occupy  Hill  602  and  Burkersdorf,  and  the  Second  battalion 
Hill  540  and  the  creek  crossings.  The  defensive  positions  of 
the  outposts  were  unfavorable.  Burkersdorf  lay  low  in  a  val- 
ley, and  Hill  540  was  a  little  too  far  to  the  front;  but,  as  the 
position  was  one  that  must  be  defended  during  the  night,  it 
was  necessary  to  secure  the  village  and  the  roads.  The  main 
point  was  to  hold  the  enemy  until  the  division  could  occupy 
the  line  Hill  635-old  quarry,  and  this  could  be  accomplished 
in  half  an  hour. 

The  commander  of  the  right  outpost,   Major  X •, 

issued  a  comprehensive  order,  covering  practically  every  point 
necessary.  He  could  do  so,  as  he  was  able  to  overlook  the 
terrane  of  his  position  from  Hill  635.  No  material  fault  can 
be  found  with  his  dispositions.  It  may  seem  strange  that  only 
6  mounted  men  should  be  used  on  the  right  wing,  near  Ober- 
Altenbuch.  But  the  country  there  was  quite  mountainous, 
nothing  had  been  seen  of  the  enemy,  and  to  simply  close  the 
village  street  with  infantry  was  sufficient.  The  First  company 
was  very  properly  stationed  on  the  Ober-Altenbuch-Burkers- 
dorf  road,  and  made  sure  that  the  main  body  of  the  division 
had  placed  sentinels  and  sentry  squads  on  the  roads  leading 
from  Ober-Altenbuch  to  Neu-Rognitz.  As  it  was  without 
cavalry  protection  in  front,  the  company  was  at  once  obliged 
to  send  out  the  non-commisioned  officer's  post  and  the  picket. 
With  the  Second  company,  however,  it  was  different ;  the  hus- 
sar picket  on  the  highway  afforded  it  such  security  that  it 
was  able  to  go  about  its  cooking  in  perfect  composure. 

Another  thing  is  to  be  observed  here.  Outpost  cavalry  is 
ordinarily  not  subject  to  the  orders  of  an  outpost  company  be- 
hind it.  Although  Field  Service  Regulations  (paragraphs  149 
and  182)  specify  that  infantry  and  cavalry  must  advise  each 
other  as  to  their  respective  locations,  experience  shows  that 
often  this,  is  done  too  late.  Very  frequently  it  happens  that  a 
company  commander,  his  horse  all  tired  out,  must  himself 
search  out  the  cavalry  in  front  to  determine  the  degree  of 
security  of  his  company.  Especial  stress  must  be  laid  on  the 
detail  of.  mounted  orderlies  for  such  outpost  companies, 
and  their  prompt  arrival  ready  for  service,   for  in  their  ab- 


330  Studies  in  the  Lkaping  of  Troops. 

sencc  a  C(jiiii)any  coniinandcr  is  wicliuut  the  most  essential 
niediunis  for  sending  reports  and  establishing  connection  with 

outpost  cavah-y  and  adjoining  posts.     Major  D took  the 

greater  ])art  of  the  cavalry  back  into  the  village.  This  was 
allowable,  and  is  certainly  advisable  when  horses  are  fatigued. 
But  it  was  absolutely  necessary,  as  was  done,  to  keep  a  cav- 
alry patrol  close  to  the  enemy  during  the  night;  and  in  this 
case  the  patrol  was  despatched  from  the  outpost  reserve.  The 
Second  outpost  company  could  well  patrol  the  highway  with 
6  mounted  men. 

Major  Y ,  on  the  other  hand,  established  his  out- 
posts in  an  entirely  different  manner.  In  the  first  place,  he 
issued  no  exhaustive  order,  as  he  did  not  clearly  compre- 
hend the  situation,  and  in  so  doing  he  was  acting  m  accord- 
ance with  Field  Service  Regulations  (paragraph  139).  It 
was  quite  clear  that  the  bridges  over  the  creek  running  in  the 
direction  of  Staudenz  must  be  occupied,  but  whether  addi- 
tional measures  should  be  taken  depended  upon  the  character 
of  the  creek  and  its  surroundings.  At  first  he  took  forward 
only  I  company,  thus  saving  the  others  unnecessary  exertion, 
for  he  found  that  on  account  of  the  swampy  nature  of  the 
ground  the  creek  could  be  easily  held  by  a  single  company. 
The  establishment  of  a  cavalry  post  under  a  non-commis- 
sioned officer  out  on  the  Kaile  highway  was  more  than  enough, 
as  an  infantry  post  would  have  answered  the  same  purpose. 
The  horses  were  tired,  and  should  have  been  spared  as  much 

as  possible.     On  the  right  of  the  outpost  line  Major  X 

took  his  hussars  to  the  outpost  reserve  before  nightfall ;  but 
Major  Y employed  his  as  picket  with  the  Ninth  com- 
pany. Yet  there  is  no  fixed  rule  for  outpost  measures.  Ma- 
jor Y acted  under  the  impression  that  strong  hostile 

cavalry  had  been  observed  north  of  Kaile  as  late  as  6  p.  m. 
The  cavalry  patrols  sent  out  by  both  outi)Osts,  from  the  out- 
jjost  reserve  on  the  right  and  from  the  picket  on  the  left,  were 

absolutely  necessary.     Major  X preferred  to  supervise 

the  despatching  of  his  cavalry  patrols  in  person,  as  he  wished 
to  give  them  special  instructions. 

The  action  of  both  outpost  commanders  in  assigning  sta- 
bles for  their  surplus  cavalry  is  very  commendable. 


Studies  in  the  Leading  oe  Troops.  331 

Major  X designated  the  outpost  reserve  as  his  hue 

of  resistance,  while  Major  Y designated  the  -support- 
ing company  on  picket  duty.  Both  were  right  in  view  of  the 
character  of  the  terrane.  The  essential  principle  is  this:  You 
must  hold  your  ground  until  the  main  body  is  ready  for 
action.  Notwithstanding  this,  to  allow  oneself  to  be  annihi- 
lated in  so  doing  would  be  a  serious  mistake. 

The  Main  Body  oe  the  Division  erom  5  p.  m.  untie 

NiGHTEAEL. 

As  soon  as  the  respective  adjutants  returned  from  the 
division  commander  with  orders  regarding  bivouac  sites,  or 
the  same  were  received  by  orderlies  from  the  division  head- 
quarters, the  brigades  immediately  proceeded  to  the  assign- 
ments in  detail. 

As  previously  stated,  the  number  of  men  in  the  various 
battalions  was  greatly  reduced ;  soldiers  who  did  not  know 
where  their  regiments  were  located  joined  the  body  of  troops 
nearest  them.  The  written  order  issued  from  Neu-Rognitz 
threw  some  light  for  the  first  time  on  the  position  of  the  troops, 
but  darkness  was  setting  in,  and  many  of  the  men  were  so 
tired  out  that  they  must  be  allowed  to  pass  the  night  where 
they  were;  they  were  mustered,  however,  and  regularly  dis- 
tributed to  the  various  bodies  of  troops. 

A  desire  for  rest,  after  the  oppressively  hot  day,  was  up- 
permost in  the  majority  of  the  organizations ;  nobody  was 
inclined  to  cook;  hunger  was  appeased  with  bread,  bacon,  or 
anything  the  men  happened  to  have  in  their  haversacks.  Water- 
carriers  were  detailed  to  bring  water  from  the  nearest  vil- 
lages, under  the  supervision  of  officers,  and  detachments  were 
sent  back  to  the  places  where  the  troops  were  engaged,  to  look 
for  any  wounded  possibly  left  on  the  battle-field.  Exhaustion 
was  too  great  to  permit  of  the  burymg  of  dead,  but  bivouacs 
were  cleared  of  the  bodies  and  arms  collected  in  piles. 

To  be  ready  for  further  operations,  cartridge-wagons 
were  brought  up  to  some  of  the  battalions,  and  the  pouch  am- 
munition replenished.  In  other  battalions  this  had  to  be  left 
until  the  next  morning,  as  the  proper  vehicles  could  not  be 
found.  In  part  of  the  Fourth  regiment  of  infantry  it  had  been 
necessary  to  replenish  ammunition  even   during  action,  espe- 


332  Studiics  in  the  Leading  oe  Troops. 

cially  in  ihc  case  of  the  troops  on  the  right  wing,  wbich  had 
fired  their  last  cartridges  early  in  the  action.  Cartridge- 
wagons  would  not  be  refilled  until  the  distribution  from  the 
ammunition  column,  which  was  ordered  for  the  next  morning. 
In  the  artillery,  the  First  battalion  fired  803  shots,  and  the 
Second  battalion  1,600;  so  a  single  ammunition  column  could 
replenisli  them. 

Comments  on    the   Bivouac   op  the   Main    Body. 

The  picture  we  have  briefly  described  in  this  instance  will 
generally  be  presented  after  every  action.  The  greater  the 
strain  has  been  on  troops  the  less  will  their  strength  be  and 
the  more  difficulty  will  we  have  in  meeting  the  demands  of 
theory. 

We  must  nevertheless  make  clear  to  ourselves  what  these 
demands  are,  and  strive  to  fulfill  them  as  far  as  permitted  by 
circumstances  and  the  strength  that  is  left.  In  any  case,  we 
must  at  least  endeavor  to  know  what  this  ideal  is. 

71ic  first  thing  is  to  get  the  troops  ready  to  ßght  again. 
This  includes  re-establishment  of  order,  replenishing  of  am- 
munition, and  finally  the  revival  of  strength. 

As  for  the  first,  we  have  attempted  to  indicate  ways  and 
means  by  which  much  can  be  accomplished  even  during  an  ac- 
tion to  maintain  the  cohesion  of  the  separate  bodies.  The 
more  regiments  and  brigades  are  ke]:)t  from  being  mixed  the 
more  promptly  can  this  be  accomplished.  Yet  this  is  ahvays 
difficult,  and  at  times  impossible ;  but  the  more  stress  we  lay 
on  such  measures  in  peace  maneuvers  the  more  attention  will 
be  paid  to  them  in  battle.  The  greatest  obstacle  in  this  direc- 
tion is  the  excessive  extension  of  the  fighting  line,  a  fault 
which  we  easily  succumb  to  even  in  peace.  This  can  be  par- 
tially obviated  if  care  is  taken,  either  on  the  defensive  or  the 
ofifensive,  never  to  deploy  a  body  of  troops  in  such  manner 
that  at  the  start  it  will  all  be  on  the  first  line. 

Whether  proper  attention  has  been  paid  during  an  en- 
gagement to  the  preservation  of  channels  of  transmitting  or- 
ders and  to  the  retaining  of  formations  once  adopted,  in  any 
case,  when  the  fight  is  over,  we  must  endeavor  to  establish 
certain  central  points  for  the  assembling  of  scattered  elements. 


vStudies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  333 

Such  points  would  naturally  be  with  the  reserves,  but  if  the 
reserves  too  have  been  employed,  then  we  must  resort  to  such 
dismembered  fragments  of  battalions  or  companies  as  may 
still  remain  within  the  hands  of  some  leader,  and  in  part  at 
least  assembled.  With  these  the  hrst  dispositions  must  be 
made;  they  are  still  fit  for  use,  and  may  be  posted  in  certain 
permanent  places.  A  large  majority  of  stragglers  will  nat- 
urally attach  theniselves,  and  thus  regiments  and  battalions 
may  be  formed  up  again.  The  importance  of  collecting  the 
scattered  men  and  dissolved  organizations,  at  the  earliest  pos- 
sible moment,  and  assembling  them  into  larger  bodies,  is  very 
apparent.  And  even  if  not  a  single  body  in  close  order  is  to 
be  found  near  the  fighting  line,  every  ofticer  must  neverthe- 
less appreciate  the  necessity  of  gathering  as  many  men  as 
he  can  around  him,  regardless  of  their  organizations,  and 
conducting  them  to  where  he  may  expect  to  find  assembled 
masses. 

When,  however,  utter  dissolution  reigns  after  an  action 
and  darkness  has  settled  down,  it  is  hardly  to  be  expected 
that  order  can  be  re-established  during  the  night.  In  such 
cases  the  division  commander  will  halt  the  subdivisions  farth- 
est to  the  front  and  charge  them  with  the  task  of  security,  and 
will  then  repair  to  any  body  that  may  happen  to  be  bivouack- 
ing at  some  important  point,  generally  near  a  highway,  and 
will  pass  the  night  there,  for  not  until  morning  will  it  be  pos- 
sible for  him  to  bring  order  out  of  chaos. 

In  the  example  under  consideration,  order  had  been  re- 
established in  all  regiments  after  the  close  of  the  engagement, 
to  such  an  extent  that  the  division  was  in  that  respect  in  good 
condition  for  further  action.  In  addition  to  this,  the  divis- 
ion commander  knew  the  location  of  the  various  regiments, 
and  it  was  thus  easy  for  him  to  assign  the  separate  bivouac 
sites.  Yet  a  large  number  of  men  had  not  yet  found  their 
proper  regiments  or  companies ;  whether  they  should  still  try 
to  find  them  will  depend  on  their  degree  of  fatigue,  their 
knowledge  of  where  their  troops  are  located,  and  the  prox- 
imity of  night;  otherwise  they  should  attach  themselves- to  the 
nearest  battalion  and  wait  until  morning.  In  any  case,  it  must 
be  insisted  that  all  the  men  work  zvith  their  utmost  ability  to- 
ward the  prompt  restoration  of  order. 


334  SruDiEt^  IN  THE  Leading  oe  Troops. 


i 


The  next  caro  is  to  govern  the  aniiiiunition  supply.  Reg- 
ulations provide  that  company  cartridge-wagons  shall  be 
under  the  charge  of  the  battalion  wagon-master  (a  non- 
commissioned officer  on  duty  with  the  train)  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  battalion  commander.  Cartridge-wagons  are  re- 
filled either  by  sending  them  back  to  the  ammunition  columns 
or  bringing  uj)  the  latter. 

Guns  should  be  cleanc  1  and  inspected  as  soon  as  practi- 
cable;  in  the  case  in  hand,  this  could  hardly  have  been  done 
that  day. 

Artillery  has  9  ammunition-wagons  to  each  battery, 
drawn  up  in  two  echelons,  besides  the  ammunition  carried  in 
the  caissons.  Should  this  not  suffice,  then  it  should  resort  to 
the  ammunition  columns.  It  is  therefore  advisable  that  the 
first  echelon  of  wagons  approach  the  battle-field  as  near  as 
possible,^  and  the  leader  of  the  second  echelon  inform  himself 
as  soon  as  possible  of  their  station.  If  conditions  demand  it, 
filled  wagons  from  the  columns  may  be  temporarily  assigned 
directly  to  the  batteries. 

Finally,  it  is  necessary  to  regain  strength  in  order  to  re- 
store our  fighting  capacity,  and  this  is  done  by  food,  drink, 
and  rest.  Frequently  the  men  will  prefer  to  lie  down  and 
sleep,  rather  than  go  to  work  digging  holes  and  fetching  wood 
and  water  for  cooking  a  substantial  meal.  Nevertheless  a 
leader  must  insist  that,  in  spite  of  all  disinclination  and  dif- 
ficulties, food  be  cooked  whenever  at  all  practicable.  It  is 
impossible  to  foresee  what  the  next  morning  will  bring  forth, 
or  whether  there  will  be  time  enough  left  for  ])ro|>er  re- 
freshment before  work  is  again  demanded  of  the  troops. 

To  accomplish  all  this,  first  of  all,  food  must  be  on  hand. 
On  the  battle-field  requisitions  generally  furnish  nothing,  or 
at  the  best  only  an  insufficient  supply.  In  such  cases  troops 
are  dependent  upon  the  emergency  ration.  Of  this  each  in- 
fantrvman  and  artilleryman  carries  three  days'  supply,  consist- 
ing of  caimed  food,  salt,  coffee,  and  hardtack  or  bread.  It  is 
advisable  to  carry  bacon  on  the  sul)sistencc-\vagons.  for  it 
keeps  well  and  can  be  eaten  cold.      Men  are  inclined   t«^  make 

iWhen  ]>atteries  are  on  the  i.iarch  and  are  separated,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  the  wagons  assigned  to  any  one  part  shoiihl  form 
in  (Mhclon. 


Studiks  in  the  Lkading  or  Tro^x^s.  ;^35 

premature  use  of  what  they  carry  in  their  haversacks,  an  in- 
fracticm  that  only  the  strictest  supervision  and  interposition 
on  the  part  of  leaders  can  prevent.  Furthermore,  hardtack  is 
universally  disliked  ;  but  although  the  subsistence-wagons  can 
carry  three  days'  complete  rations  for  each  man,  including  tea 
and  bread,  three  days'  supply  of  bread  is  almost  too  much  for 
a  man  to  carry  on  his  back. 

At  all  events,  the  one  ration  used  on  the  27th  must  be 
promptly  replaced.  For  such  purposes  we  have  subsistence- 
wagons,  and  then  the  commissary  columns,  which  follow  the 
corps  and  are  brought  up  as  soon  as  possible,  during  the  night 
if  practicable.  One  such  column  suffices  for  one  day's  supply 
of  an  infantry  division  with  corps  artillery.  If  the  subsistence- 
wagons  arrive  at  the  bivouac  in  good  season,  then  the  issue 
can  be  made  from  them  direct ;  but  if  this  is  repeated  for  some 
time,  care  must  be  taken  that  the  emergency  ration  is  renewed. 

Horse  artillery  carries  two  days'  forage  supply,  and  cav- 
alry one  day's.  Additional  supplies  are  carried  in  the  forage- 
w^agons  of  the  supply  column.  Special  attention  must  be  given 
to  the  supply  of  oats. 

Through  an  error,  no  permanent  columns  were  assigned 
to  the  Second  infantry  division ;  2  wagon  trains  and  i  supply 
column  would  have  been  sufficient. 

The  first  duty  of  a  chief  quartermaster  of  a  division  dur- 
ing an  engagement  is  to  provide  sufficient  wagons  filled  with 
straw  for  carrying  wounded,  and  to  direct  these  to  the  dress- 
ing station.  Furthermore,  he  has  to  see  to  the  timely  bring- 
ing up  of  the  columns.  Had  columns  been  assigned  to  the 
division,  they  would  have  been  obliged  to  remain  at  Schöm- 
berg  until  the  result  of  the  engagement  appeared  no  longer 
uncertain,  and  they  could  not  have  been  ordered  up  until 
then.  The  ground  north  of  Sorge  and  to  the  west  of  the  high- 
way seems  to  be  the  most  suitable  place  for  them  to  estab- 
lish a  park  after  their  arrival  during  the  night.  A  chief  quar- 
termaster will  request  the  general  stafif  officer  to  inform  him 
where  the  various  bivouacs  have  been  established,  and  then 
await  the  arrival  of  the  trains. 

If  the  trains  come  up  in  time  to  issue  provisions  during 
the  evening,  this  should  b.'  done  :  if  they  arrive  too  late,  the 
necessary  supplies  can  be  sent  to  the  various  bivouacs,  or  ev- 


336  STüini'.s  jx  tiik  Lkading  ov  Troops. 

-erythin^'  prepared  (lurin,Li  the  nii^lit  so  an  issue  can  be  prompt- 
Ay  made  at  dayhrcik.  }>eef  cattle  may  be  driven  along-  as  far 
as  practicable,  but  should  never  be  killed  for  immediate  issue 
to  troops.  For  actual  consumption  beef  should  be  taken  from 
the  sup|>lv  carried  on  the  commissary  wagons,  if  these  are  at 
hand.  This  meat  is  then  at  least  a  day  old,  and  much  more 
wholesome  than  if  freshly  killed.  All  empty  wagons  of  the 
■  column  ^^hould  be  immediately  sent  back  to  the  nearest  sup- 
ply station,  but  in  so  doing  will  be  utilized  in  the  transporta- 
tion of  wounded  in  case  enough  wagons  have  not  been  requi- 
sitioned for  that  purpose.  The  chief  quartermaster  attends 
to  this,  and  sees  that  sufficient  straw  is  provided  for  bedding 
in  the  wagons.  Finally,  he  must  daily  submit  to  the  chief 
quartermaster  of  the  corps  an  exact  report  as  to  how  long 
he  can  subsist  the  division  with  the  aid  of  the  columns  as- 
i»igned  to  it.^ 

Turning  to  the  general  question  of  bivouacking,  we  may 
say  that  a  bivouac  should  only  be  established  when  the  situa- 
tion requires  it.  If  practicable,  we  should  always  endeavor 
to  put  the  men  under  cover,  and  they  should  be  billeted  in  all 
available  places  in  the  immediate  vicinity,  or  at  least  go  into 
bivouac  in  a  village.  In  this  case  the  proximity  of  the  enemy 
to  a  great  extent  prevented  the  seeking  of  such  accommoda- 
tions. ])esides,  fighting  had  taken  place  on  all  sides  of  Neu- 
.  Uognitz,  and  the  village  would  very  likely  be  filled  with 
wounded  incapable  of  being  transported.  Some  of  the  farm- 
houses must  furthermore  be  cleared  for  shelter  for  the  staffs, 
as  their  clerical  work  had  to  be  attended  to.  An  occupation 
of  Ober-Altenbuch  and  Alt-Rognitz  could  very  properly  be 
dispensed  with ;  men  quartered  in  the  former  place  would  be 
much  exposed,  and  therefore  require  extensive  measures  of 
security,  and  troops  put  into  the  latter  would  be  too  far  away 
and  could  not  be  brought  up  soon  enough  in  case  of  a  hos- 
tile attack.  As  for  Hohcnbruck,  it  was  already  within  the 
territory  of  the  First  infantry  division. 

The  distribution  of  bivouac  sites  in  the  case  of  the  Sec- 
ond infantry  division  met  all  demands  that  could  be  made  up- 

'In  t\u'.  (itTinan  Army  the  subsistence  of  troops  is  performed 
by   fhp  CiMarlcriiiiistfM's  })e\)artim'nt.Tr(nisla(or. 


Studies  in  thk.  Leading  of  Troops.  337 

on  it.  In  the  first  place,  it  must  be  remembered  that  troops 
should  lie  behind  the  position  to  be  occupied  in  case  of  hos- 
tile attack.  Furthermore,  here  they  were  all  on  even,  rising 
slopes,  where  the  ground  holds  the  least  moisture.  Meadows 
should  be  especially  avoided  as  inimical  to  health.  In  addi- 
tion to  this,  all  of  the  bivouacs  were  protected  against  the 
wind  by  the  ridges,  woods,  or  villages  surrounding  them. 
Moreover,  wood  for  cook-fires  was  easily  obtainable.  Pro- 
tection against  rain  can  be  secured  by  shelter-tents,  which  can 
be  erected  in  a  short  time. 

In  woods  care  must  be  taken  to  establish  a  boundary  in 
rear  of  the  bivouac  (as  a  ravine,  road,  or  fence),  which 
should  be  guarded.  Otherwise  troops  will  scatter  too  much; 
some  will  even  entirely  leave  the  bivouac,  and  this  has  a  bad 
influence  upon  the  readiness  of  troops  for  action. 

All  other  considerations  must  give  way  to  readiness  for 
action.  In  this  direction  some  difficulty  might  be  encountered 
with  the  water  supply.  Here  the  troops,  being  so  closely 
assembled,  were  dependent  on  Neu-Rognitz  and  Burkersdorf 
alone  for  water,  with  possibly  some  help  from  Ober-Altenbuch 
and  Sorge. 

Where  more  freedom  is  allowed  in  the  selection  of  biv- 
ouacs, it  is  well  to  consider  the  facilities  for  procuring  water 
and  for  watering  animals,  and  to  have  these  facilities  as  near 
at  hand  as  possible. 

The  more  limited  the  ground  available  is,  the  more  care 
must  be  taken  to  assign  to  each  body  its  place  precisely.  We 
must  also  insist  in  bivouac  that  every  body  of  troops  in  close 
order  always  take  up  its  proper  formation. 

Under  ordinary  conditions,  the  size  of  the  several  biv- 
ouacs must  be  in  accordance  with  Field  Service  Regulations. 

In  war  we  will  often  be  forced  to  deviate  from  the  pre- 
scribed order  in  establishing  a  bivouac.  In  this  way,  on  ac- 
count of  the  irregular  formation  of  the  ground,  as  seen  in  the 
case  of  the  Second  battalion  of  the  Second  regiment,  a  battal- 
ion may  camp  with  some  of  its  companies  in  a  second  line, 
instead  of  the  companies  alongside  each  other  in  platoon  col- 
umns; for  if  it  were  desired  to  give  the  men  the  benefit  of  the 
shelter  of  the  bushes  at  the  edge  of  the  woods,  then  the  forma- 
tions must  conform  to  the  character  of  the  ground. 


33^  Studiks  in  thk  Lkadixg  of  Troops. 

In  such  an  event  the  places  for  roll-call  and  for  the  stacks 
will  be  outside  of  the  timber,  while  the  spots  where  the  men 
should  camp  are  designated  within  the  woods. 

Similar  departure  from  regulations  is  necessary  in  the 
location  of  holes  for  fires  and  sinks,  so  they  will  not  annoy 
either  the  troops  themselves  or  adjoining  bodies.  It  would 
hardly  have  been  practicable  to  construct  sinks  in  the  biv- 
ouac of  the  Second  infantry  division;  nevertheless  places 
should  be  designated  where  men  could  attend  to  the  calls  of 
Nature.  If  troops  are  obliged  to  encamp  one  behind  another, 
sinks  must  not  be  located  between  them,  but  placed  on  the 
flanks  or  in  rear  of  the  last  subdivision. 

In  order  that  all  these  considerations  may  not  be  disre- 
garded, a  bivouac  commander  must  be  appointed.  "The  sen- 
ior officer  present  is  the  commander  of  a  bivouac."  As  the 
commander  of  the  First  infantry  regiment  was  assigned  to 
the  command  of  a  brigade,  and  as  the  other  regimental  com- 
manders were  either  dead  or  wounded,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
J ,  of  the  First  regiment  of  field  artillery,  was  the  sen- 
ior officer  in  the  bivouac.  He  must  therefore  camp  at  a  spot 
easily  recognizable  (in  this  case  close  to  the  highway)  ;  and 
he  must  see  that  the  place  is  made  known  to  all  guards ;  he 
must  tissign  stables,  wells,  and  watering-places,  and  is  respon- 
sible for  the  measures  of  safety. 

Let  us  now  take  a  closer  view  of  the  bivouac  southwest 
of  Neu-Rognitz.  It  consisted  of  4  companies  each  of  the 
First  and  Second  regiments,  3  squadrons,  and  6  batteries. 
The  first  question  was.  Where  shall  the  artillery  be  placed? 
Above  all,  it  must  have  a  clear  field,  in  order  to  quickly  oc- 
cupy the  position  assigned  it  on  Hill  635 ;  but  it  should  also  be 
near  a  main  road,  so  that  it  could  respond  promptly  in  case 
it  should  be  needed  farther  to  the  front.  For  these  reasons 
Lieutenant-Colonel  J stationed  it  near  the  southwest- 
ern corner  of  Neu-Rognitz,  close  to  the  highway.  There  it 
was  i)rotccted  by  the  hill  in  front  and  by  the  near-by  infantry, 
which  had  been  specially  located  for  that  purpose  in  front  of 
the  artillery. 

Upon  the  right  the  cavalry  could  rest  (juietlv.  as  nothing 
need  be  feared  from  the  direction  of  Ober-Altenbuch.  and  2 


I 


i 


Studiks  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  339 

sentry  posts  were  in  the  vicinity.     In  case  of  an  action,  the 
hussars  could  find  employment  only  on  the  right  wing. 

It  was  advisable  to  place  companies  of  the  Second  bat- 
talion of  the  First  regiment  in  the  region  between  liill  635 
and  the  highway  on  the  right  wing,  so  that  if  the  ourposts 
should  fall  back  behind  the  right  wing  of  the  main  body,  the 
First  infantry  regiment  would  be  united.  A  sentry  post  was 
needed  on  Hill  635  to  secure  possession  of  this  point  on  the 
right  wing. 

The  First  battalion  of  the  Second  regiment  should  un- 
questionably bivouac  along  the  highv/ay,  to  the  east  of  which 
the  two  other  battalions  were  camped. 

In  general  the  following  may  be  said  with  regard  to  the 
arrangement  of  these  bivouacs:  If  the  wind  came  from  the 
northeast,  the  fire-pits  behind  the  various  bivouacs  should  be 
located  as  far  as  practicable  toward  the  west.  Vehicles  and 
any  sutlers  on  the  ground  would  be  located  between  the  in- 
fantry and  the  artillery,  and  sinks  in  the  point  of  the  woods 
west  of  Neu-Rognitz  that  projected  southward. 

The  interior  order  in  the  bivouac  was  maintained  by 
the  color,  standard,  and  park  (artillery)  guards.  In  order 
to  give  rest  to  the  troops,  these  guards  must  be  limited  as 
much  as  practicable.  For  the  same  reason  economy  was 
exercised  in  the  establishm.ent  of  sentry  posts,  one  on  the  right 
near  Sorge,  and  two  in  front  (one  on  Hill  635  and  the  other 
on  the  Burkersdorf  highway). 

But  when  all  is  said,  the  principal  thing  is  to  secure  rest 
and  comfort  for  the  troops  as  soon  as  possible.  Upon  arriv- 
ing, every  body  of  troops  must  begin  at  once  to  establish 
itself,  and  when  once  engaged  in  this  duty,  every  interrup- 
tion amounts  to  a  loss  of  rest,  and  can  be  justified  only  by  the 


The  Hospital  Service. 

Let  us  here  recapitulate  the  measures  taken  by  the  Med- 
ical Department  up  to  this  time. 

As  soon  as  the  engagement  was  expected,  the  fact  was 
communicated  to  the  division  surgeon,  and  directions  of 
march  were  designated  for  the  ambulance  company  and  field 
hospital:    At  the^ame  time  (8:50  a.  m.)  the  surgeon  was  in- 


340  Studies  in  tuk  Lkadixg  of  Troops. 

structed  to  requisition  wagons  for  the  transport  of  tlie  wound- 
ed. For  this  puri)osc  some  cavalrymen  were  placed  at  his 
(Hsposal. 

Shortly  before  1 1  130  a.  ni.  the  division  commander  \yas 
advised  that  a  dressing  station  had  been  established  in  Krib- 
litz  and  that  21  requisitioned  vehicles  were  on  the  spot.  Up 
to  that  time  it  had  not  been  necessary  to  employ  the  ambu- 
lance company,  as  the  4  litter-bearers  regularly  detailed  by 
each  company  had  been  sufficient  to  carry  wounded  to  the 
dressing  station.  This  carrying  of  wounded  was  done  under 
the  supervision  of  specially  detailed  non-commissioned  offi- 
cers, who  were  placed  under  the  regimental  surgeons,  together 
with  4  or  5  litters  to  each  battalion  taken  from  the  two- 
horse  medical  wagons.  These  wagons,  in  accordance  with 
regulations,  had  followed  behind  the  battalions  a?  light  bag- 
gage, so  that  the  necessary  number  of  litters  was  promptly 
available.  The  medical  wagon  belonging  to  the  Second  bat- 
talion of  the  Second  regiment  remained  at  the  dressing  sta- 
tion, and  the  necessary  medicines  and  appliances  were  taken 
from  it.  The  surgeon  of  the  Second  regiment  took  charge  of 
the  medical  service  at  the  station,  and  had  a  Red  Cross  flag 
raised. 

When  near  i  o'clock  the  engagement  assumed  greater 
proportions,  the  division  surgeon  put  the  ambulance  company 
to  work  and  established  a  general  dressing  station  at  Krib- 
litz.  To  this  point  he  also  brought  up  the  field  hospital.  All 
this  was  duly  reported  to  the  division  commander  at  i  :45 
p.  m.,  who  was  further  advised  that  the  ambulance  compa- 
nies of  the  First  infantry  division  had  also  arrived  north  of 
Jiohenbruck.  These  dispositions  met  the  approval  of  the 
division  commander.^  We  might  add  that  if  the  entire  am- 
bulance comi)any  of  the  First  division  had  not  been  on  hand, 
a  section  of  the  Second  division  could  have  been  advantage- 
ously employed  near  llohenbruck. 

In  this  instance  the  division  surgeon  made  disposition  ol 
the  ambulance  coni])any  of  his  own  accord.  He  has  the  right 
to  do  so  when  no  order  is  received  from  division  headquar- 
ters and  there  is  danger  in  delay ;  nevertheless,  an  order  from 

iSee  pages  230  and  233,  Part  III.,  for  furtlier  remarks  on  the 
medical  service. 


I 


Studies  in  thk  Lkading  of  Troops.  341 ; 

division  headquarters  might  easily  have  been  obtained.     The: 
one  who  ought  to  make  the  dispositions  is,  however,  the  conT^- 
mander  of  the  troops ;  he  should  decide  whether  the  company  • 
should  be  set  to  work,  how  much  of  the  company,  at  whaf 
place,   and   whether  .the   temporary   stations   should   be   con-' 
tinned  or  absorbed  into  the  general  dressing  station.     This  is-' 
prescribed  in  Regulations.     The  highest  commander  alone  is- 
able  to  surmise  with  any  degree  of  certainty  where  the  fight 
will  be  more  fierce  ;  he  knows  where  he  will  carry  on  a  dilatory' 
action  for  a  time  ;  he  also  knows  where  the  assault  will  entail 
the  greatest  sacrifices.     He  can  best  understand  whether  for 
the  time  being  it  will  be  simply  an  initiatory  action  and  the 
decision  worked  out  somewhere  else.     All  these  points  must 
be  considered  in  the  establishment  of  dressing  stations  and  the 
distribution  of  the  medical  personnel.  ■   ■  '■ 

On  the  right  wing  ample  provision  was  made  for  the 
time  being  by  the  dressing  station  in  Hohenbruck.  The  estab- 
lishing of  one  at  the  northwestern  farm-house  of  Alt-Rognitz 
does  not  seem  to  be  a  fortunate  choice  for  a  dressing  station- 
on  the  left  wing,  as  the  Fourth  brigade  would  have  to  reach 
out  almost  to  the  church  of  St.  Paul  and  St.  John  before  it' 
could  enter  the  engagement.  The  division  surgeon  was  not 
aware  of  this,  and  so  he  could  not  take  it  into  account;  but 
the  division  commander  should  have  advised  him  iii  due  sea- 
son. In  consequence  of  this  neglect,  the  wounded  on  the  e:?t- 
treme  left  were  over  a  mile  and  a  half  away  from  the  nearest* 
station,  which  is  too  great  a  distance,  especially  when  wound- 
ed must  be  carried. 

The  subsequent  moving  of  the  main  dressing  station 
from  Kriblitz  to  Alt-Rognitz  and  merging  the  temporary  -sta- 
tion with  it  was  eminently  correct.  Here  it  was  not  reached  ' 
by  infantry  fire,  had  water  near  by,  and  need  not  pitch  dress-; 
ing-tents,  as  houses  were  available.  The  spot  was  marked' 
by  two  flags — one  the  National  color  and  the  other  the  Red 
Cross  flag.  .••■-. 

To  get  the  best  service  from  the  hospital  corps;  it  is  a15-' 
solutely  necessary  for  the  commander  to  keep  medical  ofli'cers- 
fully  informed  concerning  the  course  of  events.    But  beforethe** 
beginning  of  an  action  a  general  survey  is  practicable  only  in 
exceptional  cases,  and  it  is  recommended  not  to  dispose  too* 


;542  STirnriv.-  ix  tttf-:  Lkadin'o  of  Troops. 

quickly  of  all  the  resources  of  the  medical  service.  At  first  we 
should  ^ct  alont^  with  temporary  dressint;'  stations,  and  employ 
the  rci^imeiUal  siir[;eons  and  medical  wagons  in  them.  It  is 
true  that  the  latter  are  hardly  ahle  to  follow  troops  advancing 
over  fields  and  frequently  seeking  cover^  they  are  often  left 
lying  in  a  ditch,  and  as  a  rule,  they  lose  connection  with  the 
hody  to  which  they  belong.  Whenever  an  action  assumes  a 
stationary  character,  it  is  well  to  permit  one  or  more  temporary 
dressing  stations  to  be  absorbed  in  a  general  dressing  station. 

r>ut  if  losses  are  considerable  at  the  outset,  then  the  am- 
Imlancc  company  must  go  to  \vork  for  itself;  even  then,  how- 
ever, it  is  advisable  first  to  employ  only  one  section  ;  and  espe- 
cially to  allow  only  one  of  th^  hospital  wagons  to  be  un])acked. 
When  a  large  stream  of  wounded  is  coming  in,  we  certainly 
are  desirous  of  helping  them  as  soon  as  possible,  and  in  such 
cases  we  arc  easily  led  to  dispose  of  all  the  nedical  service 
at  hand.  But  if  this  is  done  and  the  fight  moves  forward  a 
few  miles,  or  perha])s  further,  then  the  wounded  are  without 
liclp;  for  it  is  not  easy  to  move  a  general  dressing  station  to 
the  front,  when  once  established,  especially  if  all  the  litter- 
bearers  are  already  deployed  on  the  field,  where  they  may  be 
so  busy  that  they  cannot  attend  to  the  wounded  assigned 
them. 

It  might  indeed  be  claimed  that  all  the  hospital  corps  can 
do  is  to  keep  incessantly  at  work,  and  that  it  cannot  be  em- 
ployed in  one  place  when  it  is  elsewhere  fully  engaged.  But 
this  is  not  so.  The  requirements  of  wounded  men  differ 
materially.  Of  course  every  man  who  is  hurt  desires  to  get 
into  the  hands  of  a  surgeon  as  so^n  as  possible;  in  many 
cases,  however,  it  makes  little  difference  if  this  is  deferred 
for  an  hour,  while  in  some  cases  life  depends  on  it.  Conse- 
quently the  first  thing  to  be  done  when  wounded  arrive  at  a 
dressing  station  is  to  sort  them  out  and  first  attend  to  such 
as  re(|uire  urgent  assistance.  But  if  there  are  hundreds  o! 
wounded  possibly  2  miles  from  the  main  dressing  station, 
where  tlicy  cannot  even  be  collected,  and  where  there  is  no 
surgical  assistance  whatever  available,  help  which  would  then 
be  of  service  might  be  useless  a  few  hours  later. 

This  is  probably  the  reason  why  Regulations  provide  for 
"leaving  half  of  the  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  of 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  343 

the  Medical  Department  with  their  organizations  in  action, 
and  half  at  the  dressing  stations.  And  notwithstanding  this  pro- 
vision, even  if  the  medical  officers  on  the  fighting  line  be  ever 
so  self-sacrificing,  their  activity  will  nevertheless  be  limited, 
for  the  necessary  assistance,  quietude,  material,  and  a  proper 
place  to  work  in  will  often  be  wanting.  Furthermore,  we 
must  not  overlook  the  fact  that  in  the  more  important  cases, 
those  which  demand  the  most  prompt  help,  especially  in  opera- 
tions, the  lone  surgeon  can  do  nothing,  but  that  he  must  have 
surgeon  assistants. 

The  more  co-operation  provided  for  the  finding  and  col- 
lecting of  wounded  and  the  greater  the  centralization  of  the 
surgical  personnel,  whereby  one  surgeon  can  come  to  the 
assistance  of  another,  the  greater  blessing  will  the  hospital 
corps  be. 

In  this  connection  it  is  recommended  not  only  to  dispose 
of  half  of  the  surgeons  with  the  troops,  but  also  to  send  the 
personnel  of  field  hospitals  not  yet  erected  to  the  dressing  sta- 
tions ;  indeed,  this  is  expressly  authorized  in  Field  Regula- 
tions for  the  Medical  Department  (paragraph  56).  Here  also 
is  it  necessary  for  the  field  hospitals  to  be  advised  in  good  sea- 
son, and  this  can  only  be  done  when  the  directing  medical  offi- 
cers {chief  surgeons  of  divisions  and  corps)  reveive  suitable 
instructions  from  superior  troop  leaders. 

The  reason  for  retaining  half  of  the  regimental  surgeons 
non-commissioned  officers  Vv^ith  their  organizations  and  not  us- 
ing them  at  the  dressing  stations  is  probably  that  troops  need- 
ing to  make  a  further  advance  will  not  be  without  surgical  at- 
tendance. In  the  field  all  surgeons  are  mounted,  so  they  can 
follow  anywhere  without  over-exertion.  Non-commissioned 
officers  of  the  hospital  corps  ought  to  be  drilled  in  the  use 
of  the  bicycle,  so  they  m.ay  keep  up  prompt  communication  be- 
tween the  dressing  stations,  the  troops,  and  the  field  hospitals. 

As  far  as  practicable,  preliminary  dressings  are  applied 
on  the  fighting  line  by  surgeons,  non-commissioned  officers 
of  the  Medical  Department,  litter-bearers,  and  the  troops  them- 
selves. 

Besides  the  general  dressing  station  established  in  Alt- 
Rognitz,  a  temporary  station  at  Hohenbruck,  in  the  rear  of  the 


344  Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops. 

Ninth  infantry  brigade,  was  ordcTcd  ;  also  a  general  dressing 
station  north  of  that  village. 

We  will  now  give  especial  consideration  to  the  station  at 
Alt-Rognitz.  The  ambulance  company  disposable  there  con- 
sisted of  a  mounted  captain  as  commander,  lieutenants,  a  quar- 
termaster, an  orderly  sergeant,  and  over  lOO  litter-bearers ; 
the  surgical  personnel  at  hand  was  a  chief  surgeon,  several 
surgeon's  and  assistant  surgeons,  a  field  apothecary,  non- 
conimissioned  of^cers  of  the  hospital  corps,  nurses,  and  the 
necessary  men  of  the  train.  Besides  the  2  medical  and  2  bag- 
gage-wagons, 8  ambulances  were  there;  each  of  the  ambu- 
lances supplied  with  6  to  9  litters. 

When   Lieutenant-General   A first   met   the   corps 

commander,  the  division  surgeon  requested  die  chief  quar- 
termaster of  the  corps  to  provide  more  wagons,  as  up  to  that 
moment  only  21  requisitioned  wagons  were  at  hand.  He  in- 
formed him,  however,  that  the  mounted  men  who  had  gath- 
ered these  wagons  had  been  sent  to  Trautenau  to  see  if  they 
could  not  find  more.  The  quartermaster  made  arrangements 
to  have  the  necessary  supply  brought  up  out  of  the  villages 
in  the  vicinity. 

The  division  surgeon  also  availed  himself  of  this  oppor- 
tunity to  discuss  matters  with  the  chief  surgeon  of  the  corps, 
and  to  advise  him  of  dispositions  already  made.  The  latter 
stated  that  he  had  ordered  three  more  field  hospitals  to  re- 
port at  Trautenau,  where  he  would  establish  rhem  if  neces- 
sary: and  that  he  would  hold  the  Third  ambulance  company 
at  the  disposal  of  corps  headquarters  in  readiness  for  any 
employment  that  might  devolve  upon  it. 

After  that,  .the  division  surgeon  went  to  Hohenbruck, 
where  he  found  the  surgeon  of  the  First  regiment,  who  had 
already  taken  charge  of  the  surgical  work  at  the  temporary 
station  there.  After  consulting  with  him,  he  hurried  on  to 
Alt-Rognitz.  There  the  ambulance  company  was  already  bus- 
ilv  employed.  The  farm-house  at  the  northwest  corner  of  the 
village,  with  its  two  large  granaries,  was  well  adapted  for 
the  purpose.  The  building  was  situated  in  a  well-sheltered 
position  at  the  foot  of  the  heights,  several  trees  furnishing 
shade,  and  a  deep  cut  at  its  side  was  ruiming  with  spring 
water.  To  the  west  of  the  buildings  was  a  suitable  place  for 
parking  the   medical   and   l)aggage-wagonj 


Studies  in  thi$  Li^ading  of  Troops.  345 

flag  was  raised  alongside  the  National  color  on  one  of  the 
granaries,  and  was  visible  a  great  distance  off.  Some  of  the 
various  regimental  surgeons  were  already  on  the  spot. 

At  that  time  the  left  wing  of  the  Third  brigade  was  hotly 
engaged  on  the  ridge  east  of  Peak  527,  and  the  Fourth  bri- 
gade had  just  left  Alt-Roguitz  to  attack.  The  officer  in  ciiarge 
iiad  sent  4  ambulances  to  the  field  on  which  the  Third  brigade 
was  engaged,  under  charge  of  an  officer,  having  equipped  the 
litter-bearers  with  the  necessary  dressings  and  restoratives. 
The  officer  halted  the  ambulances  in  a  depression  behind  the 
left  wing  of  the  brigade,  and  from  there  sent  forward  the  sev- 
eral litter-bearers  each  to  a  definite  point,  which  he  distinctly 
pointed  out  to  them.  When  he  rode  over  the  ground  and 
noticed  that  the  litter-bearers  of  another  ambulance  company 
(that  of  the  First  division)  were  already  at  work  near  Hohen- 
bruck,  he  contented  himself  with  sending  men  in  that  direc- 
tion only  into  the  thickets  on  Hill  527.  To  the  north,  how- 
ever, beyond  Hill  513,  the  litter-bearers  found  several  men 
of  the  First  and  Second  regiments  who  were  severely  wound- 
ed. These,  as  well  as  wounded  found  elsewhere,  were  first  re- 
freshed and  provided  with  first  aid,  then  lifted  on  the  litters, 
and  carried  either  to  the  general  dressing  station  or  to  wagons, 
according  to  distance.  When  practicable,  the  wagons  drove 
up  to  them.  Whenever  a  wagon  was  filled  (2  to  4  wounded), 
it  was  driven  back  to  the  station  under  supervision  of  a  lance 
corporal ;  arms  and  equipments  were  picked  up  and  carried 
along.  These  wagons  were  returned  from  the  dressing  sta- 
tion as  quickly  as  possible,  after  they  were  again  loaded  with 
litters,  and  were  sent  to  a  station  established  on  the  fighting 
line. 

Those  who  were  slightly  wounded  were  directed  to  this 
dressing  station,  while  company  litter-bearers  soon  caught 
sight  of  the  wagons  and  brought  wounded  up  to  them.  Al- 
though the  dressing  station  soon  became  crowded  with  pa- 
tients, it  was  still  possible  to  examine  and  attend  to  them  all. 

When  the  wounded  were  brought  up,  they  were  taken  out 
of  the  wagons  by  so-called  receiving  details,  which  consisted  of 
surgeons  and  non-commissioned  officers  of  the  hospital  corps. 
The  senior  surgeon  present  had  divided  his  corps  of  assist- 
ing surgeons  and  their  helpers  into  three  parts.     The  duty  of 


346  STiri)ii:s  IX   ihk  Liai>i\<;  oi-  Trckjps. 

the  first  was  rcce[)tion,  bedding,  refreshing,  examining,  and 
sorting.  The  second  party  appHed  the  more  difficult  dress- 
ings recjuiring  time.  The  third  party  performed  such  vital  op- 
erations as  could  not  have  been  performed  at  the  temporary 
station. 

The  division  surgeon  soon  came  up,  and  he  took  charge. 
Whenever  a  body  of  slightly  wounded  gathered,  he  had  them 
march  to  Trautenau,  to  report  to  the  commanding  officer  at 
that  place,  with  a  view  to  their  being  sent  to  the  nearest  sup- 
ply station.  It  was  impossible  to  furnish  an  escort  during  the 
engagement ;  Regulations  require  such  details  to  be  made  by 
division  headquarters.  Neither  could  the  end  of  the  fight  be 
awaited,  for  above  everything  else  it  was  important  that  the 
place  be  cleared  as  m.uch  as  possible. 

In  like  manner  those  who  w^ere  severely  wounded  were 
sent  to  the  field  hospital  in  Kriblitz ;  those  unable  to  walk 
being  taken  in  requisitioned  wagons. 

When  the  action  opened,  the  number  of  wagons  on  hand 
was  quite  sufficient ;  surgical  assistance,  too,  could  be  prompt- 
ly rendered ;  but  as  soon  as  the  Fourth  brigade  became  en- 
gaged, the  situation  changed.  As  we  know,  the  attack  of  the 
left  wing  of  this  brigade  miscarried  in  a  very  short  time,  and 
with  heavy  losses.  As  soon  as  the  brigade  deployed  west  of 
Alt-Rognitz,  the  commander  of  the  ambulance  company  im- 
mediately sent  the  Second  section  and  all  available  ambulances 
to  that  village,  on  account  of  the  extent  of  the  field  of  action. 
The  officer  in  charge  of  this  section  divided  his  force  into  two 
parts,  to  each  of  which  he  assigned  territory  marked  by  the 
roads  in  front.  In  a  few  minutes,  however,  the  stream  of 
wounded  went  directly  to  the  dressing  station,  and  the  serv- 
ices of  the  entire  surgical  personnel  were  taxed  to  a  high 
degree. 

According  to  Field  Service  Regulations  for  the  Medical 
Department,  the  division  surgeon  must  assume  command  at  the 
main  dressing  station,  whicli  was  done  in  this  case.  The  senior 
surgeon  has  to  do  particularly  with  the  work  of  the  ambulance 
personnel.  The  corps  surgeon,  when  acting  as  division  sur- 
geon, cannot  remain  permanently  at  one  main  station ;  he  must 
superintend  all,  and  not  become  absorbed  in  the  work  at  one 
alone.   In  this  case  the  division  surgeon  went  at  once  to  the  left 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  Troops.  347 

wing  to  see  personally  what  help  might  be  given  there.  At  that 
point  he  found  the  field  com])letely  covered  with  dead  and 
wounded,  regimental  surgeons  having  been  unable  to  accom- 
plish anything  in  the  general  confusion.  Accordingly  he  im- 
mediately sought  out  the  ambulance  company  officer  who  was 
in  the  vicinity  with  his  section;  the  latter  could  lead  him  to 
the  surgeon  of  the  Fourth  regiment,  with  whom  he  had 
spoken  shortly  before  this.  Fortunately,  they  found  the  sur- 
geon quickly.  The  division  surgeon  thereupon  directed  the 
regimental  surgeon  to  go  to  the  farm-yard  in  front  of  the 
church  of  St.  Paul  and  St.  John,  and  establish  a  temporary 
dressing  station  there,  and  instructed  him  to  send  thither  any 
company  surgeons  he  might  meet.  Moreover,  he  despatched 
a  mounted  non-commissioned  officer  of  the  hospital  train  to 
the  chief  surgeon  of  the  corps,  with  the  following  written 
recommendation : 

Heavy  losses  on  the  left  wing  make  it  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  use  the  Third  ambulance  company.  Please  send  it  as 
quickly  as  possible  to  the  church  of  »St.  Paul  and  St.  John,  in 

Alt-Rognitz,   where   Major   E ,   surgeon,   will   establish 

a  dressing  station.  P , 

Chief  Surgeon  of  Division. 

The  division  surgeon  then  hastened  back  to  the  main 
dressing  station,  to  send  help  from  there  to  Major  E . 

The  establishing  of  the  new  dressing  station  was  a  most 
difficult  task;  except  for  location,  which  was  rather  con- 
venient, there  was  nothing  else  at  hand.  The  medical  offi- 
cer succeeded  in  finding  two  other  surgeons,  several  non- 
commissioned officers  of  the  hospital  corps,  and  some  assist- 
ant litter-bearers,  whom  he  sent  thither.  The  wounded  too, 
when  they  perceived  the  direction  taken  by  the  bearers,  also 
followed,  and  soon  a  large  number  of  men  in  need  of  help 
were  assembled.  But  everything  in  the  way  of  supplies  was 
wanting;  even  the  medical  wagons  could  not  be  found.  There 
was  not  a  single  mounted  man  at  hand  to  look  for  them. 
Finally,  after  more  than  half  an  hour  had  elapsed,  the  divis- 
ion surgeon  arrived  with  3  medical  officers,  3  non-commis- 
sioned officers  of  the  hospital  corps,  and  i  medical  wagon ; 
these  had  turned  over  the  wounded  they  had  in  charge  to  their 
colleasfues  at  the  main  station. 


348  Sti:uii;s  ix  tiik  Lkadinx  oi-  Troops. 

Even  the  wagons  that  had  been  requisitioned  by  the  corps 
quarterniaster  did  not  arrive,  as  they  had  been  appropriated 
by  the  main  dressing  station  when  they  had  arrived  at  the 
northwestern  entrance  of  the  village.  No  attempt  was  there- 
fore made  to  send  to  the  rear  during  the  day  men  from  the 
newly  established  station ;  it  was  preferred  to  shelter  the  men 
in  the  nearest  farm-buildiiigs,  in  which  work  the  slightly 
wounded  were  required  to  assist. 

An  hour  and  a  half  of  anxiety  passed,  and  finally  the 
Third  ambulance  company  arrived,  and  order  was  partially  es- 
tablished. After  this  much  had  been  accomplished,  the  divis- 
ion surgeon  thought  he  ought  to  see  how  matters  stood  oh 
the  right  wing,  where  in  the  meantime  a  successful  action 
had  been  in  progress,  and  also  to  see  how  the  wounded  were 
being  cared  for  there.  On  the  right  wing  he  found  a  tent 
erected  near  the  last  house  (which  had  been  battered  down) 
at  the  northern  extremity  of  Neu-Rognitz,  and  to  his  delight 
observed  that  a  section  of  the  ambulance  company  of  the  First 
infantry  division  had  gone  forward  to  that  point;  the  section 
had  certainly  all  it  could  do.  From  there  he  wrote  the  fol- 
lowing report  to  division  headquarters : 

The  First  ambulance  company  is  posted  north  of  Hohen- 
bruck  and  in  Neu-Rognitz,  the  Second  at  the  northern  ex- 
tremity of  Alt-Rognitz,  and  the  Third  in  the  center  of  the 
village  near  the  church.  The  Third  ambulance  company  is 
wholly  without  w^agons  for  carrying  wounded.  The  number 
of  w^ounded  cannot  yet  be  determined,  but  it  will  exceed  1,000. 
During  the   night   I    will   remain   with   the    Third   ambulance 

company.  P , 

Chief  Sii}\(:;co)i  of  Division. 

The  work  of  the  division  surgeon  and  the  other  medical 
officers  continued  without  cessation  during  the  entire  night, 
and  yet  little  could  be  done  for  the  enemy's  wounded,  which 
remained  on  the  field.  Fortunately,  the  opponent  had  left 
some  surgeons  for  them  in  Neu-Rognitz  and  Burkersdorf 
when  he  retreated.  At  the  latter  place  these  were  assisted  by 
two  surgeons  who  had  kept  up  with  the  First  regiment.  The 
litter-bearers  were  kept  busy  for  several  hours  during  tlie 
night  searching  for  wounded. 


Studies  in  tiik  Leading  of  Troops.  ^^49 

Great  difficulty  was  encountered  when  it  came  to  trans- 
porting the  severely  wounded  to  the  nearest  field  hospital. 
For  instance,  400  wounded  had  to  be  sent  from  the  main  dress  - 
ing  station  at  the  northwestern  extremity  of  Alt-Rognitz  to 
Kriblitz  and  Trautenau.  The  21  wagons  on  hand  could  carry 
only  4  men  each,  a  total  of  84  men  for  one  trip ;  an  average 
of  2  hours  was  required  for  each  trip,  going  and  returning. 
The  first  transport  started  out  at  about  3  o'clock.  By  7  p.  m., 
therefore,  only  168  men  could  be  sent  to  the  field  hospitals, 
and  232  wounded  would  be  obliged  to  remain  out  of  doors 
without  sufficient  attention.  It  was  therefore  a  great  help 
when  many  more  wagons,  in  the  aggregate  about  50,  were 
requisitioned  by  supreme  efifort,  and  the  main  dressing  station 
was  thus  cleared  of  severely  wounded  before  darkness  set  in. 
When  practicable,  the  wagons  were  fitted  up  with  boards  and 
ropes  in  such  a  way  that  the  beds  of  the  patients  swung  back 
and  forth,  whereby  the  jolting  was  not  severely  felt. 

This,  in  brief,  outlines  the  work  of  the  Medical  Depart- 
ment on  the  battle-field  on  the  27th  of  June. 

Tke  General  Staff  Officer. 

While  the  division  commander  was  away  on  his  trip  to 
the  outposts,  the  general  stafl:*  officer,  in  Neu-Rognitz,  debat- 
ed whether  anything  further  could  be  attended  to.  The  nec- 
essary arrangements  for  ammunition  and  subsistence  had  been 
made.  In  view  of  the  great  distance  from  the  commissary 
wagons  and  the  baggage,  nothing  could  be  done  but  to  order 
the  use  of  the  emergency  ration.  If  the  commissary  wagons 
should  actually  arrive  at  midnight,  all  they  could  do  was  to 
renew  the  emergency  ration  consumed.  Wliat  was  further 
required  to  satisfy  immediate  wants  of  subsistence  and  forage 
ever  officer  had  received  authority  to  requisition  for  his  own 
command,  giving  receipts  therefor.  In  the  field  the  arrival 
of  subsistence  can  never  be  definitely  counted  on.  The  men's 
strength  must  be  restored.  It  is  better,  however,  that  the 
chief  quartermaster  of  the  division  should  authorize  requisi- 
tions. The  chief  quartermaster  had  indeed  consulted  the  gen- 
eral stafi:*  officer  (Major  X )   about  this,  but  immediately 

thereafter  went  av.-ay.     The  major  was  also  aware  that  pris- 


350  Studiks  in  tke  Leading,  of  Troops. 

oners  and  capture»!  horses  should  be  sent  to  Trautenau,  and 
that  wounded  men  had  been  directed  to  go  to  Trautenau  and 
KribHtz.  No  orders  had  been  issued  relative  to  brinc^ing  up 
the  heavy  baggage ;  indeed,  this  is  a  matter  that  is  f requently 
overlooked.     During  one  of  the  long  periods  of  the  general 

staff  officer's  absence,  however,   Lieutenant-General   A 

had,  in  good  season,  sent  back  an  order  directing  the  bag- 
gage to  follow  as  far  as  Parschnitz,  as  soon  as  the  Guard  had 
passed  through  the  mountain  defiles ;  also  at  the  close  of  the 
engagement  he  had  sent  orders  for  it  to  advance  to  Neu- 
Rognitz,  via  Trautenau.  However,  when  darkness  set  in,  the 
wagons  were  not  on  hand,  and  the  general  staff  officer  felt 
obliged  to  send  an  orderly  to  meet  the  heavy  baggage,  with 
directions  that  it  should  park  before  Neu-Rognitz,  west  of 
the  highway,  as  it  could  hardly  find  the  various  bodies  of 
troops  in  the  darkness  and  might  cause  disturbance. 

As  already  stated,  for  the  night  officers  and  men  derived 
no  benefit  from  the  heavy  baggage  ;  at  any  rate,  it  would  be 
on  hand  the  next  morning.  The  timely  ordering  up  of  bag- 
gage is  often  forgotten  in  war  and  in  peace,  or  at  least  attended 
to  rather  late.  Troops  judge  the  general  staff  officer  in  part  by 
his  work  in  this  direction,  as  it  so  materially  affects  their  condi- 
tion, and  it  is  recommended  rather  to  do  too  much  than  too 
little  as  regards  the  baggage.  A  general  staff  officer  will 
do  well  to  have  one  of  his  assistants  remind  him  of  this  meas- 
ure during  an  engagement. 

After  debating  on  these  points.  Major  X turned 

to  the  preparation  of  the  report  on  the  day's  events,  which  he 
just  finished  as  his  general  returned  (8:45  p.  m.).  After  the 
major  stated  what  he  had  done  with  regarxl  to  the  train  and 
what  measures  the  chief  quartermaster  had  adopted  for  sub- 
sistence, and  the  general  liad  signified  his  approval  of  these 
steps,  he  read  the  following  draft : 

Report  of  flic  Second  Infantry  Dk'isio)i  on   the  Eni^a^^cnioil 
Xcar  A'eu-Ro^i:^nitc,  June  J/,  i860. 

At  4  a.  111.,  June  27,  th.'  division.  accom])anied  by  the 
First  cavalry  brigade,  broke  l)iv(>nac  near  r>ertelsdorf  and 
Schömberg,  and  took  up  the  march  upon  Trautenau  (Exhibit 
.\  :  di vision  order  ). 


Studies  in  the  Leading  of  TroopS;  351 

At  6:30  a.  m.  the  point  reached  the  exit  of  the  tnoun- 
tain  defile  near  Parschnitz.  All  that  had  been  seen  of  the 
enemy  up  to  that  time  were  isolated  bodies  of  dragoons.  Pur- 
suant to  orders  from  corps  headquarters,  a  halt  was  made  at 
T^arschnitz.  The  First  infantry  division  had  not  yet  arrived, 
though  communication  had  been  maintained  with  it  by  patrols 
(Exhibits  B  and  C;  messages).     For  security  during  the  halt, 

Colonel   D occupied   the    defile    on    the    Liebau    road, 

nearly  three-quarters  of  a  mile  north  of  Trautenau,  with  7 
companies  of  infantry,  2  batteries,  and  i  squadron,  while 
Alajor-General  B crossed  the  Aupa  and  took  up  a  posi- 
tion on  the  heights  on  the  right  bank  with  4  battalions  of  the 
Third  brigade,  i  battery,  2i/<  squadrons,  and  the  engineer 
company.  A  company  of  infantry  and  a  platoon  of  hussars 
were  detached  in  the  Aupa  valley  toward  Raussnitz. 

At  8:30  a.  m.  a  message  was  received  from  the  left  flank 
detachment  (Exhibit  D),  stating  that  a  strong  hostile  column 
of  all  arms  was  marching  upon  Trautenau,  and  that  its  point 
was  not  far  from  Hohenbruck. 

Although  the  First  infantry  division  had  not  yet  arrived, 
it  seemed  necessary,  under  the  circumstances,  to  take  pos- 
session of  Trautenau  before  the  enemy  could  firmly  establish 
himself  there.  An  advance  upon  the  right  bank  of  the  Aupa 
against  the  flank  and  line  of  retreat  of  the  enemy  promised 
to  lead  most  quickl}^  to  the  objective,  and  the  main  body  of 
the  division  was  therefore  directed  to  cross  the  Aupa  near 
Parschnitz  and  advance  to  the  left  of  the  parts  of  the  Third 
brigade  which  were  already  there. 

At  9  a.  m.  a  hostile  battery  opened  fire  from  the  Hopfen 
Mountain;  this  fire  was  immediately  returned  by  three  of  our 
own  batteries.  In  consequence  of  the  turning  movement  which 
threatened  his  right  wing,  the  enemy  was  forced  to  abandon 
his  position  on  the  heights  south  of  Trautenau,  and  to  hur- 
riedly fall  back  upon  Neu-Rognitz.  The  Second  battalion  of 
the  First  regiment  of  infantry  became  involved  in  a  livelv 
skirmish  with  hostile  infantry  at  the  Kriblitz-  ravine.^ 

The  enemy,  whose  strength  was  at  first  estin'iated  at 
about  I  infantry  brigade,  4  b'ltterjes,  and  4  squadrons,  all  of 
the  Tenth  army  corps,  thereupon  occupied  the  woods  north 


352 


SlUDIKS   1\    THE   LlCADlXC   Ol-    Tkoops. 


of  Neu-Rogiiitz,  where  lie  prepared  for  defense.  As  a 
continuation  of  the  action  would,  however,  have  deflected  the 
army  corps  from  its  intended  march  upon  Arnau,  the  divis- 
ion was  again  temporarily  assembled,  on  the  heights  between 
Hohenbruck  and  Alt-Rognitz.  and  the  action  meanwhile  con- 
tinued by  artillery  (Exhibit  E:  division  order). 

At  1 1  130  a.  m.  his  excellency  the  corps  commander  ar- 
rived upon  the  heights  south  of  Trautenau,  and  as  the  First 
infantry  division  at  that  time  was  in  the  act  of  approaching 
the  town,  he  ordered  a  continuation  of  the  attack.  The  plan 
of  attack  was  to  firmly  hold  the  highway  against  the  enemy's 
front  and  at  the  same  time  turn  his  right  flank. 

For  this  purpose  the  Third  brigade  was  verbally  directed 
to  deploy  for  an  attack  against  the  hostile  front  near  Hohen- 
bruck and  east  of  the  highway.  The  Fourth  brigade  was 
instructed  to  advance  in  the  direction  of  the  church  of  St. 
Paul  and  St.  John,  its  left  wing  covered  by  Alt-Rognitz,  and 
followed  by  the  hussar  regiment  to  turn  toward  the  oppo- 
nent's flank.  The  First  regiment  of  artillery  was  ordered  to 
support  the  attack  from  Ridge  soo  (northwest  of  Alt-Rognitz), 
and  the  horse  battery  to  remain  in  action  on  die  Galgen  ]Moun- 
tain  until  the  arrival  of  the  Sixteenth  field  artillery  regiment, 
which  had  been  asked  for. 

In  view  of  the  threatened  flank  novement,  the  enemy,  who 
had  evidently  been  reinforced,  now  also  occupied  the  woods 
south  of  the  wagon-road,  between  Alt-Rognitz  and  Neu- 
i^ognitz.  and  pushed  skirmidiers  forward  into  the  the  de- 
pressions and  low  meadows  in  front  of  his  position. 

As  soon  as  the  Fourth  brigade  had  completed  its  march, 

Major-General  P> advanced  to  the  attack  with  the  Third 

brigade  from  Hohenbruck  and  the  region  east  of  it.  This 
movement  involved  the  First  regiment  (which  was  on  the 
fight  wing)  in  a  prolonged,  bloody  fight,  in  which  a  hostile 
countei -attack  was  only  successfully  repulsed  by  the  P'irst 
cavalry  brigade  and  the  horse  battery.  | 

Shortly  after  i  p.  m.  the  hostile  artillery,  which  had 
taken  position  with  T  battery  to  the  west  and  3  or  4  to  the 
east  of  the  main  road,  was  subdued  by  our  artillery,  the  Six- 
teenth field  artillery  regiment  having  joined  in  the  fire  from 
the  G.ilcren  Mountain. 


I 


Studies  in  the;  Li^ading  of  Troops.  353 

About  the  same  time  the  Fourth  brigade  had  begun  its 
attack  from  Alt-Roguitz,  thereby  effecting  a  united  attack 
by  the  division. 

While  the  Third  brigade  was  successful  in  penetrating 
the  strongly  occupied  thickets  northeast  of  Neu-Rognitz  and 
even  gaining  ground  there  and  in  the  village  itself,  the  attack 
of  the  2  battalions  of  the  Third  regiment  on  the  left  wing 
of  the  Fourth  brigade  miscarried.  These  troops  were  met 
with  a  cross-fire  from  the  village  and  the  thickets  to  its  south, 
while  fresh  hostile  forces  appeared  on  their  flank  and  the  en- 
emy's artillery  again  took  part.  In  spite  of  its  heroic  eflfort 
to  advance,  the  left  wing  of  the  brigade  fell  back  with  heavy 

losses.     Major-General  C and  Colonel   F were 

wounded  in  that  action.  Hostile  cavalry  threatened  to  attack 
the  retreating  forces,  but  their  attempt  was  abandoned  when 
the  hussar  regiment  hurried  up. 

The  right  wing  of  the  brigade  in  the  meantime  resolutely 
continued  the  attack,  and  supported  the  overthrown  battal- 
ions so  efficiently  that  they  were  able  to  take  part  in  the  at- 
tack anew. 

I  went  to  the  left  wing  in  person  and   restored  order. 

Major  Z took  provisional  command  of  the  brigade,  as 

Colonel  G had  been  killed. 

While  the  Third  brigade  was  gradually  gaining  com- 
plete possession  of  Neu-Rognitz  and  the  woods  west  of  it, 
the  entire  Fourth  brigade,  including  its  left  wing,  undertook 
a  fresh  attack  on  the  woods  at  the  wagon-road,  from  which 
they  succeeded  in  driving  the  opponent.  Strong  hostile  re- 
serves, however,  still  held  the  chain  of  woods  southeast  of 
Neu-Rognitz,  also  the  heights  toward  Burkersdorf  on  both 
sides  of  the  highway.  An  attack  upon  this  position  was  de- 
ferred for  the  time  being,  as  meanwhile  a  message  had  been 
received  (Exhibit  F),  stating  that  the  First  infantry  division 
of  the  Guard  was  advancing  via  Rudersdorf  and  Staudenz. 
Under  pressure  of  their  advance,  about  4  p.  m.  the  enemy 
evacuated  his  last  position,  and  under  cover  of  strong  masses 
of  artillery  and  cavalry  withdrew  upon  Deutsch-Praussnitz 
and  Kaile,  which  villages  his  rear  guard  held  for  some 
time.  A  battalion  of  the  First  regiment  advanced  to  Burkers- 
dorf and  occupied  that  village,  while  the  artillery  kept  up  a 


354  SruDiiiS  IN  TMK  Lkading  of  Troops. 

fire  on  the  retreating  forces  from  the  heights  north  of  Btirk- 
ersdorf.  Under  the  protection  of  the  hussar  regiment,  \yhich 
had  been  led  south  of  Burkersdorf,  outposts  were  estabHshed 
on  the  hne  Ober-Altenbuch-Burkersdorf-Staudenz. 

The  main  body  went  into  bivouac  around  Neu-Rognitz. 

The  losses  cannot  yet  be  ascertained,  but  certainly  exceed 
2,000  men.     Unfortunately,  in  addition  to  the  above-mentioned 

officers.  Colonel  E ,  commander  of  the  Second  infantry 

regiment,  is  severely  wounded.  The  losses  on  the  side  of 
the  enemy  appear  to  be  considerable ;  several  hundred  pris- 
oners (not  wounded)  are  in  our  hands.  The  opponent  seems 
to  consist  of  the  Tenth  army  corps  and  a  cavalry  division. 

Lieutenant-General    A gave    his    approval    to   this 

draft.  As  the  clerks  had  not  yet  arrived,  it  was  handed  to 
one  of  the  aids  to  be  copied. 

The  division  surgeon's  report,  which  had  been  made  in 
pursuance  of  Field  Service  Regulations  for  the  Medical  De- 
partment, had  in  the  meantime  arrived  (this  report  has  al- 
ready been  given),  and  gave  assurance  that  everything  possi- 
ble had  been  done  in  that  direction. 

As  the  promised  orders  from  corps  headquarters  were 
yet  to  come  in  during  the  night  and  would  probably  call  the 
entire  staff  to  perform  some  new  duties,  shortly  after  10 
o'clock  the  general  dismissed  his  officers,  who  at  once  sought 
out  resting-places. 

COMMKNTS   ON    THK    DIVISION    RkPORT. 

We  have  quoted  the  division  report  verbatim.  As  far  as 
practicable,  such  reports  must  be  prepared  by  every  body  of 
troops  on  the  same  day  in  which  the  action  occurs.  They 
furnish  not  only  the  materials  for  the  later  historical  account, 
but  are  the  source  of  all  experiences  which,  gained  through 
heavy  sacrifices,  serve  to  regulate  the  tactical  training  of 
troops  in  time  of  i)eace.  They  are  also  needed  in  substantiat- 
ing claims  for  distinction  and  rewards,  as  well  as  for  other 
purposes  of  research,  and  especially  for  refuting  accusations 
or  clearing  up  various  questions  in  dispute. 


I 


Studies  in  the  Leading  oi?  Troops.  355 

Reports  written  immediately  after  the  occurrence  of  events 
bear  the  surest  stamp  of  truth,  forming  a  permanent  frame- 
work for  such  detailed  narratives  as  may  be  called  for  later. 
When  these  reports  are  put  ofif,  memory  will  step  in  and  play 
some  most  remarkable  tricks,  so  that  even  the  most  honest 
intention  to  describe  only  what  actually  took  place  will  be 
entangled  with  rare  pictures  that  our  own  fancy  has  built  up. 
After  the  battle-field'  has  been  left,  human  imagination  meas- 
ures time  and  space  with  entirely  different  standards  than 
when  the  battle  has  just  ended;  minutes  of  restless  waiting 
under  a  hot  fire  are  remembered  as  hours,  while  a  long  period 
of  uninterrupted  activity  and  excitement  seems  only  a  brief 
moment. 

The  main  points  to  be  sought  in  such  reports  are  cor- 
rectness, brevity,  and  explicitness.  It  is  advisable  to  state 
only  what  one  has  seen  in  person  jr  learned  through  mem- 
bers of  his  staff'.  Unsuccessful  phases  of  the  fignt  must  not 
be  omitted,  but  acknowledged  openly,  as  was  done  in  this  case 
with  the  attack  of  the  2  battalions  of  the  Third  regiment  of 
infantry.  Silence  on  such  points  is  useless,  for  they  are  sure 
to  be  rumored,  and  this  will  most  certainly  call  into  question 
the  truthfulness  of  the  one  who  makes  the  report.  Care  should 
be  taken  that  exact  statements  of  losses  are  not  given  out 
immediately  after  an  engagement;  only  guesses  can  be  made 
on  these  points,  as  well  as  on  the  intentions  and  strength  of  the 
enemy.  The  statement  of  the  exact  time  is  also  an  important 
item,  although  time  can  generally  be  correctly  recorded  only 
in  the  higher  staffs,  where  an  officer  may  be  specially  charged 
with  such  a  duty ;  when  with  troops  we  do  well  if  we  can  pull 
out  a  watch  as  the  first  cannon-shot  is  fired  or  as  the  engage- 
ment comes  to  an  end. 

It  is  equally  advisable  to  quote  word  for  w^ord  all  orders 
received  or  given  when  they  are  of  especial  importance,  else 
many  differences  of  opinion  may  arise  in  the  course  of  events 
which  it  will  be  no  easy  task  to  clear  up. 

Often,  too,  troops  are  praised  after  the  most  exalted  fash- 
ion. For  instance,  it  will  be  stated,  "The  regiment  stormed  the 
position  with  unprecedented  bravery,"  while  afterwards  it  will 
be  seen  that  only  10  or  20  men  were  lost  in  driving  off  the 
enemy,  or  that  the  position  had  been  actually  occupied  only  by 


356  Studies  in  thk  Leading  or  Troops. 

a  few  hostile  companies.  History  is  bound  to  bring  real  facts 
to  light,  to  the  dissolution  of  all  halos  of  glory  received  in  this 
manner.  History  does  not  need  these  voluntary  exaggera- 
tions ;  its  business  is  to  explain  things,  and  the  expert  will  be 
far  more  impressed  by  a  simple  statement  of  facts  than  by 
grand  words  of  commendation. 

The  same  care  that  is  needed  in  the  preparation  of  re- 
ports should  also  be  exercised  in  keeping  diaries.  Here  too 
we  insist  that  entries  be  actually  made  daily,  for  if  we  wait 
to  do  this  on  days  of  leisure,  queer  errors  are  apt  to  creep 
in.  We  remember  once  having  looked  through  an  old  diary 
in  which  the  thirty-first  day  of  June  came  in  for  special  re- 
mark. There  are  no  rules  that  can  be  given  for  keeping  dia- 
ries. But  it  is  certain  that  if  all  the  entries  they  contain  dwell 
on  the  conditions  of  quarters  or  quote  the  names  of  sore-back 
horses,  such  records  will  be  useless. 

Exact  data  collected  later  showed  that  the  loss  sustained 
by  the  division  was  as  follows : 

Dead 20  officers,        285  men,       57  horses. 

Wounded 8t  officers,     1,771   men,       59  horses. 

Missing officers,  91  men,       19  horses. 

Total igt  officers,     2,147  men,     135  horses. 

The  heaviest  sufferer  was  the  Third  regiment  of  infantry, 
having  lost  37  officers  and  873  men ;  which  goes  to  show  that 
the  following  lesson  taught  by  Drill  Regulations  was  well 
learned :  "The  soldier  must  press  steadily  on  in  the  advance, 
and  not  halt  without  orders,  be  the  losses  ever  so  great  and 
the  fire  ever  so  destructive,  for  retreat  leads  to  annihilation." 

Course  oe  Events  with   the  Enemy. 

Tn  conclusion,  it  may  be  of  interest  to  learn  something 
about  the  enemy  as  facts  became  known  later  through  pub- 
lished reports  and  historical  accounts. 

According  to  these,  on  June  26  the  Tenth  corps  with  i 
brigade  of  the  First  reserve  cavalry  division,  all  belonging 
to  the  southern  armv,  were  in  scattered  quarters  around  Kön- 
iginhof, chieflv  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe.     The  First  bri- 


Studies  in  the  Leadinx.  of  Troops,  '{\67 

gade,  consisting  of  8  battalions,  3  squadrons,  and  3  batteries, 
had  been  pushed  forward  to  Deutsch-Praussnitz.  In  addi- 
tion to  these,  the  Second  dragoon  regiment  watched  the  fron- 
tier near  Trautenau. 

When  the  presence  of  the  First  corps  of  the  Prussian 
army  near  Schömberg  and  Liebau  became  known  at  head- 
quarters, the  Tenth  army  corps  received  orders  to  advance 
early  on  June  27  to  Trautenau,  and  oppose  the  crossing  of 
the  frontier  by  the  enemy. 

In  pursuance  of  this,  soon  after  8  o'clock  the  First  bri- 
gade arrived  near  Trautenau,  but  found  the  enemy's  point 
already  near  Parschnitz.  The  considerable  superiority  of  the 
latter  permitted  him  to  cross  the  Aupa  there  and  turn  against 
the  brigade's  flank.  In  order  not  to  enter  into  an  action  alone, 
it  withdrew  in  time  from  the  threatened  turning  movement, 
and  went  back  into  the  position  of  Neu-Rognitz.  Here  the 
First  battalion  of  riflemen  occupied  the  woods  west  of  the 
highway,  and  the  First  regiment  held  the  woods  along  the 
highway  and  also  the  little  woods  northeast  of  the  village. 
The  Second  battalion  of  riflemen  remained  behind  it  in 
reserve.  One  battalion  of  the  Second  regiment  was  sent 
into  the  thickets  at  the  wagon-road  leading  to  Alt-Rognitz, 
to  cover  the  right  flank,  the  two  other  battalions  remaining 
at  the  southern  exit  of  Neu-Rognitz  as  reserve  and  at  the 
disposition  of  the  brigade  commander.  At  the  latter  point 
the  Third  squadron  of  the  uhlan  regiment  was  also  posted. 
The  regiment  of  dragoons  examined  the  country  toward  Rud- 
ersdorf and  Eypel.  The  batteries  went  into  position  east  of 
Neu-Rognitz,  being  later  reinforced  by  a  horse  battery  which 
came  up  with  the  cavalry  brigade  and  took  position  near 
Sorge. 

The  Prussian  army  gave  the  brigade  ample  time  to  estab- 
lish itself  in  its  position.'  The  attack  did  not  commence  until 
I  p.  m.,  and  was  first  directed  against  the  front. 

When,  however,  the  turning  movement  by  the  Prussians' 
left  wing  was  later  discovered,  the  brigade  commander  re- 
inforced the  battalion  of  the  Second  regiment  in  the  thickets 
near  the  wagon-road  with  another  battalion  of  the  regiment. 
The  last  battalion  of  the  reserve  was  directed  by  the  division 
commander    (who  had  arrived  in  the  meantime)   to   occupy 


358  Studies  in  Tiit;  Leading  of  Troops. 

Ncii-Koi^iiitz,  as  the  Second  brigade  was  approaching  the 
battle-field  on  its  way  from  Königinhof.  The  Second  battal- 
ion of  riflemen  was  brought  u]^  to  the  advanced  line. 

At  the  same  time  reports  were  received  from  the  dragoons 
that  new  strong  columns  of  the  enemy  weie  advancing  from 
the  north  upon  Rudcrsdorf.  and  an  order  was  sent  to  the 
Second  brigade  to  send  t  regiment,  with  i  battery,  to  the 
heights  of  the  old  quarry,  for  the  support  of  the  extreme  right 
wing,  but  to  leave  the  other  regiment,  with  the  Third  bat- 
talion of  riflemen,  continue  their  march  to  Neu-Rognitz. 

In  the  meantime  Prussians  had  considerably  reinforced 
their  artillery,  and  compelled  the  3  batteries  east  of  Xeu- 
Kognitz  to  withdraw.  Soon  afterwards  the  infantry  attack 
followed  along  the  whole  line.  On  the  right  wing  it  was  vic- 
toriously repulsed,  where  the  uhlan  regiment  was  participat- 
ing. On  the  other  hand,  the  opponent  succeeded  in  penetrat- 
ing the  woods  north  and  northeast  of  Neu-Rognitz,  and  short- 
ly afterwards  entered  the  village  itself,  while  a  counter-attack 
started  by  the  First  and  Second  battalions  of  riflemen  and  a 
battalion  of  the  First  regiment  had  been  repulsed. 

The  commanding  general  was  now  forced  to  consider 
whether  he  had  best  attempt  to  restore  the  action  by  putting 
in  his  reserves;  the  moment  appeared  propitious  for  this. 

Various  reports  of  the  approach  of  new  hostile  masses, 
however,  convinced  him  that  a  momentary  success  could  only 
make  the  general  situation  still  worse.  He  already  knew  that 
he  had  been  opposed  by  one  entire  division,  and  the  columns 
of  another  advancing  via  Hohenbruck  west  of  the  highway 
could  be  distinctly  seen.  The  presence  of  such  strong  hos- 
tile artillery,  which  was  finally  joined  b>  njw  batteries  from 
the  direction  of  Trautenau.  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the  en- 
tire l?russian  First  army  corps  was  assembling. 

lUit,  in  addition  to  this,  reports  had  come  in  of  the  ad- 
vance of  new  masses  via  Rudersdorf,  while  it  w^as  simultane- 
ously learned  that  columns  were  ai)proaching  from  the  east 
in  the  Kypel  defile. 

Against  these  forces,  which  were  estimated  at  two  army 
corf)s,  only  15  battalions  were  disposable:  the  2  brigades  of 
the  corps  and  the  c{)rj)s  artillery  were  only  coming  up  to 
Deutsch- Traussnitz,  their  start  havint>  been  delaved  on  account 


Studies  in  thi;  Li^ading  of  Troops.  359 

of  the  great  distances  between  the  various  quarters  in  which 
they  had  been  sheltered  upon  the  right  bank  of  the  Elbe. 

It  therefore  seemed  best  to  break  off  the  action  while 
yet  possible,  in  order  to  avoid  a  threatened  turning  of  the 
flank,  and  to  unite  the  entire  corps  for  the  present  in  a  posi- 
tion south  of  Deutsch-Praussnitz-Kaile,  where  it  could  cover 
the  roads  leading  to  the  Elbe  and  could  expect  reinforcements 
the  following  day. 

Under  the  protection  of  the  artillery,  increased  to  6  bat- 
teries, which  went  into  action  southwest  of  Neu-Rognitz,  as 
well  as  the  3  battalions  of  the  Second  brigade,  which  now 
occupied  the  heights  of  Burkersdorf,  the  troops  of  the  First 
brigade  were  successfully  withdrawn  from  the  action  and  put 
in  march  upon  Deutsch-Praussnitz.  The  right  flank  was  se- 
cured by  the  3  remaining  battalions  of  the  Second  brigade 
and  I  battery,  who  had  yet  to  continue  a  slight  engagement 
with  bodies  of  the  Guard  north  of  Staudenz. 

The  Second  brigade  was  supported  in  the  plain  by  the 
cavalry  united  there,  consisting  of  the  First  brigade  of  the 
First  reserve  cavalry  division,  3  squadrons  of  uhlans,  4  squad- 
rons of  dragoons  (in  all,  19  squadrons),  and  6  batteries. 

Large  forces  of  the  enemy  pursued  only  as  far  as 
Burkersdorf. 

The  losses  were  1,670  men  dead  and  wounded  and  650 
prisoners.  A  considerable  number  of  the  wounded  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

It  is  seen  from  this  account  that  the  Second  infantry 
division  was  engaged,  in  the  main,  against  only  8  battalions, 
7  squadrons,  and  4  batteries,  reinforced  at  the  last  moment 
by  7  battalions,  12  squadrons,  and  3  batteries,  and  that  in  the 
course  of  the  engagement  its  losses  were  very  heavy- 


GLOSSARY  FOR  USE  WITH  MAPS. 


Abth.  (Abtheilung).     Battalion  of  artillery. 
alter  Steinbruch.    Old  quarry. 
Avantgarde.    Advance  guard. 

A.  W.    Sentry  guard. 

B.  (Berg).    Mountain. 
bei.    To. 

C.  V.  C.    Company  as  outpost  support. 
Capelle.    Chapel. 

D.  B.  (Br.)  T.  (Tr.).    Division  bridge  train. 

D.  T.  (Tel.)  A.  (Abth.).    Signal  corps  detachment. 

Die  Höhen  sind  in  preuss.  Decimal  Füssen  25  dec.=9.4  m.  The 

heights  are  in  Prussian  4^cimal  feet  (2^  ft.^=p.4  meters). 
diesseitiger  Truppen.    Prussian  forces. 
Entsendet.     Detached. 
Esc.    Escdr.    Escadron.    Squadron. 
F.  L.  (Laz.).    Field  hospital. 
T.W.    Picket. 
Fahrweg.     Wagon-road. 
Feld  Art.    Field  artillery. 
gegen.    Toward. 

geschlossene  Abtheilungen.    Troops  in  close  order. 
Grenze.    Boundary. 
Hainwiese.    Wooded  meadow. 
Jäger.    Riflemen. 
Kirche  St.  Pauli  und  Johann.     Church  of  St.  Paul  and  St. 

John. 
Kirchhöfe.    Churchyard. 
Komm.  General.    Corps  commander. 
Marschkolonne.     Columns  of  march. 
n.  (nach).    To. 
nördl.  Fussweg.    Northern  foot-path. 

361 


302  Glossary.  \ 

ohne.    Less. 

P.  (Pi.)  C.    Engineer  company. 

Rechte  Seit.  Deckung.    Right  ßunk  cover. 

reit,  (reitende)  Battr.    Horse  battery. 

Rothe  Sandflur.    Red  sand-bed. 

S.  U.  P.     Detached  A' on-coni  mission  cd  officer's  post. 

San.  Det.    Ambulance  company. 

Schäferei.     Sheep-fold. 

Schkicht.    Ravine. 

Schützenlinien.     Skirmish  lines. 

sichtbare  Aufstellung  des  Feindes.    Perceptible  position  of  the 

enemy. 
Spitze  des  Gros.    Head  of  the  main  body. 
Steinbruch.     Quarry. 
südl.  Fussweg.    Southern  foot-path. 
u.    And. 

U.  P.     N on-commissioned  officer  s  post. 
Ueber.     Via. 
V.  Gr.     Outpost  reserve. 
von.    Prom. 

Vorp.  Cav.  in  Ställen.    Outpost  cavalry  in  stables. 
Wäldchen.    Little  woods. 
Z.  (Zg.)  (Zug)  Hus.    Hussar  troop. 
Z.  S.  D.    Ambulance  company  section. 


^\ 


i 


FLAK  I. 

ORGANIZATION 

OF  THE 

D. INFANTRY  DIVISION  AND    1st  .CAVALRY  BRIGADE. 


Commander:     Lieutenant  General  A. 
General  Staff  Officer:     Major  X. 

4tb  lafanlry  Brigade.  3d  Infantry  Brigade, 

Major  General  C.  .Major  General  B. 

3d  Inf.  Regt.  Col.  P.  1st  Inf.  Regt.  Col.  D. 

3d  Bn.         2d  Bn.         1st  Bn.  3d  Bn.         2d  Bn.         1st  Bn. 

I  SBBHMH     ■■■■■■■     gmumi  '■■■■■■i     ■■■■■■     ■■■■■■I 

4th  Inf.  Hegt.  Col.  G.  2d  Inf.  Regt.  Col.  E. 

Bn.         2d  Bn.         1st  Bn.  3d  Bn.         2d  B.         1st  Bn. 

1st  Hussar  Regt. 

Lieut.  CoU  H. 

1st  Field  Artillery  Regt. 

Lieut.  Col.  J. 
2d  Bn.  1st  Bd. 

ß  5  4  3  2 

|ll|tl|M|H|l  »||t||l|l»(»«|M|«  »ImImIi«]!!!!!!!  l|«.|«<|M(l.||l|t  •|m(«|)||(||(||||  ||m)|  l|M|t  l|t  t{l 

1st  Co.  1st  Bo.  Engineers  (with  Division  Brfdge  Train). 

Sig.  Corps  Det.  Ambulance  Co. 


I 


Ist  Cavalry  Brigade 

Major  General  L. 
Ut Uhlans,  Col.  N.  lit  Cuirasrvicrs.  Lieut.  Col.  M. 

1st  Horse  Battery,  1st  Field  Artillery  Regt. 
•|i  «h  ^|•  •(•  «I»  «li 


petach^d:    2d  Uhlan  Regiment  to  1st  Infantry  Division. 
Temporarily  Attached (o2d  Injantry  Division:    2d  Field  Hospital. 


Map.  I.     Camp  of  Second  Infantry  Division  on  June  26 


LAGE 

derll-lnfanterie-Division 
ani26-Juni 

Fried  land/ 


Dtsck  Hernejsdorf 


loftuiii'v  E  S   tttdrraSohn  Berbi,  (l(oc>,.tr  G8\7l) 


l-.tHustvWilkGri 


Map  II.     Rendezvous  of  the  Second  Infantry  Division  at  Parschnitz. 

vVerdy-t.GossIr-.Truppennihnmg  1,1. 

RAST 

der2-lnfanterie-Division  bei   \^    moiu 

den27'?JuM8ühr40Miii.fra 

'iumnufUiof\    .^WMmIIi^ 


Vm^iKjl  KotVchhv  E  S  MoüsrlSok  Berlm  (K.ct>»trl> 


l>di  Instv  Wi!K  CTem.  Berlin 


Map.  I.     Camp  of  Second  Infantry  Division  on  June  26. 


LAGE 

derD-Infanterie-Division 
ani26-Juni 


.AiüSLge  1. 


llth  InstvlVukKreve    Btriin. 


Map  II.     Rendezvous  of  the  Seeoad  Infantry  Division  at  Parschnitz. 


iiLvVerdy-vGossIer  Trufpenruhnml 


Anlage  IV. 


RAST  -..  I 

der2-lnfanterie-Division  bei   %^    u <;//..  | 

den  27H?  Juni  8  Uhr  40  Mm  früh  ^ 


D 


Humnuthol  \ 


IfM  i|\\: 


vÄ*^ 


-4-' 


Vnli^dl^HolWHiv  ES  MaderiSohn  BerUi,  (Koch.b- b8\71) 


liA  InnvWIkGreve.  Be; 


Map  III-     Position  of  the  Second  Infantry  Division  at  9.60  A.  M. 

Zn    vVcr^vGoislerlruppiniuliruiig   Heft  H 


FORMATION 


der  2^^"  Jnfantene  Divisio<( 


Hohenbiuck  ^ 


Verlag  .1  K^Hoibudii,  v.f  S  l/TitiJ.,!  a  i;ihr..,i1ciliti  ■Jv<idi8ti--68\71.) 


LidJlwi-vWilliUrevi-,  Berlin 


Map  IV.     Position  of  the  Second  Infantry  Division  at  11.30  A.  M. 


.  Verdy-v.  Gossler,  Studien  I.  3. 


Gefechtsplan  I 

LAGE 

der  2!£  lafaDterie-Dimion 

mn  11  Uhr  30  Minuten  Vormittags. 


Verlag l-KJlHafbuoKLvESMittler  j.  Soini.Bfrlmlkiirhsi.r  b8/7J 


Entsendet: 

u  •    iir  ,u  .      i    '■'■  Comp.  Rgt.  A'o.  i 
be,    Welhota    ;      ,^^  ^^  ^   £,^^ 

_  .  i    /  Etcadron  der 

Gegen  Arnau   {  ^   CavaUrri,-Brig. 

LitK  h\EUt<a  v  TOK  lirsvj  Bwl. 


Dil- Hähm  sind  in preutsSaimai Fassen    ?5''««'-9a 


Map  V.     State  o!  the  Pight  at  12.45  P  M. 


Jes  GefecMs  der  lis,  Infanterie -Dimion 


1„  Uhr  45  MinutPD  Nachmittags. 


VnU|i  K(LEiin<itULTCSKinln  i.  SabLBnlmObcluu  «1^11 


BU.  Ush^  tu,i  In 


^erdy  \    Gossler  Studien  I  3 


Map  VI      State  of  the  Fight  at  1  45  P  M 


STAND 

des  Gerecbts  der  2ü  InfaQterie-DiTisioD 

1  iJhr  45  Minuten  Nachmittags. 


VerUf  ä  K^Hofbuchh-x  ESJtttlfr  u  Soto-BrrlmlKbckstr  68/711 


Schtitienhmen 
J       *  geschlo':sme  Abtheüungen  iüssaliger  Truppen. 
I  Marschkolonne 
_  sichtbare  Aufstellung  des  Feindes. 

Entsendet: 
(   2  EiCadron  der 
Gegen  Arnau  j  ^    CavatUru-Brig. 


LiÜL Iii£titui  T  VfiFK  Orere  Berlm 


J) it  Hohm  sind  mprmss.ßtämal Füssen   aÄ^^-ftv* 


Map  VII      Bivouac  and  Outposts  of  the  Second  Infantry  Division 
on  the  Evening  of  June  27. 

Biwaks  und  Vorposten -Aufstellung  der  2""  Infanterie -Division 

über  Truppenfuhrung  I    4  am    Abend  dos  21    Juni 


3 


-    F. 


—^  Hol 


^Si^ 


"^      _,/" 


i-l«Sd.KjlHiifbMUL7lS.Minlir  j.  Suhl  Berlin  (Kbelutr,  tihW 


Zu    V   Veid\        Gossler    Müden  über  Truppenfuhrung 


Map  VII.     Bivouac  and  Outpoats  of  the  Second  Infantry  Division 
on  the  Evening  of  June  27- 

Biwaks  und  Vorposten- Auf steUung  der  2«"  Infanterie -Divisicn 

am  Abtnd  do»    7    Juni 


tU{l.K<lBrfhuliLTES.«ittl.t  1.  SitojMlmlKbclvnr.  88^1 


GENERAL  LIBRARY- U.C.  BERKELEY 

liiiiiin 


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